

# **JOURNAL**

OF THE

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**INDEX**

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
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# Journal of the United Service Institution of India



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
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Lt.-General Sir Henry E. ap Rhys Pryce, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., I.A.,  
Master-General of the Ordnance in India.



## FOR REFERENCE

Not to be taken out

# The Journal

OF THE

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*The views expressed in this Journal are in no sense official, and the opinions of contributors in their published articles are not necessarily those of the Council of the Institution.*

### EDITORIAL

In spite of the efforts made by the League during the summer of 1935 to avert war, Italy refused to be turned aside from her object and on the 3rd October commenced operations against Abyssinia without a formal declaration of war. It is not proposed to give a detailed account of the progress of these operations. Enough has appeared in the Press, not only to interest all students of the situation, but to mystify them thoroughly as to what is really the true state of affairs.

After a practically unopposed Italian advance to Makale in the North, and to a short distance into Ogaden in the South, there has been little movement on either front for some time.

The original Italian Commander-in-Chief, General de Bono, apparently hoped to gain his object by the employment of mechanized forces to as great an extent as possible, coupled with a definite road-building programme. Considerable friction was reported between the various Italian Commanders in the field, a parallel to the Adowa Campaign, and, finally, General de Bono was superseded by Marshal Badoglio, the Italian Chief of the General Staff.

It appears that the Italians have relied on mechanization to a greater extent than is warranted by the nature of the country, and that Marshal Badoglio has been forced to halt, not only partially to convert his transport system from a mechanized to a pack basis, but also to clear the country behind, and on the flanks of his advancing columns. It is unlikely, in view of the difficulties on the L. of C.

that a further general advance will be possible in the near future. The time factor operates against the Italians, who hope to gain as much ground as possible before the spring rains; and in favour of the Abyssinians, who need time in which to organise and equip their forces with the munitions that are now allowed to be imported. There are signs that the Abyssinians are already adopting a more aggressive attitude, and the next few weeks should be more fruitful of events.

It is not the local situation in Abyssinia, however, that is the chief object of world interest at the moment, but the efforts of the League and of its leading members to bring the war to a close. On October 12th fifty-one out of fifty-four nations voted in favour of the application of sanctions. The date on which these were introduced was the 18th November, and it was decided to place an embargo on the supply of certain raw materials and key products to Italy. Considerable protest was made by Italy, but the action of the League has not yet had time to have any marked effect upon her actions.

A "Sanction" is the name which legal writers give to measures for securing obedience to the law. These may consist of either (a) moral, (b) diplomatic, (c) financial, (d) economic, or (e) military measures. Of these, only the economic and military measures are likely to be really effective. In view of possible reprisals by the nation against which the latter are applied, and in consequence in this case, the almost certain disturbance of the peace of Europe, if not of the world, it is necessary to avoid military sanctions except in the last resort. The danger is that economic sanctions, if applied really stringently, may lead to military sanctions. It is this danger that politicians fear, and this is the cause of the hesitation to apply restrictions on the supply of oil to Italy.

It is probable that this is also the cause of the desperate efforts that have been made by certain politicians to find an alternative solution acceptable to all parties. The main principles on which what may be termed the Paris proposals were based are:—

- (a) Exchanges of territory advantageous to both Italy and Abyssinia.
  - (b) League assistance to Abyssinia for the purpose of social and economic development.
  - (c) Special facilities for Italian settlers and companies in connection with this economic development.
- •       •

In answer to the severe criticisms levelled from many quarters it has been stated that these proposals are a basis of discussion only and before being brought into force must be acceptable, not only to the League, but to Italy and Abyssinia as well.

Whilst it is not possible to foretell the reactions of Italy and the League, Abyssinia has already expressed her disapproval. From her point of view this is understandable. She does not see why a country which has been deemed the aggressor and is acting in defiance of the veto of the League and who, up to the present, has not achieved any real military success, should be given considerable territorial gains at the expense of a fellow member of the League. In the words of the Ethiopian Minister in France "If there is any question of handing over territory to Italy, we shall fight on until no Abyssinian is left alive rather than yield of our own free will to the aggressor."

The Italian point of view may still be taken to be that expressed in an article in the *Popolo d'Italia* of July 31st: "The essential arguments absolutely unanswerable are two, the vital needs of the Italian people and their security in East Africa..... The solution of the problem can only be totalitarian. Any action of expansion or any protectorate must be accompanied by military measures. Italy is the only judge of her security in East Africa. Put in military terms, the Italo-Abyssinian problem is simplicity and logic itself. The problem admits of only one solution, with Geneva, without Geneva, or against Geneva."

Such being the case, and unless Italy has undergone a change of heart, any arbitration between the two countries would seem to be of no avail. The most surprising thing is that Italy has still remained a Member of the League, whilst challenging its authority.

It is impossible to see what the final reaction of Italy to the sanctions will be, but the future cannot be described as hopeful. The prospect of a complete collapse of Italy due to economic pressure, or the disintegration of the League as a possible result of its failure to achieve any result in the present dispute, are factors which, to put it mildly, would tend to increase the feeling of insecurity in Europe.

\* \* \* \* \*

The Naval Conference. The Naval Conference which met in London on December 9th to review and, if possible, revise the existing ratios in the size of the fleets of the leading naval powers, is not likely to conclude its deliberations for some time. Previous

attempts to discuss the problem have hitherto met with little success, as none of the Powers has been prepared to sacrifice any of their principles in order to reach a common ground of agreement.

From previous discussions, and from what has appeared in the Press up-to-date, it is evident that Japan, with her demand for parity with the British Empire and the United States, is likely to prove the greatest obstacle to agreement. Her demand for parity and for a quantitative reduction in the size of fleets is based on the theory that "The equal strength of all navies will afford security as the attacking side will always be at a disadvantage."

It is difficult to see the force of this reasoning, as a nation whose territorial interests are limited to the Western Pacific can not have the same naval problems as one whose interests are world-wide. The effect of parity with the British Empire would mean that, in the Far East, at any rate, Japan would have an overwhelming superiority. It is possible that Japan is considering only her policy of penetration in China, and is afraid of anything that would prevent her having the free hand she desires.

It is fortunate that agreement has already been reached between England and Germany, and that we are in close accord with France.

Whilst any plan that would result in a cessation of competitive naval building would be welcomed, recent events have shown more clearly than at any time since the end of the Great War, that the British Empire needs a sufficient and well equipped navy if its interests are to be safeguarded. It is to be hoped that any solution found will not prevent the deficiencies in this respect from being made good.

\* \* \* \* \*

The disturbances in the Mohmand country, which were mentioned in the October 1935 number of this Journal, led to a decision to extend the motor road from Yusuf Khel over the Nahakki Pass into Kamalai-Halimzai territory. The Nahakki Pass was captured without difficulty and with very little opposition, but subsequent operations on the 29th September resulted in heavy casualties in the Nowshera Brigade, especially in the Guides.

The losses inflicted on the enemy on that occasion seem to have been the final effort that was needed to enforce submission, and on

October 1st the Mohmand *Jirga* came in. On October 14th an agreement was signed by which the Mohmands agreed :—

- (a) That the motor road to the Nahakki Plain should be completed without interference.
- (b) That they would be responsible for maintaining friendly relations, and for the action of all outlaws and bad characters against Government or the friends of Government.
- (c) That Government was to be freed from the restrictions imposed by the Ghalanai agreement of 1933.
- (d) In the event of failure to observe these terms, Government to take such action as was necessary.

In return, and in consideration for the number of casualties inflicted, Government decided to impose no fines and to take no hostages. The road to the Nahakki Plain was completed on October 28th, and by the beginning of November all troops had returned to their peace stations.

The situation in the Hazara District was restored comparatively quickly, and a show of force was all that was required to disperse a demonstration of tribesmen who have never been noted for their martial qualities.

The Mohmand operations necessitated the employment of four infantry brigades together with a large amount of artillery and other troops and No. 1 Group, R. A. F. It is to be hoped that the Mohmands will respect the recently concluded agreement better than they did that of 1933. It is doubtful though if the Upper Mohmands will ever be really pacified until such time as a road policy similar to that in Waziristan has been completed.

\* \* \* \* \*

## FIELD MARSHAL SIR PHILIP CHETWODE.

*(A slight sketch)*

"I followed power to the last,  
 Gave her my best and Power followed Me.  
 It's worth it—on my soul I'm speaking plain,  
 Here by the claret glasses, it's worth it all.  
 I gave—no matter what I gave—I win.  
 I *know* I win. Mine's work, good work that lives!"

*Kipling.*

It is probably as unfair to use these rather bombastic lines as a heading to an article on Sir Philip Chetwode as it was for Kipling to put them into the mouth of the late Lord Dufferin. And yet, although it is inconceivable that the late Commander-in-Chief in India ever consciously followed Power, it is undeniable that Power followed him and that he can, if he chooses, declare in equally unmeasured terms that his work in India will live. But, that is the last thing he will ever do. In the Victorian era Empire builders suffered from no illusions or inhibitions regarding their labours and were gratified to see their splendid exploits advertised in verse or song; it took a great war and victory to teach Englishmen to hide their heads in confused modesty.

When one of the lesser known Greek philosophers stated that a man's destiny was to be found in his character he possibly had in mind such a man as Sir Philip Chetwode. For when one surveys the career of a young man, who in 1889 joined the 19th Hussars from the militia, and finished his active service last November as a Field Marshal, one of the greatest Commanders-in-Chief that India has ever had, the secret of his success must lie necessarily in the fundamental springs of his character, tradition and upbringing.

Sir Philip was wont to admit that he owed his success in some measure to the education or training he received in the Cavalry arm, which gave him a certain independence and width of outlook. These qualities he certainly has, but it is a moot point if he would have utilised them so advantageously for the Empire if behind them were not that driving character and clearheaded personality.

Of his early years in his regiment, both at home and in India, there is no record, and we may suppose that he followed the traditional pursuits of his contemporaries, polo, racing and shooting. Indeed Sir Philip himself tells the sad story of his racing career brought to an expensive conclusion when it was discovered that his head jockey was in the pay of bookmakers.

Then in the South African War which threw up a select coterie of cavalry leaders all destined later for greater things, Sir Philip was in Ladysmith and lived on horse flesh. After the relief he and a brother officer went to Durban and celebrated their release with lobster mayonnaise and other delicacies. That gastronomical experiment nearly killed him, but may have, for all we know, laid the foundations of his celebrated culinary knowledge.

From 1906 until 1908 Sir Philip was Assistant Military Secretary to General French, then G. O. C.-in-Chief, Aldershot, and it is not unlikely that these few precious years mark the first big stepping-stone of his military career. He got command of his regiment when only forty years of age, and five years later was a Brigadier-General earmarked for the Expeditionary Force.

Of his war services it is unnecessary to write here except to mention in passing their extraordinary variety. The Retreat from Mons with the 5th Cavalry Brigade, followed by command of the 2nd Cavalry Division and promotion to General rank. Then Egypt and Palestine in various high commands (culminating in the command of the corps which took Beer Sheba and Jerusalem) concluding the war as a Lieut.-General commanding an Army Corps. These years of active service brought him several honours and awards, and of these one which gave him great pleasure was an invitation to consider himself a member of "I. Z." for having kept his wicket intact.

Then followed several years of unrelenting toil at the War Office. First as Military Secretary when much of the work of demobilisation of officers and their reposting fell on his shoulders; then a spell as Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff with Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson as his Chief. Two years more as Adjutant-General, and eventually Aldershot reclaimed him as General Officer Commanding-in-Chief.

When Sir Philip Chetwode came to India in 1928 as Chief of the General Staff it was a foregone conclusion that he would be the next

Commander-in-Chief, and his appointment to that post, the most responsible military command in the Empire, occasioned no surprise.

It is too early yet to appraise his work in India or to place it in its historical perspective. Every year, every month, almost every week produced its major problem until latterly the Field Marshal was in the habit of asking his staff officers; "Well, what's to-day's bombshell?" No problem was too big, no question affecting the training, equipment or health of the forces in India too complicated to daunt him. Indeed, the more difficult the task, the more obstacles to its fulfilment confronted, the more "Oriental delays" encountered, the more did the Field Marshal enjoy its pursuit.

When one looks back on those past five years some idea of the amount of work done can be gained.

We might first of all cast our minds back to the various field operations, particularly those on the North West Frontier. In 1932 and in 1934 the tribesmen tried to interfere with the biennial reliefs to Chitral necessitating military and Air Force action. In 1933 also, 12,000 tribesmen entered Khost in Afghanistan and a serious situation was only averted by the success of the Army in preventing a further exodus and taking measures which secured the return of those who had already crossed the border.

These annual operations, for so long accepted as a necessary evil, were at last recognised as a waste of lives, time and money—if some effort were not made to deal more quickly in future with hostile tribes by crushing incipient rebellion, and it was during Sir Philip's tenure of office that it became axiomatic that every expedition should leave a road (if even a few miles) behind it. Thus in 1933 twenty miles of road were built in the Gandab Valley. In the spring of last year a Brigade with the Royal Air Force assisted the political authorities to re-establish authority in the Loe Agra Salient, and the troops built a road through the hills, and last summer the Gandab road was extended over the Nahakki Pass. Time will show the military and civilising value of these roads, and the credit for them is shared between the Governor of the N. W. F. Province and Field Marshal Sir Philip Chetwode who loyally supported him.

Whilst the covering troops and field army were thus engaged, Internal Security units had their own less pleasant duties. The activities of the Red Shirts in the N. W. F. Province; nearly twelve months of armed rebellion in Burma; terrorism in Bengal; serious

situations in the Indian States of Kashmir and Alwar; bloody communal riots in Cawnpore and Bombay; a massacre narrowly averted in Karachi. All these called for military intervention, and the Chief, watching these grim happenings anxiously and carefully, never interfered with the "man on the spot" but gave him wholeheartedly his support, confidence and backing.

It has been said that "G" work was Sir Philip's especial favourite, and to a certain extent this is true if it means that he waxed more enthusiastically over questions of training than he did over drains. But there are files in every branch of A. H. Q., dealing with every imaginable subject, which bear the impress of his clear brain and rapid grasp of the pith of "the matter under reference." His knowledge, for instance, of Ceremonial Drill was as detailed as his conception of how an officer's bungalow should be constructed. He took a deep interest in the welfare of British troops in the East and introduced several reforms which will add to their comfort and well-being.

These are all minor points when compared with the two major problems which were in the foreground throughout his whole tenure of office, Indianisation and Economy. Increased Indianisation of the forces in India was one of the foremost demands made by the delegates at the various Round Table Conferences. The logic of the demand in the new Constitution is impeccable, and Sir Philip was confronted with the unenviable task of satisfying legitimate political aspirations so far as it seems possible to go at present without imperilling the efficiency of the services. He himself would say it now rests with Indians to prove that it can be carried further.

Giving every encouragement, personally and officially, to the birth and growth of the Indian Military Academy at Dehra Dun, he set his face sternly against any forensic political pressure in the legislatures until each step had been tested, each rung surmounted. At the same time he faithfully carried out the Indianising policy of the Government of India and the Home authorities and, in place of the eight-unit scheme, threw open to Indians all the different branches of the services, including Engineer, Artillery and Air. He has called upon India to train and produce the officers required for the number of units equivalent to a Cavalry Brigade and a Division, with the proper complement of staffs, services and departments. Naturally enough in such a great experiment he met with opposition.

of diverse character; from "Diehards" and traditionists of the old school who oppose all reform whether constitutional or unconstitutional; from Indian politicians who appear to imagine that Major-Generals are born and not made in the most rigorous school of service. Between these antagonising opinions the Chief steered a serene, steady course, as ready to whip the obstructionists as he was to lash the extremists. Above all he ensured that real sympathy and encouragement should be given to this great adventure and did everything possible by personal endeavour and personal touch to guarantee its success. The Academy at Dehra Dun, which he loved to visit, pays eloquent testimony to the reality of his purpose.

When the great depression set in and rigid economy in all services was the order of the day, the Indian Defence Budget was the special target of politico-economical criticism. Determined to maintain efficiency and at the same time to give practical support at a time of unparalleled financial difficulty the Chief, assisted loyally by all his officers, reduced the Military Budget by seven millions sterling. This entailed a large reduction in mobilisation stores and equipment, the hardship of a 10 *per cent.* cut in pay and the postponement of many measures of modernisation dear to his heart. And yet, despite the shortage of money and the preoccupation with riots on our border and within our compound it is no exaggeration to say that the Defence services have weathered the storm at any rate for the time, and that the efficiency of the officers and men of the Army in India is as high as ever it has been.

Apart from his service activities Sir Philip had other public duties no less exacting and onerous than his purely military affairs. As a Member of the Council of State he had on occasions to deliver public pronouncements on Defence matters which were statements of Government's policy, although generally expressed in characteristic straightforward terms which came—sometimes—as a shock to his more verbose audience. As a Member of the Viceroy's Executive Council the Field Marshal was closely associated with all the large questions of policy, both inside and outside the Defence sphere. It is an open secret that his ripe wisdom and sane judgment on matters, even those outside and unrelated to Defence, carried great weight with his colleagues.

This concludes a rather hurried and totally inadequate sketch of Sir Philip Chetwode's career. If it makes the reader ask what

is the equipment of a man who can look back without misgiving on a record of such multifarious achievement, one can only quote the words recently written about him in the "Observer."

"An unrivalled mastery of his own profession, a flair for selecting and concentrating on the essentials in every problem, a readiness to take quick decisions and, on occasion to depart from the orthodox course—these are the attributes of a big man; and Sir Philip possesses them in abundance."

Finally, those privileged to know Sir Philip Chetwode as a friend (and he spent his life making friends) will always remember his infectious good humour, his gift for lucid and forcible expression, his complete absence of "side," his friendliness, his generosity and his charm. Those who served him received a liberal education in the arts of soldiering and living.

## THE DIFFICULT ROAD

By "M. C. K."

Many interesting articles have been written during the last few years describing journeys by road between India and England and every year more cars set out to follow the projected line of the international highway that the A. A. has planned to link London with Calcutta. Some people avoid the difficult portions of this road by railing or shipping the car, but by doing so they increase their expenditure and sacrifice some of the most interesting and lesser known parts of the route for comfortable but monotonous journeys by train or ship.

Last March, two rather old and dilapidated cars containing five army officers, left India and arrived in Syria three weeks later. The occupants were determined to be in England for Jubilee week, but had set out to see as much as possible during the trip without spending more than the equivalent of a second class fare from Bombay to London. We had been given vivid accounts of the difficulties to be encountered in Turkey and these became more alarming as the distance to that country decreased. In Beirut the only advice obtained was to embark on a Messagerie or Lloyd Triestino in order to avoid Anatolia, but we wished to see this country where Cook's tours are unknown and where the new Turkey can be seen rising from the historic surroundings and primitive conditions of Asia Minor. After we had found out the Steamship Companies' fares and investigated the state of our own finances, we decided that our wish would have to be fulfilled.

A short description of the journey through Turkey at a time when weather conditions were unfavourable, may help some intending travellers with the route and prevent them "running out" when they approach the greatest obstacle.

Arriving in an unknown foreign country always produces a feeling of adventure and subdued excitement. One is conscious of being a guest and possibly unwelcome and one realises that information, advice or help may be difficult to obtain. Although this was the fourth frontier we had come to during our trip, the feeling of suspense was even greater than when we left India three weeks before and

entered Iran at the unattractive village of Mirjawa. We knew that Turkish roads were bad, but the disused and grass covered track leading North from Alexandretta seemed appalling after the excellent roads of Syria. We had been told that we might expect rain during April which would increase our difficulties and all we could see of Turkey, across the Bay of Iskanderun, was a range of forbidding looking hills banked up with dense clouds. But our greatest anxieties were that none of us spoke Turkish and that we had been unable to obtain a map of Anatolia.

A few miles from Alexandretta we were delayed for a considerable period at the Syrian frontier post while an official examined our baggage and passports.

Half a mile further on we could see the small building of the Turkish post but, before we could reach it, we were stopped by a zealous sentry. It appeared that the frontier was one hundred yards south of the building and was marked by a large stone lying by the track and the sentry. He seemed to be prepared to use his bayonet if we proceeded and appeared to have selected our radiator as a vital-looking spot. We produced our passports and pointed out our international driving plates but he remained immovable. However, when we invited him to inspect the numerous and complicated car papers he acknowledged defeat and escorted us to the building to obtain assistance.

A young officer, who spoke a little French, gave us a charming welcome to Turkey, dealt with our passports and took us to the railway station where our luggage was examined. An interested crowd immediately collected, but we were now used to such audiences and they were only too willing to assist unloading our baggage. They showed great interest in the car and while they talked we frequently recognised the words "chuma chok" (deep mud), they would then indicate a level to show to what depth they expected we would sink. The most pessimistic appeared to think that our radiator cap might not be covered when we ploughed through the softest portions. When we left the Customs there still remained an hour of daylight in which to cover the ten miles to Dortyol. We bumped along a stony and muddy track, threading our way between large masses of rock and clumps of bushes. When about a mile short of Dortyol we came to a swiftly flowing river and, not wishing to attempt the crossing in darkness, we camped on the bank for the night. Early next morning, with the

assistance of the usual crowd that collected from nowhere, we carried our heavy kit across, waded into the ice cold water to clear away some of the largest boulders and, after about two hours, succeeded in bringing both cars over without any damage.

The police in Dortyol were very helpful and we were lucky in finding a man who spoke a little French. He was able to point out the track leading to Djehan, the next village, thirty-nine miles away. It took us nine hours to cover this distance. There had been some rain a few days before and the road was not metalled but consisted of soft, "black cotton" soil. It passed through cultivated areas and sometimes a farmer had increased the size of a field by extending his ploughing over the road. Often the track disappeared completely and we were forced to retrace our way for some miles. There were also several unbridged streams which had to be reconnoitred as the fords were ill-defined and not always suitable for motors.

The country was beautiful and appeared to be very fertile. When not under cultivation a profusion of wild flowers covered the hills, and old ruined castles overlooked the railway line which was the only sign of civilization. Once, when we were close to the line and discussing whether we should drive the cars along the track, the Taurus express passed and the Wagons Lits, with neat tables set for lunch, looked strangely out of place.

The soldiers and village people in Djehan showed us every kindness and hospitality and again the crowd never left us, taking a great interest especially when we were washing, shaving or eating our meals. The so-called hotel provided a bare room, but water was hard to obtain and sanitary arrangements were non-existent. We had our meals in a small eating house nearby.

The next day, continuing through the same type of country, we were only able to cover nineteen miles during the first three hours. We arrived at Adana early in the afternoon, but cashing a travellers cheque at the Bank was a long business and we were delayed for over two hours. At last we managed to buy a map. It was a kindergarten affair, very highly coloured and with inter-provincial boundaries but not very much other detail. We noticed that we were on a first class road and had already crossed the Taurus mountains! We camped for the night one mile beyond Tarsus, having covered sixty-four miles through some of the most beautiful country we had seen.

From Tarsus we climbed up towards the massive range of the Taurus and the road improved. The scenery was magnificent. Pine trees, blossoms and wild flowers covered the hillsides and deep gorges ran down from the snow-covered mountains. We had to buy some petrol at Bozanti and were charged about four shillings and sixpence per gallon. After Bozanti we passed through the Cilician Gates, and suddenly the great Taurus range was behind us and it was impossible to pick out the pass in the mountains where the road had come through. We were now on the central plateau and could see the enormous mass of Mt. Argaeus standing up about fifty miles to the north. From Bozanti to Uli Kishla must be familiar to many British prisoners of war in Turkey who worked on the construction of the railway and maintenance of the road, or marched through on their way to concentration camps. We had a quaint meal in a shop at Nigde and continued for another ten miles, camping for the night after a day's run of one hundred miles.

Rain began at midnight and lying in our valises we tried to persuade ourselves that it was only a light shower. When we experienced that uncomfortable feeling of water running down our necks we bundled bedding, stores and cooking utensils into the cars and struggled into our clothes. Very cold and horribly wet we drove off hoping to reach a better road before the condition of the present one became impassable. The road was atrocious. Deep ruts filled with water were responsible for much pushing and spade work and often the car ploughed along crab fashion with the rear wheels in different ruts to the front pair.

The rain stopped and at daylight we came to an unknown village where we changed our clothes and drank numerous glasses of hot tea. The cafe proprietor soon had a stove nearly red-hot and the male population collected and showed a friendly interest. After our enforced early start we decided to try and reach Ankara that evening. We felt confident that the road must improve as we approached the capital, but conditions became worse and we spent the night in a filthy lodging house at Kushire instead of a modern hotel in Ankara.

The next morning we were early on the road and imagined that we would be in Ankara for lunch. From the top of the hill near Kushire we could see that the surface of the road appeared to change a few miles further on. We thought that all our troubles were now

over and slithered down the greasy hill only to meet a fresh difficulty. Many tons of loose stones had been spread over the road and the surface had been badly cut up by heavy lorries—the ruts were far too deep for our cars and it was impossible to avoid them. After about one hundred yards the leading car came to rest in a hole where some lorry had sunk axle deep, but only our running boards were damaged. We dug a way out and, although the ground alongside was soft and greasy, we continued across country and for the rest of the morning ignored the highway. We reached Bala that evening and once again spent a night under squalid conditions.

On the morning of our seventh day in Turkey we were still fifty miles from Ankara and were now experienced enough to know that we might take as long as two days to cover this distance. However, with our well known cry of "Ankara for lunch," we set off. It had snowed during the night and we were very short of petrol owing to continual low gear work. A gallant attempt of our Ford to run on paraffin was not a success, and we were stranded in a village for two hours while the Chevrolet went ahead with only one gallon of petrol in the tank. The villagers brought us glasses of tea and refused to accept any payment. As soon as we finished drinking more appeared and we did not like to refuse. They seemed to think we were inveterate tea tipplers, but the local supply of this beverage was saved by the arrival of a lorry which sold us a tin of petrol.

Early that afternoon we slid down a mountain road deep in mud, past groves of fruit trees in full blossom and entered the city of Ankara. Only then, for the first time since leaving Alexandretta, were we on a modern tarred road.

The phenomenal development of Ankara has occurred in the last ten years. Nearly all the buildings are of the ultra-modern style of architecture, but the flowing lines and rounded corners appear meaningless when crowded together. When a building stands in an open space—and there are many open spaces in Ankara—it is often very impressive. The Military Staff Headquarters, Ismet Institute and the Sergievi are the most striking.

Modern Ankara was created after the treaty of Lausanne in 1923 to take upon itself the dignity of a capital, and it owes its selection to its strategic position and historic association. It is far from ports and manufacturing areas and, as the cost of transport

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is high and there is very little competition, prices of goods are excessive. There are two thoroughly Europeanized hotels, but the rates are enormous and the bill contains a staggering list of extras however simply one has attempted to live.

A rocky hill with a precipitous North face dominates the valley. The old citadel stands on the summit and appears to have been built at a time of great emergency, for its walls contain many fragments of statues, broken columns and stones bearing Greek and Hittite inscriptions. The old town stretches down the Southern and Western slopes of the hill to the modern city and the open plain beyond.

There is a road from Ankara direct to Haider Pasha and Scutari but, as it passes through the Ismid military zone, it cannot be used without special permission. We had been told in Ankara that transit *visas* were seldom given and could not be obtained at short notice. Accordingly we had to take the road through Eskeshire and Bursa to Mudania on the sea of Marmora.

We left Ankara early one morning. The tarmac road extended for about four miles and then changed to a metalled surface full of pot holes. At Estimut railway station, about ten miles out, we were directed on the wrong road to Polati. We did not realise that it was a short cut only possible in fine weather, so that when rain and sleet appeared we struggled on, pushing, digging and becoming plastered with mud. Chains on the wheels were of no assistance and only held the clay which formed a solid mass between the mud-guards, wheels and under-carriage. This was too much for our engine and we had to work our way under the car and free the wheels every few miles.

Late in the afternoon we returned to Estimut and only then discovered that we had been on the wrong road. Two hours later we reached the village of Ayas with our speedometer reading a day trip of seventy-three miles but we could still see the lights of Ankara about twenty miles away. From Ayas to Beybazari there are some fair stretches of road in the hills where stone is easily obtained, but there is no solid foundation so the surface is quickly cut up into ruts which are a serious obstacle to the average touring car. The motor traffic in Anatolia consists almost entirely of Ford and Chevrolet lorries; touring cars are seldom seen except in the large towns. We only passed one car between Alexandretta and Ankara, and that

contained a party of English botanists who had landed at Mersin and were making their way to the region round Lake Van.

We were delayed in Beybazari for two days when the Chevrolet broke its differential. We lived for this period in a bleak room above a stable in a building which called itself an hotel, taking our meals in a small restaurant. A newly killed lamb hung in the corner and did not make our usual dish of garlic flavoured stew, bread and "yougourt" any more appetising. We spent many hours in the local cafe where the entire male population assembled in the evenings to drink coffee or, more often, small glasses of very sweet tea.

One of the methods of awakening national consciousness is the display, in all public rooms, of posters showing important episodes of the past. The usual set consists of a rather badly drawn picture of the British fleet which appears to be charging a fort on Gallipoli, a view depicting Turkish women working on the lines of communication through the Taurus, and Turkish cavalry chasing the Greek army into the sea. There is always a picture of Kamal Ataturk looking very ferocious, but arrayed in full evening dress.

During our stay in Beybazari we made many firm friends and, but for the assistance of the local chemist, hotel proprietor and Singer sewing machine agent, we would have been delayed in this out of the way village for several days longer. We were advised to take a guide for the next part of the journey and the man our friends selected to accompany us proved invaluable.

From Bozanti to Eskeshire is a cross-country journey of about one hundred miles over tracks, fields and hills. We averaged about nine miles per hour and were fortunate in having dry weather so that we only stuck twice. After a hurried meal in Eskeshire we continued through lovely country but over awful roads to Yenishere. We knew that there were only three boats from Mudania during the week, so decided to continue in case there was one sailing the next day for Istanbul. It was now about one o'clock in the morning, but when we saw a well-patronised cafe we could not resist stopping for a few minutes to drink a glass of tea. Our sudden entrance at this early hour and our weird appearance in poshteens and "caps comforter" roused a certain amount of suspicion. We were not actually detained until we reached the next village which was being patrolled by soldiers. We gathered that travelling by night was not

allowed, and in any case we could not proceed without seeing their officer who was in bed and could not be disturbed.

When we insisted on an immediate interview they took us to a cafe and ordered glasses of tea for us all, preparing to spend the remainder of the night in a friendly manner. We sent the most persistent and talkative member of our party to the officer's house armed with all our passports and he succeeded in making it clear that we had no time to waste.

We reached Bursa at daybreak after twenty-two hours on the road. The hotel was comfortable and possessed a bath-room, but the supply of hot water was very limited. We learnt that there was no boat from Mudania that day but that arrangements could be made to ship the cars from Yalova. After a short rest we set out on the last stage of our journey in Asia. This sixty miles was through beautiful country and the view from the hills above Gemlik, which takes in both the sea of Marmora and the snow-covered mountains near Bursa, made us forget our hurry to reach Europe.

Yalova is an attractive town, and during the summer excursion boats bring many people from Istanbul. We bargained with several ruffians, one of whom spoke a little Urdu, and we were assisted by the local dairy shop proprietor who had spent several years in America. On receiving thirty-five Turkish pounds they contracted to land both our cars at Istanbul that evening. It was not until we had paid the money that we were allowed to see how precarious the transport arrangements were. With great difficulty we loaded the cars on to a thirty-foot fishing boat, but as there was no deck we had to build up a platform amid-ships. There was a serious list to port and we were making a great deal of water. An antiquated oil engine was coaxed into life and, as the evening set in, we chugged across the Gulf of Ismid to the twinkling lights of Istanbul.

It was pleasant to be in Europe surrounded with modern luxuries and comforts, but Constantinople would be a disappointment to those who were out there immediately after the war. We spent some time sightseeing, but objected to the large crowds from cruising ships which were being herded round the town. But we concealed our annoyance when we were swept up with a large party from a German liner and carried into the mosque of St. Sofia without paying. Returning to our hotel we found that the British Empire representatives of an International Womens' Congress had arrived and in the evening

we were the only men in a large and crowded dining room. We decided to leave early next morning.

The road to Erdine can be classified as first class for the first few miles and then deteriorates into a bumpy track. Our leading car passed the police post at the outskirts of Istanbul and the sentry then came to life and stopped the second car. Climbing on the running board he gave chase, and eventually we all returned to the post where extracts from our passports were copied out and the details on the first page were verified item by item. A recent law had made family names obligatory but the officials were perplexed until we admitted being Monsieurs Gerald, Edward and William.

We were now in a military zone and had to carry a soldier for the next twenty miles. The road runs close to the sea and a considerable amount of work was being done on it, necessitating us driving on the grass alongside. Turning inland to Chorlu we again met the vague track that we now regarded as typical of a Turkish main road. Fortunately there had been no rain and we were able to keep up a good speed over rolling country very like Salisbury Plain. Erdine is a melancholy town and we camped outside, descending on Madame Marie's hotel in the morning for a wash and breakfast. We were provided with saucers of warm water and a truly continental breakfast for which we paid a high price.

Eleven miles from Erdine we came to the frontier and completed our Customs formalities in about half an hour. After much handshaking we drove into Bulgaria and were sorry to leave the country where we had experienced nothing but courtesy and friendliness during our thousand miles journey, and where the scenery is some of the most beautiful in the world.

## THE BRITISH ORDERLY ROOM

By "ISLWYN."

A well organized and efficiently run Orderly Room is an important factor in the general efficiency of the unit as a whole. That this essential efficiency is often missing (but due to no fault of the unit) is a fact sometimes brought clearly to light, and often discussed.

The necessity for constant maintenance of a high standard of efficiency in the Orderly Room does present a problem. Much more so in the case of units which recruit from certain areas, *e.g.*, South Wales and the North of England where the vast majority of men are coal miners or manual labourers in some form or other. To find suitable clerks from this material must then be the exception rather than the rule.

The constant turnover in the British Army of to-day is also a factor which retards the attainment of a high standard. Take, for example, a soldier with two years' service, perhaps even more, taken into the Orderly Room for the first time. By the time he becomes reasonably well trained and capable of carrying out any task in the Orderly Room, his remaining service as a trained clerk is limited. The necessity therefore for a high standard of ability in the Orderly Room Sergeant is clear. He must have a thorough knowledge of regulations, office organization and all branches of clerical work. His efficiency commands respect and increases the standard of knowledge in his subordinate clerks.

Having examined the method of obtaining clerks for the Orderly Room and having decided that the most important essential is a first class Orderly Room Sergeant, let us consider how he is to be obtained.

The Adjutant, faced with the necessity for finding an Orderly Room Sergeant owing to a casualty, looks through the qualifications of all his N. C. Os. Failing to find an N. C. O. of real clerical ability, as is only too often the case, he takes the one who appears to be the most intelligent. The disadvantages of this system, if it can be so called, are obvious. The Orderly Room fails to get its efficient Orderly Room Sergeant and the Company probably loses a first class

N. C. O. Furthermore, the N. C. O. is taken away from his legitimate work and, when he again returns to it, finds he has lost touch.

The entirely different conditions obtaining in India from those at Home and Colonial stations are, without doubt, a considerable handicap to the Orderly Room Sergeant. This is particularly so during the first few years of a British unit's tour in India. The vast number of new regulations and books confuse him (it is probably no exaggeration to say they are never really understood by many) and it takes him a long time to shake down to the changed conditions.

His knowledge of the staff and its various branches is vague and this lack of understanding adds considerably to his work, and no doubt to that of the staff also.

The writer has endeavoured to show clearly the difficulties which militate against a high standard of efficiency in the Orderly Room, and now suggests a remedy which would not only bring about the desired effect, but would effect it at no great expense.

Units have at present attached to them an Ordnance Armourer. Why not, in the same manner, attach a trained clerk in the Orderly Room to replace the Orderly Room Sergeant? The latter is every whit as much a "technical expert" as the former.

Where are these clerks to come from?

The R. A. S. C. (Clerks Section) for units at Home and in Colonial stations, and the I. A. C. C. for units in India, are the suggested sources of provision. Trained clerks of these Corps would do a tour of duty of, say, four or five years with a British unit. After completion of their tour of duty they would return to the Staff and be replaced by another trained clerk of the same Corps. By trained clerk is meant one who has had at least "A" and "G" experience.

The interchange of units between stations under the Imperial Government and India should be no obstacle to the scheme. The R. A. S. C. Orderly Room Sergeant would take over from date of disembarkation, and *vice versa*.

The advantages of the scheme are many. A closer understanding would be brought about between units and the Staff, to the benefit of both. The services of a staff clerk would be invaluable to the C. O. and the Adjutant in many ways, while the company organization would not be interfered with by the need to provide the Orderly

Room Sergeant. Furthermore, the attached Orderly Room Sergeant could, in addition to training his own subordinate clerks, put all company clerks through a course in the afternoons or evenings. Not only would this tend to improve the company office but it would also enable the Orderly Room Sergeant to keep note of the clerical ability of men in companies and to earmark potential clerks to replace casualties in the Orderly Room staff.

The actual cost of such a scheme would, it is thought, be by no means prohibitive. The increase in the strength of the R. A. S. C., and I. A. C. C., would be set off by the decrease of one N. C. O. in each unit. In regard to pay; as Orderly Room Sergeants are already in receipt of tradesmen's rates there should be little or no increase under this head at Imperial stations. There is, however, in India a difference between tradesmen's rates and that of the I. A. C. C. Pensions of course would be slightly increased by the normally longer service of the staff clerk and, in India, by the addition of the Indian element.

Such a scheme already obtains in the Royal Artillery which has its own clerical section. The Royal Artillery need not therefore necessarily come into this scheme, but the existence of such a system in the R. A., is mentioned as it does lend still greater force to the contention that something on the same lines is required for all units.

# KING GEORGE'S ROYAL INDIAN MILITARY SCHOOLS

BY CAPTAIN T. H. L. STEBBING, M.C., M.A., A.E.C.

(*Commandant, K. G. R. I. M. School, Jullundur*)

Speaking at Jullundur, in the Punjab, on February 25th, 1922, to a large and representative assembly of pensioned Indian officers and soldiers, H. R. H. the Prince of Wales said: "Many Indian soldiers have pleaded for better educational facilities for their children. Their plea reached the ear of my father, the King-Emperor, who commanded that the moneys of the King-Emperor's Patriotic Fund should be devoted to building special schools for the sons of Indian soldiers, and that these should be called the King George's Royal Indian Military Schools. It is my privilege to lay the foundation stone of these Schools to-day."

Such was the definite approach to materialization of a project formulated at Army Headquarters, India, in the early months of 1920. The scheme had been steered through the various difficulties of ways and means by the Directorate of Military Training who had recognized the urgent need in India for institutions which might, whilst serving the purpose of two similar schools for soldiers' children in the United Kingdom, at the same time, produce for the Indian Army soldiers whose early environment would especially fit them to become intelligent leaders of a rapidly changing Army.

The original intention in the foundation of the King George's Royal Indian Military Schools was to provide institutions in which the Indian officers and men of the Regular Indian Army might find a means of obtaining for their sons, at a cost which was within their limited means, the type of education which would enable a boy to find a suitable career in his father's regiment or corps. Difficulties consequent upon the necessarily long absence of a father from home: the Indian mother's natural reluctance to part with her children, the extremely sporadic nature of the Indian system of elementary education—the majority of isolated villages in the great recruiting areas having no schools whatsoever—together with a general suspicion on the part of the martial classes for the intelligentsia of village life: all militated against the Indian soldier's son obtaining an education which was fitted to the new demands of the Army. A more intelligent class of recruit was required who should be capable

of understanding the changed methods of warfare which had marched with the progress of civilization and science.

Apart from domestic hindrances, few Indian soldiers could afford to send their children, even if it had been desirable, to the better organized and more advanced schools in the larger towns and cities of the provinces.

Funds, however, were not easy to raise. The years immediately after the War were not those in which to inaugurate expensive philanthropic schemes of which the immediate cost outweighed any potential value in the economic scale. Every rupee was precious to a Government whose financial dangers were daily emphasized in a succession of committees for retrenchment and economy.

Yet, the future of the soldiers' son was secured, to an extent little expected, by help from a source which was deeply interested in the welfare of the Indian Empire. Late in 1920 His Majesty the King-Emperor commanded that the whole of the King-Emperor's Patriotic Fund should be appropriated to the provision of suitable schools for soldiers' children. This Fund, which was at the personal disposal of His Majesty, had been started in July, 1918, and consisted of gifts from the ruling princes of India to Their Majesties on the occasion of their silver wedding. It was at first decided that the Fund should be known as the King-Emperor's Patriotic Fund, and that it should be invested and its income devoted to the relief of Indian sufferers with claims, based on the war, which are not covered by any other fund in existence or which may only come to light when such funds have been finally closed. In 1920 the Fund contained approximately ten lakhs of rupees.

The personal intervention of His Majesty at a stage when the claims of economy in public finance were paramount saved the situation, and the laying of the foundation stone at Jullundur by the heir to the Throne in 1922 set the seal on a project which has made the education of her soldiers' sons an especial care of the Indian Empire, whose troops had rendered such signal service in the world struggle of recent years.

Progress was of necessity slow, since, even though the capital expenditure had been provided by the King-Emperor, recurring charges had to be accepted in the Army Budget. It was not until September 15th, 1925, that the Schools of Jhelum and Jullundur were able to open the doors of a partially constructed institution to

their first pupils. The School at Jullundur—to which this article particularly applies, though the School at Jhelum and, later, that at Ajmer, are organized on identically the same lines—began with thirty-four pupils.

At the outset the Schools were controlled by one superintendent, Colonel O. H. Radford, whose enthusiasm and keenness had already left its stamp on the Army School of Education at Belgaum. A Commandant who was an officer of the Army Educational Corps, and a staff of specially selected Indian officers and non-commissioned officers, comprised the initial administrative and teaching personnel of each School. In 1927 the difficulties of the administration of the two Schools by one superintendent were realized and, as a measure of economy, the post of superintendent was abolished; but not before Colonel Radford had been able to infuse both Schools with that characteristic spirit which had marked his spade-work at Belgaum.

To be eligible for nomination a boy has to have certain qualifications which, except for physical, educational and age limits have not changed since the inception of the Schools. In order to maintain regimental interest and connection, boys are required to be nominated by units of the Indian Army to whom vacancies are allotted by enlisted classes in proportion to their requirements. Selection rests with the Commanding Officers, whose nomination implies a unit's agreement to accept its candidate at the conclusion of his school career. Preference is given (though, of course, this is now a diminishing need) to boys whose parents have been killed or suffered subsequently from injuries received in the Great War. Definite medical standards are insisted upon, and in the case of serving personnel a parent must have at least ten years' service before his son is eligible for nomination.

The idea lying behind the original scheme was that after five years in the School—a boy was then admitted at the age of ten—the boy should be given a short period in which he could renew his interests in village life. (It must not be forgotten that the Indian Army is recruited chiefly from the Zemindar (yeoman) class whose land connection and continuity are inseparably bound up with the economic interests of India.) The intention was, then, that the boy would enlist when sixteen and a half to seventeen years old and follow the normal training of the average recruit. But, before the conclusion of the first five years of the Schools' existence, it was

obvious that much of the good which had been achieved by five years' routine of healthy school life and discipline might be nullified by a return to domestic conditions likely to counteract any advantages already gained, whilst the opportunities for a boy to continue his education would be comparatively negligible. There was, in addition, the danger from undesirable influences which might be brought to bear on the boy's life and outlook at an age when he was most susceptible. Consequently, in 1930, it was decided to raise the age of admission to the Schools to twelve—with its corresponding civil educational qualification—and to retain a boy in the School for the normal course of five years or until such time as he attained the necessary physical standards for direct enrolment in the Army.

During the Schools' early years the main object of the syllabus was to provide an education up to the conclusion of the primary stage of the Punjab Civil Educational Code. This may be considered as approximating roughly to Standard III of the English Board of Education Elementary system. It must here be remembered that, on admission to the Schools, a large number of boys were practically illiterate. Later the standard of the syllabus was raised to the equivalent of the Punjab Middle School or Vernacular final examination, which corresponds approximately to a stage slightly beyond the conclusion of the English Primary system. However, it was soon realized that, if the boys of K. G. R. I. M. Schools were to be able to compete with their confrères from the civil world, the standard of their attainments must be again raised to keep progress level with the equivalent product of local schools. Especially was this necessary if boys of the K. G. R. I. M. Schools were to produce, as is hoped, a quota of Indian Army cadets for the new Indian Military Academy, which was launched on its career in the autumn of 1932. Henceforth, it was of paramount importance that, while having a military bias, the standard of education in the schools for soldiers' sons should be in no way inferior to that obtaining in the civil schools of the Punjab.

With this object in view, in 1932, a new syllabus was framed by which a boy will be given an education up to the standard of the Matriculation examination of the Punjab (which must not be confused with the Matriculation standard of an English university) and also to the examination for the Indian Army Special Certificate of Education. The latter certificate, it may be mentioned, is a

qualification for nomination by the Commander-in-Chief to the Indian Military Academy. Finally, in the spring of 1933, an India Army Order was published enabling boys of King George's Royal Indian Military Schools to sit for both the 1st Class and Special Certificates of Education while still in residence at the School.

The result has been that competition for vacancies in the Schools is now showing signs of improvement. Previously, it was doubtful whether serving and pensioned Indian Army officers and soldiers realized the immense advantages to be obtained from the educational facilities afforded by the Schools, but it is now anticipated that, far from fulfilling merely their original purpose, the K. G. R. I. M. Schools will also provide a fertile recruiting ground for a proportion of the future leaders of the Indian Army. At the same time it must be stressed that the mere fact of having been at a K. G. R. I. M. School does not guarantee promotion. It is carefully explained to every boy (and to his parent) that his future lies entirely in his own hands and is dependent upon his being fitted by proved merit for the leadership of his men. Every boy enlists as a sepoy and carries his own destiny in his personal keeping. But it is not without omen, perhaps, that the first nomination of an ex-schoolboy of K. G. R. I. M. Schools to the Indian Military Academy was made by the Commander-in-Chief in India in February, 1933.

The establishment of the Schools is limited. Originally, in 1925, two Schools were founded in the chief recruiting areas of the Punjab. One located at Jhelum caters for Mohammedans, and the other, at Jullundur, for Sikhs and Dogras. To the classes admitted by the latter have now been added Punjabi Hindus, Garhwalis, Kumaonis and Gurkhas. The success of the two original Schools and the advisability of extending their facilities to classes whose main recruiting areas make it financially difficult to attend in the Punjab, led to the opening in 1930 of a similar school at Ajmer, designed for other Hindu classes of the Army which are drawn from recruiting areas to the south of the River Sutlej. The establishment of the School at Jhelum provides for 303 boys, while those of Jullundur and Ajmer allow for 258 and 210 pupils respectively.

So far as the parent is concerned, expense is not heavy. While it is the intention that only a limited proportion of boys shall be the sons of Indian officers, it must be borne in mind that the Indian officer holding the Viceroy's commission commences his military

career as a sepoy, and every boy is considered as a potential Indian officer who must be trained accordingly. A large proportion of boys—*i.e.*, sons of deceased soldiers and those with a very limited income—are admitted free, whilst in addition, a number of regimental and civil scholarships, based on income as well as proficiency, are available for deserving cases. The most a parent is asked to pay is Rs. 7-8 annas per month for a school term of nine months—*i.e.*, approximately £5 per year.

For this a boy is housed, clothed, fed and educated under conditions which leave little to be desired. Uniform, books, bedding, regulation school mufti, medical attendance, games, and food, are provided on a scale which ensures that the atmosphere in which the boy lives shall be such as will cultivate the very best conditions for physical and mental development. The class-rooms, dormitories and School hospital are lofty, airy, well-lighted, built and equipped on the most modern hygienic lines, and compare favourably for conditions with many of the most recent educational buildings in England. Good playing fields afford ample opportunities for games and are put to their greatest possible use. Further, splendid facilities exist for elementary training in musketry and the initial routine drill of a soldier's life, while physical training forms a prominent item in a day's programme at the Schools.

The internal organization of the Schools endeavours to reproduce, as far as is consistent with Indian life and customs, the system of the English public school, and, at the same time, to develop the boy's inherited military instincts. The Schools are organized on the "House" system—three in Jhelum, two in Jullundur and two in Ajmer—and on a platoon basis. On arrival each boy is posted to a platoon with which he maintains his connection, except for cases of individual promotion, throughout his career in the School. Each platoon is commanded by an Indian officer (or non-commissioned officer) assisted by a platoon havildar (who is a senior prefect) and four section commanders (or junior prefects). The team spirit is fostered in every detail of the boy's daily life, and the ideal at which each platoon aims is that every member shall be capable of commanding a section both in administration and normal training. At Jullundur, a platoon competition for efficiency, embracing all branches of training both educational and military, and including all details of daily administrative routine, promotes a healthy

atmosphere of rivalry which assists in the maintenance of a high standard of discipline and competency. In addition, regimental *esprit de corps* is fostered by every means. Boys are encouraged to regard their nominating units as their military foster-parents. They wear their individual regimental crests and badges on all School ceremonial parades, whilst at all other times the badge remains in a position of prominence above each boy's bed. For educational training only, the boys are organized in the normal forms independent of their platoons.

As may be imagined, games play no small part in the system of training. The Indian sepoy has a natural aptitude for games, and his son takes to hockey as naturally as an English lad to cricket or football. Within the School, games are organized on a platoon basis in hockey, football and basket-ball. This ensures that every boy is occupied daily in one of these three games unless on duty or temporarily excused by the medical officer. Hockey is of a good standard. It may be interesting to remark that, in 1933, in the final of the Punjab Native Army Hockey Tournament, at Jhelum, which attracts some twenty teams from the whole of Northern India, no less than four old boys of the Jhelum and Jullundur Schools were playing. Each School can put up a School team which can give the average regimental side a moderate game.

It must be emphasised that, in these Schools, the medium of games gives the instructional staff an invaluable means of inculcating the spirit of unselfishness and *esprit de corps* which, at first, is a little difficult for the newcomer to the routine of a King George's Royal Indian Military School to assimilate. The Englishman is liable to forget that the sporting spirit which characterises him almost from birth is not always as fully developed in other nationalities whose history has not nurtured that priceless attribute. In the training of character at K. G. R. I. M. Schools too much emphasis cannot be laid on the assistance which has been given in the inculcation of sporting ideals and self-control by the organization of properly supervised games.

Each year a competition is held between the Schools at Jhelum and Jullundur for a flag of honour presented by Colonel Radford, the first Superintendent of the Schools. The competition includes hockey, football, basket ball, athletics, a cross-country run, wrestling and shooting. The conditions of the competition are so arranged

that each School is limited to a selection of thirty boys (excluding the shooting eight) from whom the competing teams in all events must be chosen. The conditions are such that they prevent either School "nursing" boys at particular games at the expense of others, and ensure a general all-round proficiency in the competitors selected. As can be imagined, the spirit of rivalry runs high, and the battle of the "Blues," which is held in alternate years on the domain of each School, in turn, is probably the event of the greatest import in the School year.

Through the generosity of the officers of regiments stationed at various times at Jhelum and Jullundur a collection of valuable challenge cups and shields gives the victors possibly a somewhat material interest in success in each event, but the writer can assure readers that in no athletic struggle he has ever witnessed has enthusiasm waxed so keen. The famous ground at Twickenham in early December can scarce contain a more tensely excited throng of spectators than those who line the touchline of the final event of a so far level contest for the Jhelum—Jullundur Flag.

As yet the distance factor has made it impossible to include the Ajmer School in the competition, but it is hoped that the day is not far distant when the representatives of Southern India will enter into the competition with their more northerly equals.

The routine of the Schools varies but little. A boy's average day commences with reveille at 6-30 a.m. (5-30 in the summer). First parade is usually one hour later, and consists of drill and physical training. Ordinary educational classes, preceded by an hour's private preparation, begin at 8-30 a.m., with intervals of approximately an hour for meals at 10 a.m. and 2 p.m. respectively. Afternoon work in the hot months is curtailed—one cannot enthuse over mathematics or history in a shade temperature of 115°—and four days in each week see every boy taking part for one hour in some organized game or other under the supervision of his platoon-commander. The remaining afternoons are holidays and, if not required for School or platoon duties, a percentage of boys are at liberty to take "walking out" leave, the granting of which is dependent on work and good conduct. Each evening, at Jullundur, an evening "Gurdwara" (Sikh temple) and "Mandar" (Hindu temple) parade is held at which every boy of the respective denominations has to attend at his particular religious building. This parade takes place half an hour before the evening meal, and is

part of the normal day's routine from which only boys on School duties are excused. Sundays, of course, are complete holidays except in so far as interior economy necessitates a certain amount of work which cannot be avoided.

In practice, therefore (at Jullundur), each boy—except those in the most junior classes—does thirty-two hours' work and nine hours' private preparation in each week. The School term lasts from September 15th to June 15th, when the boys proceed to their homes for a three months' recess. For the benefit of the uninitiated to Indian life who may possibly regard these hours and terms as a little excessive in comparison with Western custom, it is pointed out that there are a considerable number of religious festivals and holidays which have to be observed, and which considerably reduce the apparently lengthy stretch of unbroken school life. Moreover, when it is remembered that some of the boys travel as far as 600 miles from their homes—many live in areas which the postman visits but once a week—one can appreciate the economic advisability of making the term as long as possible consistent with the health of boys and staff.

A word or two about the boys themselves in comparison with English boys of a like age may not be without interest. When it is borne in mind that many of King George's Royal Indian Military School boys come from villages as yet untouched by modern communications—some have a journey of sixty to seventy miles on foot or pony before they get within reach of even a by-road—and when it is considered that their previous learning has been sometimes culled from a village schoolmaster whose own ideas of the outside world, other than those interpreted by a neighbouring high school, are possibly limited to a single visit to Lahore or similar city, one can estimate the quality of the material on which the future of India must partially rest. Yet the assets of the Indian Army's sons are not a few. Tales of the British Raj and the amazing wonders of its organization and development, stories of far-flung campaigns on the North-West Frontier, Iraq, and distant France, accompanied by yarns of a father's or grandsire's personal experiences, have all trickled through into Indian village life and made an impression on the mind of the Indian soldier's son much akin to that printed by Henty's books on the imaginative young English mind of nearly half a century ago.

The Indian enthusiasm for learning which, on account of the attendant status hitherto involved, has earned no little respect : a credulous belief in his teachers : a memory and power of application which are not without value ; and a pronounced aptitude for absorbing information ; have all tended to make the average Indian boy into material which can be easily moulded for the good. The soldier's son, who is no exception, adds to the normal qualities a quickness and alertness which readily respond to a training which demands smartness in movement and drill as well as the intelligent execution of an order. He appreciates discipline and does not fail to recognize its value to an organized social community. It is noticeable how quickly boys who have known no other than a rough uncouth village existence, far removed from the conditions of Army life, rapidly acclimatize themselves to their new surroundings and vie with each other in "turnout" and drill for the sake of their platoon. Little time elapses before a new boy takes a personal pride in giving, if possible, a smarter salute than the boy of the year before.

That the boys have faults, is true ; but most of these are not exceptional to their class, and they are not difficult to surmount. Consequently, an inherited and instinctive obedience to orders, coupled, in most cases, with an amazing desire to get the greatest value possible out of the educational facilities afforded, furnish, in the person of the K. G. R. I. M. School boy, the educationist with what might be thought almost an ideal ground on which to work. One would possibly welcome something of the normal devilment generally latent in the average English schoolboy ; but when it appears in his Indian counterpart it usually assumes a milder form, and is entirely divorced from work. The reason is, possibly, that the average Indian boy, at the present, acquires an idea of responsibility for his own future which the English lad has, as yet, generally no cause to accept until he has attained a more mature age.

To sum up : Quickly responsive to good leadership ; eager, as a rule, to please—a word of praise goes much further than with an English boy, who not infrequently regards commendation as his right ; usually enthusiastic in most things he does in the course of his School routine ; gifted with powers of imitation and imagination which are not to be despised ; simple in his pleasures and tastes, but anxious to drink deep of the stream of Western knowledge, which he is prone to think infallible ; the K. G. R. I. M. School boy offers to the Indian

Army, material whose future influence bids well to be considerable, not only in the Army itself, but also in the village life of the greater India in which that seasoned manhood must eventually settle.

What of the future? Apart from his potential value to the Indian Army as an intelligent leader of men, the K. G. R. I. M. School boy carries with him to the outer life of a new India a duty to his fellow countrymen which it is earnestly hoped he will not fail to discharge, if only in gratitude for that unselfish patriotism of his forbears which his School commemorates as each Armistice Day rolls by. If those who immediately benefit from the gracious gift of their King-Emperor bear in mind the precepts outlined for them by the Heir to the British throne, when laying the foundation stone at Jullundur, the purpose of the Schools will not be without avail, and the service of their boys to the Indian Empire will bear more practical and immediate fruit. H. R. H. the Prince of Wales then remarked, when concluding his speech, "I hope that the descendants of the soldiers who come to learn in this School will carry three simple facts in their minds as they daily pace this stone. Firstly, that this School was built by the desire and at the command of the King-Emperor as a token of his admiration and regard for the military classes in India, and in gratitude for their loyalty and devotion; secondly, that this stone was laid by me in loving memory of my comrades in the Great War; and thirdly, that the noblest use to which they can turn the education received here is to the upholding of the great tradition of loyalty, patriotism and service, which was handed down to them by their fathers."

If these simple but impressive words of advice, spoken on the broad acres of the Punjab long before their future homes of learning had risen from the plain, are remembered by the boys; if the latter recognize, as we are confident they will, the obligations which they owe to their King-Emperor in return for that heritage which he personally handed over to India as a token of an Empire's gratitude for the devotion of her sons in her hour of need; and, lastly, if the boys bear with them to their village homes in the far reaches of the Indian Empire those precepts which their School tries to implant; then the efforts of those who, in the early days of the formation of the Schools, sought to instil ideals and traditions creamed from the best of English public school life, will not go unrewarded; nor will the scheme which was nursed through its infancy by the persistence of the late Lord Rawlinson and his General Staff prove at fault in its practical application to one of India's most pressing needs.

## THE DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN

### THE LANDING AT ANZAC

BY MAJOR H. C. WESTMORLAND, D.S.O., THE HAMPSHIRE  
REGIMENT

Despite the lack of strategical preparation for the Dardanelles campaign by the General Staff at the War Office, and the consequent disadvantages under which the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Ian Hamilton, prepared his plan for landing on the Gallipoli peninsula, the verdict of history is that there was still a chance of success at the moment the attack was launched. Taking the landing at Anzac as an illustration this verdict will be examined.

On 24th March 1915, Enver Pasha, the Turkish war minister, placed the defence of the Dardanelles under the German General von Sanders. This officer, in his appreciation, considered that the main landings would be attempted at Bulair on the European side, and Besika Bay on the Asiatic shore. Thus for the defence of the western coast of the Gallipoli peninsula, from Suvla to Sedd el Bahr, some twenty miles in length, only one division (the 9th) was allotted. (*Note.*—The Turkish 9th division consisted of three regiments of infantry, three batteries of field artillery and two mountain batteries. A regiment consisted of three battalions and a machine gun company. Each battalion had four companies.)

At Ari Burnu, where the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps eventually landed, two forward company areas (2/27th Regiment) joined, each of these companies being responsible for the defence of about a mile and a half of coast line. The reserve company was about a mile east of Gaba Tepe. One mountain battery was in a position on 400 plateau (see sketch map), and guarding the coast at Gaba Tepe were two 12 cm. guns, while two 15 cm. guns were a little inland from that point.

Although on the coast the outer crust of the defence was thin, reserves were well situated to oppose a deep penetration. The two battalions forming the reserve of the 27th regiment were four miles from Ari Burnu in the direction of Maidos, and the general reserve of eight battalions (19th division), with a proportion of artillery, was located at Boghali, just over four miles away to the east of the landing place.

Concerning this portion of the front it was thought at British G.H.Q. that two or more divisions might be available for the defence of this western shore of the peninsula. The lack of accurate information about the enemy was attributable to the shortage of aircraft. This shortage was to be felt in many ways. By the first week in April 1915 no photographs had been taken over the enemy lines owing to a shortage of cameras. Bombing flights were however carried out and a certain amount of information collected. It is interesting to note that on April 23rd the reserve battalions of the 27th Regiment were bombed out of the village of Maidos, but unfortunately moved into bivouacs  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles nearer Gaba Tepe. At this stage, and particularly in this type of operation, air photographs would have been invaluable in checking the many inaccuracies in the maps provided. The impossibility of adequate reconnaissance of the ground over which the first battle has to be fought must always be a difficulty connected with a landing on a little known enemy coast.

The area into which the Anzac Corps was to advance may be described as a tangle of nullas, ravines, precipices and small plateaux. In addition to these difficulties of terrain, the high ground on the north flank of the operation was "for the most part covered with a low scrub. This indeed could be seen from the sea, but the resisting nature of that scrub was never suspected before the operations began. Standing some three feet high and interspersed with prickly dwarf oak, its stubborn bushes are often so close together, and so thorny, that even a strong man has difficulty in forcing his way through. In the attack, therefore, it is a serious obstacle to movement while it has the further disadvantage that men lying down in it are unable to see their neighbours on either flank. But for snipers, or for infantry delaying a hostile advance, the cover that it affords is almost ideal." (Official History.)

East of Ari Burnu the ground generally forms itself into three ridges. The first ridge comprises features subsequently known as Plugge's Plateau, Russell's Top, and Walker's Ridge. The seaward face of the long narrow plateau, known as Russell's Top, is almost unclimbable, being an almost vertical cliff some 300 feet high. At the south end of this "the ridge suddenly contracts for 200 yards into a veritable razor edge, impassable even by infantry, with a deep chasm on either side." (Official History). Nearest the sea is Plugge's Plateau. According to the map it appeared possible to advance from

here, along the high ground, to Baby 700. The razor edge was to play an important part in the operations.

The second ridge forms the eastern side of a deep ravine known as Shrapnel and Monash Gully. To the south it consists chiefly of a plateau known as 400. This narrows northwards to the southern slopes of Baby 700. This last hill commands Shrapnel and Monash Gullies, the only line of communication between the upper portion of the second ridge and the coast.

The third ridge was known as Gun Ridge. This starts south of Chunuk Bair and finishes near Gaba Tepe. Scrubby Knoll to the north, and Anderson's Knoll to the south of this ridge are features to note.

The task allotted to the Anzac Corps was to land north of Gaba Tepe and cut the Turkish communications between Gallipoli and Sedd el Bahr. The covering force was to be the 3rd Australian Infantry Brigade who had orders to capture the guns on 400 Plateau and occupy Gun Ridge, their left resting on Chunuk Bair. On the right, troops were to clear Gaba Tepe and disable any guns found there. This gave the brigade a responsibility for about 6,000 yards of frontage.

The 2nd Brigade, which was to land immediately after the covering force, had instructions to extend the front northwards to the highest point of the third ridge, Hill 971, a mile North-east of Chunuk Bair, and protect the left flank by holding a line between there and Fisherman's Hut. The 1st Brigade formed the reserve of the 1st Australian Division. Arrangements were made for the 7th Indian Mountain Brigade to be landed as early as possible in the morning and to be attached to the covering force on arrival.

The orders by the O. C., Covering Force, were for the 9th Battalion to land on the right, two companies to clear Gaba Tepe and the remaining two to make for Anderson's Knoll; this battalion would therefore operate on a frontage of 3,000 yards. The 10th Battalion would land in the centre, capture the guns on 400 Plateau, and occupy Scrubby Knoll on Gun Ridge, while the 11th Battalion was to seize the northern end of this ridge and Chunuk Bair. The remaining battalion, the 12th, was in brigade reserve. The mountain guns, on arrival, were to go to 400 Plateau.

Naval support was arranged as follows :—

1. The O. C., Covering Force, was to ask for ships' fire by signal.

2. The fleet was to fire by observation on any Turkish troops or guns definitely seen.
3. On each flank an artillery officer was to act as an observer for the ships. Messages to the beach by telephone, thence by W/T to the flagship.

It should be here noted that in the actual operation no ship fired till 17-00 hours, largely owing to the difficulties of communication. Probably some form of timed programme would have been better.

The time the leading troops were to reach the shore depended on the hour of the moon's setting; on 25th April this was at 02-57 hours. This meant that the first tows could not be beached before 04-30 hours which was half an hour after first light. General Birdwood considered that a night landing was the best means of obtaining surprise, but the danger of ships being silhouetted against the moonlit sky made this not quite possible.

Corps orders laid down that wounded were not to be evacuated to ships till the infantry of the Australian Division was ashore. In the 1st Australian Division Operation order it seems as though this order was not made strong enough. It reads "The navy launches equipped as hospital boats will begin to ply from shore to ship after the infantry of the division is landed." Disobedience of the spirit of this order was a contributory cause of the programme for the landing getting nearly four hours behind schedule.

At 01-00 hours on 25th April the battleships had reached their rendezvous and boats were being lowered. At 02-35 hours all tows were ready and when the moon had sunk behind Imbros, the three battleships, with 1,500 men on board, destroyers carrying the remainder of the covering force, steamed slowly towards the peninsula. At 03-30 hours the battleships anchored within  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles of the shore and 48 cutters, in twelve parallel columns, were being towed ashore by steam launches.

The landing was a complete surprise. Owing to an error in navigation the boats were beached a mile further north than had been intended, but the original place selected had been better prepared by the Turks. At Ari Burnu there was only one sentry group, who opened fire, and a few small posts overlooking the beach. Without waiting to re-organise, the troops pushed rapidly inland.

The effect of the error in navigation was to land the first tow on a very narrow front and to inter-mix units from the start. The

troops had been told to expect a low sandy bank skirting the beach, but they must have disappeared into the ravines before fresh orders could be given to them. It is improbable that the junior officers realised what had happened until it was broad daylight.

At 05-00 hours the situation was roughly as follows. The 9th Battalion was very scattered. About 100 men, under an officer, were being led across Shrapnel Gully to the north end of 400 Plateau. The 11th Battalion were reorganising in a gully forking North-east from Shrapnel Gully, just east of Plugge's Plateau. Some were still near the beach, pinned by machine gun fire from Fisherman's Hut. In the meantime the 12th Battalion landed from the destroyers, but instead of remaining in reserve, they got caught up in the advance. Parties of this battalion reached 400 Plateau ahead of the battleship parties and captured the guns there.

The Commander, 3rd Australian Bde., arrived at the southern end of Plugge's Plateau about 04-40 hours. Owing to the scrub and the ravines which hid the troops, he was unable to appreciate the situation. He knew there were no troops between him and Gaba Tepe, but the volume of the enemy's fire was negligible and there were no signs of any further enemy approaching. He decided to advise the Commander, 2nd Bde., that his troops should be employed on his right instead of on his left. The wisdom of this decision seems doubtful, since the points of tactical importance were on the left flank, namely Chunuk Bair and Baby 700.

About this time the C.-in-C. appeared in *Queen Elizabeth*, and received the report that the troops were a mile inland. Presumably this was the report from General Birdwood timed 06-39 hours in which the capture of 400 Plateau was reported, although the Official History records the fact that at 06-00 hours the C.-in-C. headed south for the toe of the peninsula. It would appear that G. H. Q. still thought that the thrust from Helles was to be the decisive blow. Possibly had the Commander-in-Chief remained a little longer and learnt the real situation at Anzac, a brigade might have been diverted from Helles and employed where there was obviously a tactical advantage worth exploiting. Gaba Tepe is two miles nearer the heights overlooking the Narrows than Helles, and it is surprising that so much importance should have been attributed by G. H. Q. to the southern landing. In the light of after knowledge one organised brigade to hold some sort of covering position, behind which the

Australians might have reorganised, would have turned the scale easily in our favour.

At Maidos the commander of the Turkish 27th Regiment heard of the landing an hour after that event, at 05-30 hours. His troops however were not ready to move until 07-30 hours and it was not until 09-00 hours that they were seen by the Australians filing up Gun Ridge from the south. At this hour therefore the Turks opposing the advance could not have been numerous, and already 8,000 Australians had landed, although in the original orders it had been hoped to have landed more by this time. The delays and their cause will be referred to later.

The real trouble, however, was to begin when the 19th Turkish division, under Mustapha Kemal, was ordered to detach one battalion towards Chunuk Bair to watch the right. This officer quickly grasped the threat to the Turkish communications and ordered a whole regiment to move as quickly as possible. He himself rode forward with a company to gain first-hand information. At 10-00 hours this company came in contact with our troops on Baby 700 and to the North-east of it. Later in the afternoon, counter-attacks here seriously threatened our hold on this part of the peninsula. A Turkish force moving south from Baby 700 to Russell's Top would outflank a position on 400 Plateau or even take it in reverse. Chunuk Bair and Baby 700 were of considerable tactical importance, and had they been strongly held by the first troops to land, the Turkish reserves would not have interfered to such purpose as to cause talk of evacuation.

In the meantime, 07-00 hours, an officer and two scouts had reached Scrubby Knoll and scattered groups of men were in possession of Pine Ridge. These forward elements remained unsupported owing to delays in landing the 1st and 2nd Brigades and to a decision by the Commander, 3rd Brigade, to entrench 400 Plateau instead of supporting troops in front. Delays in landing at this time were caused by the shelling of the anchorage, which made the transports stand out further from the shore, and the disregard of orders for the evacuation of wounded. The return of boats for more troops was held up while wounded were being embarked. Added to this there was lack of organisation on the beach, no naval or military personnel for this purpose being landed until 10-00 hours. Even when troops were landed the change of orders for the 2nd Brigade must have

caused further confusion, since the issue of orders under the conditions prevailing at this time must have been difficult.

At 10-45 hours one and a half battalions of the New Zealand Infantry Brigade, under Brig.-Gen. Walker, were made available. General Bridges, commanding the 1st Australian Division, decided to use them to restore the situation on Baby 700. This situation had been caused by the advanced elements of Mustapha Kemal's 19th Division. The New Zealanders started off by way of Walker's Ridge, but General Walker decided that the ground was too difficult and changed the line of advance to that *via* Plugge's Plateau and Russell's Top. The change of orders caused confusion and the troops also got involved with the razor edge east of Plugge's Plateau. The result was that not more than one company reached a position west of Baby 700, and that not until 13-00 hours. By 15-00 hours no one seems to have been in command of this left sector. The scattered companies were not co-ordinated and no one seems to have known the plan. The troops had done very well but casualties in officers had brought movements to a standstill.

At 16-00 hours the full weight of the counter-attack on Baby 700 was being felt and troops fell back, gaps appearing in the line. Initiative had passed to the enemy. By 17-00 hours the remainder of the New Zealand Brigade and 4th Australian Brigade had not yet landed and there were no troops to restore the situation on the left, where the absence of counter-battery work was trying the troops very highly. Enemy batteries from the direction of Chunuk Bair had been troubling our troops since 13-00 hours.

About this time further delays were caused at the beach owing to lack of decisions by the divisional staffs. It could not be decided whether more troops were to be landed or whether evacuation was to be ordered. Lack of orders, the consequent demoralising rumours, failure of beach organisation, resulted in the lack of support to forward troops at a critical time.

During the evening Turkish counter-attacks were to add to the general discomfiture by preventing reorganisation.

**LESSONS.**—The narrative of events points plainly to several lessons. Bad beach organisation means grave delays. Delays in this type of operation, where success depends on exploiting any surprise, are absolutely fatal. A tactical surprise had been achieved, but numbers could not be produced quickly enough to take advantage

of it. The confusion and difficulties caused by deploying from a narrow front, although this was no fault of a military commander, confirms the wisdom of the original order to land on a frontage of nearly a mile. Overcrowding on the beach is to be avoided, particularly when the beach is narrow.

The influence of ground over the movements of troops is well illustrated, providing an example also of the need for reconnaissance by all means available so as to avoid being surprised by the ground. The delaying power of well concealed marksmen in this scrub covered country was most apparent, and snipers took heavy toll of those who put their heads up to reconnoitre.


The operations furnish an example of the need for leadership. Numbers are useless without co-ordination, illustrated by the lack of progress made by 8,000 of our troops against about 500 of the enemy, otherwise the situation at 09-00 hours would have been in our favour entirely. The opportunity to make progress after this hour in the morning never reoccurred.

The landing of H. Q. 1st Australian Division three hours after the initial disembarkation might be considered a contributory cause of failure. The decision to employ the 2nd Brigade on the right might not have been made had Divisional H. Q. been represented on shore. The position of commanders needs careful study in landing operations. The position of the Commander-in-Chief, confined in "Queen Elizabeth," at Sedd el Bahr is open to the gravest criticism. He could not have been fully aware of the situation of the troops at Anzac until very late in the day.

The Official History states that the ease of the initial landing may have caused a false sense of security. The will to win can never be too highly cultivated, but this must be tempered by a reasoned respect for the enemy. The study of the characteristics of foreign armies might well be deserving of study by regimental officers; better facilities than those now prevailing might be given.

The value of discipline and training are self-evident, but this type of operation calls for the highest form of both. The lack of covering fire was a handicap to the troops; the ships did not open fire till 12 hours after the landing, and the orders cancelling the landing of the artillery deprived the troops of this moral support. Absence of aircraft was to deprive commanders of the information about the progress made by forward troops and neutralised the

# ANZAC





presence of naval artillery. The maps issued were of little assistance ; in this type of operation good maps are of paramount importance because of the limited reconnaissances possible.

Many other lessons may be deduced from the landing at Anzac. As General Callwell (*The Dardanelles Campaign* ; Gen. C. E. Callwell) points out, a maritime descent against the coasts of a well organised enemy with good rail and road communications is a most hazardous and difficult enterprise.

## A TRUE FISHING STORY

By "MUGGER."

Since the following account was written, many sportsmen have captured many tunny fish, and every successive year successively heavier fish are recorded. A tunny fisherman now killing anything under 500lbs. in weight would seriously consider returning it "to let it grow up;" however, up to the year 1932, tunny fishing was still in an experimental stage in home waters and any tunny caught off our shores was worth keeping.

This story was originally produced in my regimental magazine of 1933, but, as although the matters of expenses and tackle used have met with some alterations, and the facilities for fishing have increased, the method of fishing for tunnies as described is still used, and I therefore venture to reproduce it for all those of the services whom it may interest.

Here is the story.

Many of us have done some big game shooting, but very few of us have any experience of big game fishing. Those who have caught heavy fish, say of over 40lbs., may have some idea of what playing a fish of over 400lbs. means. Fishermen, shikaries and others of the services will all be interested to read a first-hand account of such an experience.

In September 1932, having completed a fortnight's attachment to the 1st Brigade at Aldershot, I felt that I had earned a holiday. I decided to try my hand at tunny fishing.

On calling at Hardy's, 61 Pall Mall, I was informed that all I had to do was to catch a train for Scarborough and that their representative there would be ready to receive me and fit me out. Accordingly, and without any other preparation I boarded a train the next night and the morning after I found myself in Scarborough. I called in at Hardy's and was provided with an outfit which consisted of a 6 ft. cane rod, 400 yds. of 54 thread line, a 9 in. Fortuna reel, harness, a 12 ft. steel trace with hook, and a gaff. These articles were hired at, I think, three guineas for two days, with a decreasing rate per diem for longer periods.

It was on the 14th of September that I got aboard my tunny boat for my initiation. The tunny boat is a sea-going motor boat

and is locally called a coble; it is about 35 ft. long and very broad in the beam. This boat takes a light dinghy in tow and about which more anon. The motor boat hire is £5 per diem and the dinghy £1 per diem. This includes a total crew of three.

It was 9 A.M. before we left Scarborough pier in a choppy sea. Spray was coming over us continually and we shipped an occasional wave. The weather was cold and I was feeling by no means happy as we forged our way eastwards through the North Sea. It took us some three hours' steaming to get up to the trawler fleet. There were about half-a-dozen trawlers steaming around with their trawl nets down.

These trawlers haul in their nets about once every two hours and usually give a blast on their sirens to let the tunny fishermen know that they are about to haul in. We steered up to one of the trawlers and I got out of my coble into the light dinghy with my boatman. I was all harnessed up and my hook baited with a herring. I sat on a board into which was fitted a brass swivelled socket which took the butt of my rod. About one foot above the reel the weight of the rod was taken on to my harness by two straps attached to a hook. Like this the fisherman can brace his feet against the prow of the boat and use his whole weight to hold up the rod against the pull of the fish. The steam winch of a trawler rapidly hauls in the trawl and just as the base of the net clears the water a momentary excitement always ensues, for this is the time that the tunnies are likely to show themselves; the theory being that they follow the track of the trawl-net below the surface of the water, and when it breaks the surface they follow it up to seize the scraps and small fish that are forced through the mesh of the net. No tunnies appeared on this occasion, nor did any appear the whole of that day. I was not sorry therefore, when it was time to put about for home. My coble reached harbour after dark and it was really good to get outside a double whisky and inside a bath.

The next day I sallied forth out into the deep at crack of dawn. We steamed about all day, but never saw a sign of even a trawler, let alone a tunny.

The 16th was a repetition of the 15th. The weather was marvellously fine and, although somewhat boring, it was pleasant, and I took the opportunity of testing my tackle and practising with my heavy fishing gear. However, two days of cruising about the

North Sea in an open motor-boat with little to do, and no one to do it with is no fun and I did not relish a repetition of this on the next day; moreover, my boatmen were not optimistic and candidly told me that the prospects for the next day were not very bright. It was only H. J. Hardy who persuaded me to stay on for a fourth day as the weather was so gloriously fine. In consequence I started out at dawn on the following day; there was a haze and the water was dead calm. At the end of two hours' steaming East-North-East, we were still not in sight of any trawlers, and the third hour was almost through and our hopes rapidly fading away when we at last sighted two trawlers steaming aimlessly about in the distance. We made towards one of them and stood by until it was about to haul up.

I now got into my dinghy with my boatman and very carefully baited my hook with a large mackerel. I also had a 16 ft. bamboo pole arrangement with which to hold my bait clear of the boat. There was one other tunny boat nearby and we were both only some 30 ft. from the side of the trawler. The trawl ropes were rattling over the winches when I cast my bait out. In doing this my bamboo gadget broke and I had hardly cleared the debris when someone indicated a tunny a few yards away. That fish was apparently making for the bait of the other fellow; he, however, struck too quickly, missed, and nearly overbalanced into the water. My own bait was still sinking and about 12 ft. down and under my boat when I felt my trace straighten out. The fish must have taken me after his turn away from the other bait and his 'boil' was still visible on the surface. My line then tightened and for a moment I thought that I was foul of the trawl-net as the line was not run out at once. I took a chance and leant back and gave two strikes with all that I could put into them. The next moment my reel was humming and my powerful rod dipping and vibrating. My boatman got the dinghy into line with the course of the fish and strained hard with the oars to get it moving as fast as possible. My line was in the meantime rapidly running out and I thought that nothing could stop it from all going. I tightened up the clutch of my reel as much as I dared. The line was like a banjo string as I had all my weight against the pull of the fish.

We were soon clear of the trawler, one great relief. The chances of the line being fouled by the trawl-net, trawler or one of the other tunny boats are considerable and the first minute always an anxious

time, but my fish was well hooked and we were soon out in the open sea.

I now could hold the fish. He was towing the boat steadily, but an occasional spurt used to run out more and more line which made me very anxious. I don't suppose that I had more than 300 yards of line out at any one time, but to me the line on the wide spool had dwindled down to next to nothing.

We went on like this for some fifteen minutes and then I started trying to regain some line. Here I experienced difficulty with my reel. The clutch rings had become heated in the first run and were now slipping and would not take the combined strain of the pull of the fish and my efforts to reel in. At one juncture I got an overrun, and for ten seconds my line was fast. A sudden increase of the speed of the fish during that critical period would have broken me for a certainty. I got the line running free once more and the struggle went on.

After some ten minutes of these tactics the fish "scunded," and I experienced some violent kicking from my rod which renewed my anxiety. I was at this stage almost beat and my boatman removed my hat and wiped my head with a rag soaked in sea-water to help keep me going. The fish went on jerking and pulling and next I felt a series of very sharp tugs. I think that it was then that the fish was having its last struggle for life and freedom.

Another five minutes elapsed and then my boatman gave the opinion that the fish was dead. The position of the fish was at this time immediately under the boat on the sea-floor, and after holding him up for a few moments to see whether he had any more fight in him, I started pumping him up to the surface. This is always a difficult job as the tunny is a solid, heavy fish, and that and the rocking of the boat demands a considerable amount of care in raising him. He eventually appeared on the surface, however, and I told my boatman to stand by ready with the gaff. Here there was a hitch. The whole time up to now I had been reproved for any interference in the duties of the handling of the boat. "All right, Sir, keep yourself to yourself, I'll look after the boat, you look after the rod," were the words from my boatman that were meant to keep me in order. Now however there was a setback to his assurance, for when I had demanded the gaff, no gaff could he produce. He had left it behind in the coble. The coble was signalled up and the gaff passed across and then a swinging

blow from it missed the fish's flank and hit my trace. A second attempt only served to knock the head of the gaff off its shaft and fail to enter the fish!! Thank goodness he was practically dead when he reached the surface otherwise we were almost certain to have lost him. Eventually he was tailed and made fast to the dinghy.

With the aid of another tunny-boat we got our catch into our coble. It was a great relief to see it at last lying in the boat. I continued fishing for a short while after this capture but, as my crew were anxious to get back to port, I soon wound in my line and we set a course for the harbour.

We arrived at Scarborough with the Union Jack flying at our mast-head—the usual method of indicating a successful trip—and found the quay very full of interested visitors. The tunny was hauled up on to the quay and photographed by a press photographer and then taken to the weighing yard for official weighing. It scaled 464lbs. It was in beautiful condition and measured 7 feet 10 inches long and 6 feet in girth.

The Scarborough Corporation issues a badge to successful tunny anglers and broadcasts any catch to the public. A club known as "The British Tunny Club," with its headquarters in Scarborough and a branch H. Q. in London has been formed. This club is an offshoot of the British Sea Anglers Society and is concerned with looking after the interests of tunny and other big game fishermen.

## A SHORT REVIEW OF MECHANISATION

BY LIEUT.-COL. A. G. BAIRD-SMITH, D.S.O. (RETD.).

After almost complete scrapping of the immense mechanical equipment accumulated during four years of war, the creation of new "mechanised" fighting units in any considerable numbers could not fail to be a very costly, laborious and slow process. Research and experiment, in view of foreign progress in the same direction, had at least to keep pace with construction; which, unless its products were to be constantly out-dated, had to avoid too much standardisation of types. If, as seemed at first probable, the only way to get sufficient money for the mechanised Arm was to starve the older Arms, then this was a risk that only enthusiasts were prepared to accept. To them, indeed, the old-fashioned Army was hardly worth even its present reduced cost.

Constructive experiments were, of course, the business of experts. It was not till tactical and manœuvre experiments could be begun with the small number of A.F.V.'s at first available, that questions as to their future fighting rôle, or their action in combination with the other Arms, could be examined or debated. The theories already formed from war experience were, however, so conflicting, that soon an acute controversy on the whole subject of mechanisation arose; which has by no means ceased at the present day. On the one side the extreme mechanisation advocates maintain that this process must embrace all Arms, and completely transform them; on the other, the more cautious and conservative regard the A. F. V.'s as at best an auxiliary Arm of yet unproved capability and of doubtful future. Total mechanisation, they maintain, is financially impossible, and, in any case, unsuited to an Army that must be prepared to fight in almost any quarter of the globe.

The mechanical school hold that, if given their way, they could build up fighting formations, "independent" of the other Arms (with possible exception of the Air) capable of conducting a war by themselves, with a rapidity and decisiveness hitherto unknown; a war in which horsed Cavalry would be useless, and ordinary Infantry superfluous. To the majority, however, it seemed that a very long road must be traversed before both conditions and equipment could combine to bring about such a desirable result.

Co-operation between A. F. V.'s and the other Arms had not achieved in the last war conspicuous success; chiefly because no general agreement on their respective rôles had ever been reached. To-day it is this co-operation, and not separation, that is occupying the minds of those responsible for the Army's training. A constant financial stringency, and the political pursuit of unilateral disarmament, has limited the scale both of their experiments and their objectives; for the immediate future any plans for wholesale mechanisation and motorisation of both mounted and dismounted Arms must be regarded as extravagant.

In technical development, since the original design of A. F. V.'s had been exclusively British, it might be assumed that foreign constructors would closely follow each British innovation; and since they might not be financially so restricted, their output of A. F. V.'s could presumably be greater. Thus the British mechanised Arms would each have its foreign opposite number; any strategical theory of their employment could not postulate one "independent" mechanised force operating, so to speak, "in vacuo," and scouring an enemy's territory without encountering its like. The tendency of the British mechanical school at first was to conceive its A. F. V.'s as having a monopoly of power, speed and range; which, naturally, would enable them to achieve the most far-reaching success. As one writer put it—"A blow at the enemy's H. Q.'s, signal centres, transport lines and supply columns would be likely to paralyze all the combatant troops that are dependent on these vital organs." <sup>(1)</sup> This was the theory of "Strategic Paralysis," largely based on the mobility, "the mental and moral effect" <sup>(2)</sup> of A. F. V.'s and on certain war experiences, the result of a one-sided mechanical superiority unlikely ever to recur.

In order to try out small "independent" mechanised formations, Medium Armoured Brigades (each of about 130 A. F. V.'s) were formed. The question of ground space for mobility training was, however, found to be very difficult; any massed movements of such formations were apt to be very destructive to private property. Even for the older Arms British training grounds were already too cramped. A suggestion was seriously made that the mechanised Arms be bodily transferred to Canada—where 10,000 square miles of open country could be rented or bought. But a boundless American prairie would

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<sup>(1)</sup> <sup>(2)</sup> Captain Liddell Hart, in "The Daily Telegraph," 25-26 Sept. 1930.

hardly suffice to train units for all the conditions of war in Europe. In France more space for rapid, long-range exercises of mechanised units was available than in England; considerable experience has been gained in the acceleration of all Arms by "motorisation," and in the study of new problems produced by it.

A result of the exercises carried out in the United States in 1932, was a report by the Chief of Staff in favour of breaking up the experimental Mechanised Force. The report stressed the "inherent weaknesses and limitations" of the various machines; which precluded "their employment in many types of terrain." Further it pointed out the impossibility of maintaining a sufficiently large number of up-to-date vehicles in immediate readiness for an outbreak of war; this impossibility, though not so specified, being no doubt financial. It also considered that the commencement of large scale manufacture after war had begun would be too late. Accordingly the principal tasks that had been allotted to the Mechanised Force were to be assumed, examined and developed as far as practicable by the Cavalry.

The problems of the United States' General Staff are certainly not identical with those of the British or French; probably it could reckon on a much longer period, subsequent to the declaration of war, in which to supplement its shortage of machines. As to the "inherent weaknesses" of A. F. V.'s, these are familiar to all who have handled them; but there is no need to assume that all these defects are to be permanently reproduced in every new type constructed.

The low rate of speed of the first tanks made them easy gun-targets; but no rifle bullet then in use could penetrate their armour. The theory, however, that "speed is armour" tended by degrees to make armour-plating a secondary consideration; the A. F. V. began to evolve from a land "battle-ship" into a "protected cruiser." But speed also spelt expense. Moreover, the only reply to armour-piercing projectiles must be either more speed or more armour-till finality is reached in one direction. The ultimate triumph of the armour-piercing projectile over both these expedients must always be considered possible.

British designers' latest achievement is a 16-ton tank, the fastest long-range A. F. V. yet made; but until money is allotted for its mass production, it remains, like the anti-tank gun, scheduled as "experimental." Costing about £10,000 apiece, A. F. V.'s of this

type, though triumphs of engineering skill, are extremely complex mechanisms, requiring as repairs and "spares" a multitude of reserve parts. Considerations of the cost of their maintenance, in large numbers ready for war, weigh even more heavily in Great Britain than in the United States; but if this cost is to be regarded as prohibitive, the part to be played by them in the earlier stages of a great war can only be a small one.

The general "motorisation" of the other Arms, which is necessary if all rates of movement are to be governed by that of A. F. V.'s, must produce a crop of fresh problems. The enormously increased, indispensable mechanical impedimenta that must follow and keep pace with "motorised" armies, suggest the dire possibility of the armies being, so to speak, strangled by their own tails. A plan to avoid this palpable danger is the drastic reduction in the personnel of the fighting forces. Thus one authority <sup>(1)</sup> maintained that a mechanised army of 30,000 men would be, for example, a much more powerful instrument than was the B. E. F. of 1914. Assuming, without warrant, that its continental opposites were equally reduced in size, still the amount of mechanical spares, and of skilled mechanics, required to keep even this small army off its feet, and in rapid and continuous motion, would still be formidable; and any prolonged separation of the mass of vehicles from its repair shops might render it completely immobile.

Proper provision for the sudden expansion of production, on the outbreak of war, of every variety of mechanical vehicle, is possible only in a country organised beforehand for "industrial conscription" as real and far-reaching as its military conscription. Such provision cannot be made in a country whose government and people are averse to conscription of any kind whatever.

So much for the material problems; those of a tactical or strategical nature are not much nearer solution. For example; it is impossible to decide whether the sudden irruption of a fleet of A. F. V.'s into an opponent's rear lines would result in his "Strategic Paralysis;" it is scarcely possible, in the light of the limited experience of peace-time exercises, to be sure that such an operation will be attempted in the next war. The natural tendency of anyone wishing to prove a theory by experiment is to provide favourable conditions; and these have sometimes produced one-sided tactical schemes, in

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(1) "Lectures on F. S. R. 111." Major-General J. F. C. Fuller.

which one active party encountered "passive resistance" embodied in the other. In war, of course, it may be possible to mark down, and stalk a passive enemy; yet for reasons of ordinary prudence it is usual to act as though he were on the alert. A mechanised surprise labours under a variety of handicaps; of which, to-day, noise is one, visibility from the air another, and a third a certain lack of flexibility, and liability to awkward mechanical breakdown.

In the exercises of 1934, a small 'independent' mechanised force was employed, in the Salisbury Plain area, against an objective representing the H. Q.'s and services of the line of communications of an army, which was halted and deployed on a wide defensive position. The conditions, of course, were far from ideal for surprise; they included all the usual hindrances and restrictions of a peace manoeuvre-area. The A. F. V.'s were not all of the newest pattern; but in no circumstances of British war are they ever likely to be so. The assumed passive opponent, moreover, proved unexpectedly active, employing both cavalry and guns with conspicuous success. The attempted raid was judged to have failed; partly for want of proper ground reconnaissance, partly for want of covering troops to its line of march, and partly to lack of concealment, and insufficient average speed. This speed was, naturally, governed by those of the slowest vehicles in the column, and the necessity of having them closed up; it would have been even slower had the duties of reconnaissance and covering been properly performed.

Inter-Divisional exercises in the Aldershot Command, in 1935, afforded several interesting situations; for example, a massed frontal attack by A. F. V.'s on a defensive position, strongly held but only lightly entrenched. The attack was to make a breach which the Infantry could afterwards exploit. On the defenders' side, a number of anti-tank guns were hidden on a forward slope below the main position, and were thus judged to have escaped the effects of a smoke barrage laid down on it. Their fire, and that of the defenders' artillery, combined to put the A. F. V.'s largely out of action. This attack, of course, was a reversion to the original tank tactics, by way of experiment; but no decided body of opinion can be said to favour such reversion.

In the subsequent Army Manœuvres, held in Wiltshire and Hampshire, the A. F. V.'s had to operate in enclosed and wooded country very unsuitable to the development of their special qualities.

A completely "motorised" Infantry Brigade, and a partly mechanised Cavalry Regiment were employed to test rapidity of movement, and the effect of an entire absence of horses. The opposing Armies, which were of about equal strength, started some thirty miles apart and met in an encounter battle somewhere in the centre of the manoeuvre area; only the limits of this area constituted some kind of security to their flanks, which otherwise were more or less "in the air." Both the rival Commanders, tempted by these artificial conditions planned enveloping attacks; which, conducted by the available mechanical means, spread themselves out to great lengths in a very short time. If it is considered likely that small, modern armies such as these might encounter each other, as it were, in empty space, then the question of "defensive flanks" assumes a new aspect. The employment of motorised Cavalry and Artillery in wide flanking movements of an "independent" nature, must necessitate, on the part of the opponent, the provision of an equally mobile flank guard; but where in space the two opposing, independent bodies would finally meet, the commanders of the armies could never know. In these exercises it was found that the attempt to provide a more or less stationary flank defence led to the stringing out of divisional fronts to so much as fifteen miles.

At present it appears that the chief problem to be studied is an increased combination of "motorised" troops with A. F. V.'s. Motorised Cavalry, probably horseless, will act with light armoured cars, and light tanks; while Infantry, if only mechanically brought to the battle zone, will be accompanied and supported by the I. tanks, the pattern of which is still the subject of experiment.

As regards all A. F. V.'s, the tendency has lately been to favour the lighter and speedier types, and to consider armour as secondary. Apart from its cost, the British Medium tank is by many considered unsuitable, as being too slow and too conspicuous in action. In fact, many advanced thinkers are already contemplating a future when armour will once more, and finally, disappear from the battlefield; in which the machine-gun bullet and the gas-shell will reign supreme.

## THE CHOICE OF A SCHOOL

BY MAJOR G. E. HAMILL, I.A. (RETIRED).

### *A Major Problem.*

This is one of the major problems which the parent has to face. It cannot be shelved. A solution has to be found. Stated briefly, the problem is to find a good school charging fees which the parent can afford. I wish to shew that it is possible to do this.

The fact that Public Schools turn out many young men who are inadequately equipped to enter a world in which high standards of efficiency are demanded, is due in many ways to the apathy of the parent. The parent pays fees but seldom takes any action to obtain satisfactory results. If he demands results, he is considered fussy. Once a child has been placed in a particular school, it is often impracticable to make a change even if the parent considers a change desirable.

As a precaution, and to ensure that money spent on education is well-spent, a school should in the beginning be chosen with care and deliberation.

### *My Authority.*

With what authority do I write ?

My investigations into this subject began two years ago, originally on my own behalf and subsequently on behalf of a friend stationed abroad. In my own case I visited schools in Sussex and Kent: in the other, the East Coast. Since that time I have had occasion to visit schools in most of the other counties. My object on each occasion was to find schools suitable for the children of Service Parents with limited means.

As a result of these investigations, I am able to say that it is possible for every parent to educate his child at a good school at a fee he can afford to pay. See Appendix A.

The maximum inclusive fee which I can at present afford is £90 a year. This is what I pay at an excellent Boys' Preparatory School in Broadstairs. My standards are, I think, high and I believe I have made a wise choice.

The procedure I shall outline will enable every parent to solve his own particular problem without difficulty.

*Service Parents are Nomadic.*

If the parent is permanently resident in England, it is a relatively simple matter to arrange his child's education. The Service Parent, however, may to-day be stationed at Catterick or Shorncliffe, and to-morrow at Rawalpindi or Gibraltar. Similar conditions obtain in all the Services.

However frequently the parent may move, it is not desirable that a child's education should be continually interrupted. Hence when a child reaches school age, the wisest plan usually is to select a Boarding School.

I am not going to discuss the relative merits of Boarding and Day Schools. Most Service Parents are obliged at some time or other, to leave their child at home when they go abroad. They have no alternative therefore, but to send the child to a Boarding School. There is no satisfactory compromise.

If both parents are abroad, arrangements have to be made for the care of the child during holidays. Where reliable relations or friends are willing to accept this responsibility, no difficulty is experienced. But if such an arrangement cannot be made, another problem arises. Is the child to be left at school or boarded out with a family?

I shall deal with these two problems as briefly and in as practical a manner as possible.

*The Practical Difficulty.*

The parent may say, "I know the exactly type of school I want, where I want it and how much I can afford to pay. But what I do not know is how to find the school. What I want is a Starting Point." This is the chief practical difficulty. My object is not to choose schools, but to suggest how the difficulty mentioned may be overcome.

There are various methods of getting into touch with schools. Lists of schools can be obtained through Scholastic Agencies, from School Books and from Newspapers and Periodicals. I do not propose to discuss the usefulness or otherwise of these methods. I believe, however, I am right when I say that the majority of Service Parents are averse from employing any of the methods mentioned. Something of a more personal nature is desired.

The ideal medium would, I think, be someone whom the parent could consult in the same way as he would consult his lawyer, doctor

or broker. This implies that transactions are conducted on a personal basis and that the client has confidence in the person consulted.

In the matter under discussion it would, I think, be an advantage if the consultant himself were a Service Parent. He would know the type of school required and would appreciate the difficulty of providing school fees with limited means.

#### *The Sound Foundation.*

It is not enough to say, "I want a Good school." This holds good both for a girl and a boy. Let us suppose a Preparatory School is required for a boy. What do we mean by "Good?" These are my views:—

The Preparatory School stage is the most important in a Boy's education. His career at his Public School and in after life will depend largely on the quality of the training given by his Preparatory School. I know parents who have spent from £1,200 to £1,800 on their boy's education, but when the boy left his Public School he had not taken his School Certificate. A Tutor had to be provided to coach the boy for an examination which his parents anticipated he would have taken at school.

Why should this be? Parents cannot afford to spend money so unprofitably. When a boy leaves his Public School he ought, in addition to possessing charming manners and an aptitude for games, to have passed his School Certificate or Matriculation, and have some idea as to what he wants to do.

The responsibility of the Preparatory School is to lay that sound foundation without which this ideal cannot become a reality. The best foundation in my opinion is, to teach the elementary subjects really well; to teach the boy to work hard as well as to play hard, and to do this under the healthiest and happiest conditions. Until the parent insists on these minimum requirements, it is unlikely that there will be any change of thought as far as the schools are concerned.

#### *Fees.*

The difficulty with limited means is to provide fees.

Fees for Boarders vary from £60 to £200 a year exclusive in many cases, of extras. As a general rule, the higher the fee the better the school. This, however, is not an infallible guide. I know a school charging an inclusive fee of £75 a year which, in my opinion,

is a far better school than some charging £120. The school in question is suitable for the children of Service Parents. It is self-contained and has always its full complement of from thirty to forty boys paying full fees. The Headmaster owns the property. No unnecessary expenses are incurred. The school is intended primarily to give a sound education for the lowest possible fee.

We can rule out schools charging over £150 as being beyond the means of the average parent. The school most likely to suit Service Parents charges from £100 to £150, and unless one is certain that a school charging a lower fee is a sound concern, it is better to avoid it.

Many schools are ready to reduce fees in order to get pupils. Some are willing to make a limited number of concessions each year in order to assist parents who cannot afford full fees. I differentiate with reason.

If a school has to meet high overhead charges, it cannot afford to take, say, half its pupils at greatly reduced fees. To do so something has to be sacrificed. Is it the food? Is the teaching staff underpaid? These questions naturally arise. The point I wish to make is that if a concession is to be of value it must be a sound business proposition, both from the point of view of the school and the parent.

There are, as I have indicated, many good schools in a position to make genuine concessions where these are justified. These take the form of Bursaries and the number granted each year is necessarily limited. The child concerned receives exactly the same treatment as those paying full fees, and the parent can with safety accept such a concession.

#### *Parent Decides Maximum Fee.*

Our object is not to "beat down" the school. It is not a question of discovering the lowest fee the school will accept. One is not bartering in an Indian bazaar. The question to be decided is what is the maximum fee the parent can afford. Only the parent himself can decide this, but until it has been decided it is better not to attempt to negotiate with schools.

#### *Private Schools.*

Only certain classes of the community are in a position to take advantage of the educational facilities provided by the State, free of cost—at the ratepayer's expense. This fact has resulted in the

growth of the Private School, or the school depending on private enterprise for its existence.

There are thousands of these schools in England. In Eastbourne alone, there are twenty-two Girls' and eighteen Boys' Preparatory Schools.

As far as I have been able to discover, anyone who chooses to do so can open a school, irrespective of his or her qualifications to assume such a responsibility. It is obvious, I think, that many of these establishments would be rendering a service to posterity were they to close their doors.

Some Private Schools submit themselves to inspection by the Board of Education. This is a voluntary act. Certain requirements have, however, to be fulfilled before a school becomes eligible for inspection. Some schools are eligible but will not submit to inspection—not because they fear inspection, but because they fear red tape and desire to preserve their individuality. There is much to be said for this point of view, provided of course that the school is run on efficient lines.

The inspection referred to is, I understand, very thorough. A school which satisfies the Board's Inspectors, becomes Recognised by the Board of Education. When choosing a school therefore, the parent should find out if it is Recognised, when it was last inspected and the result thereof. Although I, personally, am of the opinion that all Private Schools should be inspected, I would point out that a school may be efficient and yet not be a Recognised School.

*Locality Preferred.*

This usually decides itself. A parent having relations or friends in Sussex will likely look for a school in that or in an adjacent county. For a delicate child, or one not too robust, the south or south-west will probably be chosen. When this has been settled, the field of choice becomes narrowed down and the number of schools to be considered is limited accordingly.

*Considerations in Choosing a Boy's Preparatory School.*

The boy—a child of eight—is about to leave his parents for good, or for at least thirty-six weeks of the year. He is about to exchange for home life the rough and tumble of school life. It is therefore essential that the school selected be one which aims at preserving something of the home atmosphere which the child has hitherto

enjoyed. The transition from home conditions to school life proper should be gradual.

The Preparatory School should not, in my opinion, be regarded either by the parent or by the school as a miniature Public School, but rather as a nursery in which the boy as an individual is prepared for his Public School. In a large Preparatory School with, say, one hundred boys, it is seldom possible to ensure this. During this important stage of his education, it is highly undesirable that a boy should become merely one of a crowd. His individuality must now be developed and preserved. If the Headmaster finds it necessary, because of large numbers, to delegate his responsibilities to Assistant Masters, and if keen competition as between Houses is an important item in the life of the School, the boy becomes a mere pawn in the game. I am definitely against competition in a Preparatory School.

The school selected therefore, should be small, with forty or fifty boys. The Staff should be sufficient to admit of small classes of ten or twelve boys. The atmosphere should be homely and happy.

#### *Preliminary Step.*

Let us assume that the ideal medium has been found, and that the parent wishes to choose a Boys' Preparatory School for his boy at an inclusive fee of £90 a year. The parent will receive a short list of schools considered suitable. Schools will write and send prospectuses.

It is not possible to choose a school from a prospectus, but just as one studies the map before going out to the ground, so one should study a prospectus. It has to be remembered that it is the school which compiles the prospectus, and that whereas one is told that, "Guinness is GOOD for you," Guinness may really be very bad for you.

The turn-out of a prospectus can be very informative. Some are cheaply got up and badly printed. Some are altogether too attractive to be genuine. I have seen a prospectus containing a photograph shewing extensive playing fields, whereas actually, the school had no playing fields worth mention. The photograph was so taken that a large piece of Common was included! The prospectus of a good school is usually simple, well-printed on good paper.

The Headmaster's qualifications should be noted. If the letters M. R. S. T. appear after his name they shew that he is a Member of the Royal Society of Teachers. This implies proficiency in Practical

teaching. A degree is desirable but not, in my opinion, absolutely essential. An Honours Degree in Mathematics may be of little use when it comes to teaching small boys simple addition. A Degree may be no indication of proficiency as a Teacher.

It is desirable that the Headmaster himself should be a parent. If he is, he is likely to understand boys, and this is half the battle in teaching boys.

The records of Scholarships recently obtained, will indicate the quality of the work done in special cases. The number of boys passing into the well-known Public Schools and into The Royal Naval College, will indicate the general standard of work.

A large Day connexion is not always an asset to a school.

It is desirable that a school should be self-contained. It should have its own playing fields, carpenters shop, swimming bath, etc.

References are usually quoted in a prospectus. Referees are usually reticent but two or three should be taken up and specific questions asked.

Other useful information will be noted.

#### *The Visit.*

The next step will be to pay a number of visits.

The personality of the Headmaster is reflected in his school.

While the boy is at school the Headmaster and his wife will have to act *in loco parentis* towards him. The question the parent should ask himself is, do they inspire confidence, can I trust them?

Now is the time to ask questions and to become satisfied on all major points. I need not go into details. Food and Health, for example, are of vital importance.

Opportunity should be taken to meet some of the boys and to talk to them.

Normal boys are dirty and untidy, therefore a school should not be too clean. Due regard must of course be paid to hygiene, sanitation and to the undesirability of overcrowding in dormitories.

The value of corporal punishment is, in my opinion, grossly over-rated. I cannot conceive of any situation which justifies a grown man beating a small boy. It is farcical for him to lament, "This hurts me as much as it does you." I cannot believe this. Psychologically it is wrong. The Schoolmaster will ask, "But how are we going to maintain Discipline?" The answer is, "You don't have to maintain 'Discipline' in a well-run Preparatory School." To talk of

Discipline in a Preparatory School is absurd. Boys are naturally mischievous, destructive, noisy and untidy. If they are not, there is something seriously wrong with them. Corporal punishment has never eradicated these faults—if they can be called faults. It is unnecessary to legislate for the maintenance of Discipline in a well-run school. If boys are kept usefully employed and if they are happy they do not break rules, for no rules are necessary. If it becomes necessary to punish a boy, the deprivation of some privilege is much more effective than a beating.

The parent should get some assurance on this question before making his choice.

#### *The Choice.*

Having followed the procedure suggested, the parent cannot fail to form sound impressions of the schools he visits and to decide on the suitably or otherwise of any particular school.

When a school has definitely been decided upon, the parent ought, if possible, to pay a second visit and take his boy with him. If a careful choice has been made, there is little likelihood of the boy not being attracted by the school. Such a visit serves a useful purpose in that it enables the boy to become acquainted with the Headmaster and to meet some of the boys. When he enters the school he will not be entirely a stranger.

Once a decision has been made, it is desirable that the school should be given as free a hand as possible. If both parents are abroad they will not, of course, be able to interfere and it is unlikely that the boy will complain should anything be amiss. Boys are like that, and this is all to the good. Confidence is necessary.

It will serve a useful purpose if the parent will get the Headmaster to be absolutely candid in his reports. When a boy is backward in a particular subject, it is not enough that the Headmaster should say he is weak. The parent probably knows that already. What he does want to know, however, is, what exactly is the school doing about it? It may be the boy's fault, but more often than not it is the fault of the master taking the subject.

Preparatory Schools are notoriously weak where the teaching of important elementary subjects is concerned. One finds a boy devoting a lot of time to French or Latin when he can neither read nor write his own language fluently. These neglected subjects—Reading, Writing and Arithmetic,—are the foundation on which his

future education has to be built up. Neglect to lay this foundation in the early stages will result in an anti-climax such as I described in the beginning.

I am convinced that the parent should, without interfering or fussing unnecessarily, keep a very close watch on his child's progress at school. Since he pays fees, he should insist on sound teaching and the best possible practical results.

*Girls.*

I have referred mainly to the education of the boy. There are essential differences between a boy's and a girl's education. The object is different in many respects, but the necessity for a sound education remains, and hence the same care must be taken in choosing a girls' school as in choosing one for a boy.

*Entire Charge.*

I have not the space at my disposal to enable me to deal fully with this question. Here are a few points for consideration.

If arrangements cannot be made with friends or relations, there are three alternatives. The school can be asked to take charge; the child can be sent to a family or to a holiday home.

I am not keen on the last named. The second is ideal but difficult to find. The first is the simplest and again one is reminded of the necessity for care in choosing.

The cost is usually from two to three guineas a week.

*Financial Provision for Education.*

It is wiser to insure to provide £30 a year for education than to make no provision at all.

SUMMARY.

*The Choice of a School.*

Decide on the type of school required.

Decide on the locality.

Decide on the maximum inclusive fee to be offered.

Decide on the medium to be employed.

Pay a preliminary visit to some of the schools and subsequently a second visit accompanied by the child concerned.

*Entire Charge.*

Decide at the time of choosing the school whether entire charge is to be taken by the school and go into the matter fully.

If a family is required adopt a similar procedure to that employed when choosing a school.

Settle all details, if necessary with legal assistance.

*Financial Provision.*

Decide how much can be afforded for the purpose.

Consult a reliable Insurance Broker.

Insure, whether it be for a large or small amount.

*In Conclusion.*

My wife has always accompanied me on my visits to schools. I mention this because, whereas the father usually chooses his boy's Public School, the mother plays the principal part in choosing the Preparatory School. Mothers usually know instinctively whether a school is suitable or not. They can sense a good school or an unsuitable one without making any conscious effort to do so. In forming opinions I have relied to a great extent on the views expressed by my wife.

In the event of any parent wishing to submit a specific problem, I would require the following information :—

Type of school required.

Locality.

Age and sex of child.

Maximum inclusive fees.

Religious denomination.

Boarder or day.

If entire charge is to be taken.

Any other relevant information.

[*Editor's Note.*—The address of the author may be obtained from the Secretary, United Service Institution of India.]

# APPENDIX A

## SCHOOLS GRANTING CONCESSIONS TO SERVICE PARENTS

<i>County.</i>	<i>Normal. Fees.</i>	<i>Concessional Rate, p. a.</i>
<i>Kent—</i>	£	£
Country, Girls' .. ..	120	75
Folkestone, Girls' .. ..	150	100
Folkestone, Boys' Prep. ..	150	90
Broadstairs, Boys' Prep. ..	150	90
<i>Sussex—</i>		
Eastbourne, Boys' Prep. ..	105	80
Eastbourne, Boys' Prep. ..	126	100
Country, Boys' Prep. ..	150	100
Coast, Girls' .. ..	126	90
Coast, Girls' .. ..	140	100
<i>Hants—</i>		
Country, Boys' Prep. .. ..	156	80
Country, Boys' Prep. .. ..	126	80
Country, Boys' Prep. .. ..	141	90
Coast, Girls' .. ..	150	105

These are some of the schools my wife and I have visited. We consider them suitable for the children of service parents. Similar concessions are obtainable at other schools known to us in Devon, Dorset, Surrey, on the East Coast, in the West Country, and a few in the Midlands and the North.

## APPENDIX B

## TYPES OF SCHOOLS AND NOTES

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| Boys' Preparatory                                | .. For boys under 15 preparing for Public Schools and the Royal Naval College.   |
| Pre-Preparatory                                  | .. For boys and girls preparing for Preparatory Schools.   |
| Home   | .. For small boys and girls.   |
| Nursery  | .. For infants.  |
| Girls' Preparatory                               | .. For girls preparing for Girls' Public or Private Schools. Most Girls' Schools nowadays have a Junior Department which serves the purpose of a Preparatory School.                                   |
| Girls' Public                                    | .. Administered by a Board of Governors.   |
| Domestic Science                                 | .. For senior girls. Most Girls' Schools have a Domestic Science Department but there are also a number of schools which specialise in the subject.  |
| Tutor  | .. For backward or delicate boys and girls or for those requiring special coaching.  |
| M. R. S. T.                                      | .. Member of the Royal Society of Teachers. Membership implies proficiency in Practical Teaching.  |
| Incorporated Association of Preparatory Schools. | Headmasters of Boys' Preparatory Schools are eligible for membership. One of the aims is to advance the interests of Preparatory School education and to ensure efficient liaison with Public Schools. |

## INDIAN ARTILLERY

BY MAJOR M. E. S. LAWS, M.C., R.A.

It is curiously appropriate that the year 1935 which witnesses the formation of the first unit of the Indian Artillery should also mark the centenary of the senior Indian Mountain Battery of the Royal Artillery. The 5th Bombay Mountain Battery, R.A., which completes a hundred years of unbroken service this autumn, is one of the only two surviving links between the old Native Artillery of the East India Company and the new Indian Artillery.

The early history of the Native Artillery units of the Indian Army is obscure, but it is clear that the policy of enlisting Gollandaz (or Indian Gunners) was at first only adopted with great reluctance. A letter from the Court of Directors of the East India Company dated 17th June 1748 laid down that no "Indian black, or person of mixed breed or Roman Catholic of what nation soever, should be admitted into a laboratory or military magazine," and later this order was extended so as to prohibit the employment of native artillerymen. Accordingly Indians were only enlisted as gun lascars, and their duties were confined to moving the guns in action by means of drag ropes, and to the carrying of ammunition. But the increasing commitments of the Army in India combined with the acute shortage of British gunners, compelled the local authorities to ignore this order and in August 1777 the first company of Indian gunners was raised for service with the Oudh Brigade. This unit, under Lieutenant Robert Bruce, marched with General Goddard's column from Bengal *via* Bundelkund to Bombay in 1778 and behaved so steadily that two further companies of Gollandaz were raised in Bengal, and these were later expanded to form three battalions of eight companies each and the gun lascar companies were disbanded.

But this reorganisation was most unpopular in the Army, since it meant the withdrawal of battalion guns from infantry regiments and their grouping into batteries manned by Gollandaz. Immediately a storm of protest arose and the old order forbidding the employment of Indian gunners was again invoked. The Court of Directors (Minutes of Council dated 23rd November 1779) decided that the Indian artillery companies were to be disbanded, but apparently

took no adequate steps to augment the supply of European gunners to take their place. This was the more extraordinary as the British were at that time on the eve of hostilities with the Mahrattas and were also fighting Hyder Ali of Mysore. So the Golandaz were disbanded and their guns once more distributed among the infantry battalions, where they were far less efficiently served by untrained sepoys.

Since no increase had been made in the number of British artillerymen, gun lascars were again recruited "to perform all the duties of ordnance with the exception of pointing and loading guns and mortars." Meanwhile, the disbanded Golandaz, refusing to re-enlist as lascars and thus accept a lower status, mostly took service with the Mahrattas and fought against the Company's troops with great gallantry. For some years this system continued, but in 1798 another expedient was tested. To each European artillery company was added an Indian officer and 46 Golandaz, the intention being that the two races should be mixed indiscriminately in the gun detachments. But the Golandaz—who were officially termed "The Component Part"—objected strongly to working beside men of different race, language, customs and religion. The British gunners were also discontented since they mistrusted the reliability of the Indians at drill and a lack of care in those days of muzzle loading guns firing powder charges meant a serious accident, with the probability of death or mutilation for most of the detachment. In 1802 after many protests the Component Parts were withdrawn from European units and were merged into a separate Golandaz establishment which was officially sanctioned in 1806. Many of the men enlisted had already manned the Mahratta guns against the British during Lake's campaign and had thus proved their staunchness as soldiers and their ability as gunners.

From this time onwards the Native Artillery grew steadily in strength. The original Bengal establishment of five companies in 1806 was increased to seven in 1809, to 10 in 1812 and to 15 in 1818. Meanwhile Madras had also been experimenting with Golandaz and though units formed in 1784 and 1799 had been disbanded soon after being raised, the Native Artillery was definitely established in 1819. Bombay raised five Golandaz companies in 1826, and by 1846 there were 12 companies of Indian gunners on that establishment. The companies were in all cases entirely separate units and they soon

earned an excellent reputation for steadiness and skill. Thus the Bombay Golandaz took part in the campaigns in Arabia, Persia, Afghanistan, Sind, Capture of Aden and the Mutiny, while the Madras Native Artillerymen fought in Burma, China and Malaya. The Bengal Golandaz were engaged during the Mahratta War (1817), in Burma, Afghanistan, Gwalior (1843) and the Sikh Wars, and in several cases these companies were awarded special distinctions as a reward for good service. Thus the 2nd Company of the 6th Battalion, Bengal Artillery, received the unique honour of having a mural crown engraved on its guns to commemorate its gallantry during the defence of Jelalabad in 1841-2. (G. G. O. of 9th January 1843). The 3rd Bombay Golandaz Company was authorised to bear the word "Hyderabad" on its appointments (G. G. O. of 11th April 1843) as a reward for its services during the Sind campaign, while the 5th Company of the 2nd Battalion, Bombay Artillery was permitted to have "Beni-Boo-Ali" inscribed on its appointments (G. O. of 11th February 1831) for its gallantry during the Arabian expedition of 1820.

When the Mutiny broke out there were 6 Troops of Native Horse Artillery and 36 companies of Native Foot Artillery in India, besides the semi-independent Indian units of the Punjab Frontier Force and the contingents maintained by various States. Though nearly all the Bengal Cavalry and Infantry regiments were infected by the spirit of mutiny, only ten Golandaz regular units failed in their loyalty and in no case was any violence offered to their officers. Indeed several Troops and Companies of Native Artillery fought against the rebels and proved themselves entirely trustworthy, while in at least one case (1st Company, 7th Battalion, Bengal Artillery) the Indian gunners carried out death sentences on convicted mutineers—a high test of loyalty. But when the Company's Artillery was absorbed into the Royal Artillery in 1862, it was decided that no Indian gunners were to be retained on the regular establishment except in the Frontier Force, and the Golandaz Companies were gradually reduced.

There were however two exceptions to this rule. The old 8th and 10th Companies of Bombay Golandaz were retained as the 1st and 2nd Companies of the Native Artillery and were equipped as Mountain Batteries. They are to-day the 5th (Bombay) and 6th (Jacob's) Mountain Batteries R. A. and can trace their unbroken descent from the original Golandaz units raised in 1835 and 1843

respectively. From after the Mutiny until January 1935 there were no Indian Artillery units other than the Mountain Batteries and these did not belong to the Royal Artillery until 1927 (Army Order 88/1927.)

The old distrust of the Indian Artilleryman which was first officially set forth in 1748 and which was revived in 1862 has at last been definitely abandoned. The services of the Indian Mountain Batteries during the Great War—which were rewarded by the grant of the title Royal to the 1st (but not the senior) battery—have disposed of all doubts as to their loyalty and efficiency, and the formation of the Indian Artillery is perhaps the happiest sign that the old prejudice is forgotten.

## PRIVILEGE LEAVE TO AUSTRALIA

By LT.-COL. R. H. MYLNE, M.C., 4TH P. W. O. GURKHA

### RIFLES

Two months' privilege leave to Australia—and why not? The object of this article is to try and place before the officer community of the Army in India the numerous advantages which, in the opinion of the writer, as the result of a recent round trip by P. and O. to Australia and back during August and September, this particular form of leave affords to all who are minded to seize the chance while it offers. It is written in the hope that it may cause a few who would not otherwise have considered the question, to give it a passing thought and, in the case of those who may have already envisaged it for future years, to try and convince them that they would be unlikely to have any ultimate cause for regrets over their choice.

How then to attack the question?

First of all is it not a fact that for those who have already spent a good many years in this country the choice of where to spend one's two months of the hot weather in India is a problem not always susceptible of very easy solution? There are some who, having enjoyed the delights of Kashmir once, for one reason or another feel disinclined to repeat the expedition. Again, even the keenest shikari may feel that in the year in question his health is deserving of more consideration than to spend his two months in the jungle. Sight-seeing anywhere in the plains is obviously impossible except during the cold weather. The normal round of hill-station life is, to say the least of it, a spineless sort of existence for two months for such as could hope to fare better. The dash to England and back, unless of course it be a measure of necessity, in spite of the many advantages it may bring is, in the opinion of many, too unrestful and expensive an experience to be worth while.

If, then, for any or all of the above reasons leave in India does not seem to meet the case and the choice of where to spend those two months already lies outside her shores, surely a visit to the Antipodes, for all but those who are afflicted with a rooted dislike to the sea, should have much to offer as an alternative. Just how much must naturally depend on individual tastes as to what a well-

spent leave should, embrace, and to generalise would be unwise, but an excellent argument on the credit-side is that one is, so to speak, half-way there from the start and that a similar chance may never occur again once one has left India for good, if only on the score of expense alone.

It can hardly be out of place, then, for the writer to give a rough outline of his own experiences during the two months, whilst adding from the outset that they provided him with the happiest and most interesting short leave which he has ever been privileged to enjoy during 29 odd years in the East. In other words he speaks from the point of view of an enthusiast on the subject, but will try and temper his feelings by setting forth dispassionately under certain headings such points as should be of general interest. These are :—

- (a) The voyage there and back.
- (b) The country and the people who live in it.
- (c) Kit and finance.

(a) *The Voyage*.—As already mentioned, for such as dislike to “go down to the sea in ships” a “sea” leave of this nature is already ruled out. On the other hand, even to those who have long since wearied of the sameness of endless voyages to England and back it is recommended that they do not allow themselves to be put off straight away by the prospect of the bulk of their time being spent on board, say, a P. & O. Liner of the nature of the *Strathaird* or *Strathnaver*, both of which have in their turn of late years been doing the Australian run during the hot weather. The contrast in conditions of the rapid voyage to England and back and that of the long Australian cruise is just as marked as can be. During the former the natural tendency, and a very noticeable one, is for the ordinary passenger from the moment he embarks at Bombay, to be thinking mainly of the moment when he can scuttle off again at Marseilles. The voyage throughout is merely a means to an end and the quicker the means are accomplished the sooner will the end be achieved. Whereas, by contrast, on a two-months cruise he will at once come to look on the ship as his temporary home thus investing it with much the same regard as he might feel towards any well-found hotel in which he has elected to take up his abode for a similar period, and it will be surprising if his whole nautical outlook does not at once change in proportion.

There may also be a tendency to exaggerate in anticipation the length and resultant dullness of the periods that are to be spent purely at sea between ports. Actually the only long period is the nine days between leaving Colombo and touching at the first Australian port, namely, Fremantle. Thereafter the other ports follow in quick succession, each with its attendant variation of interest. Neither on the outward nor the homeward voyage at the time of the year in question is the ship anything approaching full, with the result that ample space and privacy, if desired, is to hand of the traveller; hence ship travel begins to reveal itself in a new light and at once assumes its brightest mantle of real comfort. No extremes of either heat or cold are likely to be experienced, and at the other end one finds oneself in a climate, probably unrivalled anywhere in the world, in the pleasant transition period from late winter to early spring, when the days on which the sun fails to shine are comparatively few and the atmosphere generally is as pleasant an antidote to the recent fatigues of the hot weather in India as the soul of man could desire.

An outline of the ship's itinerary throughout the complete voyage is given below :—

*Outward journey.*

Z	day	dep.	Bombay.
Z plus 3	day	arr.	} Colombo.
		dep.	
Z plus 12	„	arr.	} Fremantle.
		dep.	
Z plus 16	„	arr.	} Adelaide.
		dep.	
Z plus 18	„	arr.	Melbourne.
Z plus 19	„	dep.	Melbourne.
Z plus 21	„	arr.	Sydney.
Z plus 22	„	dep.	Sydney.
Z plus 24	„	arr.	Brisbane.
Z plus 26	„	dep.	Brisbane for cruise to Fiji Islands.
Z plus 35	„	arr.	Sydney.

*Homeward journey.*

Z plus 37	day	dep.	Sydney.
Z plus 39	„	arr.	Melbourne.
Z plus 40	„	dep.	Melbourne.
Z plus 42	„	arr.	} Adelaide.
		dep.	
Z plus 46	„	arr.	} Fremantle.
		dep.	
Z plus 55	„	arr.	} Colombo.
		dep.	
Z plus 58	„	arr.	Bombay.

A glance at the above will show that at Colombo, Fremantle and Adelaide the ship halted in port for the day only, but on every occasion this comprised a generous "inside of a day," both going and returning, thus providing an ample spell on shore for sight-seeing or, may be, a round of golf. At Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane two full days are at one's disposal, and in such glorious cities the possibilities are great, always assuming that the voyage is one for whom new places and new people hold their genuine appeal. Furthermore, even those to whom the very word sight-seeing is apt to conjure up visions of super-organised parties being rushed round in charabancs by garrulous guides may set all such fears at rest. Hired cars for organised tours certainly are at once to hand in every port and may be booked from the ship's bureau, at very reasonable cost withal and excellently arranged in every way. In fact, as far as the writer's experience goes, they have everything to recommend them. The drivers are efficient at their trade and themselves constitute the guides, explaining just as much or as little as their passengers desire, but the ultra-loquacious specimen was never encountered and they seemed to take a genuine pleasure in showing off whatever their town had to offer, with a pride in it that was nothing but justifiable. But for those who prefer to wander on their own, picking out their own itinerary in their own way, the information contained in the little brochures issued free on board the day before arrival, provides much of the information requisite to avoiding waste of valuable time. At night during the periods in port one's floating hotel with its every comfort renders it a pure waste of money to sleep in hotels on shore.

There remain the periods between Z plus 26 and Z plus 35 days, which on this occasion the *Strathaird* spent on the cruise from Brisbane to the Fiji Island, returning direct to Sydney, from which port she commenced the homeward journey. Of this the writer had no personal experience, having preferred to spend the ten days on shore, divided between Brisbane and Sydney, in preference to spending an additional ten days at sea with the prospect of less than two full days at Suva in the middle. Some of us Army folk disembarked at one or other of the remaining ports whilst others did the whole round voyage. Suffice it to say that on all these short cruises the ship becomes extremely crowded with Australian trippers, for whom in fact the cruise is primarily laid on. Many of these may never before

have left their own state, with the result that, faced with the prospect of spending their ten days' holiday at sea, they are determined to do the thing thoroughly. The ship inevitably responds in turn by providing a highly organised programme of sports and entertainments of every kind with few empty moments, and, if a recommendation be called for at all, it is that this part of the voyage may well be avoided and the time spent far more profitably on shore in trying to see a little more of Australia itself, which one has come so far to see, and all the pleasures that it offers.

To sum up : for those who completed the Fiji cruise as an all—in part of the round trip, the number of days spent on Australian or Fijian soil totalled sixteen in all. For a passenger who disembarked at Brisbane and re-embarked at Sydney this was increased by ten days, making a total of twenty-six days in all, of which the ten days in the middle were continuous. Both going and returning also, a whole inside of a day could be spent on shore at Colombo, which for those who were minded could comfortably include the very pretty drive to Kandy and back.

(b) *The Country and the People.*—To attempt to give any detailed description of the country itself must be considered beyond the scope of this article, as it would savour of treading lightly on ground already well-trodden down by many and better feet. But to most visitors the charm of Australia's five great ports, namely, Fremantle (the port of Perth), Adelaide, Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane, the capitals, respectively, of Western Australia, South Australia, Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland, must surely lie in their great contrasts, whilst to the round voyager too there is the advantage that the two *chez-d'œuvres*, Melbourne and Sydney, come late in the programme ; and those who gasp mildly at the beauties of Perth, as well they may do, may find their breath coming shorter still after Melbourne and Sydney. Even then the greater homeliness of Brisbane, with its contrasting semi-tropical vegetation and climate, will not be without its charms. There is a saying that a stranger arriving to take up permanent residence in Melbourne is asked "Where do you come from ?" In Sydney the question is "How much have you got ?" And in Brisbane "How d'ye do ?" Perhaps there is something in it. But in every single port there is much to see both within the town itself and outside it. The only difficulty lies in seeing all that one would wish to in the time, though gaps left on the outward journey may still be filled in as far as possible during the return trip.

and if a word of advice may be given to the prospective visitor who has not the time to journey far inland, it is to concentrate on the towns themselves and their immediate environs rather than on the outlying country which borders them—that is, as far as the scenic beauties of the latter are concerned. Many beautiful sights there undoubtedly are, but there is a tendency in Australia to exaggerate scenery to the eyes of anyone who has travelled at all extensively elsewhere. To do so in the case of what the towns themselves afford, both at Melbourne and Sydney, would be difficult. In other words, each in its own way is unique—the country in their close vicinity is not. Few places could be harder to describe in adequate terms than Sydney. The visitor will assuredly be prepared for a beautiful harbour, spanned by what is generally termed the finest bridge in the world, but he is likely to find that both of them are far beyond his expectations; and he can be possessed of no soul at all if, on first introduction, he fails to experience a thrill from the time when the pilot is picked up outside The Heads until the ship finally ties up at the Quay. More especially when, as it passes under the famous bridge, the optical illusion remains to the last possible minute that a considerable portion of the mast must be carried away in the process.

So far we have spoken of the ports only without mentioning what, as most Australians will tell you, the “real Australia” consists of, namely, the life on the “stations” inland, which those who base themselves on the ship throughout the whole voyage will not have the opportunity of glimpsing. Those who break the journey at Brisbane, however, or at one of the other ports, will have this chance, to a greater or lesser extent according to their separate tastes. A possible compromise which affords a fleeting impression in economical form is to travel by train from Brisbane to Sydney, not by the direct coastal route which occupies approximately 24 hours, but to spend some 5 hours longer in the train and travel inland *via* the Toowoomba Ranges. “Trains and sleeping accommodation are both good and moderate, as are the meals at the recognised halts, and the country traversed will at least afford a glimpse from the train of some typical country such as the stations administer—mile upon mile of land under cultivation, animals at grass in their paddocks, here and there a lonely bungalow or straggling township, but otherwise hardly a living soul in sight. With this comes realisation of the extreme paucity of population for so vast a country—seven millions in all, of

whom nearly half are comprised by the combined populations of Melbourne and Sydney alone, and the grand total of whom is more than swallowed up by that of Greater London. Is it to be wondered at that the problem is ever present of how much longer the policy of a "White Australia" can continue to be maintained? That it has lasted as long as it has is surely a lasting testament to the country, always bearing in mind that Australia, as countries go, is yet in its teething stage and that Melbourne, the city of wide and tree decked thoroughfares, with its open spaces and glorious green parks, all planned by master hands, has only quite recently celebrated its centenary.

It is not proposed to make more than passing reference to the possibilities which Australia holds out to the War Block or normally-pensioned officer. There was more than one officer on board on the return voyage who had been spending his furlough there with a possible eye to the future. But the subject has been duly dealt with in the various pamphlets issued for the benefit of all such by Army Headquarters, and it will be sufficient to say that of the several States of the Commonwealth, New South Wales and Queensland, especially the latter, are generally considered to offer the greatest opportunities. Sir Leslie Wilson, some time Governor of Bombay and now Governor of Queensland, and who must therefore be more than ordinarily qualified to understand the outlook of the retired officer from the the East, has himself written up the amenities of Queensland after touring in it extensively. Furthermore, in conversation with him in his study at Government House in Brisbane, he spoke of it in equally, if not more, enthusiastic terms than he has already expressed in print.

And what of the people themselves, or such of the seven million as the privilege-leave-wallah is likely to encounter throughout his journey, and what sort of impressions of them is he likely to carry away? Whatever these may be it will be surprising if a memory of the most genuine and open-handed hospitality on every side does not hold pride of place. It may be that the visitor will start with a few introductions already, but should this not be the case let him have no fears of any real necessity for them. Acquaintances made on board ship are likely to mature into friendships on shore, and no feeling of loneliness or of being in a strange land can hold good in a country where, as Australians will always assure you, "we are all

British," and who, even if they have never been there, will commonly refer to England as "home." Remember'also that the Englishman on shore in Australia, even when he is on leave from India, is not immediately recognisable as such and is likely to be taken for an Australian at the start or until he proclaims the facts to be otherwise. It is true that for anyone who has travelled much the motto "In Rome do as the Romans do" is one which it does him no harm to bear in mind, but the necessity for it must be largely discountenanced in a country where he at once finds himself a "Roman amongst Romans."

It will be strange if he is not struck with the fine physique of the population, especially amongst the male fraternity, which is noticeable at once even in the capital cities, where the weedy and under-nourished specimen is infinitely less in evidence than in any of our big cities at home. Unemployment there is, though happily on a far smaller scale than in England, and the prevailing atmosphere, as it is likely to strike the outsider, is that of a healthy and prosperous community where labour is well paid ; where sport in its every variety is exceptionally easy to obtain and at an extremely low cost ; and where amongst all classes a genial and entirely natural camaraderie takes the place of the somewhat icy frigidity that even nowadays is apt to enshroud the severer class distinctions of life in the Homeland.

Tipping of all and sundry, on the part of the inhabitants themselves at any rate, is far less the recognised order of things than in England or on the Continent—at times its absence is even somewhat noticeable. From the English visitor, once he is known to be such, it is fair to say that a tip is usually hoped for but nonetheless gratefully accepted.

A notice which appeared in this Journal not long ago exhorted officers when visiting Australia to be sure to call on the various Messes. The writer, who made a point of doing so in all the ports, would like to endorse this excellent advice. You certainly should have no regrets for doing so—but let your head be a strong one !

Strange as it may seem, there is even now one topic of conversation which may well be left alone, whether it be on board ship or on shore, in the company of Australians, namely, International Cricket—that is, unless you are sufficiently adroit in steering the conversation deftly through the channels bounded by the Bodyline-controversy. Discussion on this vexed and sorely tried subject is

seldom easy to conduct in the amicable and impartial spirit that one would wish in the circumstances—and that in the third year since the series of Test games which gave it its most inopportune birth—truly a sad indictment of two great sporting communities.

Why raise the subject? But even that advice may be easier to give than to follow when, if you are a keen cricketer, you are likely to pay a visit to the beautiful grounds in Adelaide, Melbourne and Sydney, quack with groundsmen and pavilion keepers, pore over old photos and autographs—and—relate your experiences to your hosts at supper the same evening. If so, beware of the fat that may already be frizzling in the fire.

Be that as it may, should your views on the whole miserable controversy have been entirely pro-English at the time of leaving Bombay, it is unlikely, should you be unwise enough to enter into discussions on them during your time in Australia, that you will not end by at least modifying them.

A custom that may strike you as an extremely pretty one is what may be termed the “streamer habit”—in other words the practice of throwing streamers from the shore to the ship and *vice versa* during the half hour preceding the vessel's departure from the quay. It is believed to have emanated from America and now-a-days is an universal custom in Australia, the streamer of coloured paper forming the last link between the departing passenger and his (or her) friends on shore, who will have come down in their dozens to see him off, and who will freeze to their end of the streamers until the ship is sometimes fifty yards from the dockside and the paper finally parts in the middle. At one port where the number of departing passengers was extra large and the ship's side was a mass of streamers from stem to stern, a rough calculation put the value of coloured paper floating in the air at £50—and a streamer costs sixpence.

It is probable that in at least one of the ports you may be bombarded by press reporters for interviews and by press photographers for your snapshot on deck. Whether you give in or not is your own concern, but, should you do so, the experience will not be without its amusing side. It may be that you will even be asked on shore to spare five minutes of your valuable time to giving a five-minute chat in the “In Town Tonight” broadcast on the local radio. The writer, who was weak enough, after an early refusal, to submit himself eventually to “Sydney 2 S. M.,” found the experience most

entertaining, if only as giving him a glance from behind the scenes at the inner workings of a Wireless Studio.

(c) *Kit and Finance*.—Of the above two headings the first calls for but little comment. A point not to be forgotten, however, is that, as already mentioned, a trip during the Indian hot weather embraces at the other end either the Australian winter or the beginning of spring a fact which constitutes one of the greatest advantages of the trip. Hence, when crossing the Bight especially, the weather is apt not only to be rough but sometimes extremely cold. Consequently in the various ports, where incidentally the climate will vary very considerably, and for a good portion of the voyage both ways, ordinary English clothes are required. On the other hand the portion from Colombo until a day or so after crossing the Line will probably produce the same warm stickiness as prevails anywhere southwards in India at the time when you leave, thus necessitating plenty of tropical stuff in addition. In other words, with the great variations of climate and the length of the voyage both ways, there is not really very much of one's mufti outfit that calls to be left behind.

It will be found that in Australia, both in hotels and private houses, dressing for dinner, in the accepted sense of the word, is far less in vogue than in England, still less so again than in India. The reason is not far to seek—the servant problem simply does not admit of it, and even Mary Jane of the Hotel, by the time 8 P.M. is striking, if you are still seated at your dinner table will be making vigorous onslaughts on the plates under your nose as threatening the punctuality of her subsequent appointment for the "pictures." Hence a dark suit, or better, a thick and a thin dark suit, for you may be glad of either, is an essential item.

Let anyone who is a golfer, whether good, bad or indifferent, make sure of taking his clubs. Golf courses are many in all the ports and absolutely first-class in some, with the added advantage that both green fees and caddies' wages are, generally speaking, far lower than is customary in England. Moreover the general rule is for the Clubs to extend a cordial welcome to the overseas visitor.

And lastly Finance, which must necessarily divide itself into the expenses of the voyage itself and those on shore at the other end. As to the voyage, seeing that every detail of the cost of passages is readily available in highly advertised form from Shipping Firms

and Agents, and that they are liable to yearly fluctuations, it would be superfluous to do more than quote actual costs on this occasion. These came to £56, first class, for the whole round cruise, including the Fiji portion. In other words one's keep for all purposes of food and accommodation on board for every day of the two months worked out at less than a pound per day. Cutting out the Fiji cruise and spending the corresponding period on shore made an almost negligible difference, as far as passage money was concerned. Leaving the shores of India also had its attendant compensations in the matter of Income Tax. And one thing more—for those who are over forty-five years of age and are fortunate enough to have a Government passage up their sleeve, bear in mind that, in accordance with the regulations, it can be utilised for the trip and you will have the satisfaction of knowing that your keep for the two months has been met at the expense of King George.

As far as the remaining expenses are concerned, both at sea and on shore, these must of necessity vary so much according to the tastes and spending propensities of the individual, including his capacity at the bar, that any detailed estimate is hardly feasible. It may not be out of place to mention, however, what these totalled up to in the case of the writer of this article. They include all tips and other boardship expenses attendant on a long voyage, ten days in hotels at Brisbane and Sydney, the roundabout railway journey between the two ports, plenty of ordinary sightseeing and a good modicum of golf, but exclude the rail journeys to and from Bombay, not forgetting at the same time that at present one English pound produces twenty-five Australian shillings on the exchange. Long may it remain so. In his case £50 amply covered the lot, and of this sum he regrets nothing.

His hope is that the reading of this article may be the indirect means of encouraging others to go and do likewise.

## HIS MAJESTY'S PRIMULAS

As told to Captain M. C. Nolan, Assistant Recruiting Officer, Burma, by Riflemen Agrawng Hpung and Labwi Tsi, 20th Burma Rifles.

Note, the Kachin word "Kha," means river.

"O Chief, we two be Nungs, mountaineers from the headwaters of the N'mai Kha which joins the Mali Kha to form the Irrawaddy just North of the town of Myitkyina, the Northern terminus of the railway in Burma.

Why did we join the Army, O Chief? Well, we Nungs are wanderers by nature, we are a poor people living in a barren mountainous country and we have always had a longing for adventure and to see the wonders of the Great World far to the South, of which vague rumours filtered through to us occasionally.

However, being cut off by the powerful marauding Kachins, we had been unable to satisfy our craving for wandering until the British occupied the Hkamti Long plain in 1914 and gradually started to open up the hinterland and make it safe for travellers.

So we were very interested when, some twelve years ago, a white military chief accompanied by some Kachin soldiers visited our village saying that he had heard we were a brave race and asking us to join the Army.

We thought the Kachins with him were the most phenomenal liars as they talked of houses made of iron which travelled at great speed along an iron road carrying hundreds of people, of machines one hundred times greater than the largest eagle that flew through the air with a great roaring, of horseless carriages driven by the white chiefs, of guns firing three or four hundred pellets a minute and other wonders.

However the maidens looked with favour on the soldiers as they had plenty of money and gave them beads, mirrors and other presents, so that our young men were very jealous, also the soldiers mocked our young men saying that they were afraid to leave their mothers, so that they nearly came to blows.

Anyhow, after long and weighty deliberations with our elders, some of the more venturesome of our young men agreed to join the Army and marched away with the white chief and his soldiers.

We heard no more of them for some years and we thought that they were surely dead, for, as you know, O Chief, in those days none of us knew how to read and write, when suddenly they re-appeared in the village saying they had been granted seven and a half moons leave on full pay and bringing in their turn money and gifts for their parents and the maidens so that we two, who had grown up in their absence, were very jealous.

Many things they told us, O Chief, and being our kinsmen we believed them, though insisting that they were liars from jealousy, so that when a white military chief came again for more recruits we slipped away and joined him.

Many tribulations we suffered on our way to Maymyo, O Chief; half-way between Hkamti Long and Myitkyina, we came on a party of Government armed men (Burma Military Policemen) and they had with them great animals as large as houses with enormous long noses and two great teeth as long as one's leg, which made a great noise so that we were very frightened and ran away into the jungle, whereat the soldiers laughed hugely and told us they were tame animals used for carrying food, so that we were very much ashamed.

At Myitkyina too, after we had rested and fed, we were put into long houses in which we were sitting quite comfortably, when suddenly there was a great whistling and the houses started off down the road gradually gaining speed; we thought we were surely bewitched and hurriedly climbed out through the openings on to the ground, seeing which our white chief made a signal and the houses gradually stopped moving; our white chief was angry with us but laughing at the same time and, after he had explained to us that these were the iron houses running on an iron road of which we had heard and that there was nothing to fear, we settled down in peace.

At Maymyo the white medicine men examined us, thumped us and pulled us, made us hop and leap, examined our eyes and teeth and finally stuck little needles into us which made us very sick for a day or two.

Then we were taken along to the Training Battalion, washed, which nearly killed us, it being too cold in our country for washing, and given great quantities of strange clothes such as we had never seen before, so that some of us put them on back to front and some put those intended for their legs over their heads, so that the soldiers with us were helpless with laughter.

However, eventually, we were clothed and then we were told numerous things we must do and innumerable things we must not do, so that our brains reeled for we are a free people accustomed to doing as we please.

The next morning we were taken out and made to do this thing called P. T., which made us ache all over, so that we groaned much during the nights and bethought us of running away but knew not how to do so.

However that is all long past now, O Chief, and we in our turn have become clean upright soldiers and laughed at the trials of many hundreds of recruits.

We two have always been good soldiers and have no entries in our conduct sheets so that we were very much upset and worried when our Platoon Commander told us during the fourth moon of 1934 that we were wanted in the Orderly Room and cudgelled our brains to think in what manner we had erred.

However our Commanding Officer was very kind and told us that we had been recommended to him as two good steady men from the Nung country and that he had selected us accordingly to go and search for certain kinds of flowers, which the Great White King had heard grew near our country and desired for his garden in England.

Well, O Chief, we were very surprised but proud, honoured and excited when we were told this, as we had not thought that the Great White King, who lives so many moons march to the west, had ever heard of our race or country and promised to do our level best to find the flowers.

Next day, we were taken along to the office of the white chiefs, who control the cutting down of trees, and shown and given photographs and samples of the flowers required, being told to get some red and white ones and some seeds.

After receiving full instructions, we left for Myitkyina at the middle of the fourth moon, where we bought Chinese clothes as a disguise, also blankets to keep out the cold, and hired a Lisu coolie at a rupee a day to carry our food, which we had to buy for, as you know, O Chief, there is no surplus rice for sale North of Myitkyina.

Then came the question as to which route to take from Myitkyina to the Akhyang valley.

We considered going *via* the country on the East bank of the N'mai Kha through Laukhaung and Hpimaw but we knew that North of Hpimaw the country is uninhabited, the mountains are all covered with dense vegetation and that there are roaring torrents with precipitous banks, which make travelling almost impossible; some of our young men have tried to come down South from the Akhyang *via* this route but have always had to turn back owing to lack of food and the terrible nature of the country, so we abandoned this idea. (Only three white men have travelled this route up to date, Captain Pottinger, driven back by the Maru tribe, in 1897, Kingdon-Ward the botanist in 1914 and Captain Bowerman of the Burma Military Police in 1926, with the utmost difficulty in each case).

Then we considered walking to the confluence and striking North-North East directly across the Triangle to the Akhyang, but this route is still unsafe for strangers and we should undoubtedly have been killed or taken as slaves if we had attempted it, despite the British Government's release of all the slaves in 1924-26 and the despatch of columns into the Triangle every cold weather since.

So we finally decided to strike North up the Myitkyina-Fort Hertz road as far as the Burma Military Police Post at Sumprabum and then East across the Northern part of the Triangle, which has become more or less safe of recent years.

Then when all was ready, we set off up the road to Fort Hertz, which follows more or less the line of the Mali Kha, the road being good most of the way though practically deserted as the monsoon was almost upon us when all the hill people, who keep tea and food stalls on the roadside during the open season, take refuge in the mountains, the road becoming almost impassable through rain and mud.

As far as Sumprabum this part of the journey was comparatively easy, but when we entered the Triangle we soon had to climb the high rocky mountains in the centre and at the same time we had to be careful to avoid any Kachin villages or parties of men travelling as they might fain have robbed or killed us, we being but three and armed only with dahs.

However we came through safely and soon we approached the high rocky mountains, rising to twelve thousand feet, which form the Mali-N'mai Kha Divide, here the going was terrible, we having to climb on our hands and knees a great part of the time, up and

down, up and down seemingly never ending mountains and ridges, being lucky if we progressed forward five or ten miles a day.

Finally at long last we reached the N'mai Kha and then we had to search for miles until we found a cane rope bridge by which to cross.

Here at the confluence of the Akyang, the N'mai Kha is a narrow foaming torrent and crossing these cane rope bridges is highly dangerous, it being necessary to make a loop of one's pagri forming a sling in which one lies on one's back, propelling on self forward by pushing on the rope with one's feet and at the same time pulling with one's hands.

Twenty-five long days marching and climbing it took us, O Chief, before we reached the Akyang Valley and our relatives and friends so, being tired, we rested some days with them and spent our time in sleeping and feasting.

(Reginald Farrar, the botanist, was buried here by the Nungs.)

All the inhabitants of the valley were very interested in the nature of our quest and astonished that the Great White King, who lives so far away, should not only know of us and our country but even of the varieties of flowers that flourish therein and wished us God speed in the fulfilment of our task.

We left all our Government clothing and kit at the house of a relative and donned the Chinese clothes bought in Myitkyina, so that if we encountered any Chinese military police there would be nothing to show that we were Government men as, if the fact were known to them, they would surely put us in gaol as spies and intruders and we might even be tortured to death.

After resting sufficiently, we struck North-East up the Akyang Valley to the very source of the Akyang River, the journey taking six days due to the difficult nature of the country as numerous torrents flow into the Akyang, which are unfordable and can only be crossed by those cane rope bridges, added to which the low mountains are covered with thick vegetation full of leeches and various stinging pests, all of which combined to slow our progress.

At the source of the Akyang, we were confronted with the wall of snow-capped mountains, twelve to sixteen thousand feet high which form the Salween Divide, the feet of these mountains are covered in thick jungle thinning out into tree forest as far as the snow line, the pass being over ten thousand feet high.

Here we were out of the country of the Nungs, our own race, and entering that of the Black Lisus, an evil, treacherous tribe, who use crossbows and arrows tipped with aconite, much feared by all their neighbours, and it behoved us to travel with caution to avoid them.

Three days it took to cross the pass and it was between these mountains and the Salween river that we eventually found the flowers.

At the waning of the sixth moon, we arrived in this country and from then until the waxing of the eighth moon Rifleman Labwi Tsi was attacked by the evil spirits and went more or less insane through suffering, making our travel very difficult; on account of the depth of the snow during the sixth and seventh moons, which made it impossible to see the flowers properly and Labwi Tsi's illness, we abandoned the search until the snows should melt and returned to the last Nung village we had passed.

Here we consulted the village witch-doctor and after a long time and great difficulty he drove evil spirits out of Labwi Tsi after sacrificing nine pigs and a goat, leaving him too weak to move for some weeks.

By this time we were short of money owing to the expenses on sacrifices and so on to the witch-doctor for Labwi Tsi's illness, and also food as little grows there but millet and maize and there is nothing to drink but water, so Agrawng Hpung decided to go to Fort Hertz, wire for more money and buy rice and other provisions from the Shans of the Hkampti Long plain.

This is a journey which we mountaineers all hate especially, as then, in the rains, the way from the Akyang valley to the Shing Rup Kyet pass up the N'mai Hka being very arduous, owing to the necessity of continual crossings of torrents by the cane rope bridges and the unhealthiness of the thick vegetation in the low-lying country by the river, it becoming even more unhealthy and malarious after one has turned West through the now deserted Burma Military Police Post of Kawnglu and approached the Hkampti Long plain.

However it had to be done, so Rifleman Agrawng Hpung set off with the Lisu coolie, leaving Labwi Tsi in the kind hands of the Nung villagers and, after much difficulty and several bouts of fever, he reached Fort Hertz, sent off his wire to the Commanding Officer and, after receiving the telegraphic money order, bought rice and

other provisions, the journey there and back taking several weeks owing to the rough going and frequent attacks of fever.

After Agrawng Hpung's return and early in the eighth moon, Labwi Tsi was strong again so, the snows having melted and there being now a good chance of seeing the flowers, we set forth again over the pass for the country between the divide and the Salween river.

We were lucky in soon finding the flowers we wanted but they were not very good specimens, being small, so we remained, from the beginning of the eighth to the beginning of the eleventh moon, until the flowers were in full bloom and seeded.

All this time we went in fear of our lives of the Black Lisus, the crossbowmen, all thieves and murderers, so we were forced to hide in caves during most of the day and avoid the obvious tracks as there were far too many signs of their murderous activities in the form of corpses, with arrows sticking in them, of unfortunate wayfarers to and from China who had fallen to their deadly aim.

Many times we saw parties of these Black Lisus but by dint of keeping to ridges and spurs, far from the beaten track, and only venturing forth to search for the flowers at early morn and late afternoon we managed to escape them.

To add to our troubles, Hnetzar Khing, our Lisu coolie, also was attacked by evil spirits in the beginning of the ninth moon and was very ill until the ending of that moon, so that we were forced to return to the Nung village, where we had taken Labwi Tsi, and consult the witch-doctor again, who drove out the evil spirits after the sacrifice of five pigs, and, after Hnetzar Khing had rested, we were able to wend our way back to the flower country again.

Many privations and tribulations we suffered, O Chief, whilst in the flower country from the penetrating cold winds of those altitudes and latterly from the torrential rains, accentuated by lack of proper food, drink and housing as, from dread of the Black Lisus, we dared approach none of their villages but had to sleep in caves, like wild animals, on the least accessible ridges swept by rain and icy blasts of wind.

However we were well rewarded for our sufferings and patience for in the tenth moon the white flowers were at their best and early

in the eleventh moon the red ones, so that we were able to gather the best of them and their seeds.

Finally, having gathered what we considered the best according to our ability and instructions, we turned back in the middle of the eleventh moon and made our way back over the divide rejoicing.

Being weak by this time, it took us fifteen days march to return to the houses of our relatives and friends in the Akhyang Valley, where we arrived in a semi-starving, exhausted condition, our clothes and blankets in tatters, at the waning of the eleventh moon.

We stayed with our relatives for some ten days, recouping ourselves with good food, drink and sleep, they being all agog to hear of our adventures for none of them had ever dared to cross the divide for fear of those murdering Black Lisus.

Then being rested and fed and in full bodily health again we started on the arduous journey across the rocky mountains of the Mali—N'mai divide, but this time we minded the travail little for, whereas we had gone forth in dread of the unknown difficulties and dangers ahead of us, we were returning in triumph, having conquered them.


We encountered no Kachins in our passage across the Triangle, travelling circumspectly and knowing the way and the position of their villages by this time, for it would have been a cruel stroke of fate, if we had been captured by them and possibly killed, at this juncture, losing the fruit of all our endeavours and disappointing the Great White King and our Officers, whom we have sworn to serve, even at the cost of our lives.

However, the spirits being kind to us, we arrived back safely at the Burma Military Police Post at Sumprabum and from then on our troubles were over, the road South being crowded with travellers and there being plenty of food stalls on the roadside, it being now the open season and how different from the deserted landscape we had seen eight moons before ?

Towards the waning of the twelfth moon we arrived at Myitkyina, and how glad we were to get in to one of those once dreaded iron houses that travel along the iron road and, resting our tired limbs, allow the iron horse to do that for us that we had been doing for ourselves for eight long moons over precipitous mountains, foaming torrents and through dense tropical vegetation.

The following day we were back in Maymyo, having travelled nearly as far in less than two settings of the sun as we had travelled on foot in the previous eight moons, and we handed over our flowers and seeds with a sigh of relief to our Officers who were very pleased with us and congratulated us on our success.

Many trials, both physical and mental, we suffered in our search for the flowers, O Chief, but we are proud and happy that we achieved that which we set out to perform at the behest of the Great White King.



ROUTE FOLLOWED - - - - -



LETTER TO THE EDITOR  
INDEBTEDNESS OF OFFICERS

SIR,

In your issue of October 1935, "M. Stone" contributes a valuable article entitled "Debt," wherein he describes the well-nigh insurmountable difficulties confronting a C. O. when dealing with an indebted officer.

This C. O.'s position is truly unenviable, for without any effective sanction in law which would pass legal muster, he is expected to exercise power by dint of a mixture of the "heavy father," coupled with "3rd Degree methods" and thus ensure that his officers never get into debt, further, that they are rescued should they fall from grace.

But "M. Stone" does not even mention the root-cause of almost all trouble of this nature in India, namely, the credit system, which in turn depends wholly on the difference between British and Indian law governing deductions from the pay of officers.

In England, this pay cannot be touched, whereas in India it can.

Bring the two codes into line and our chief curse, the Indian money-lender, would go out of business.

Officers in doubtful financial circumstances would no longer be given credit or allowed, even encouraged, to pile more liabilities on top of existing ones, for there would be no legal redress of any practical value open to the creditor.

2. When reform of the Indian Code in this respect is advocated it is usual to hear stated that, if an amendment is introduced, it would be necessary to grant similar relief to all Government officers, whether civil or military. And that the Legislative Assembly would never consent to such a measure. But is it unreasonable to hope that the Legislative Assembly working with a sense of responsibility under the new Government of India Act, will cease from throwing out legislative measures, no matter how constructive, merely because they are sponsored by Government.

However, if the passing of a measure to protect all Government officials is thought to be impracticable, it is still possible to make out a case for providing protection for military officers.

For apart from the clear Home precedent, the soldier is still entitled to special treatment in this matter by reason of his youth

on joining, his smaller pay and the more gregarious life he is forced to lead in a military community, where the temptations to comparatively minor excesses are strong and where the means of recovery are lacking. There is no elasticity about the budget of the young officer, unless he has private means—a factor which is fast disappearing and on which the State has no right to reckon.

It is entirely in the interests of the State that its lower paid servants shall function at the peak of their capacity, which is impossible unless they are free from the encumbrance of debt, and from the temptations which indebtedness invariably breeds.

Nor is it in the interests of the community that a type of social parasite should be protected by the Courts to enable it to batten on the life-blood of the young soldier.

Unless and until the law in India is amended, it is futile to expect a C. O. to exercise control over the affairs of his officers once they have got into the usurers hands.

As "M. Stone" states, and as every family solicitor will confirm, no involved youth ever tells the *whole* truth.

The poison of debt has eaten deep into his system sapping his moral sense; he has become a blind gambler refusing to face the issues; he is desperate, in fact for all practical purposes, he is insane.

And all the time, nudging his elbow, is the money-lender with his circular.

Being so deeply involved, what does it matter if he dips deeper still? It will postpone the evil day for a little, and in the meantime he cultivates the gambler's feverish hope that something will turn up to save him.

And when the inevitable happens, the State loses a servant on whose training a large sum of public money has been wasted.

To attempt a cure, except in the initial stages of the disease, is a waste of time.

The treatment required is prevention, which an amendment of the law, here recommended, would ensure.

The incubus of debt on a considerable scale amongst serving officers is no fantasy. Unless they are protected their avoidable wastage, from this cause alone, will be heavy.

It is an issue which can no longer be burked.

I am Sir, etc.,  
"A SEXTON."

# A SUGGESTED METHOD OF HANDLING REMOUNTS.

SIR,

The article in the October number of your journal on "A suggested method of handling remounts" throws some doubt on the nationality of Professor Lichtwark and where he learnt his equitation.

About 1892 Lichtwark who was then living in Taranaki, New Zealand, published a book called "Educating the Horse." In the preface it states that the author was the descendant of a German physician and that he arrived in Melbourne when fifteen years old. Since then he had spent all his life in Australia and New Zealand.

As a boy Lichtwark had been interested in the training of horses for his uncle's circus but he makes no reference to Continental methods. He compares the systems of Rarey (an American who lectured in England in the 'fifties), Sample (also American) and Hickton (an Australian); he also quotes from J. Mayhew's work on horse management as he admits that his own knowledge on this subject is meagre.

The methods as described in the article and in the book only differ in two small details.

(i) Lichtwark does not mention the tail raising lessons but places great importance on handling the horse's head, particularly the nostrils and upper lip.

(ii) Lichtwark only recommends the safety rein used in conjunction with a crupper for a hard mouthed horse that had already been broken in.

His system of "mouthing" was to connect the rings of a straight bar rubber bit to a crupper for periods of about two hours, during which time the horse was allowed to run loose. This also taught the horse to carry his head correctly.

In this part of the world horses were seldom ridden in anything but a snaffle and many owners could not devote much time to training a horse once it had been backed. Lichtwark's method would teach the young horse to bend and develop a good head carriage.

Yours faithfully,

E. J. C. C.

26th October 1935.

## REVIEW

**The Campaign of the Marne, 1914**

BY SEWELL TYNG

*(Oxford University Press) 21 sh.*

This American author, writing twenty years after the battle, has made a clear and impartial study of the leadership and strategy on both sides. His main conclusion is that the Allied victory was the reward of better generalship than the enemy displayed, and that it was in no sense a fluke or happy chance that turned the tide of German invasion.

Mr. Tyng has not brought to light many new facts. That was hardly possible, but he has treated as one connected campaign the whole fighting from the first shots around Liège to the German recoil to the Aisne. Orders and events in each sector of the long swaying front combined to bring about the strategic situation which was the hope and the plan of the French Generalissimo.

Joffre is generally referred to as the embodiment of a serene composure, a tower of comfort to France in her hour of danger, but like many another chief he has had to see his successes attributed to more popular figures. The author portrays Joffre as a leader whose quality shewed itself not only in calm courage, but in the energy with which he recast his plans and revived his armies by personal touch; and in the boldness with which he detached troops from his right and even from his retiring centre to rebuild the left wing. With peremptory firmness he bade Lanrezac counter-attack at Guise to help the British, and with tactful firmness he persuaded the British Commander, who looked like marching right out of the battle front, to join in his general offensive. This energetic leadership is sharply contrasted with the weakness of the German High Command and the jealous dissensions between their Army Commanders.


The book is well arranged for its purpose, and is recommended for inclusion in the general reading of any student of 1914 or of the War as a whole. Its forty-three short chapters each deal with a phase at one of the various General Headquarters, or with one stage of the fighting, such as Mons, Guise or the Ourcq. The tactical descriptions of the fighting are not as good as the strategic narrative.

and, although enlivened with some graphic pictures, such as Franchet d'Esperey's charge with colours flying at Guise and the struggle around Mondemont Chateau on Foch's front, give but little idea of the conditions of the battlefield or of the methods of fighting on either side.

In dealing with the share of the British Expeditionary Force Mr. Tyng is somewhat biassed. We are told that we retreated too fast and advanced too slowly ! But there were other considerations which have received little notice from the author. He omits all reference to the difficult rivers and wooded slopes of the Morin and Aisne Rivers, so skilfully used by Marwitz's cavalry and Jaeger rear guards. He does, however, give full credit to the sturdy fighting of the British soldier at Mons and Le Cateau.

R. M. H.





His Excellency General Sir ROBERT A. CASSELS, G.C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O.,  
Commander-in-Chief in India.



# The Journal

OF THE

## United Service Institution of India.

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### EDITORIAL

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Contrary to the opinion expressed in the January number of this Journal, the Italians appear to have quickly completed the reorganization of their forces in Italy and Abyssinia. Abyssinia, and to have achieved not inconsiderable success in the early part of this year. In January, the Abyssinians threatened the Italian lines of communication on the Northern front and, by the use of small raiding parties employing guerilla tactics, caused the Italian forces considerable inconvenience and some loss. The Italians took the offensive in Tembien on approximately February 10, and since that date claim to have annihilated the armies of Ras Mulugheta, Ras Kassa, Ras Seyoum and Ras Imru. On the other hand, the Abyssinians contend that their action has been nothing but a carefully carried-out retreat in the face of superior force, and that this retreat should cause an extension of the Italian forces over a wide front.

Whatever the true story of the recent operations may be, it would appear that the Abyssinians have to some extent abandoned the tactics that they originally adopted with success, and that the Italians have less to fear now for the safety of their communications in Tembien.

On the Southern front there has been little activity since an Italian motorised column advanced 120 miles north from Dolo on January 18, and inflicted heavy losses on Ras Desta; thus removing the threat to the left flank of General Graziani's army.

It would be rash indeed to attempt to forecast events during the next few weeks, but it appears that the Italian forces in the north will continue to endeavour to make as much ground as possible before either the rains intervene, or peace negotiations force them to call a halt. A recent feature of the campaign, that has caused much adverse comment, is the apparently deliberate bombing by Italian aircraft of Abyssinian and neutral ambulances. It is contended by the Italians that these have been situated too close to fighting troops or have been used for illicit purposes; but definite proof of this has not been forthcoming, and it is difficult to understand the reason for such a flagrant disregard of the Geneva Convention.

Of perhaps more interest are the efforts made by the League, and of certain Powers acting independently, to bring an unsatisfactory campaign to a conclusion. The Hoare-Laval proposals were unacceptable to the Italians as they did not go far enough, and to Abyssinia and other members of the League as they favoured a declared aggressor. They were consequently abandoned. It might have been expected that the policy of applying economic sanctions, including that on oil, would then have been fully pursued by the League; but the reverse has been the case. Apart from the declaration by Italy that she would regard an oil sanction as an act of war, its application has presented many difficulties owing to the virtual impossibility of preventing oil from reaching its destination from countries that have not agreed to sanctions, except by the use of force.

Peace proposals have been in the air since the beginning of March, as on the 3rd of that month an agreement was reached on the text of an appeal to both combatants, urging them to cease hostilities and open negotiations. Rumours of an armistice were published in the Press, but these were premature as Italian preparations for a further advance have not slackened. It would appear, though, that both Mussolini and the Emperor are now not averse to considering negotiations to achieve as favourable terms as possible. Recent events in Europe, however, have rather tended to put the Italo-Abyssinian dispute in the background.

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On March 7th, without any previous warning, Germany denounced the Locarno Pact and sent troops into the demilitarised Rhineland zone. The same day she presented a note to the Powers which are signatories of that treaty, which gave as the reason for her denunciation

Germany and Locarno  
Pact

the proposed (now concluded) Franco-Soviet Pact. She also expressed her readiness to agree to a new demilitarised zone providing France and Belgium reciprocated, and offered to sign various 25-year non-aggression Pacts. At the same time she brought up the question of the return of her colonies, and expressed her willingness to return to the League on certain conditions.

This step has created considerable consternation in the Chancelleries of Europe. France and Belgium were naturally alarmed and demanded a meeting of the League Council; at the same time steps were taken to occupy the French frontier fortifications. The British attitude was that, while condemning unilateral action on the part of Germany, it would be advisable to give due consideration to her proposals. This attitude was made all the firmer by the Foreign Secretary's statement to the effect that, if at any time during the period necessary for consideration of the new situation, any attack on France or Belgium should take place which would constitute a violation of Article 2 of Locarno, H. M.'s Government, notwithstanding Germany's repudiation of the treaty, would regard themselves in honour bound to come to the assistance of the country attacked. Suggestions that Germany should show her willingness to negotiate freely by a symbolic evacuation of the Rhineland appear to have been of no avail.

Since then, meetings of the Locarno Powers and of the League Council have been called in London to discuss methods of settlement of the problem. Germany has been invited to attend the Council meeting and has accepted in principle, subject to the conditions that her representatives should enjoy perfect equality with those of other Powers at the meeting, and that the Powers agree to enter forthwith into negotiations on her proposals.

At the time of going to Press it is impossible to attempt to prophesy what the result of the Council's deliberations will be. Germany's reasons for her action appear to be that she regards the Franco-Soviet Pact as a violation of Locarno, and that she is determined to settle once and for all the problems created by the Peace Treaty. She insists that all she desires is peace in Europe, and threatens to withdraw into isolation if her proposals are not favourably considered. There can be no doubt that the denunciation by Germany of a treaty that she signed of her own free-will has placed her in the wrong, she ignores the fact that France had previously offered to

submit the provisions of the Franco-Soviet Pact to the League Council for discussion. In all statements made by Herr Hitler since the crisis, he has stressed the fact that no pacts of any sort will be made with Russia. Not only does Germany appear to be extremely nervous of the intentions of the Soviet but, as in 1914, she appears to fear encirclement by other Powers and considers that her efforts to come to an understanding with France are of no avail.

There is not at present complete unanimity amongst the other Powers. Great Britain, in the words of her Foreign Secretary, says that co-signatories of Locarno and the Council can count on the fullest co-operation of the British Government in all endeavours to establish peace and understanding between the nations of Europe upon a firm and enduring foundation. France, rather naturally, demands evacuation of the Rhineland or at least a guarantee from Germany that no fortifications will be erected there, as a basis for negotiation. She is inclined to demand the imposition of sanctions, and refuses to consider any suggestion that discussion should be entered into on the German proposals before the question of the violation of the Locarno Pact has been settled. Belgium supports France in her condemnation of German action; and Italy, whilst agreeing to assume her responsibilities as a signatory of the Locarno Pact, is naturally against any policy of sanctions.

To reconcile the views of the various powers and to satisfy Germany's claims to equality of treatment is a task that will tax the ingenuity of the League to the uttermost. Time alone will show whether it is a body capable of dealing with a serious European situation, or whether it will collapse and there be a return to the old system of alliances.

\* \* \* \* \*

It has often been stated that the basis of our foreign policy is the support of the principle of collective security within the League. One of the essentials of this principle is that members of the League should be strong enough to fulfil any demands made upon them in support of it. It is very doubtful if this has been the case up till recently as far as the forces of the British Empire are concerned. In our efforts to secure international disarmament we have set a solitary example of restriction of expenditure on defence. We feel that an extract from the recent speech of one of the Dominion Ministers for Defence is apposite. He said, "Defence is an imperative necessity, for the nation

which refuses to provide for its security lays itself open to attack from hostile and predatory elements of which the world has no lack."

In view of the disturbed situation in Europe and of recent events in the Far East, it is therefore satisfactory to note that the Defence Estimates of Great Britain have provided for a limited expansion and modernization of the three services, which should enable the Empire to play her part, if occasion should arise, with greater efficiency.

\* \* \* \* \*

The demand for parity with Britain and the United States on the part of Japan met with no approval, and  
**The Naval Conference.** in January that country left the Conference. Her representatives remained, however, as observers.

Since then, discussions have continued on a nominal Four Power basis, with Italy tending to remain in the background as the result of the situation created by her dispute with Abyssinia and the League. A technical sub-committee has been at work and it appears that agreement has been reached as to the age-limit of battleships, qualitative limitation, and advance notification of building programmes. It is understood that it is proposed that the new Treaty should remain effective till 1942, and that the age of the battleship should be extended from 20 to 26 years. There is no reason to suppose that Italy will not sign the Treaty eventually, though it is to be regretted that Japan will be no party to it. She is now in the position, if her finances permit, to build without limit. It is to be hoped that the example set by the signatories of the new Treaty will have a moderating effect on the expansion of other navies.

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In the October 1935 number of this Journal, we drew attention to the fact that Major W. J. Cawthorn, 4/16th  
**The War Block.** Punjab Regiment, was carrying out a tour of the Rhodesias, Nyasaland and Kenya at the invitation of the governments concerned, with a view to ascertaining the suitability of those countries for officers contemplating settlement in the colonies after retirement.

Major Cawthorn has produced a report on all four colonies, which has been distributed to units in India, and also to the Employment Bureau for retired officers at home by the Information Bureau at

Army Headquarters. The report goes into conditions in each colony very clearly and in great detail. Much valuable information is provided as to cost of living, climate, possibilities for profitable farming, and educational facilities in all four colonies. It also touches on possible causes of the present dissatisfaction amongst settlers in Kenya. Major Cawthorn is of opinion that all the colonies are suitable for settlement by retired officers and that the present time is likely to be opportune for those wishing to commence farming on a moderate scale. He considers that it is possible for any retired officer to augment his income by agriculture, but very wisely lays stress on the fact that, in addition to gaining experience before starting agriculture on an independent basis and possessing a genuine liking for the life, it is imperative that no portion of retired pay or pension should be commuted. Major Cawthorn is to be congratulated on producing a pamphlet that will be of great value, not only to officers retiring under the War Block scheme, but to those of any age who are contemplating settlement in East Africa.

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Captain Liddell Hart has written very fully on the subject of our criticisms of certain passages in his book *N.-W. F. P.* "When Britain goes to War," which appeared in the July 1935 edition of the Journal. He quotes at some length from certain secret documents, which we are unable to reproduce, in support of the view which is expressed in his book; and still maintains that air action was the predominant influence in suppressing the tribal risings in Waziristan in 1930.

Our object in commenting on Captain Liddell Hart's book was to draw general attention to the chapter in question, in order that our readers might judge it for themselves. It was not to open a controversial discussion on the comparative merits of ground and air action on the Frontier, for we feel that it is in the appropriate application of the combined resources of all the forces which are at the disposal of Government, and not in an atmosphere of unhealthy competition between those forces, that the best results will be obtained.

## THE CHANGING ASPECT OF OPERATIONS ON THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER

By " SHPAGWISHTAMA "

### *Introduction*

" By Jove how things have changed ! " That remark was made by a rubber-necker from the Sloth Belt after a visit to last year's " Frontier War Zone." Unfortunately the statement, though true, was not further amplified.

The aim of these miscellaneous notes is to outline, under specific tactical and administrative headings, some of the changed conditions brought about in Frontier Warfare to-day through " modernization " on our part, and a determination on the part of the Pathan to keep level with us.

The remarks are based on observations made during the Loe Agra and Mohmand operations of 1935. They will, perhaps, be of interest to those who were not present but whom Fate and the Relief Programme may bring in " next time." Some tentative suggestions for the future are also included since it is now " the next show " which we ought to be preparing for ; not " the last one."

### *Camp Protection*

The size and complexity of the modern " perimeter " camp, compared with camps of even a few years ago, is one of the greatest surprises to anyone who has been off the Frontier for a spell. Most people can visualise the old-fashioned square perimeter containing probably brigade headquarters, four battalions, a pack battery, some cavalry, large numbers of camels and mules, a minimum of other ancillary troops and services and, generally, a minimum of comfort.

To-day it is not unusual to have to add some or all of the following:

Medium Artillery	{	In fact a generally increased proportion of artillery of all natures.
Mechanized Field Artillery		
Tanks and Armoured Cars	..	
Sappers	..	In large numbers.
Signals	..	In vastly increased proportions.
Field ambulances and other		
Medical Detachments	..	In increased proportions.
Engineer Parks	..	

Ordnance Depot	..
Lorry Transport	..
Dairies	..
Canteen Contractors	..
Road construction coolies	.. Possibly in a separate camp, but protection necessary.
Headquarters	.. Considerably larger than formerly.

Even if operations take place beyond road-head, some sort of mechanical transport track soon follows nowadays and up come all the vehicles. It must be borne in mind, in this connection, that mechanical vehicles require double their standing space to allow room for maintenance and manœuvre.

The net result is a vast camp whose size must be seen to be appreciated. It can be well imagined that the problem of laying out such a camp and arranging its protection—especially if fighting has taken place the same day—is one of considerable difficulty.

The extra area required invariably necessitates a very large number of camp piquets, whilst the length of the perimeter to be held becomes truly formidable. There is the additional difficulty that it is rarely possible to find sufficient suitable ground where one can fit in a camp of regular shape for a force of this size. In consequence there is a danger of troops firing into each other. An irregular shaped camp is also uneconomical as regards defence by automatic weapons.

The brunt of producing this defence falls on the infantry. It is pertinent to note that the proportion of this arm has not changed in a brigade or division. Hence the infantry are often hard put to it to carry out their task of camp piquet and perimeter defence, even with the best "co-ordinated framework of weapons."

It is surprising, but true, that on occasions a battalion nowadays finds it cannot produce sufficient automatic weapons to go round. Camp and permanent piquets take Lewis guns with them as the rule, not the exception, and many require machine-guns. These piquets have to be given preference and this leaves a shortage of automatics on the perimeter.

One solution would be to get up additional automatic weapons on the lines of "Piquet stores" which are often a Brigade or Force pool. But this is only a partial answer to the problem. The men of the regular machine-gun and Lewis gun sections are already

overworked on night duty and "minimum strengths" make it difficult to use reserve gunners from rifle sections already dangerously depleted.

The theory has recently been propounded that a continuous line of defence round a camp is no longer necessary, as the days of tribesmen attempting to assault by night are over. There was definite evidence in both the Loe Agra and Mohmand operations that this is not so. The writer has also spoken to educated pro-British Pathans who agree that, given the opportunity, the tribesmen will still act as they have done in the past and it would be the height of folly to ignore this fact!

The only really satisfactory solution in a situation where the camp is extensive is to attach more infantry to the formation as a temporary measure. Such extra infantry will inevitably be required if the force is to move out from camp on an operation and still preserve its normal tactical organization. Unless this is done the number of troops to be left behind for camp protection, in camp piquets and camp itself, is so large that either the formation or unit organization must be broken up.

One last point before leaving this question of camp protection. There seems no reason why, on occasions, the Light Tank should not take its share in the defence of camp by night. Rumour has it that this has been done, though the writer cannot himself vouch for the fact. After all it is merely putting down a machine-gun in a sniping-proof box as opposed to a similar gun in a sniping-proof hole in the ground: and the box is mobile!

*Night snipers and anti-sniping tactics.*

The mention of "sniping" brings back vivid recollections of the vast strides made by the Pathan in this particular branch of mountain warfare. Gone are the days when the odd round from a disgruntled man was countered by the casual "snuffing" of the Mess Tent lamp and further action was unnecessary.

Seriously, modern day sniping is a very definite problem. Heavy fire, by which is meant anything from 500 to 1,000 rounds pumped into the camp, cannot be ignored.

The following two examples give some idea of the tribesmen's methods as encountered last year:—

- (a) Several parties (including at least one knife party) advancing from various sides on the camp controlled by lamp signals from a distant hill. According to the signals received

so did the various parties advance in turn under voice control of their leader, *i.e.*, fire and movement centrally controlled.

- (b) A party of thirty to forty snipers in specially prepared fire positions on the forward edge of a deep, narrow *nullah*. On a given signal controlled "volley firing" commenced. This is now a favourite method of the Mohmands. Their positions are so chosen that it is hard to inflict casualties. On a given signal by the leader the gang crawls forward into position. Then comes the simultaneous volley and the party drop like a stone into the nullah, too late to open fire on the flashes.

On other occasions heavy sniping was continued for several hours through the night.

The loss of sleep that this "organized sniping" entails to the Force is a serious factor: to say nothing of casualties, particularly those to the unfortunate animals. It is true that human casualties were remarkably few last year, considering the intense nature of the firing, but many were the lucky escapes, and good luck cannot hold out for ever.

With night operations in great favour, there is also a grave risk that the initial start of such moves may be jeopardised through heavy sniping. On the night of the Nahakki advance at least one camp was seriously sniped. Had this taken place a couple of hours later, as it might well have, when preparations for the move were in progress, the greatest confusion and delay would have resulted.

There are various ways of dealing with this menace. Some are old, some are adaptations of old ideas in a new shape. But whatever the methods employed, three points are essential for success:—

- (a) Someone with a good eye for likely sniping haunts.  
(b) A properly co-ordinated anti-sniping scheme for the camp, as a whole.  
(c) Probably the most important for as quiet a night as possible—  
The strictest fire discipline and control throughout all arms, both in camp piquets and camp, if, and when, the scheme is put into force.

As to the scheme. It will naturally include well chosen night lines for machine-guns. But a 1935 invention, which proved most effective, was a field gun at 400 to 800 yards. A couple of rounds

sufficed to procure a quiet night when the gun was brought into action on a shrewd night line.

The *chupao*\* is of course another well-known ingredient. In both the Loe Agra and Mohmand operations most successful *chupaos* were staged. But in mountain warfare it is above all necessary to ring the changes, and it is suggested that a Tank *chupao* on the lines of the disabled "Q" boat of the Great War might be tried as an alternative once in a while. Details will not be discussed here; the idea is put forward to show that in future campaigns we may still produce new schemes so as to keep the tribesman guessing.

A corollary to any anti-sniping programme is to send out a strong patrol next morning to see what they can find. There may be blood, may be only signs of a dead or wounded man being dragged away: perhaps a bagful of fired and *unfired* rounds; possibly tracks of the special *chaplis*† snipers often wear. These, if followed up, will often give a clue to the general direction whence the party came or will lead to alternative sniping positions. To obtain full value out of this search it is best to get a reliable Pathan, *e.g.*, one of the Intelligence Staff, to accompany the patrol. The results frequently have an indirectly beneficial effect in stopping further sniping as spies may see that their places are spotted. Local friendly villages, confronted with evidence that they have harboured snipers, can be dealt with, and fresh ideas for new night lines may be evolved.

#### *Night Operations*

Beyond the fact that night operations to-day are perhaps more ambitious in scope, there is, and can be, but little general change from the normal night operation of heretofore.

Tanks, and units such as mechanized artillery, motor-cyclist despatch riders, etc., appear at first sight to present a "silence" problem during any night advance; but thanks to the mobility they possess, good staff work can usually surmount the problem and "get them there by daylight," which is what is wanted.

The problem of heavy sniping causing loss and stampede in a camp prior to a night move has already been mentioned. It is worth noting that on one occasion a brigade knew where the trouble was likely to come from (low ground quite near camp) had a company told off to move out and deal summarily with the trouble with the bayonet. In the event, this was not necessary, but the idea is one to keep in mind for the future.

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\* Ambush. † Sandals.

It sounds Irish, but the writer's real aim in mentioning the question of night operations is to put in a plea for an occasional "afternoon operation." The same old principle of ringing the changes in mountain warfare. Such an operation as the seizure of a piquet position or some important point on the line of advance, *i.e.*, "a limited objective," might well come as a surprise if initiated in the afternoon—as opposed to the eternal early morning or night move.

It was done with success in the Burma Rebellion on a hot afternoon when a village, including dogs, suddenly found themselves surrounded and their afternoon siesta rudely interrupted. A well-thought-out plan which included some ruse such as a morning reconnaissance in force in an alternative direction to the ultimate afternoon's objective should succeed as well as any night operation. There are disadvantages certainly, but one big advantage over the night operation is that we retain the ability to use our superior armament of all natures.

#### *Light Tanks*

To see Light Tanks in action on the Frontier is to realise to the full the truth of our rubber-necker's remark with which these notes began. Many articles might be devoted to a discussion of "The Tank on the Frontier in 1935" (and probably have by this time). Here it is only intended to touch on one or two small aspects as they struck an envious "Infanteer."

The first thought to come to mind was, "By Jove, I only wish things had changed a bit quicker." Recollections of the long-drawn-out 1917 operations and a protracted stay in Waziristan a few years later were conjured up. The reply that Frontier roads were then few and far between and the present-day Light Tank did not exist anyhow, is only a "squashing retort," so far as the last portion of the answer! To the layman the performance of these A. F. V.'s along *nalas* is remarkable and surpassed expectation. Where one comes up against a formidable obstacle such as the Nahakki, it is equally surprising to see how soon Sappers and Infantry can construct a 7 ft. 6 in. Tank track. The Nahakki track took just one week, if memory serves aright, to convert from camel to tank passability. The writer was informed on good authority that this time could have been bettered if the Tanks' performance up and down *nala* gradients (as opposed to along the normal track alignment running round a hill with the possibility of a nasty drop over the edge) had been more widely known.

The thorny question of whether Tanks should always be used in companies and not in small packets will be gracefully skated over in this article ; except to mention *en passant* that, as the enemy have no Tanks and no anti-Tank guns, it seems logical and "economy of force" to employ only a section, or less, if that number of Tanks can safely do the particular job in hand !

Whatever the approved policy may eventually turn out to be, it can be stated without fear of contradiction that the infantry of advance guards and rear guards as well as those about to scale up the heights felt the greatest benefit from Tanks operating in co-operation with them.

The Gunner, on the other hand, is worried by the advent of the ubiquitous Tank. He says, and with some justification, "I dare not shoot, because I do not know where those confounded Tanks are now."

It is surely not really such a difficult problem to solve if we remember that the same general difficulty arose some time ago *vis-a-vis* the infantry. In their case the answer was screens and distinguishing flags which are in general use to-day.

With the Tank the particular answer will depend on circumstances. Sometimes it may be a line on the map beyond which the Tanks are not to go. At other times it can perhaps be done by R/T from the Tank Commander who merely says where he is ; again it may happen in certain country that, if it is a case of supporting the infantry, a decision will have to be given as to whether Tanks or Guns—but not both—are to be the infantry's helpmate. Sometimes the Tanks will be right away on a flank in the blue and will not worry the gunners at all.

In the future it seems that a Commander's task of reconnaissance will be greatly simplified with the aeroplane, and now the Tank, at his disposal. For instance, one can imagine piqueting and withdrawal of piquets being speeded up if the executive commander concerned is allowed a Tank in which to "see the country round the corner." This would enable him to appreciate the ground long before he otherwise could have done so, and thus save valuable time.

It is also suggested that when some particular operation is in view, photographs taken at close range from a Tank might be helpful in supplementing air photographs. It may be argued that if the Tank can get ahead in this manner, then personal reconnaissance makes photographs from the Tank unnecessary. The answer is that

photographs can be taken and studied later at leisure ; whereas, if the enemy are having pot shots at the Tank (I am naturally assuming the Tanks to be well ahead and no hills are piqueted), it is not so easy to get and retain a calm and collected mental picture of the ground. Remember, too, that one feels very naked wandering about *outside* a Tank on a reconnaissance in enemy-country with no nice infantry piquets on the heights above !

Whether the Tank will have such an easy passage in the future, it is impossible to say. The tribesmen had made anti-armoured car trenches and obstacles in expectation of their old friends. Luckily, we produced Tanks which were able to overcome the obstacles without difficulty. One may be fairly certain that the Pathan will make an effort of some sort to defeat the Tank. The country is hardly suitable for copying Abyssinian methods of digging pits, but perhaps he will evolve something equally ingenious.

#### *Inter-Communication*

*Wireless.*—In both series of operations it was interesting to notice how much we have come to depend on wireless as the means of communication *par excellence*. As an infantry man one could not help feeling that this reliance is ahead of the reliability of military wireless, at any rate it is ahead of such mobile sets, as for instance, the R/T or W/T pack set with which an Advanced or Rear Guard Commander is usually now provided. These are very valuable, but have definite limitations especially in hilly country. It still seems advisable to lay on an alternative method, whether visual, cable, mounted orderly, or other means. There appears a distinct danger of this precaution being neglected.

#### *The new oil-cooker*

While the Light Tank probably holds the field as the outstanding change in the fighting composition of the 1935 Force, there is little doubt that the new oil-cooker was, to the troops anyhow, the administrative *piece de resistance*. To anyone who remembers the miserable hours spent collecting wet wood and the smoky half-cooked meals which resulted, the sight to-day of a brightly flaring oil-cooker is good indeed.

At present about the only drawback to them is the noise and light which necessitate precautions being taken prior to any night operations. Otherwise the sleepest of Pathan sentries on a cold night will be afoused ; though he be far away and dreaming of tomorrow's prospect of " houris in Heaven !"

Even the Indian Langri took a liking to these machines with wonderful celerity. In the writer's unit the only passive resistance came from the mess cook who saw his rake-off on charcoal disappearing.

*Clothing and equipment (Indian Troops)*

Unfortunately the hills are still with us and have not changed, so the problem of how to reduce the weight carried by the sepoy and increase his mobility is as pressing as ever. The following list gives some idea of how certain units succeeded in easing the burden of clothing. These measures are unauthorised but highly effective. In fact, one might well use the word essential.

Light chaplies ..	.. In lieu of heavy boots.
Ankle puttees ..	.. In lieu of full length puttees.
Short puggree ..	.. In lieu of the weighty and cumbersome full length puggree.
Khaki cotton shirt	.. For hot weather in place of the grey flannel shirt.

*Omission of hose tops.*

This does not amount to a great deal, but it is sufficient reduction to make a wonderful difference on a long day in the hills : try it and see.

There were occasions also when ammunition could, with safety, be reduced. Admittedly one has to be careful on this point, but there are many instances where a needless amount of ammunition is carried. For example, when it is known that there are no actual *lashkars*\* in existence, road protection troops can surely move with safety carrying about fifty rounds on the rifleman instead of seventy or a hundred rounds. The balance of the ammunition to be carried in company or battalion reserve. This, combined with the reduced weight in clothing, gives the poor sepoy at least a sporting chance up or down a hill.

*Conclusion*

If these notes produce the germ of an idea for inclusion in a revised "Manual of Operations on the N.-W. Frontier" (or even for an eventual amendment!) they will not have been written in vain.

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\* Body of tribesmen.

THE "APEX" OF INDIA  
(or "THROUGH CHITRAL, ISHKUMAN AND HUNZA.")

By "PERCUSSION."

During the Hot Weather of 1934, T. and I (a Sapper and a Gunner) decided to spend our three months' leave as far off the beaten track as we could. The country North and East of Chitral seemed to offer interesting possibilities for trekking but we found, when it came to the point, that it was not at all easy to get permission to carry out our journey as we had originally planned it.

Finally, we settled upon the route shown in the sketch map as being the most interesting one we could manage in the time available. Before starting we obtained permission to travel as far as Mastuj, and it was a matter for conjecture whether we would eventually get permission to travel the rest of the way.

For the sake of economy we cut down our baggage to a minimum, basing our calculations on the "Light Scale, Winter" of Wana Column, and a previous 600 miles trek done by another member of our mess on a diet of *chupatties*, bacon, sugar and tea, with only one mule as transport. We estimated our requirements at four ponies, but when it came to the point we found we could not do with less than five.

At last everything was ready and the great day arrived. We left Wana on the 12th July by an old contractor's lorry and arrived in Dir, road-head for Chitral, four days later. Here we were fortunate enough to find a Sapper officer building a bridge and he kindly put us up for the night and procured transport for us.

The following day we rose early, eager to start our 700 miles march and relieved to think that the long and tiring lorry drive was over. The first day's march lay over the Lowari Pass (10,000') and the second to Drosh, where the greater part of the Chitral garrison lives. We spent a pleasant night in the Lower Mess before continuing our journey to Chitral city. A detached company from the battalion at Drosh lives here in the historic fort and we stayed one night with the company commander. The next day, having received an invitation from H. H. the Mehtar, we went to his summer residence in Burmoglasht, near Chitral but about 3,000' higher, and spent a very pleasant day there.

Another five marches brought us to Mastuj where we spent two nights with the Heir-Apparent, Shahzada Nasur-ul-Mulk, who entertained us very hospitably. At this stage we received permission to travel along the whole route we had planned. Had we not received it we should have had to turn to the East and cross the Shandur Pass into Yasin instead of continuing in a Northerly direction to the Baroghil.

As we left the post office at Mastuj to continue our journey T. remarked that it would be our last glimpse of civilization for several weeks; this proved to be the case, as we did not see another telegraph office for a month, or a post office for six weeks.

Six more marches and we reached the foot of the Baroghil Pass, which is on the boundary between India and Wakhan, a northern province of Afghanistan. Here the country opens out into rolling pasture land, which is a relief after the narrow gorges of the Yarkhun River, and the pass is therefore an easy one. We had now reached the beginning of the least travelled and, therefore, the most interesting portion of our journey. The Baroghil is visited practically every year by members of the Chitral garrison; and the Kilik Pass, in Hunza, is likewise visited frequently by members of the Gilgit garrison or by the Political Agent. Very few, if any, people have, however, travelled from one pass to the other by the shortest route. It was this route, which lies over the difficult Chillinji Pass, that we intended, if possible, to traverse.

At first our prospect of success did not seem too bright. The local greybeards said that at that time of the year the rivers we had to cross would be too full of snow water to be fordable and that there were no bridges. This was supported by a Yarkandi traveller who had just crossed the Karumbar Pass and who said that he had had the greatest difficulty in fording rivers, and that it would be quite impossible for *us*. In spite of these gloomy forecasts we decided at least to have a shot at getting over the Chillinji and, if we failed, to go over the Darkot Pass into Gilgit or down the Karumbar valley to Gupis and thence to Gilgit.

After four days' halt to allow T. to recover from a mysterious eastern disease, we continued in an easterly direction to a camp at the foot of the Shawitak Ailak Pass into Wakhan. We visited the pass on the way and were fortunately just able to discern the famous Oxus River in the distance, so were well rewarded for our climb.

The third day after leaving the Baroghil we crossed the Karumbar Pass (14,000') into the state of Ishkuman. The pass was open and very easy, and on the top was a deep blue lake surrounded by a carpet of flowers. Shortly before crossing we were met by two guides sent by the Raja, and these led us to a small camp at a deserted shepherd's hut where we stayed the night.

According to the Chitralis the following day was the one on which our difficulties were due to begin, and there is no doubt that the route became much less easy than before, but fortunately the obstacles were by no means insuperable as we had been led to believe. The river, swollen by snow water, was deep and had to be forded several times with increasing difficulty, and two glaciers had to be crossed. The first of these was fairly narrow and was crossed without unloading the animals, but the second, named the Chashboi ("Destroyer"), was a mile wide and would doubtless have destroyed both ourselves and our mules had it not been for the invaluable help given us by the Wazir and several coolies thoughtfully sent to meet us by the Raja. These unloaded the mules and carried the loads to the further side themselves; but, in spite of this assistance, the animals had the greatest difficulty in keeping their feet. The next two nights were spent in Sokhta Robat, a shepherds' shelter occupied only in summer, where the Wazir had kindly prepared a camping ground for us.

After our experience on the glacier, and on the advice of the Wazir who said that the Chillinji Pass was quite impassable for any animals, even yaks, T. and I decided to send the mules back over the Karumbar and Darkot Passes to a rendezvous in Hunza, carrying with them all the clothing and stores which could be spared. This we did, and it proved to be a most successful experiment in spite of our fear that we might never see our kit again.

A short but difficult march on the following day brought us to a camp at 13,000' at the foot of the Chillinji Pass. We could camp no higher as it was the top edge of the tree line and there was no fuel higher up. T., always full of energy, went out with the Wazir in the evening and shot an ibex after a long stalk. It was not a big one, but this would appear to be promising ibex country.

Next morning, after a breakfast at 3 a.m., we started our 4,000' climb to the pass. The first-half of the ascent was not particularly difficult and then we reached a gently sloping plateau on which a little snow was still lying. Crossing this plateau the ascent again became

steep, but there was no snow and it did not look worse than the first half. Appearances were deceptive, however, and directly we started climbing we realised that the rest of the climb lay over extremely slippery shale on which one slipped back one foot for every two one climbed. The remaining 2,000' climb thus developed into a 3,000' one and an exhausting one at that, so that it was with considerable relief that we eventually reached the top (17,200') at about 9. a.m. Much to our surprise the coolies arrived only fifteen minutes later having climbed wonderfully.

After a short rest, during which we refreshed ourselves by tea laced with brandy, T. and I decided to climb one of the mountains flanking the pass in order to see what promised to be a magnificent view. Accordingly we sent the coolies on to the next camp and climbed the extra odd thousand feet by ourselves. We were not disappointed. The visibility was perfect and on every hand stretched a sea of snowy peaks to a distance of nearly a hundred miles. (See panorama photograph.) We saw mountains in Afghanistan, Russia, Chinese-Turkestan and Gilgit: the great chain of the Karakorum dominated the landscape to the South-East and the Pamirs to the North-West. We were now at a height of over 18,000' by far the highest either of us had ever climbed, and this gave me a severe headache, but T. was apparently unaffected. Nature, on this day, appeared to be trying her best to amuse us and before we left the top we were treated to the sight of a very fine avalanche on the far side of the valley.

The descent, about two hours after the coolies had left, proved difficult. On the northern side of the pass lay a glacier seamed with narrow but deep crevasses which were concealed by a thin covering of snow. In the early morning, before the thaw had set in, the snow acted as a bridge but, by the time we started our descent, the snow had softened and one was in danger of falling into a crevasse. Before we fully realised this state of affairs, T. had once sunk up to his knees in one and I fell through up to my waist and only saved myself from a hundred years cold storage by flinging myself flat on my face in the snow. (We learned later that a coolie had also fallen through and had been saved by his load which wedged between the edges of the crevasse.) After these warnings our progress became slow and cautious in the extreme, and we prodded vigorously with our sticks before taking the next step forward. Luckily the Wazir became anxious about our non-appearance and, after we had travelled

two miles or so in this fashion, returned to meet us with two coolies and a rope. Thenceforward we were able to move more rapidly and safely till we reached the moraine. We finally arrived in camp at Buattar at 4-30 p. m., after a pretty strenuous twelve and a half hours.

We now regretfully said good-bye to our Ishkumani friends who had been so helpful as, having crossed the pass, we were now in Hunza. This would be a suitable place to write a description of the little-known state of Ishkuman. Unfortunately, however, we only spent four days in the state and during this time we saw no villages and very few inhabitants besides the Wazir and coolies who came to help us. With these we were much impressed; the Wazir was a very pleasant fellow who had a fair knowledge of Urdu and did everything in his power to assist us; the coolies with him were easily the strongest, most willing and most cheerful ones we met on the whole trip. We were also particularly struck by the fair colouring of the inhabitants we saw. This is probably due to the fact that nearly the whole habitable part of the country lies in a narrow valley which runs North and South and they therefore get very little sun.

At Buattar we were met by two guides sent by H. H. the Mir of Hunza. This was fortunate as without them transport would have been hard to obtain, the nearest village being a day's march distant. Directed by these guides we made our way along the Chaprusan valley, through Reshit, to the Kermin Pass (13,500'). Crossing this pass we were caught in a snow-storm and could not descend on the further side so had to climb along the ridge to a shepherd's shelter at Shilo-ki-Pari (15,000') where we spent a most uncomfortable night.

Two marches from Shilo-ki-Pari brought us to the foot of the Kilik Pass (15,600'), the "Apex" of India, where we were surprised to find a polo ground which must be one of the highest in the World. Here also herds of yak, sheep, and goats and one camel, all belonging to the Mir, were grazing. While in this area we visited the pass and found it to be an open, easy one, somewhat similar to the Baroghil; and T., having obtained permission from the Mir, shot an *Ovis Poli*. We also climbed Kilik West mountain (18,020') where we had a fine view of part of the Karakorum Range, and were just able to discern Mustagh Ata (24,500'), half-way to Kashgar.

Returning from the Kilik we camped at Murkushi, which is at the junction of the routes leading over the Kilik and Mingtaka passes, and visited the latter pass. (Our guide told us that in Chinese "Ming"

means "a thousand" and "Taka" means "ibex," but though we kept a good look out we saw none; on the way back, however we picked up a 45" head which looked as if it had been killed by a leopard.) The approach to this pass is not as easy as that to the Kilik because the path lies over the moraine of the Ghul Kwaja Unwin glacier and is very rough. We saw the corpses of several ponies which had apparently broken their legs on this bad going, but, in spite of this, travellers prefer this route to the Kilik as it is a few miles shorter and there is less danger from robbers on the far side. The top of the pass itself is flat and boggy and the northern approach is very open and easy. Although this pass is lower than the Kilik, being 15,450', we found the air to be extremely rarified and had as much difficulty in breathing there as we had had the previous day at 18,000'. This is an interesting fact but we could not account for it in any way.

The following day we reached Misgar, the most northerly village in India, where there is a telegraph office, and thus came into contact with civilization for the first time for a month. This was also half way in distance, but not in time.

From Misgar to Baltit, the capital of Hunza, is a distance of fifty-two miles and this we marched in four days. Between these two places there is a road theoretically fit for pack animals but, since the road lies through the Hunza gorge where the river cuts its way through the Karakorum Range, it is very narrow and it is safer to use coolie transport along the greater part of the route. A caravan from Kashgar, which was a short way ahead of us, lost two ponies on this part of the route through their loads hitting the cliff on the inside of the track and forcing them over the cliff on the outside and into the river. In winter, when the river is low, it is possible to walk along the river bed and thus avoid the road. Another obstacle on this bit of road is the Batura glacier which is nearly a mile wide and which animals have great difficulty in crossing.

A few miles North of Baltit is an interesting obelisk which commemorates the fact that this road was built in 1902 to enable Lord Kitchener to visit the Russian frontier.

Baltit, with its green fields, shady trees and white houses, seemed a paradise compared with the somewhat barren country through which we had come. On arrival we were welcomed by the Mir's sons and invited to stay in some palatial tents adjoining the palace. We gladly accepted, and spent a very pleasant evening with a hot bath

and good dinner, followed by an interesting conversation with the Mir.

Though pressed to stay longer we unfortunately could not spare the time and, the next day, continued our journey to Aliabad where we found Colonel and Mrs. L. staying in the Rest House. They had recently arrived and were proposing to spend a year or more studying the language and customs of the Burusho. During the course of an excellent lunch we learnt many interesting facts about the country through which we were passing. After lunch we walked the remaining few miles to Minapin where we proposed to spend the night. This was at the foot of the beautiful mountain of Rakapushi (25,500'), which dominates this part of Hunza, and we had a fine view of it in the evening light. On arrival we found to our delight that our mules had also arrived, having safely negotiated the Darkot Pass. We were secretly very relieved to see them again as their success had seemed problematical and it was a high test of the honesty of the Pathan muleteers. Incidentally these two muleteers, who hailed from Peshawar, accompanied us the whole way from Drosh to Bandipur.

Two days later we crossed the border into Gilgit, but before leaving Hunza it would not be out-of-place to record our impressions of this interesting state and its people. As in most mountainous countries the main population of Hunza live in the valleys and graze their flocks on the hills in summer. They are nearly self-supporting and spend the winter, when they are snowed up, making various articles of clothing.


It is noticeable that a large number of the people have very fair complexions and blue eyes and there is a theory that these are descendants of Alexander the Great's army.

Another notable feature is the absence of watch dogs, there being, I believe, only two in the whole of Baltit and from this it may be assumed that there is very little crime in the state. In fact it is claimed by the Mir that there have been only two murders in the 40 odd years of his reign.


The women of Hunza appear to be much freer than their sisters in the rest of India. They work in the fields with the men and even play games with them and appear to be thoroughly contented. Polyandry is generally practised, and this is not inconvenient as many of the men are away on the hills during the summer, acting as shepherds.




Ghul Kwaja Unwin Glacier from near the Mingtaka Pass.




Part of the Hunza Gorges North of Baltit.





Coolies crossing the river near Sokhta Robat, Ishkuman.



View looking West from Kili West mountain.




S  
SOUTH


W  
WEST

N  
NORTH

E  
EAST



PHOTOGRAPH 32  
MAP REF: 42 L  $\frac{1}{4}$ "=1 MILE  
TAKEN FROM THE SECOND "1" OF "17215" SPOT HEIGHT OF CHILLINJI PASS  
HEIGHT 18,000'





The language is of great interest to the philologist since it has no apparent connection with any other language and has an extremely complicated grammar besides. Fortunately for travellers, however, at least one man in every village can be found who understands Urdu and it is possible to travel in the country without an interpreter.

Polo is the national game and is played in most villages throughout the winter. The road very often runs through the village ground which is from 200 to 250 yards long and 40 yards or so wide. It does not seem to worry the players if there is a ditch running across the ground or if there is a bog in the middle of it. One ground we crossed was curved and there was a small hill in the centre of it so that the ends were not intervisible. There are very few rules of any sort and none about crossing and dangerous play. Although six is the normal number of players on a side, more may play if necessary. No definite time is laid down for a game, but they normally play till one side scores nine goals or till the ponies are no longer able to stand. Such is the hardiness of the ponies that, though there are no intervals for rest and players have only one pony, games sometimes go on for as long as two hours.

We spent a very pleasant two days in Gilgit where we were most hospitably received by the Doctor and his wife. Unfortunately we could stay no longer as time was growing short. In Gilgit is the most northerly post office in this part of the world and the first one we had seen for several weeks.

A description of the rest of the journey is unnecessary as it is regularly performed by members of the Gilgit garrison and sportsmen in pursuit of markhor. The only diversion from the normal route was a two days march up the Rupal nullah along the southern foot of the Nanga Parbat. Here we had a magnificent and awe-inspiring view of the 16,000' precipice whose foot is in the nullah. There can be very few finer views of a mountain in the world.

Finally we reached Bandipur, on the Wular Lake in Kashmir, on September 19th, after a journey of 710 miles covered, mostly on foot, in seventy days. Thus ended a most interesting journey, and one which we were indeed fortunate in having the opportunity to perform.

"F. S. R. 1740."

Just under two centuries ago, it was appreciated that "a cessation of arms for over twenty years must unavoidably have been attended by the loss of most of our old Generals and officers, and their posts at length fill'd with many who never served abroad."

For the benefit of the young entry, a field service manual was compiled by Brigadier-General Adam Williamson, who, by publishing his work in 1740, adroitly anticipated, by a matter of weeks, the next Great European War.

A comparison of his book with F. S. R. presents several points of interest, and not a few of humour.

In the title pages and preface are a number of pleasing human touches which the modern volume lacks. General Williamson dedicates his work to the King in "an ardent desire to be deemed, even in the smallest degree, a useful subject to your MAJESTY." To-day, the sole reference to the Throne is the austere warning—"Crown Copyright Reserved." Nor were readers plunged without ceremony (as now) into a war of the first magnitude. The General politely, albeit pointedly, suggests that officers "should put this book in their pockets: it will take little more room than their snuffbox, and if as often look'd into will be of greater use to them."

It is unexpected to find Williamson quoting, as his chief authority, "the great Marshal *Turenne*." The victories of Ramillies, Malplaquet and Oudenarde were still fresh in the minds of the nation, and the Brigadier himself had served in Flanders.

This preference shown to a foreign authority substantiates Lord Milne's criticism that "for years past British soldiers have been nourished on the ideas of continental strategists." On the other hand, many of Turenne's maxims bear Marlborough's hall-mark, for, as Williamson tells us in foot-notes, the Duke not infrequently adopted them.

In order to retain the flavour of the original, it has been thought best to quote freely, and as nearly as possible *verbatim*, from selected passages, rather than attempt to give a general summary. It is but fair to add that only those orthographical eccentricities which lie between inverted commas, are debitable to General Williamson's account.

*" The Duty of a General. "*

" A General ought to be acquainted with History, Geography, but above all, Topography, or the situation of the country which is to be the seat of war ; what it produces ; the genius and disposition of the inhabitants, their government, and what sort of dominion they like best.

" For you preserve your conquests by ingratiating yourself with the conquer'd, and taking away their desire of revolting.

" Should you fall into misfortunes, do not lose time in complaining, but wholly apply your thoughts how to get out of them. Choose rather to be unjustly blamed than to excuse yourself at the expense of your friends ; in short, be more intent in repairing your fault than in making useless apologies.

" Let not any pique or ill-will to your superior officer divert you from doing all the real service you can to your King and Country.

" Never let others perceive your fears or uneasiness ; and appear more gay than the ordinary in the time of most imminent danger.

" Know well your officers, so that you may employ those on all important and bold enterprises who are the most willing to execute what you have projected.

" Never give the command of a brisk and important attack to a slow officer. The lives of men are lost oftener by the bad direction of an attack than by the fire of the enemy.

" Do everything for the good of the soldier, that is consistent with your service to your King and Country. Let none fear you but the enemy and the evil doers ; yet see that there be subordination in your army ; for obedience and discipline amongst the troops is one of the first means of obtaining victories : while an officer that knows not how to obey will not know how to command.

" Remotely form your projects, revolve them a long time in your thoughts, and let nothing of it be spread abroad."

The quality of this advice compares favourably with that given in the equivalent passages of F. S. R. But the following admonitions to senior officers may be judged too outspoken for modern consumption.

" Distribute your bounty yourself, and let it not appear that any other person had a hand in it : but let punishments (though you order them) seem to proceed from courts-martial, or other courts of judicature.

" When a project of importance is to be executed, choose the commander you think best qualified for it ; and as duty is done by seniority, send these officers who are before him on other commands, to prepare the way for the officer you have your eye on. Thus will your schemes prosper, and your officers jealousy of your partiality be prevented.

" General officers should keep the posts assigned them, or which their rank gives them : and not leave them, to go where their curiosity or a distant fire invites them ; and to have it said in print, *such a one was everywhere* : when really they should remember, that he who is everywhere is nowhere ; and that he is the best officer, who is found where the duty of his post requires his presence.\*

" Instead of wishing for a war that you may make a greater figure, endeavour nothing so much as the good and tranquility of your country.

" A Commander-in-Chief should never be prevailed upon to drink to excess : that might give the enemy a terrible advantage over him."

Here the General possibly felt that young officers might despair of achieving the perfection necessary for high command. At all events, he encouragingly points out that " All military expeditions are attended with a variety of unexpected accidents and circumstances. When a man boasts of never having committed errors in war, it is a sign that he has not long been a general officer. He is the best General who commits the fewest faults or oversights."

### *The Principles of War*

The broad principles of War are discussed in a section headed " The Disposition of an Army." As in F. S. R. we are warned that " In field expeditions it is impossible exactly to prescribe to an army or separate body how to govern itself in each action, because every different motion of the enemy, and the various accounts a man has of them, ought to make him alter his measures. There is no giving a commander other than general rules, the rest depending on his own conduct and behaviour of his troops."

The first rule given to commanders is, " Always endeavour to make your war offensive. As soon as there is an opportunity of giving

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\*One suspects that the author of this maxim may be Williamson, and not Turenne. The worthy General, while serving in Flanders, was A.D.C. to a notably active commander !

the enemy battle to advantage, do it at once. This gives spirit to the men and fear to the enemy, and prevents them intrenching."

Of the other principles quoted, pride of place is given to surprise. A capacity to mislead the enemy by means of ruses, subterfuges, feints, ambushes and the like, is held to be one of the chief characteristics of generalship. As a corollary, much importance is attached to secrecy for "the world is full of tattlers."

Commanders are cautioned never to "act by constant rules and methods," and the moral effect of surprise, even when fortuitous, is stressed. "Remember what the great *Turenne* often said, viz., "*Qu'un sot l'embarroissoit quelquefois plus qu'un habile homme.*" Truly a comforting reflection for "blockheads."

Amongst the means suggested for disconcerting an opponent, is the study of meteorology. "Wind, dust, rain, the sun, foggs, are things which may be serviceable to you: but you must not trust them too far, they being liable to change."

It is here convenient to remark that an insistence on the power of surprise is the key-note of the book. Certainly the ruses recommended are not Machiavellian in conception. On the other hand they are of the type which, from Marathon to Megiddo, have so often proved successful in war. For instance, "You may surprise a place by sending in soldiers dress'd like the peasants of the country, or in the dress of women, merchants, or priests." Not so many years ago, Mahsuds collected some 60 rifles and 120,000 rounds of ammunition from a Waziristan post by means of this ancient strategem.

### *Characteristics of Fighting Troops*

*Cavalry.*—The methods laid down for the employment of cavalry in reconnaissance or protection, differ little from modern practice.

Mounted action is strongly advocated. "Cavalry should always attack sword in hand: there is little hope for those who begin with the fire of their carabines."

Commanders are told to seek opportunities of using cavalry and infantry in co-operation, under circumstances which permit the former to exploit their powers of mounted attack. As an example, "Lay ambushes of foot in woods, posting likewise a body of horse near the place the enemy will be driven out; then the cavalry charge them in front, flank and rear; and you have them at a cheap rate."

But, while an exponent of the value of the "brisk charge," Williamson holds that the employment of cavalry unaided, in attacks against any considerable formed bodies of enemy can seldom be justified.\*

He comments on their then lack of fire support and adds that "there is nothing so weak as the flank and rear of cavalry." "When horse are sent to attack the rear of a retreating enemy, let them, when possible, take foot behind them. They should not grumble at it, for they will find great use and comfort from them."

By "taking foot behind them," the General meant mounting them *en croupe*. This means of locomotion, common in the past, would nowadays make the infantry sore, let alone the cavalry. Yet in dire emergency, it might still solve the same vexed problem—that of quickly supporting mobile troops with infantry.

*Artillery*.—As might be expected, the passages relating to artillery are entertaining, rather than instructive. There are, however, a few modern touches. Cannon, for instance, are kept well up in a column, as "the order of march is best, that requires least time and movement to put an army into order of battle."

But it is difficult to believe that the General's views on gunnery can have been acceptable to artillerymen, even in 1740. In writing of laying for elevation he says, "it is fit that you should know, that if a cannon be fired horizontally, on a horizontal plain, one half of the range of its ball describes a right line, the other a curve or parabola." In a later section he has the temerity to discuss the founder's art, but covers himself by a footnote which reads: "But these proportions differ, inasmuch as every foundry, even in *France*, has its own proportions, and each founder thinks his own best."

There is a list of thirteen cannon, bearing such distinctive and attractive names as the Basilisk, Flying Dragon, Passwall, and Faulconet.† But the age of standardization had already set in for "our pieces of ordnance are now commonly called only by the weight of their ball, as a 42 pounder, 24 pounder, 18 pounder, etc., which are the natures of the several guns on board our line of battleships."

\*Curiously enough he makes no mention of Marlborough's brilliant use of cavalry at Blenheim, though he twice criticises the enemy lack of reconnaissance which made this decisive intervention possible.

†Details of these pieces are—

Name			Pounders	Feet long	Weight
Basilisk	..	..	48	10	7,200
Flying Dragon	..	..	32	22	7,200
Passwall	..	..	16	18	4,200
Faulconet	..	..	2	10	1,350

As regards performance, " A cannon pointed to hit the mark will carry its ball about 700 yards. Its force, fired at 200 yards from the mark, will drive the ball into solid earth about twelve feet, and into sand or loose earth some twenty-four feet."

General Williamson probably intends no discourtesy to the Royal Regiment by remarking that " In an army you must look on four-fifths only as military, either of men or horse : the rest serve for the baggage, sutlery, artillery, etc." At the time he wrote our Artillery had no trained drivers, and in war depended on hired teams and wagoners. In parenthesis, Fortescue remarks that the Gunners of that day " were a peculiar people, but their chief distinction was their superiority."\*

*Engineers.*—In Williamson's time the Corps of Royal Engineers did not exist, but Pioneers are mentioned as forming an essential part of advanced and rear guards. The individual advisory engineer, however, was a man of great consequence in an age of frequent sieges, and much was expected of him. As a single example, taken from a section on mining, an engineer was required " to know well height, depth, breadth, thickness and slopes, by a plumb-line ; what is parallel to the horizon, and what is not ; to take levels of all earths, and to have the most perfect knowledge of all sorts of rocks, earths, sands ; and to know the force of all sorts of powder."

#### *Operations*

Of the sections devoted to specific operations of war, rather more than half deal with open warfare ; the remainder give rules for the attack and defence of fortifications.

Naturally enough, General Williamson attaches great importance to the part which fortresses may play in war. Thinking probably of Belgium, he remarks that " even a small state that has one or two well fortified towns, may defend itself for some time, till a neighbouring power, who sees with jealous eye the increase of a neighbour, may come to its assistance."

But the Brigadier is not blind to the limitations of fixed defences. " Fortified places, tho' strong, either without good troops, or provision for them, must surrender ; and remember that there is no place impregnable, or that baffles the industry of man. Yet, for that reason do not neglect to defend them well, that your honour be not surrendered with a town."

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\*The Army and the Empire, p. 19.

In his avoidance of pedantry, Williamson sets an example to many later military writers. He introduces his chapter on Battle thus. "There are two sorts of battles, a general or particular engagement. But as they differ only in the number of troops engaged, the methods are the same." Moreover there is little—possibly too little—repetition in the book.

*Night Operations.*—Williamson claims (and who can gainsay him?) that the cover of darkness is the best means of "outwitting the enemy, while preserving the lives of your own men."

"Near an enemy," he says, "it is best to move by night. To succeed you must consider well, and be very secret." After dealing briefly with the routine of night marches, such as the blocking of side roads, he returns to his main themes of secrecy and surprise. "Keep your gates shut till the moment you march, taking care that no spy slips out with the troops. Let your tattoo beat as usual, and detail a few men to remain behind to light fires. On your march forbid the showing of lights; choosing for secrecy and security, to go through woods, bottoms, hollow ways; avoiding all inhabited places as may be.

"Detail cavalry to secure all persons they meet, lest they should give intelligence of your march. Take several routes, and seem to march an indirect way to the place you aim at, in order to deceive the enemy and make them take wrong measures."

Of night attacks on field entrenchments he writes: "Seem to resolve to attack the intrenchments in the part you least design: let glaring preparations be made; and whilst the enemy is intent on the defence of that part, you march in the night, and slip into their line. They, not seeing your dispositions, will not know where the storm will fall.

"Reconnoitre well the enemy's lines, that you may know their situation, and the approaches to them, before you attack.

"Make a false attack, to favour the true ones; and let your attacks begin precisely at the same time. March briskly, with your infantry in lines, and keep your fire.

"Carry good store of fascines and hurdles with you: and direct your infantry, as soon as they have entered the lines, to open the barriers and level the line for the cavalry to go through.

"It almost always happens, that an army which thus attacks intrenchments in the field with vigour, and is well sustained, finds great advantage over those who defend. This method was practised

with success by the Duke of Marlborough, to the great saving of the lives of men, when he pass'd the *Geet*, and the lines at *Helishem*, and after that at *Arlieux*."

*Retreat*

" A fine retreat," General Williamson considers, " is the masterpiece of a good general."

The temptation to quote his rules for withdrawals will be resisted, as interest mainly lies in their close resemblance to modern teaching. As usual he emphasises the importance of artifices. For instance—

" Leave three or four troopers and a trumpet, well mounted, at the entrance of a wood, close country, or road at the top of high ground. The enemy appearing, the troopers show themselves, sound their trumpet, and oblige the enemy to march slowly and with precaution; and then at a certain distance they gallop as fast as they can, and join your army."

The interposal of simple passages, such as the above, amongst weightier material, is typical of the book. Whether unwittingly or not, the General is a master of the art of introducing that light and shade into writing which holds the attention of a reader. Nor does he lack an eye for a telling phrase, as when describing the value of a resolute counter-attack, delivered from ambush, on a too thrusting pursuer. " Draw up your troops in a cover'd place," he says, " and fall on the enemy with vigour, or as the *French* call it, *tête baissée*."

The sections discussing the measures which the commander of a retreating army may employ to turn the tables on his opponent are, in the light of later history, of peculiar interest. " You may get the advantage of the enemy," he writes, " by laying waste the country from whence they must draw their subsistence. Make the avenues as difficult as you can; break down the bridges; burn the mills; cut the dikes, open the sluices, drown the country if you can; drive in the cattle, and bring in the grain, forage, hay, and the other fruits of the earth. All that distresses the enemy may turn to your advantage." In order to reap this advantage, you must " make your own camp sure by good intrenchments and redoubts, which defend your avenues and communications; endeavour to be *near the sea*, or a navigable river; in a word, be master of your rear, and have wherewith to subsist your army."

One's mind instinctively turns to the Lines of *Torres Vedras*.

*Curious Passages*

Turning to the (to modern eyes) curious passages in the book, it would be interesting to hear a historian's, or ethnologist's views on this peculiar manifestation of a caste system in Europe :

"Keep your camp clean, and order the malefactors of each regiment to bury all dead horses, dogs, etc., that are found in front or rear of their regiment. But this method must not be ordered amongst the *Germans* ; for he that does but touch one of these dead animals, or even the rope that draws it, is so contaminated in their opinion, that no officer or soldier will eat or drink with him everafter. Therefore there are persons appointed for this purpose, with whom the soldiery will have no commerce."

This next quotation recalls an entertaining article, written some years ago by a distinguished officer, on the important part played by Grape and Grain in military history. The author had a staunch supporter in General Williamson :

"If the assault be long and obstinate, and the fire smart, refresh the soldiers covered with blood, sweat, and dust with a dram. These little comforts re-animate their courage."

Passing from drink to food, it seems fortunate that in 1740 armies were not expected to march on their stomachs, for these organs were then but poorly cushioned to withstand the bumps of the road :

"Care must be taken that the soldier never wants his full allowance of bread, for the rest he can shift. You give to each soldier two pounds of bread *per* day." On such a meagre ration it was indeed necessary to "take care of roguery, corruption and treason, but above all that your bread waggons be not insulted by the enemy."

To supplement their bread, each regiment was allowed only "one sutler with a wheel carriage." It is no wonder that looting of live-stock was then viewed with a tolerant eye. The horses did much better than the men if, in fact, they received their daily allowance of "ten pounds of oats, twenty-five pounds of hay, and three bundles of straw."

Officers were allowed "three baggage-horses to each captain, and one to each subaltern, for the rest according to the pleasure of the Prince or General ; remembering always that the fewer wheel carriages attend an army, the less it is encumbered : and that a superfluous number of baggage horses eats up the forage for the necessary ones." That this admonition was timely is shown by the following

samples of kit carried by an infantry C. O. in Marlborough's time.\*

" Six new laced fine shirts.

Twelve new fine holland shirts with musslin

Five new fine musslin cravats.

A new scarlett cloake laced with gold lace.

Six perewigs.

A silver handled sword.

About five or six dosin clerett."

The romance of battle, as exemplified by the "silver handled sword," died, we are sometimes told, in the last Great War: choked with chemicals, and riven with explosives. But here are some of the other weapons used in the good old days:

"Bombs are of great use to destroy defences, and red-hot bullets to set a town afire.

"And number amongst your weapons, halberts, partisans, scythes set on a long staff, or reverse scythes, to cut off an enemy as they mount, and tumble them into the fossé, where it is easy to fire on them.

"Have good store of mortars, bombs, grenades, and hand-grenades; old nails, bolts, and pieces of iron-chains, old iron and chain-bullets, as well as double-headed and grape shot.

"Also burning and bursting barrels, rolling, fires, fire darts and lances, fire pots, oil, lime, and boiling pitch, tallow, melted lead, and burning sand.

"Lay on your parapets great beams, stones, and fire-machines, to crush or burn those who may slip.

"To countermine, or blow up the mines of the enemy: petard them: and bury their miners; or drive them out by the smোক of sulphur, or other suffocating stuff.

"Never omit to try any water or provisions left by an enemy, lest they be poisoned.

"In short, never neglect anything your imagination can suggest for the annoyance and destruction of the enemy, and your own preservation."

But this, we suggest, is mainly official ruthlessness on General Williamson's part. To take leave of him on a kindlier note:

"You should post good marksmen, to take off the General or principal officers of the enemy. But this murdering manner is seldom followed, and should have no place in a generous war."

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\* Taken from a lengthy list quoted by Fortescue.

## APPRECIATION OF THE SITUATION AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

BY COLONEL A. H. C. KEARSEY, D.S.O., O.B.E.

### I. OBJECTS *to be attained*

(a) The object for the Japanese was to secure Korea, to regain Port Arthur, to prevent the Russians from controlling southern Korea, and to check the Russian advance.

(b) The Russians wished to gain an ice-free port in the Far East and to control the sea communications from Vladivostok.

### II. CONSIDERATIONS *affecting its attainment*

(a) *Strength and location of the opposing forces.*—The Japanese with their population of approximately forty millions could bring 150,000 men into the field at once out of their total field troops available at the outbreak of war; namely, 208 battalions, 55 squadrons, 726 guns. The Russians in spite of their population of some two hundred million could not hope to be in superior force until August 1904. In the East they had the following field troops; namely, 86 battalions, 35 squadrons and 196 guns. Their available field troops to meet the Japanese field armies would not be more than 60,000 rifles, 3,000 cavalry and 164 guns.

Their local weakness would, therefore, force the defensive on them.

As to locations the Russians were in a salient. Japan possessed a re-entrant frontier from Vladivostok round to Port Arthur.

The Russians could, therefore, carry out the principles usually adopted by an army in a salient, either to act on interior lines by containing one of the opposing convergent forces and striking the other; or by massing at the base of the salient, so that they could gain the necessary time to collect their scattered forces.

(b) *Topography.*—The Korean peninsula is 600 miles long and 150 miles broad.

It is bounded on the north and north-west by Manchuria, which was the main theatre of war. Korea possessed the advantage for the Japanese, that through it there would be a comparatively safe line by which supplies and reinforcements could be forwarded from Japan to Manchuria. It would also form a convenient base to which

the Japanese army could fall back if required until reinforcements arrived from Japan.

Korea was of political importance as its occupation and future management were among the main points of dispute between the Japanese and Russians.

There were few good harbours in the 2,300 mile coast-line of Manchuria and Korea except in the south of Korea, where the coast is not shelving. On other parts of the coast the shore is muddy and slopes gradually for a great distance out to sea, so that even at high tide it is hardly covered with water.

The Korean peninsula contained only the one road 140 miles long from Seoul to the Yalu.

From the Yalu this road is continued 180 miles to Liao Yang by the Motienling Pass and Fenghuangcheng.

The roads in Manchuria being few and bad would cause considerable dispersion of force for the Japanese in their advance, which was intended to culminate in a decisive battle at a definite point against the Russian main field army.

(c) *Communications*.—The Japanese possessed four naval bases, of which the most important was Rikaho. They landed troops in Korea in order to draw off part of the Russian field army from Port Arthur, and they also landed troops in the Liao Tung Peninsula for the siege of Port Arthur. They subsequently made a converging movement against Kuropatkins' field army. Therefore, their communications both in Korea and in the Liao Tung Peninsula up to Liao Yang must be considered.

The road from Port Arthur to Liao Yang *via* Chin-chou, Fu-chou, Kaiping, Tashihchiao, Haicheng, Anshanchan to Liao Yang is 220 miles. From Wiju on the R. Yalu to Liao Yang is 180 miles by the road east of the R. Yalu to Shuitien, then north-west to Kuantiencheng and Saimachi, then west through the Motienling to the Tang Ho, then north-west again to Liao Yang.

This road meets the Imperial road from Peking and Mukden at Saimachi, seventy miles south-east of Liao Yang.

The coastal road between Antung on the Yalu and Port Arthur *via* Takushan is 230 miles. As the Fourth Army landed at Takushan between the 19th May and the 9th June, it is necessary to consider the route from this place to Liao Yang.

A road 160 miles long joins Liao Yang and Takushan *via* Hsiuyen, Huanghuatien, and Langtzushan.

During the winter only were these roads passable with ease. The roads in Manchuria being so few and bad considerably affected the Japanese plan of campaign. The Japanese had to accept the risk of defeat in detail by superior numbers when their armies were dispersed on the available roads leading up to their assembly positions in front of the Russian field army at Liao Yang.

The Yalu and the Liao rivers were navigable when not frozen, and then they could be crossed by sleighs.

The railway from Port Arthur to Liao Yang was a single five-foot gauge line. This single-track line ran six thousand miles from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok with a branch to Port Arthur.

During this period of the campaign the quickest journey between Warsaw and Mukden was fifteen days.

There were sidings every ten miles, by which the engines were returned.

The empty wagons on arrival in Manchuria were mostly used either as huts or were burnt as fuel. Coal was available in Southern Manchuria but not further north.

Thus the Russians' means of reinforcement and supply was inferior to that of the Japanese, whose sea-transport enabled them to reinforce their field army more quickly than the Russians could with their railway which, until the 25th September 1904, did not run round the southern end of Lake Baikal. By the end of 1904, however, 410,000 fighting men, 100,000 non-combatants, 1,000 guns complete with transport and 93,000 horses, had been sent from European Russia to Mukden.

*(d) Weather was an important factor, as it affected the mobility of both sides.*

During a thaw, troops had to march round the southern end of Lake Baikal, supplies being shipped across. Troops were able to march across it when it was frozen. During a thaw the roads, which were all unmetalled, became almost impassable, carts sinking up to their axles in mud. The rainy season in Manchuria is from July to September. From October to March the roads remain hard and frozen. The climate, though hot in the summer and very cold in the winter, is healthy.

(e) *Supplies*.—Coal was obtainable in the mines at Fushun and Yentai. In Mongolia, millet, Indian corn, pigs, fowls, rice and vegetables could be procured.

Rice was the staple food for the Japanese. This facilitated their supply system considerably.

(f) *Morale and Armament*.—In the Japanese army the morale was excellent. The men were keen and intelligent. The infantry were well-armed with modern rifles. They were trained in fire-action and in the use of ground both in attack and defence. Their artillery was armed with an improved breech-loading weapon, most of which were quick-firing.

Their battleships, though equal in number to those of the Russians in the Far East, were superior in quality. In all other vessels Japan had the advantage. This was an important factor as the Japanese had to rely on a decisive naval success, so that they would be able to transport and land troops in Korea, at Takushan and Talion Wan, unmolested.

Their supply and transport organization was carefully considered. Their medical arrangements were adequate.

It was Kuropatkin's opinion that the Russian army was inferior in every military quality to that of the Japanese.

The Russian army was not fitted for war. The infantry were untrained in musketry. They were taught to rely on massed bayonet attacks unsupported by adequate fire. Initiative was discouraged, protective duties were neglected. The defence was encouraged at the expense even of local counter-attacks.

Yet defensive positions were occupied without attention to concealment, observation, and field of fire.

The Japanese were inspired with patriotic sentiments and unselfish devotion to the cause of the war.

The Russians were indifferent, and their morale was at a low ebb.

In fact the Japanese successes may be said to be due more to morale than to strategic skill. For this morale their Commander must be given his share of praise, as well as for his bold leadership.

Oyama also encouraged initiative in his subordinates. Kuropatkin on the other hand did not display the same gifts of generalship.

He was immersed in detail, he interfered unduly with his subordinates. His policy was hesitating. The many errors he

committed finally enabled the Japanese to defeat the Russian army at Liao Yang.

These errors included the detachments sent under Zasulich to the Yalu, and under Stakelberg into the Liao Tung Peninsula. Then in allowing the dispersed Japanese armies crossing the mountains into the Liao valley to concentrate against his position passively held at Liao Yang.

Oyama on the other hand rigidly maintained his objective with unwavering determination, and thus he inspired his subordinates.

Admiral Togo, Commander of the Japanese Navy, admirably co-operated in the Japanese plan of campaign realising that loss of sea control would mean ultimate and inevitable defeat. It was essential for Japan to secure the passage of transports to Korea and Southern Manchuria.

(g) *Time and Space*.—The Japanese calculated that in six weeks from the outbreak of war a force capable of dealing with the Russian Far Eastern combatant troops could be landed in the area of operations, and that this force could be more quickly reinforced than could the Russian army.

This calculation was based on the figures that the Russian field troops available in February 1904, would be 3,000 sabres, 164 guns and 60,000 rifles, posted near Vladivostok, Port Arthur, and Harbin.

The Japanese had thirteen active divisions, two Cavalry and two Field Artillery Brigades, thirteen reserve Kobi Brigades.

Local conditions favoured the Japanese. The Russians would have to be reinforced by the Siberian single track line, 6,000 miles from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok. The quickest journey was fifteen days between Warsaw and Mukden.

From Sasebo in Japan to Chemulpo on the west coast of Korea is four hundred miles, to Gensan on the east of Korea is four hundred and fifty miles, and to Dalny six hundred miles.

Therefore, speed in mobilization and concentration of troops was vitally important for the Japanese in order to take advantage of the local weakness of the Russians.

### III. COURSES

(a) *Open to the Japanese*.—(i) To land at Gensan and advance in a north-easterly direction in order to cut off Vladivostok.

(ii) To land at Chemulpo and advance towards Port Arthur and the railway north-east of it.

(iii) To land at Gensan and advance Westwards.

(iv) To land a force in the Liao Tung Peninsula for the siege of Port Arthur ; with a combined movement of a force landed in Korea and also in the Liao Tung Peninsula, to advance in a northerly direction against the main Russian army. With reference to these suggested courses a landing in force near Gensan or Vladivostok would not have helped the situation at Port Arthur. A land force besieging Port Arthur must be protected from a Russian field army advancing south from Harbin.

The course suggested in paragraph (iv) would be the best one to help the Japanese to carry out their objective of driving the Russians from Korea and Manchuria, and of destroying their naval and military forces in the Far East before they could be reinforced from Europe.

The destruction of the Russian fleet in a fortified harbour by their fleet alone would not be easily or quickly accomplished. Therefore, they considered that troops must be landed in the vicinity to invest Port Arthur from the land side. In addition it was decided to occupy Korea and to converge on any central Russian field army in co-operation with troops landing at Takushan or in the Liao Tung Peninsula. In that case it would be better to land on the west side of the Korean Peninsula than the east side at Gensan, especially as the Vladivostok coast was ice-bound until April. It was more important for the Japanese to deal with Port Arthur than with Vladivostok, although in both harbours there were ships that would threaten Japanese communications. In Vladivostok, however, there was only one squadron. The Russian forces in these two places were out of touch with each other ; whereas the Japanese armies advancing north against a Russian field army on the Harbin—Port Arthur line—would be in touch with their troops in the Liao Tung Peninsula. Therefore, as the Japanese were pursuing the double objective of capturing Port Arthur and operating against the Russian field army, they acted wisely in disregarding Vladivostok and in operating with all the troops that could be spared from Port Arthur against the Russian field army, which was their other objective.

Japan's first problem, however, was to establish superiority at sea, so that their transports with the necessary troops, munitions, war materials and supplies could be safely brought to the seat of war. They would then gain the advantage of their proximity to the area of operations and of the superior organization, which their war prepara-

tion had given them, of being ready to act before the Russians could operate in force either in Korea or southern Manchuria. Their first step would have to be to land troops in Korea. These troops would act as the right wing of the forces converging on the Russian field army by the Imperial road leading from Wiju towards Liao Yang. This was the main idea underlying the Japanese land strategy. To carry this out their troops must be deployed in southern Manchuria in such a way that they could envelop the Russian field army. Another reason for landing first in Korea was that the control of this province was one of the main points in dispute with Russia. In addition Korea was the nearest part of the mainland to Japan. It was, therefore, the safest line of supply from Japan to troops operating in Manchuria. In the event of a reverse the ports in Korea would form the most secure bases on which a retreating army could fall back to be refitted and reinforced from the home ports.

(b) The courses open to the Russians were (i) to collect troops for the defence of Vladivostok, Haicheng and Port Arthur while their main field army was concentrated further north on the trans-Siberian railway near Liao Yang, Mukden or Harbin.

(ii) To retire altogether out of the salient and to wait for the advance of the Japanese.

However, the difficulty for the Russians was that their local weakness and the rapidity of Japanese mobilization and early movement of troops would force them on the defensive. Admiral Alexeiev, the Governor of the Far East, and supreme commander in Manchuria and in the Kuan Tung Peninsula, decided that Port Arthur must be protected to the utmost extent of General Kuropatkin's power. General Kuropatkin, on the other hand, considered that the best course would have been to retreat slowly in front of the Japanese armies without fighting land battles until the Russians were strong enough to strike in superior force. It would not be possible to carry out this policy as it did not coincide with Alexeiev's plan. The preservation of sea-power for the Russians depended on the safety of Port Arthur and Vladivostok.

Their policy must, therefore, be to conserve their forces by sea and land until they were strong enough to take decisive action. Their difficulty, then, was that the safety of their land forces could be ensured by withdrawal until they were strong enough to take the offensive; on the other hand the preservation of sea-power depended

on the safety of Port Arthur and Vladivostok, for which purpose troops would have to be left to defend these places.

It was vitally important to the Russians to gain command of the sea. Russia had strong enough navy and army to ensure the defeat of the Japanese only if command of the sea was obtained, so that sufficient land force could be transported and maintained in the Far East.

Russia's land successes would have been of little use in gaining ultimate victory until sea power enabled her to utilise the ports for the invasion of Japan.

At the decisive point, however, the Russian eastern detachment was not numerically superior to the Japanese fleet. Therefore, the Russians were anxious to conserve their resources in the Far East until they could ensure the defeat of the Japanese navy when their own European navy arrived.

Therefore, to carry out this policy their two harbours, Port Arthur and Vladivostok, were of paramount importance to them.

Of these two, Port Arthur, being the base of the larger portion of the fleet, and being ice-free, was the more important.

Therefore, Kuropatkin's suggested plan of complete withdrawal to a position on the trans-Siberian railway could not be carried out.

The Russian plan, therefore, might have been to strengthen and prepare adequately their fortresses for siege warfare, and with the other forces available to manœuvre in such a way as to contain the Japanese field armies until the arrival of sufficient forces from Europe to enable them to take the offensive with every prospect of success.

Actually the Russian operations were a series of half-measures. Their strategy and their tactics were dictated to them by the Japanese. Kuropatkin hoped to be able to win victories by taking no risks and by waiting until he had complete information on which to make his plans and dispositions.

The result was that the Japanese acted while he was waiting, and he was always conforming to the operations of his enemy.

The force necessary to defeat the Japanese was underestimated.

Before peace was signed in favour of the Japanese, Russia had brought into the field three times their original force.

#### IV. PLANS

The Russian plan was—

- (a) To concentrate their main field army on the trans-Siberian railway in the vicinity of Liao Yang.

- (b) To send forward detachments to delay the advance of Japanese forces converging on Liao Yang.
- (c) To garrison Port Arthur and Vladivostok and prepare them for a siege.

The Japanese plan was—

- (a) To besiege Port Arthur and to contain the Russian fleet in its harbour.
- (b) To send a force into Korea.
- (c) To make a concerted movement with the troops landed in Korea and in the Liao Tung peninsula against the main Russian field army.

This plan, owing to the roads in Manchuria being few and bad, would lead to considerable dispersion of force.

There was, thus, the risk of any of their converging armies being defeated in detail. Having decided to besiege Port Arthur, however, it was wise to operate actively with every available man not required for the siege against the Russian field army.

Of their thirteen available divisions, four might have operated against Port Arthur; nine divisions would then have been available for field operations. There was only the imaginary danger of a landing by the Russians from Vladivostok that caused the Japanese to retain two divisions for home defence.

Time was an important factor for the Japanese. The Russian army was daily being strengthened. It would have been advisable for them to have brought to bear every available man before the Russians could concentrate adequate force to deal with their local superiority in numbers.

However, by advancing from the R. Yalu against the left flank and communications of the Russian field army at Liao Yang, the army under General Oku was saved from an attack by the whole weight of the main Russian army.

It was important for the Japanese to occupy Korea from a political point of view, as its possession was one of the causes of the war.

In addition, until Dalny was captured, no satisfactory harbours existed except in Korea. The Russians moving south to relieve Port Arthur could not afford to neglect a Japanese army advancing north-west from Korea.

The Japanese were right in disregarding Vladivostok, as troops operating there would not assist either the capture of Port Arthur or the operations against the Russian field army. However, by leaving two of their thirteen divisions in Japan the Japanese jeopardised their cause, as they did not possess superiority either in front of Port Arthur or against the Russian field army at Liao Yang.

The drawbacks of a converging advance made by the Japanese by isolated forces separated by intricate and mountainous country were to some extent reduced by the landing of their 10th Division at Takushan and its subsequent advance in a northerly direction between the First and Fourth Armies, by the care and skill with which their numbers and dispositions were kept from the Russians, by the immobility and lack of enterprise on the part of the Russians, and finally by the determined leadership and the effective combined efforts of the component parts of the whole Japanese army.

# "THIS 'BRAINSLACKNESS'; ITS CAUSE AND CURE"

BY MAJOR H. R. K. GIBBS

A charge frequently laid at the door of the modern officer is that of sinking into a state of brainslackness, and a stagnation in general education. His military instinct and leadership are also subject to serious criticism. It would be idle to try to controvert the truth of this indictment, since report after report on promotion and Staff College entrance examinations contains the same stricture. Loose thinking and slipshod deductions from known facts are also among the complaints preferred by examining boards. Such being the symptoms it will be wholesome to diagnose the disease, ascertain the causes and, if possible, prescribe remedies to effect a cure.

Old traditions die slowly. William of Orange, on becoming King William III of England, had a poor opinion of English officers. He considered them far below European officers in their professional skill and knowledge of war. He considered Marlborough even, only "good in spite of his extreme youth and lack of experience." So it is that we find the chief commands were given to his Dutch generals; Schomberg the elder and then his son, Waldeck, Ginkel and Solms. His Dutch Guards and Danish Infantry were the patterns held up to the rude English soldiery.

For many years birth, patronage and money were the essentials which governed appointment to and promotion in our army. Merit *per se*, was not yet the touchstone for success. The exigencies of war in distant parts of the growing Empire slowly opened the gates to the keen professional soldier and the abolition of the purchase system further improved his chances. But for long, social position was the more potent factor. The fool of the family was considered fit for the army provided that he came of a "Family." His more gifted brothers went up to the university and graduated into politics or a diplomatic career, while for him a scanty education was sufficient. It is interesting to note that Lady Mornington had but a poor opinion of her younger son, the future Iron Duke. His education was entirely the result of his own keenness and deep reading during his early service. Moore and the Napiers were students of war and training, but they were exceptions in their time.

It has only been during the last fifty years that military education has really assumed an importance in the British Army. The Napoleonic wars in the Peninsular, operations on the Indian Frontier, in Egypt and the Sudan, gave rise to a band of enthusiasts who encouraged the study of military matters. Early mistakes in the Boer War further pointed the lesson, and the leaders of military thought began to make themselves felt, until the outbreak of the World War in 1914 found us with as fine a professional army as the world had ever seen.

This army was, however, a very small one, and so the leaders of thought were but few in number and unable to make themselves felt outside their limited circle. The nation as a whole knew little and cared less about its army other than as a picturesque adjunct in State processions and celebrations. On the continent it was not so. The armies of France and Germany constituted a large part of the people, and consequently their officers assumed a correspondingly greater importance in the public eye and more attention was paid to their education by the government.

The years 1914-1915 saw the virtual extinction of the British Regular Army. That period and the succeeding four years, moreover, had other far-reaching effects. The nation in arms emptied the schools, colleges and universities of the best scholars. The baneful effects of this were apparent for several years immediately after the war in all walks of life. This applied in considerable force to the army. Military education from 1914 to 1919 was thrown completely out of gear. The Staff Colleges closed down, all Military Colleges and Schools of Instruction became purely technical. Fighting, training raw recruits and assimilating new equipment left no time for the higher forms of study. This state of affairs continued for some time after the Armistice. Small wars in India, Iraq, the Sudan, and disturbances in Palestine, Egypt and China claimed the attention of the Regular Army, while the great upheavals consequent on demobilization had not subsided.

With peace and demobilization the civil machine, never wholly stopped, began to function again. The universities reopened, the learned professions recommenced their studies, the man of business returned to his office. The system carried on on familiar lines much as before 1914. On the other hand the army found itself in a different position. The shattered pieces of the old regular army had to be collected while the new armies dissolved. The war had left

it in a welter of new ideas. Changed weapons, equipment and conditions raised innumerable problems. Who was to face them?

Casualties had claimed the best part of a generation of instructors, and the years of war had not allowed of others being trained to fill the gap. Military instinct must be fostered and developed in young officers by the instruction and example afforded by the seniors. The writer submits that for several years after the war this was not done. Possibly this was not altogether the fault of the senior officers who were distracted by events then in progress.

The reduction in the strength of the army meant, among other things, that many officers who had been in command of companies and battalions during the war now found themselves relegated to work in less exalted spheres. The excitement and glamour of war was replaced by prosaic and monotonous peace-time training. This was but an insipid brew after the intoxicating draughts of war. Promotion blocks, "axing" processes, and financial stringency all added to the feeling of disillusionment. It was in these circumstances that the post-war commissioned officers were posted to their units. Furthermore, the breakdown of the system of education during the war years had other psychological effects. A spirit of unrest and a disinclination for concentrated mental work was conspicuous in the rising generation. A lack of sound education, moreover, meant a lack of knowledge as to the best methods of tackling a problem.

Let us for a moment examine the training of a doctor or a lawyer. He leaves school at the same age as the youngster entering the army, but he goes up to the university for three or four years where he continues his general education. He is in the company of men of different ages and in an atmosphere of study. Then follows the more detailed study of his profession. The doctor is usually occupied for six years learning his work before being "qualified," and the barrister, if "called" in his fourth year, must spend some years "devilling" for an established senior. The training of both is more arduous than that of the soldier, but the prizes are the more obvious. The incentive for progress is keener, if more selfish. Their promotion does not depend on a time-scale or a limited number of vacancies. A further spur is provided by necessity. The man outside the army or navy, unless the possessor of considerable private means must work hard for his daily bread and butter, and still harder for the cakes and ale. The very nature of his work is changing daily; he must

keep up to date. His normal life brings him into contact with a greater variety of people and so enlarges his mental horizon.

In comparison, the early training of the army officer is sketchy. His technical education comes when his general education has hardly begun. The Army Class at school, often followed by a spell with a crammer, spells a narrow education. The course at the R. M. C. or R. M. A. cannot be compared with the curriculum of a university, though attempts have been made since the war to improve it. When he joins his unit he is to a large extent segregated from other types. This is the more so on foreign service, especially in India. Indifferent facilities for reading and study, and the lack of variety in the society he comes into contact with do not make for intellectual freshness.

That the spirit of leadership is present is proved by the events of the Great War and the campaigns which followed it. Junior officers then shouldered responsibilities that had never fallen to the lot of their predecessors, and on the whole the responsibilities were well-discharged. Leadership thrives on opportunity. Do we provide this in our training now? Not nearly enough; too often the desire to "put up a good show" is allowed to override the necessity of letting the junior officer assume full control. Provide this opportunity and allow full responsibility, and the quality of leadership will develop naturally. Mistakes will be made, but they will bring out the lessons which can never be taught by undue interference and supervision. The improvement in general education and military instinct must be the result of study and personal effort. Encouragement and direction from higher authority will ensure this.

Now for the cure. The courses at the R. M. C. and R. M. A. have been modified in recent years. This is all to the good, as it means that the Cadet's general education is carried on while leaving more of the purely technical work to be taught after he has passed out. During these early years a desire for intellectual accomplishments may be instilled. A broad foundation of history, which is so often neglected at school, may well encourage wide reading; the study of foreign languages still further opens up the field of literature besides being of obvious use to the soldier; the study of political economy will open fresh windows on the world. Such matters too, will insure against hours of boredom in the inevitable spells of duty in lonely outposts and small cantonments.

There is one other matter about which much ink has been spilt; the question of administration, accountancy and office routine.

The writer would emphatically state that an altogether undue proportion of a regimental officer's time is spent in the office. That this side of an army's existence is important goes without saying, but it should be the secondary part of a regimental officer's duty. His main object is the fitting of himself to lead men and train them, not to carry out the duties of a junior clerk.

Travel nowadays is faster and cheaper than ever before, and much can be made of this facility even though the long spells of leave that were available before the War no longer come in the way of the modern officer. Travel, coupled with reading, will enlarge an officer's ability to express himself if he is encouraged to write down his experiences and impressions.

The stereotyped "Subjects for Study for the Hot Weather" might with advantage be diversified. Matters outside purely military history and administration can be introduced. For example, the development and history of the province or district in which an officer is stationed might form the basis of reading and discussion; some of the problems of the day such as international trade and empire development and settlement are equally worthy of attention.

Brainslackness is often the result of monotony; vary the fare and interest is created and the mind will thrive on a better balanced diet.

## MOHFORCE SIGNALS IN THE NAHAKKI OPERATION

*18th September 1935.*

BY CAPTAIN L. R. HALL, M.C., ROYAL SIGNALS

The road built during the 1933 Mohmand Operations stopped short of the ridge of high ground which divides the great Kamalai plain in the north from the narrow valley of the Gandab Khwar to the south. The most important event of the 1935 operations was the extension of the road over this ridge of high ground by way of the Nahakki Kandao (or pass).

The object of the following article is to describe the part played by Mohforce Signals in the operation for the capture of the ridge.

\* \* \* \* \*

By the 17th September, the 2nd (Rawalpindi) Brigade having taken over the protection of the L. of C. behind Ghalanai, Brigadier Auchinleck had a force of three infantry brigades and attached troops available for a further advance. Of this force, Nowbde and attached troops were at Katsai and the remainder at Ghalanai.

The Signal situation was as follows—"A" Corps Signals had taken over the Force H. Q. Signal Office at Ghalanai, thus relieving Mohforce Signals from all responsibility to the rear. They had also extended their 5-wire permanent route as far as Katsai. The whole of the resources of Mohforce Signals were therefore available for the internal communications of the Force itself. These resources consisted of five wireless "C" set detachments, a pack cable section, an R. A., H. Q. section and sufficient office staff (including despatch riders) to man the main signal office and a small temporary signal office. There were also R. A. F. radio telephone sets for communication to the machines in the air, and of course the infantry and artillery brigade signal sections. The work of these latter sections does not come into the scope of this article.

The country described in this article is illustrated by the sketch map facing page 153. It is formed on a larger scale than that about Dand and the Karappa Kandao through which had been our earlier advance. For the first three miles out of Ghalanai the nala bed and the road built in 1933 are alternative routes. The nala bed is broad and flat-bottomed with a surface quite tolerable for a four-wheeled motor car. It is in the centre of the valley with

the hills at convenient piquetting distance. The water pipe-line and the telephone route were both constructed in it. To the left, that is south-west of the nala, is the 1933 metalled road, at this time none the worse after two years in the hands of the Mohmands. About a mile short of Katsai camp, the road turns north to cross the nala. Katsai camp was then on the right or east of the road, tucked into the side of a high hill.

Not far from Katsai the valley bifurcates, the left fork running nearly due west up what is generally called the Toratigga valley. The right fork starts north-east and then turns sharply to the left at Shati Khel, thence running past Wucha Jawar on a line nearly parallel to the Toratigga valley. The 1933 road followed this route, but it was known that soon after the turn at Shati Khel, where it crossed the nala bed, it degenerated into a track. The ability of this track to take M. T. was one of those uncertain factors which caused us anxiety. To the north of the Wucha Jawar valley is the formidable Khazana Sar feature which gradually flattens out as you move up the valley until you reach the Nahakki Kandao, which is a climb of only 600 feet, though the broken surface and steep ascent make it dangerous for a loaded mule. From the Nahakki Kandao there is a magnificent view over a new world with the great Kamalai plain creased by innumerable nala beds; and beyond that the high mountains. In the foreground is Nahakki village with what looks like a large Sussex dew pond.

The object of the operation of the 18th September was to secure the Nahakki Kandao so that a road could be built over the pass unmolested by the tribesmen. The objective included Nahakki village to the north, Wucha Jawar to the south and the nearer hill features each side of the pass.

The plan of the Force Commander shows the apprehension he felt for his left flank. The roles of Nowbde and the 3rd Infantry Brigade were respectively to close the Wucha Jawar valley and the Toratigga valley from that direction. Peshbde was then to seize the main objective.

The inter-communication paragraph of the Operation order is important for our purpose. The main artery was laid down as the nala bed where the road crosses it to turn north, thence the road itself to its end about Point 2652 and so by the track over the pass to Nahakki village,

H. Qs. of infantry brigades were to be as follows—

Peshbde Point 2652, thence to Nahakki Kandao. Nowbde house 354354 (about half a mile north of Wucha Jawar).

3rd Infantry Brigade spur 358313 (at entrance of Toratigga valley).

H. Q. Mohforce was to close at Ghalanai 05.30 hours and open Point 2652 same time. After the capture of the Nahakki Kandao, Mohforce was to move to the house 354354, an advanced Headquarters being temporarily formed in the Kandao itself.

The Signal plan for this operation falls into three parts :

1. The extension of the main artery to keep the Staff in touch with the rear as they advanced. This task was allotted to a mechanized cable section of "A" Corps Signals under Major Schofield. His order was to lay two pairs D8 cable from Katsai post to the house 354354. He was to move behind Nowbde.
2. Communications for Force H. Q. at Point 2652 from 05.30 hours ; and later for the temporary Advanced Headquarters at Nahakki Kandao. This was the rôle of Advanced Signals (on pack) under Major Collin, O. C. Signals.
3. Communications for Force H. Q. at house 354354 while Advanced Headquarters was at Nahakki Kandao. This was the rôle of the M. T. portion of Signals under Captain Hall. The party was to leave Ghalanai at 05.30 hours and advance *via* Point 2652, which it was anticipated it would reach while the forward party was still there.

The extent to which Mohforce Signals had been mechanized will be noticed. In addition, the whole of the administrative echelon and also the "A" Corps wireless sets for communication to the rear were M. T. (10 lorries in all). The anxiety of O. C. Signals as to the nature of the track beyond Shati Khel will be understood. This mechanization of Mohforce Signals was largely extemporised. It was made possible because we were fighting for the most part along the road which had been constructed in 1933. In the next operation undertaken by Peshawar District Signals we may very likely find ourselves on a pack basis once again.

The wireless plan requires explanation. Of the five "C" set detachments, four were pack and one was in a lorry. Pack sets were

allotted to Nowbde and 3rd Infantry Brigade, and the other two to the forward party under O. C. Signals. The lorry set moved with the M. T. echelon. For the first phase, that is from 05.30 hours when Force Headquarters was at Point 2652, one of the pack sets with the forward party was to work from this point to Nowbde, 3rd Infantry Brigade and Ghalanai. The second pack set at Point 2652 was to remain closed. On the renewal of the advance by the forward signal party, the second set was to accompany it and on arrival at Nahakki Kandao to open up communication with the motor "C" set with the rear echelon of H. Q., which by that time should be at house 354354. The set working to Nowbde and 3rd Infantry Brigade was not to advance with the forward party beyond Point 2652, but to be taken on by Captain Hall and retain its rôle until it should reach house 354354, when it would be required to communicate with 3rd Infantry Brigade and Ghalanai only; Nowbde and the rear echelon of Force H. Q. being now together.

The cable plan was as follows—

The pack cable section and the H. Q., R. A. section were both to go out with the forward party under O. C. Signals. The pack cable section was to extend the main artery by a pair of D8 cable from the house 354354 over the Nahakki pass. It was then to maintain the line it had built.

The H. Q., R. A. section, an operating and cable laying unit which had been extemporised from the draught cable section and men made available from the 4th Field Brigade section, was allotted to the C. R. A. who was in direct control of 4th Field Brigade (less two batteries) and the 15th Medium Battery.

The office personnel were divided into a small forward office and a main office (in two reliefs). The former was to serve Force Headquarters at Point 2652 until the arrival of the main office, and later to form the temporary Advanced H. Q. at Nahakki Kandao. The main office was to close at Ghalanai 05.30 hours and move to Point 2652. Here it was to serve Force H. Q., later moving to house 354354.

It may seem strange that a large section should be allotted solely for the communications of the C. R. A. when no such section exists in the war establishment of a divisional signals. It is an example of the improvisation which is continually occurring in an operation of this kind. In the earlier part of this campaign, the whole of the

cable resources of the unit were used for the construction of the main cable artery from Subhan Khwar to Ghalanai. Later, "A" Corps Signals took over communications on the L. of C. In the operations based on Ghalanai and Wucha Jawar, headquarters of infantry brigades were usually close to the main artery and such extensions as were required could conveniently be made by the pack cable section. At the same time it was desirable both for the Staff and the C. R. A., that the latter should have his own lines to artillery brigades and batteries under his direct control for the particular operation in hand. Such artillery brigades and batteries would normally be near the road or nala bed, and so the draught cable detachment was suitable and became the C. R. A.'s section. When the force began to withdraw, both pack and draught cable sections were required for dismantling the main cable artery. The C. R. A.'s section therefore ceased to exist.

We must now follow the fortunes of the three signal parties.

Major Schofield with his section in four 30-cwt. lorries moved forward to Katsai camp on the afternoon of the 17th, his intention being to give his men a short night's rest there before the operation. However, on arrival at the camp, he was told that Nowbde was starting out in the middle of the night and thereafter the camp site would be unprotected. He therefore turned to Katsai Post, a battalion post on the L. of C. constructed to take the place of Katsai camp and situated about a quarter of a mile along the road. But the accommodation of this small defended locality did not include an M. T. park; and the section had to remain outside the perimeter.

Major Schofield set out in the small hours of the next morning and started to lay his two pairs of cable, keeping well behind Nowbde so that the noise of his lorry engines should not give away the advance. The section was therefore working alone and in the dark. When he reached the road and nala crossing at Shati Khel, Major Schofield was met by the D. A. P. M. who forbade him to advance any further by the road because Nowbde had turned left into the nala bed, and so the road itself was not covered by our own troops. Major Schofield was therefore obliged to depart from his original orders and to lay his route up the nala bed after Nowbde; and so Major Collin on his arrival at Point 2652 found no cable there. This, as will be told later, caused delay in establishing line communications for Force Headquarters. A deflection from the main artery laid down in the

Operation Order may be dictated by the tactical situation ; but it is a serious embarrassment to Signals.

Major Schofield continued his two cable pairs up the nala bed and thence across country to the house at 354354. He then laid one pair back *via* Point 2652 to the road and nala crossing at Shati Khel, thus providing an alternative path for the forward portion of this route. In the event, as will be told later, it was this line that failed, a fault occurring in the rear portion of the route where the circuit was not duplicated.

Advanced Mohforce Signals with the C. R. A.'s section moved out of Ghalanai camp at 02:30 hours and covered the six miles to Point 2652 in a night march of 2½ hours. Here wireless communication was opened to Nowbde and 3rd Infantry Brigade, but of course there was no sign of the cable. However, at first light the pack cable section were sent out to the nala bed to look for it, and having found it they built a short spur to connect it to the new Force Headquarters.

Meanwhile, the advance was proceeding more rapidly than had been expected, the enemy having withdrawn without resistance. At 06:30 hours, Major Collin was informed that the Staff were moving forward to Nahakki Kandao. The pack cable section, the pack signal office and the wireless set, which had so far remained closed, were therefore immediately despatched to the Nahakki Kandao. It will be remembered that the wireless set working to Nowbde and 3rd Infantry Brigade was to revert to Captain Hall's party, which fortunately arrived at Point 2652 as Major Collin was about to leave.

The pack cable section picked up the cable route at house 354354 and laid forward to Nahakki Kandao. It had to keep off the mule track in case it should get in the way. So it laid straight up the face of the hill roughly along the route afterwards followed by the water pipe-line. The mules with their heavy loads of D8 cable just managed the climb with the aid of a good deal of encouragement from behind. Telephone communication back from Nahakki Kandao was established by 07:10 hours. The rest of the party was delayed by congestion on the track, but the wireless set was erected and working by 08:30 hours.

Meanwhile Peshbde advanced to Nahakki village. Communication forward was first by visual, but the pack cable section having

laid a route to Nahakki, telephone communication was established by 10.30 hours.

Headquarters Advanced Mohforce moved to Nahakki at 15.15 hours, and a small office was erected there for the night. Some delay was caused by the necessity of digging down for protection. The party spent an uncomfortable night.

Now to follow the story of the M. T. echelon: The tactical portion consisted of a lorry "C" set and two lorry-loads of office personnel proudly led to war by the new Ford V8 van. The party left camp at 05.45 hours just before dawn, its place in the order of march being directly behind the 18th Cavalry. As the cavalry moved by the nala bed and Signals by the road, the latter moved in a considerable gap.

After the road and nala crossing at Shati Khel, the road rapidly deteriorated and then ceased to exist, the lorries bumping along a bad track. One of the vehicles was an old Albion four-wheeler and its struggles began to cause anxiety. At several places it was necessary for all the men except the driver to get out. Having reached a point beyond which further progress was clearly impossible, the O. C. party was relieved to see the pack echelon and realise that this was Point 2652. It was now 06.45 hours and the Staff had already gone on. O. C. Signals therefore handed over to Captain Hall the wireless set which was working to Nowbde and 3rd Infantry Brigade, and hurried on.

There was no object in the M. T. echelon remaining at Point 2652, but every reason to push forward to the house 354354 where the rear echelon of Force Headquarters was to be established. But some little delay was caused while the wireless set was getting rid of urgent traffic left on its hands. At 07.10 hours the office was closed at Point 2652. The pack wireless set was despatched direct across country to house 354354. The M. T. portion had to retrace its route back and move *via* the road and nala crossing at Shati Khel and the nala bed itself. It was considered impossible to move the lorries by the track as laid down in the Force Operation Order.

House 354354 was found to be a ruined village about 150 yards from the nala bed. Here headquarters Nowbde was already installed and its wireless set erected. There was no way for M. T. from the nala bed to the village, so the alternatives were either to establish the Force signal office at the village and use the Nowbde wireless set,

or have it in the nala where the lorry set could be used. It was decided to move to the village. The motor "C" set was left closed in the nala bed and the Nowbde set was taken over for communications to Advanced Mohforce in the Nahakki Kandao. This communication was established at 08.30 hours. The decision turned out to be fortunate because, as will be seen presently, it assisted the maintenance of communications during the subsequent move into the camp.

The pack wireless set which had been sent forward across country from Point 2652 arrived at about the same time as the M. T. It was erected and opened communication to Ghalanai at 08.32 hours, and to the 3rd Infantry Brigade at 09.10 hours.

The line situation was found to be well advanced. One of the two pairs laid by "A" Corps Signals was through from Katsai to Nowbde, and the pair laid by the pack cable section was through from Nowbde to Advanced Mohforce. So that was really all that mattered. As has already been said, the second pair from Katsai was found to be disconnected. "A" Corps Signals found the fault right back beyond Shati Khel where a dozen yards of cable had been chewed up by a tractor. The line was put through at 10.00 hours. It was this line that was looped back from the ruined village *via* Point 2652 to Shati Khel. This return pair puzzled our linemen at first. The lines were transferred from the Nowbde signal office to the Force signal office which was set up about a 100 yards away, the two being connected by a line. Telegraph sets were superimposed on both pairs working to the rear.

In the meantime, the ten lorries containing the "A" Corps Signals wireless sets and the administrative details had arrived in the nala bed, together with scores of lorries belonging to other arms. All were waiting to move into the new camp, the site of which was about half a mile distant from the ruined village. The nala bed had the appearance of a busy London street during a traffic block, and the supply convoy was due to arrive in a short time. It was fortunate that the enemy was not equipped with artillery, or worse still bombing aeroplanes. These concentrations of M. T. on the Frontier where every road is a defile would present an ideal target for a civilized enemy.

The R. E. had been hard at work since early morning, and by about 13.30 hours they had completed a rough road from the nala bed into the new camp. The problem was now to move Mohforce Signals

into the camp without dislocating communications. It was here that the third wireless set proved so useful because it allowed two sets to work while the third was on the move. The first to move was of course the motor "C" set lying closed in the nala bed. It was not well placed in the queue-up for the camp. It was not even facing the right way. However it was soon turned round and then, when the new road appeared passable but before the general rush of M. T. had been released, a Signals N. C. O. was decorated with a blue and white armband and told to take the motor "C" set down the nala past the waiting traffic and to try to get into the camp before the rest. It was not possible for Captain Hall to leave the signal office to go with the lorry himself, and he watched its progress with some anxiety. However, the police were helpful. It was seen to turn into the new approach road and presently up went the masts in what was to be Wucha Jawar camp. This was one of the many occasions on which Signals had to ask for right of way on the road. They were always given it, but it was clear that often the troops wished they were somewhere else.

The motor "C" set erected in Wucha Jawar camp opened up communications to the 3rd Infantry Brigade and Ghalanai at about 14.00 hours, thus relieving the Force H. Q. pack set at house 354354. This set in turn closed down and moved into the camp. Here it reassumed its rôle of communication to the 3rd Infantry Brigade and Ghalanai, the motor "C" set taking on Advanced Mohforce in the Nahakki Kandao. Thus, for the first time, both these sets were carrying out the duties allotted to them in the original order.

It was now about 15.00 hours, and the Officer Commanding Nowbde wished to move his headquarters into the camp. Fortunately the Nowbde wireless set which had done such useful work for Force Headquarters could now be released. So much for the movement of the wireless sets.

For moving the line communications two office reliefs were available. While the first relief was maintaining communications at house 354354, the second relief was given three ringing telephones, and at about 13.00 hours they moved across country into the camp laying a line of cable as they went to extend the Nahakki line back to the new signal office. Major Schofield arrived at an opportune moment to lay two spurs to connect the main cable route in the nala bed to the camp. The three telephones were put on the ends

of these three lines in Wucha Jawar camp, that is one line forward and two lines to the rear. As soon as these three lines had been tested through, the Force H. Q. telephone exchange at house 354354 was taken out of circuit, and the forward line joined straight through from Wucha Jawar camp to Nahakki Kandao. The line to Nowbde was also temporarily tapped in to this forward line. This made a nasty omnibus circuit, but Nowbde was just about to move into camp.

By this time members of the Staff were arriving in Wucha Jawar camp. Communications were maintained for them by the three telephones while the telephone exchange and telegraph equipment were man-handled the short distance from house 354354 to the camp. The telephone exchange and telegraph sets were working by 16:00 hours.

For the move from house 354354 into camp everybody carried something; and the share of the O. C. party was the D. R.'s despatch from Peshawar which had recently been dumped on the temporary signal office. Captain Hall carried these packets *via* the nala bed as he wanted to make sure that all the Signals M. T. had got away. He was surprised at the weight of the packages and glad to get a lift for the few hundred yards into camp. He noticed one substantial cover bearing the name of a famous Service Journal. Signals have sometimes to appeal to the Staff to cut down the number of despatches to go by D. R.


The foregoing account is an example of the arrangements made to move a signal office without interrupting communications. It is not possible to foresee just how this can best be done. The ground was a very important factor for Signals in this operation, as it necessitated three successive positions for Force Headquarters all well within one square mile. Had the nature of the track through Point 2652 been known before the operation, it is probable that Force Headquarters would never have gone there at all, but moved by the nala bed. The problem would then have been much easier, but it would have been far less representative of the situation that Signals must expect to meet in a war.

The rest of the day was spent in clearing the traffic and establishing the camp. The two-line telegraph circuits were working back, and all traffic was cleared both ways by 03:00 hours 19th September.

It was an interesting day's work.

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# SKETCH MAP OF COUNTRY BETWEEN GHALANAI CAMP AND NAHAKKI VILLAGE





## SOME NOTES ON THE UNIFORM OF THE INDIAN SEPOY

BY "YUFUF."

This is a subject of which it is difficult to discover accurate details. Accurate sketches and first-hand descriptions are few and far between. Though many thousands of British officers have passed through the Indian armies in the last 150 years, they have recorded little on this subject.

Four wars have each affected considerably the organization and also the uniform of the Indian Army. They are the Mutiny of the Bengal army in 1857; the Afghan war of 1878-80; the South African war of 1899-02; and, of course, the Great war. Although Indian troops were not directly engaged in the South African campaign, nevertheless the great reorganization under Lord Kitchener in 1903 was partly inspired by lessons of the Boer war.

I shall therefore divide these notes into the five periods bounded by these wars.

*Period prior to 1857.*—During this early period it was the custom to dress the sepoy so as to resemble closely Thomas Atkins. The reason appears to have been two-fold: firstly, it had probably not occurred to Authority that an Indian soldier need be dressed in a fashion different to a European one; secondly, it was considered by many that a British regiment was capable of defeating a number of native ones. It followed that it was not good policy to advertise the strong and the weak parts of the line, and the sepoy was accordingly made up to resemble at a distance his British confrère.]

He was dressed in red cut-away coat, and later in coatee, and wore white cross-belts and knapsacks like the Europeans. ✓

While cocked hats and round hats were in vogue by the British infantry, the sepoy wore a type of turban, which from a distance resembled the former head-gear. A sketch of a Bombay grenadier in 1801 shows him wearing a fur-crested affair on his head, while his long hair is plaited and turned up in a loop at the neck, "Grenadier fashion." ✓

An order issued about this time reprimands certain commanding officers for letting their sepoy wear their hair "cut and turned down,"

and goes on to direct that it should be worn "long, turned up, and tied in a knot on top of the head."

During the eighteenth century and first two decades of the nineteenth, the sepoy's close-up resemblance to the European ceased at the waist, for his nether garment was a pair of white shorts, usually finished with vandyked trimmings. This garment, both comfortable and inexpensive, did not, however, contravene the principle of making native soldiers look like Europeans, for at a distance, the white shorts and long black bare shanks bore a distinct resemblance to Thomas Atkins' white pantaloons and black splatdashers!

When the British soldier took to trousers the sepoy followed suit and, similarly, when the Europeans adapted the "shako," a corresponding head-gear had to be devised for the sepoy.

Originally these were simple affairs, made of black cloth on wicker or iron frames and had no peak.

One hundred years ago the sepoy was well dressed, judged by the standard of the day. Contemporary prints show him wearing a shako ornamented with ball-tuft and badge, and dressed in red coatee with collar and cuffs of regimental colour and laced in the British fashion. His trousers were of dark blue or white, according to the season. In addition to cross-belts he wore a white waist-belt, an article not then worn by British infantry. He was also furnished with a flat topped forage cap with band of regimental colour. The Light and Grenadier companies wore "wings," and the bandsmen, following the French fashion of the day, were often attired like hussars or lancers. Bare feet thrust into sandals or native slippers came rather as a climax!

At the time of the Mutiny the sepoy was still dressed like this, except that the forage cap was now "pill-box" shape.

After the Sikh wars each Bengal battalion was ordered to enlist one hundred Sikhs. We have never discovered what head-covering these men wore. His religion requires a Sikh to wear a pagri. Brahman, Rajput, Hindustani Mahommedan, and Sikh, stood in the ranks, shoulder to shoulder; there was no class-company in those days. Did the Sikhs wear pagris next to the shakos of their fellows, thus spoiling the parade appearance of regiment; or were they made to bundle their long hair into shakos—as Greek priests pull theirs into chimney-pot hats?

We do not know if the sepoy wore numbered pewter buttons earlier in the century, as was done in British regiments. In 1857 the normal buttons in use were brass die-struck ones, made in England, bearing "the regimental number within a broken ring, surrounded by a laurel wreath." The 66th B. N. I. (now 1st Gurkhas) had in addition, above the number the word "Goorkhas." Thus it would appear as if they were looked upon as differing from the other regiments of the line, amongst whom they were numbered. Curiously enough this old "John Company" design was later used by both the 21st Punjabis and the 108th Infantry.

The breast-plates on the cross-belts were of brass, and an eighteenth century order directed that they should have the regimental number engraved upon them—nothing else.

Ackerman's prints, published in the 'forties, show more elaborate affairs with embossed badge, similar to the type then popular in the Queen's regiments. We really have no information on this subject, for, though many of the officers' plates exist in collections and museums, we know of no single specimen of sepoy's breast-plate.

Information again as to the clothing of the Punjab Irregular Force is very scanty. Khaki drill, as we now know it, did not exist in Mutiny days. It is probable that the "Piffers" were clad in some drab cotton material or *puttoo* (grey homespun), fashioned in native style, and brightened up by the addition of gaily coloured facings, pagris, kullahs, and putties; perhaps using the afore-mentioned brass numbered buttons.

*Period—Mutiny to 1880.*—After the Crimean war it was the fashion of the British army to copy all things French. In finding a substitute for the sepoy's coatee and trousers, it was perhaps therefore natural for the authorities to seek inspiration from the garb of French colonial troops. The result of this was an issue to the Bengal and Madras infantry of that extraordinary garment—the "zouave jacket"! This jacket was made of red cloth, very short, and had shoulder-straps, slashed cuffs, and a five inch strip down the front of the colour of the regimental facings, piped with white. It buttoned up to the neck (there was no collar) by eight brass buttons. With it blue plus-four knickerbockers with scarlet welts were issued.

The Bombay regiments, however, were given short red jackets with five buttons and coloured collars.

Drab clothed Punjab infantry had tunics, and Gurkha Rifles dark green jackets.

Native infantry was now administered on the "Irregular System," so, except for the jackets and knickerbockers, all clothing was provided under regimental arrangements.

✓ The Hindustani, Gurkha, and Bombay regiments usually wore circular forage caps with brass numeral in front, other regiments pagris of various colours and patterns. Some of these forage-caps were jaunty little affairs, for example those worn by the 23rd Bombay Light Infantry, who had white (later black) ones with a strip of white and green diagonally-striped muslin wound round them, and a brass french-horn badge fixed in front.

✓ The white spat-gaiter, also copied from the French Zouaves, was a popular leg-wear, though the blue puttie was coming into favour in the north.

The pre-mutiny brass numbered buttons were probably still supplied on the jackets, and brass numerals on the shoulder-straps.

We must not pass on without mention of the cherry-red Zouave-like "bags" affected by the Baluch regiments.

Now as regards the "Working kit." The cloth clothing was unsuitable for work in very hot weather, or for marching or fighting in any except cool weather. British troops had white cotton clothing for this purpose, which they had found it convenient to dye brown when attacking Delhi in '57.

It is certain that Indian regiments provided the sepoy with cotton clothing. This was made up in the regimental bazaar to regimental pattern, and worn for most of the duties, which were performed later in khaki drill.

This was probably originally white, but the tendency was to adapt a working kit of more drab coloured stuff, such as the Punjab Irregulars found so useful. Multani mull (or mutti) was a favourite material. It was a reddish brown hue and the dye was tolerably fast. No doubt other locally produced materials such as *dasuti* were also available, and possibly even English manufactured khaki drill was in use before 1880.

This working kit was usually made up in loose native style, and unadorned by metal buttons or badges.

White buff belts and black or white pouches were worn by red-clad infantry, and brown or black equipment by regiments wearing drab or green uniforms.

*Period 1886—1903.*—The Afghan war was fought by British infantry in red tunics during the cold periods, and in white drill

uniforms, dyed mud-colour during the hot seasons.

The Native infantry wore, for the most part, their "khaki" clothing with coloured regimental pagris or forage caps.

After this war khaki became the working dress of the whole army in India—British and Indian.

Native regiments had to provide their men with a khaki head-dress, either pagri or forage-cap cover, and uniform made of khaki drill, which was now available, though of poor dye.

This khaki clothing was still made up regimentally, and each battalion had its special pattern. Some regiments wore jackets and others blouses. Small details such as type of cuff, pockets, cartridge tubes, number and type of buttons, collar, etc. etc., were never the same in any two corps.

Loose knickerbockers were much favoured; some regiments, notably the 20th and 26th Punjab Infantry and the Baluchis wore most voluminous affairs.

Brass numerals could be obtained from the clothing factories for use on shoulder-straps, and universal buttons bearing the Crown and Imperial Cypher were issued in place of the numbered ones.

As regards full-dress, the chief change was in the replacement of the forage-cap in favour of the pagri, though the Gurkhas retained the cap.

In the Bengal army several regiments were issued with red tunics somewhat similar to the British pattern, while the 32nd B. I. received long red blouses. An improved pattern zouave-jacket, having a longer skirt and a high collar of regimental colour, was also provided for the Bengal army.

Regimental badges now began to make their appearance. Quite a number of corps adapted metal brooch-badges, which were worn either pinned in front of the pagri or else fixed to a coloured pagri end at the side. This latter fashion was very popular in the Madras army.

Collar badges were also worn by several of the Madras regiments; and shoulder badges bearing, in addition to the number, the title or initials of the regiment, were used by most regiments of the Coast armies, in preference to the official brass numerals.

Some corps also had regimental buttons manufactured for use in the sepoys' khaki jackets or blouses.

Both khaki shorts and "slouch" hats are reputed to have originated during the Tirah campaign of '97. The Gurkhas, who wore tight leg-wear like Thomas Atkins, found that trousers split at

the knee when climbing up to piquet crags. They therefore cut them off—hence shorts! The khaki covered Kilmarnock cap also was found poor protection from a summer sun on the plains. Result, a canopy round the cap, giving shade for the eye and protection for the neck; next step a puttoo hat, and later a felt “wide-awake!”

After the Afghan war the white buff equipment was replaced by a serviceable brown leather one. The belt-lockets on these were plain brass, though some regiments, like the 21st Madras, seem to have worn ones with their number in the centre, probably salvaged from the discarded white belts.

There was at this period no question of the sepoy looking like the British soldier. He differed in practically every single article of dress and equipment.

*Period 1903—1914.*—Following the formation of a single Indian army from the components of the old Presidency armies and other regular forces, came a considerable change in the full-dress of the infantry. A long loose blouse was introduced, made of scarlet, green, or drab serge, with shoulder-straps and piping on the cuffs, collar, and breast-opening, of the colour of the regimental facings. The idea of this may have come from the cavalry, or from a similar garment worn by the 32nd (Sikh) Pioneers, or it may have been suggested on account of the popularity of the khaki drill blouse.

The Frontier Force regiments, with the exception of Coke's Rifles and the Guides, however, wore tunics cut more to British pattern, as did the Gurkha Rifles.

The Carnatic regiments continued to wear zouave jackets for many years; in fact it is questionable if some of them ever received red blouses.

The clothing factories still only issued full-dress blouses or tunics and knickerbockers. If regiments cared to add further embellishments—there was no objection. A list of those articles, which regiments did provide under their own arrangements, is as follows—

Coloured pagri	Regimental buttons
Do. kullah	Pagri badge
Do. putties	Collar badges
or spats	Title badges
Do. kamarband	

Probably no regiment wore all these articles, though the best dressed ones managed to provide most of them for ceremonial parades. At the same time there were many corps, which possessed none of

them and made khaki pagris and khaki putties do duty with red blouses and blue knickerbockers.

A full-dress parade by a large Indian garrison before the Great War, displayed a far greater variety of colour and differences in kit than a similar function at Aldershot could show.

Though "ammunition" boots were not officially issued, their provision was now insisted upon. Formerly the foot-wear in most regiments was the sandal or slipper. A great review, however, in honour of the Viceroy brought matters to a head. It had rained and the parade ground had been churned by the cavalry into a sticky mess. A slipper-shod Hindustani battalion in marching past managed to leave most of their shoes in the mud. A jemadar, carrying the regimental colours, was so obsessed by the loss of his slippers that he laid his honourable charge in the slime, what time he ran bare-footed back to retrieve them!

All the same, for field work, the *chapli* remained the favoured foot-wear for Pathans—and their British officers.

For field work also shorts, originally adapted by the Gurkhas, were increasing in popularity, and by 1914 were worn by a number of Indian regiments.

Most of the Frontier Force regiments could be distinguished by the colour of their putties—blue, black, or grey. The 24th and 46th Punjabis also wore blue putties, even in marching order.

As regards the khaki pagri; nearly every regiment wore an end-piece (frequently a dummy one, tucked in) of one or more colours, arranged to fall over the right or left side, or to show on top. These usually formed an easy distinguishing-mark between regiments. Additional touches of *panache* were affected by coloured *kullahs* and *pags*.

Two other head-dresses perhaps deserve mention. Black Glengarry caps had formerly been worn by the buglers of Madras regiments; the Carnatic infantry and pioneers kept up this tradition. The experimentally raised and soon disbanded regiments of Coorg and Moplah Rifles wore fezes, circled by short whisps of muslin, and the 18th (Mussulman) Infantry, shortly before the Great War appeared in khaki covered fezes, such as are worn in the Egyptian army.

Most of the great-coats supplied were made of a shoddy khaki cloth without embellishments. Regiments had their own patterns.

some were knee-length and others of "British warm" variety. The half-sleeve *poshteen* had also its devotees—usually on the Frontier.

The khaki drill was now manufactured in a really fast dye. About 1910 a new greenish shade in this material was marketed, and approved by a number of regiments; so now, added to the many various little differences in pattern existing between regiments, were two distinctly different shades of colour.

By 1914 the sepoys of most regiments were wearing buttons bearing a regimental device and title-badges in their khaki. Collar-badges however were not popular, and were only favoured by the pioneer regiments from the former Coast armies.

*Period 1915 onwards.*—Naturally neither the Silladar nor the Irregular systems could stand a war of five years' duration, waged in as many different countries. Government was forced to stock and issue all service clothing to troops.

A universal infantry blouse with knickerbockers, shorts, putties and pagri was approved.

Regiments, however, still managed to procure their distinctive shoulder-title badges (often made up by the *mistri* from melted-down cartridge cases).

In 1923, resultant to the renumbering of regiments, official pattern shoulder-badges were at last manufactured and issued. A novelty was introduced with these, that of wearing under the regimental title-badge a patch of coloured cloth to denote the particular battalion.

The same year the blouse, which had been such a popular garment with Indian troops for half a century, was superseded by a frock, similar to that in use by British troops, but slightly longer.

Now that shorts and stocking-tops are also the approved leg-wear for Indian infantry, we seem to have completed the circle; and to find that, except in the matter of head-covering, Thomas Atkins and Bahadur Singh are once more dressed alike—as was the fashion a century past.

## IMPERIAL CABLE AND WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS

BY CAPTAIN D. A. L. WADE, M.C., ROYAL SIGNALS

The purpose of this article is to give a brief survey of the expansion of our Imperial cable and wireless communications, and to emphasise their importance in relation to Imperial defence.

Our sea communications have been aptly described as the arteries along which the life-stream of the Empire flows. To carry the simile further, one might describe our telegraphic communications as the nervous system without which the Imperial body would become paralyzed.

Practically every transaction in overseas trade entails the transmission of a cable or radio-gram, whilst every movement by sea or air demands a similar message. And yet, apart from broadcasting, the public and the press display little interest in cable and wireless communication. The reason is not hard to find. Compared with railways, shipping or aircraft the subject is dull and prosaic; whilst by their very nature the means employed are unobtrusive. Few people ever see a submarine cable; whilst the outward appearance of a wireless station with its gaunt skeleton of masts and wires provides little to remind us of the invisible thread which links it to a distant land.

The submarine cable and wireless telegraphy are comparatively recent inventions. The history of submarine telegraphy dates from 1851. In that year the first cable was laid across the Straits of Dover. The project was greeted with much criticism and even ridicule. Many people thought it operated like a bell wire, and that the messages were sent by tugging at the end of the wire. The original cable is still in operation to-day. Fifteen years later (1866) the Atlantic was successfully bridged after many attempts had failed.

From that date until 1914 was a period of intense cable-laying activity. England led the way, followed by U. S. A., France and Germany. After the war Italy also entered the field. At the present time practically the entire cable systems of the world are owned by these five nations. England's share is by far the largest—about 60 per cent.—representing over 200,000 miles of cable.

In 1901 Marconi had succeeded in bridging the Atlantic by wireless, but up till 1914 this method of communication was mainly confined to ship-to-shore services. Germany alone appears to have regarded long range point-to-point wireless services as offering advantages, mainly strategical, as compared with cables. About 1910 she started to build up a system of high-power stations designed to link the Fatherland with her colonies.

Since the war the position has entirely changed. The rapid growth of wireless telegraphy and radio-telephony have diverted a considerable volume of traffic from the cables, and in consequence comparatively few new routes have been laid. So far as the British Empire is concerned three main factors have contributed towards the loss of revenue by the cable companies :

- (1) The development of beam wireless telegraph services.
- (2) The introduction of overseas radio-telephone services, and
- (3) more recently, the speeding up of the postal services by air mail.

The scales would have been more heavily loaded against the cable companies if their engineers had not discovered the means of increasing the working capacity of their cables. The introduction of what is technically known as the "loaded" cable in 1922 resulted in a four-or-five-fold increase in the speed of working at an additional capital cost of 12—25 per cent. compared with previous types of cable. For example, the original Pacific cable laid in 1902 had a capacity of 50 words per minute, whereas the second Pacific cable laid in 1926 had a capacity of 250 words per minute.

The net result of these and other developments in cable and wireless technique is that telegraphically and telephonically the world has shrunk to diminutive proportions during the last 20 years. In 1914 a cablegram from London to Sydney took several hours to reach its destination owing to the necessity for reception and retransmission at several intermediate points *en route*. To-day the same message can be sent instantaneously without human intervention. In 1914 telephone conversations were limited to distances of a few hundred miles, *e.g.*, London to Edinburgh, London to Paris. To-day a telephone subscriber in England can put a call through to any number almost anywhere in Europe, America, Australasia, and many parts of Africa and Asia. The English telephone system is, in fact, at the present time connected to over 90 per cent. of the world's

telephone subscribers, and the percentage is increasing almost daily. Similar facilities are available in the more important cities and towns throughout the Dominions and India.

The economic and social effects of these improvements are self-evident; their strategic importance is less obvious. It is with this latter aspect that we propose now to deal.

Prior to the war, with one exception, the British Government had taken no part in the building up of Imperial communications. The exception was the Pacific cable, laid in 1902 between Canada and Australia, which was jointly owned by the governments of Great Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Private enterprise had built up a system of cables adequate for commercial needs. The result was, that although the Dominions and Colonies were linked with London and with one another, the principal cable routes were designed to serve both British and foreign trade; the majority of them either passed through foreign territory, or were landed at foreign shores *en route*. Appendix "A" shows the principal British and German cable and wireless routes in 1914. It will be seen that all the cables between Great Britain and Canada, were either owned by or leased to American companies. The leases were taken out in 1911 and were for a period of 99 years. There was only one cable to India and the Far East which did not touch foreign (Spanish, Dutch or Portuguese) territory, whilst to South Africa there was none.

The Pacific cable alone could claim to be all-British, and then only if one overlooked the fact that its extensions to London were *via* the American operated Trans-Atlantic cables. The only W/T route of importance was that between Great Britain and Canada.

Nowadays no one could regard such a position as satisfactory from the point of view of Imperial defence, but it must be remembered that until 1914 overseas telegraphic communications had played little part in war. In South Africa and in the Russo-Japanese war they had hardly entered into the picture. In the Spanish-American war of 1898 the Americans had not attempted to cut off cable communication between Spain and her West Indies possessions, finding it more advantageous to impose a strict censorship than to cut off the islands completely.

As has already been stated, Germany had before the war decided to build up a system of W/T stations in her colonies. This decision was probably based on three factors:

- (1) Her overseas possessions were for the most part in Africa and the Western Pacific. To reach them cables from Germany would have had to pass down the west-coast of France; they would thus be liable in war to interruption by the French.
- (2) Her colonies had only recently been acquired. Commercial interests had not yet had time to link them up by cable. Long distance wireless had just been proved economical and reliable, and cable shares had depreciated to a large, and as events proved, quite unjustifiable extent. It seemed, therefore, to the German government that the more modern method offered distinct advantages.
- (3) In the event of war with England the German Navy would be incapable of gaining command of the seas. Germany must, therefore, in this event be prepared sooner or later to lose contact with her colonies until the war had been brought to a successful conclusion. It would be comparatively easy for the British Navy to destroy cables at their landing points, but W/T stations could be sited inland out of reach of the Navy.

All the German African colonies were in contact by wireless with Nauener near Berlin. The Pacific colonies were all linked up by wireless with Yap, from Yap a German cable ran to Guam, whence the connection lay by American cables and land lines across the U. S. A. to New York. From there two German cables ran *via* the Azores to Emden. In addition there was a route from Emden to Monrovia (Liberia), whence branches led to South America and West Africa, and another from Emden to Vigo.

On August 5th, 1914, Post Office engineers under naval escort located and cut the five Emden cables in the Channel. The ends of one of the North American cables were diverted to Penzance and Halifax, respectively, and used by ourselves. Another one was subsequently picked up and re-laid between England and Archangel. Thus within 24 hours of the outbreak of war all direct cable communication between Germany and America and *via* America and the German Pacific colonies, was cut off. The effect of this was serious to Germany in two respects. Firstly, it hindered her arrangements for the purchase of supplies from neutral sources. Secondly, Germany was forced to communicate with America *via*

neutral countries (*i.e.*, Scandinavia, Holland and Spain). Since all the Trans-Atlantic cables connecting with these countries centred on England, a copy of every message thus sent came into our possession.

Having thus dealt with the German cable routes, the Government turned its attention to their wireless services. To quote from the Official Naval History :\*

“In the first days of the war a special Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence was appointed to deal with overseas attack.....Its instructions were to submit to the Cabinet proposals for combined expeditions which would produce a definite effect on the course of the war.....The Committee recognised the principle that all expeditions for the conquest of distant territory were faulty in conception unless and until we had established a working command of the sea in all quarters.....The objectives.....were not far to seek. They must all be naval, and of these the most important were the enemy's foreign bases and centres of intelligence.....The single object was to deprive the enemy of his distant coaling and telegraphic stations.”

Tsingtau, Luderitz Bay (with the adjacent W/T station at Windhoek) and Dar-es-Salaam were all too formidable to start with. Others less difficult, all mainly centres of communication, were Kamina, Duala, Rabaul, Yap, Nauru, Anguar and Apia.

At this time Von Spee's squadron was at large in the Pacific and the *Emden* was operating in the Indian Ocean.

On August 21st a detachment of W. A. F. F. landed near Kamina, and by the night of August 24/25th had advanced 100 miles inland to where the wireless station was situated. Seeing the position was hopeless the German commander blew up the station and surrendered. On September 26th a combined British and French force under General Dobell landed at Duala and captured the town and the wireless station.

In the meantime, a small naval and military force despatched from New Zealand had captured Apia on August 30th, whilst between September 9th and September 21st, a similar force from Australia had captured or destroyed the wireless stations at Rabaul, Nauru and Angaur.† The station at Yap had already been wrecked by gunfire from H. M. S. *Minotaur* on August 12th.

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\**Naval Operations*, Vol. I p. 129 *et seq.*

†A full account of these operations is given in the *Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18*.

On November 7th, Japan having joined the Allies, a combined British and Japanese expedition captured Tsingtau, whilst as early as August 8th H. M. S. *Astraez* had succeeded in destroying the wireless station at Dar-es-Salaam by bombardment. So by the end of the year there remained only Windhoek, and this was eventually captured by South African forces on 5th April 1915.

Deprived of all shore communications Von Spee's position in the Pacific became untenable. In the picturesque language of Mr. Winston Churchill.\* "He was a cut flower in a vase; fair to see, yet bound to die, and to die very soon, if the water was not continually renewed." This "water" was coal, and coaling could only be effected by colliers, directed to a given rendezvous by wireless. The wireless was now in British hands. He was, therefore, forced to take refuge in South American waters, where his squadron was finally destroyed at the Falkland Islands on December 8th, 1914.

The destruction of Von Spee not only relieved all anxiety as to the safety of our trade routes in Eastern waters, but also frustrated any further attempts by the enemy to cut off our communications with Australia and New Zealand. There had been two such attempts.

On November 9th, 1914, the *Emden* appeared off the Cocos Islands and landed a party to destroy the cable and wireless station. Before the boats touched the shore the station superintendent had sent out an S. O. S. As was the usual practice at isolated cable stations, spare instruments were left buried in the vicinity. In this case they were buried round the station tennis court. Seeing that the Germans were about to blow up the wireless mast so that it would fall across the court, the superintendent appealed to the officer-in-charge as a sportsman not to ruin their prospects of recreation during their enforced leisure by damaging the court. The German willingly assented and blew up the mast clear of the court, with the result that within a few hours of the *Emden's* departure the cable staff had dug up the spare instruments, temporarily repaired the cables and reopened communication.

Thanks to the resourcefulness of the superintendent, H. M. S. *Sydney*—at that time 55 miles North of the island—had been warned, and by nightfall the *Emden's* career was ended.

At Fanning Island the Germans were more successful. On September 7th, 1914, a landing party from the *Nurnberg* cut the

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\**World Crisis*, 1911-14. Vol. I, p. 295.

cables and destroyed all the instruments including the spares. It was not until three weeks later that communication was completely restored.\*

These two incidents serve to emphasise the serious position which would have arisen had the Germans managed to carry out their task with more thoroughness. With the Pacific Cable and the Cocos Island's cables cut all communication between England and India, Australia, New Zealand and the Far East would have depended on the routes running through the Red Sea. With the capture of Perim or Aden the Eastern half of the Empire would have been virtually isolated. The Turks actually attempted the capture of both places in 1915, so the danger was not entirely problematical.

No account of the part played by cables and wireless during the war is complete without some reference to ciphers.

It has long been the practice of the Foreign Office to employ ciphers for confidential documents. They were in fact used before telegraphy was invented. But it is probably true to say that until the last war they were not treated with quite the same attention and respect as they are to-day. According to a recently published history of the Foreign Office, cases often occurred where ciphers were compromised by the premature publication of telegrams in Blue Books, although they were in paraphrase and not in full; and the loss of a cipher book was not entirely an uncommon occurrence. Referring to the period just before the war, the author says:

"I once had the pleasure of circulating a notice which ran something like this—

Cipher G. No. 86 has been received at Mexico.

Cipher E. No. 102 has been received at Naples.

Cipher E. No. 23 has been devoured by crocodiles."

He adds "the crocodiles (Abyssinian variety) were considered a safe receptacle."

The use of cipher nowadays is of course common to all government departments.

But the security of our ciphers has, in recent years, received considerable attention, mainly due to the serious mistakes made by the Germans during the war.

The classic example is provided by what is usually known as the Zimmerman correspondence. As stated above, the Germans

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\*For an account of this incident, see the *Empire at War* (Lucas) Vol. III, p. 407.

were forced to rely on neutral sources for their cable communication with America throughout the war, and all the cables passed through England. Alternatively they were able, from 1915 onwards, to communicate direct by wireless with New York. The interception of traffic by this method likewise presented no difficulties to us.

In 1917, just before the U. S. A. entered the war, the German Foreign Minister, Zimmerman, telegraphed through Washington to his ambassador in Mexico City instructing him to approach the Mexican government inviting them to enter the war on the side of the Central Powers if, and when, the U. S. A. came in on the side of the allies. As an inducement they were to be allowed to annex the States of Arizona, Texas and New Mexico, after the war. To make quite certain that it was safely received the telegram was sent by four or five alternative routes. Within a few hours of its despatch, this and subsequent telegrams giving further instructions were deciphered in London and handed over to the American Ambassador for transmission to President Wilson.\*

According to Walter Page—the American Ambassador at that time—it is doubtful whether these disclosures or the renewal of the unrestricted submarine campaign did more to convert President Wilson from Peace-maker to War-maker. The point of immediate interest, however, is that after the telegrams had been made public, the Germans continued to use the same cipher. It did not apparently occur to them that their cipher had been broken, and it is said that they attributed the leakage to a member of their embassy staff at Washington.

These and other incidents of the Great War undoubtedly had a marked effect on our post-war policy as regards cables and wireless.

Immediately after the war we set about expanding and duplicating our cable routes. In 1920 the Government, through the Post Office, acquired a direct cable from Penzance to Harbour Grace. Within a few years the Imperial routes to the East were strengthened by the laying of a second direct cable from Penzance to Gibraltar, and an alternative route from Aden *via* the Seychelles to Colombo. In 1926 the Pacific cable was duplicated. Appendix "B" shows the present Imperial cable and wireless routes. It should be noted that there are now at least three alternative routes to each of the Dominions and India.

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\*Vide *My Three Years in America*, by Count Bernstorff, p. 324.

So far back as 1911 the Imperial Conference had recorded a decision that a chain of Imperial Wireless stations connecting England with the Dominions should be erected. By 1913 a scheme for erecting eight high-power stations had been prepared and contracts placed. However, the war intervened and the whole project was abandoned in favour of a less ambitious scheme comprising eighteen smaller stations to be used mainly for ship-to-shore work. These were built during the war and proved extremely useful to the Navy and the Merchant Service, but they did not fulfil Imperial requirements.

In 1919 the Government appointed an Imperial Wireless Committee to consider the whole question of wireless communications within the Empire. The Committee recommended that the various parts of the Empire should be connected by a system of long-wave relay stations at intervals of 2,000—3,000 miles. This scheme was not acceptable to the Dominions, who decided to erect high-power stations capable of direct communication with England. Much controversy ensued. Numerous Committees and Commissions were appointed. Each one cancelled the recommendations of its predecessor. The only concrete result achieved during this period was the completion of the high-power long-wave station at Rugby.

This station is the most powerful telegraph station in the world. Its chief value is its ability to communicate with British ships at any time and in any part of the world.

The situation was finally brought to a head in 1926, when the Marconi Company demonstrated the possibility of long-distance communication by the short-wave beam system. The Marconi Company immediately built stations in England to communicate with corresponding stations in the Dominions and India. They were leased by the company to the Post Office.

The advantages of the beam system were, and still are :

- (1) Low capital cost compared with cables or long-wave wireless.
- (2) Comparative immunity from atmospherics.

Their only disadvantage was their liability to interruption for short-periods at certain hours of the day and certain times of the year. This disadvantage has now been largely overcome. Interruption is most likely to occur when the path between the stations is half in daylight and half in darkness.

The Australian Service is most affected. To minimise this effect, transmission from England to Australia is at some periods of the day directed eastwards round the world ; at other periods westwards ; and, at times, both ways simultaneously.

It is sometimes stated that the beam is immune from interception. This is not the case. Within the path traversed by the beam signals can be intercepted. Moreover, the beam subtends an angle of 11 degrees, so that by the time it has travelled a few thousand miles, its width is very considerable.

Owing to the comparatively small cost of operating the beam system, serious competition was soon created with the cables.

This state of affairs could not be allowed to continue, for if it had, one of two things would have happened. Either the cable companies would have been forced to close down their less remunerative routes, or else they would have been tempted to dispose of their assets to foreigners ; and there was at this time every indication that the U. S. A. were only too anxious to acquire our cables. In either case the strategic security of the Empire would have been seriously affected.

In 1928, therefore, the Government appointed an Imperial Cable and Wireless Conference to review the whole situation as regards Imperial inter-communication and "to make recommendations with a view to a common policy being adopted by the various governments concerned."

The Conference included representatives for each of the Dominions, India and the Colonies.


Acting on the recommendations of this Conference, Parliament transferred the control of all the principal external telegraph services (cable and wireless)—whether private or government-owned—to a new company called Imperial and International Communications, Ltd. The overseas telephone services and the continental telegraph services remained under the G. P. O. To safeguard strategical and commercial interests the Communications Company is subject to certain restrictions.—

- (1) Two of the directors are appointed by the Government.
- (2) Profits are restricted. Annual revenue above a fixed sum must be applied as to 50 per cent. to the reduction of rates, or to such other purpose as the Imperial Advisory Committee may approve.




# BRITISH AND GERMAN CABLES & WIRELESS. AUG. 1914.

APPENDIX "A"



## PRINCIPAL IMPERIAL CABLE AND W/T. ROUTES. 1934.





- (3) Alterations in rates and routes can only be carried out subject to the approval of the Advisory Committee.
- (4) In time of war or other national emergency the government may assume control of the cable and wireless systems.

The Imperial Communications Advisory Committee is a permanent committee representing the various government departments concerned, *e.g.*, Board of Trade, Colonial Office, etc., and the Dominion governments. It meets periodically in London. It is primarily concerned with safeguarding commercial interests as regards cables and wireless.

The Communications Company is, in short, a public utility company, and although the operating companies which it embodies still retain their original titles, the parts are subordinate to the whole and the whole is effectively applied in accordance with Imperial needs. In this manner the Empire has acquired a system of communications economically adequate in peace and strategically secure in war.

## MINOR TACTICS TRAINING

By Q. T.

Some years ago a small book appeared entitled "The Young Officer's Guide to Knowledge." It was a humorous little book, but it contained also some very useful stuff. One particular phrase recurs to the mind. It went—"the darker the night, the more inclement the weather, the better the exercise." One can picture some portly old gentleman enunciating this dictum in the Mess for the benefit of the newly joined, helping himself as he did so to a second glass of madeira, and inwardly dismissing as ridiculous the thought that he, personally, should ever dream of putting such a fool idea into practice. But, in actual fact, is it such a fool idea? Is there not more than just a modicum of truth in it? Are we, or are we not, rather inclined to carry out our tactical training in the easiest, and therefore the least realistic way? It is not suggested that we should set troops groping about the countryside on dark and rainy nights as our Major friend above would have them do, but it is submitted for consideration whether we could not with advantage practise more constantly the difficult things, in the hope that by doing so these difficulties would automatically become decreased and so more easily surmounted.

It is proposed to discuss here three particular agents which tend to cause difficulty and disorganization when an active enemy is actually present. These three agents are Casualties, Compendium Strengths and Ammunition Supply. It is suggested that sufficient consideration during our periods of training is not always paid to the influences they exert.

*Starting with Casualties*

The disorganising effect of casualties upon tactics is obvious and needs little stressing. Quite a few casualties can transform a perfectly simple minor tactical scheme into one of very considerable difficulty. In hill warfare especially is this the case when one wounded man requires the services of three others to get him off the hill. A piquet, for instance, withdrawing from its position and suffering, say three casualties, may easily necessitate the employment of a complete company, or more, to put it back on its position and enable the casualties to be got away.

Casualties, in fact, dominate all tactics. It is the inflicting or suffering of casualties, or the possibility of inflicting or suffering casualties, that differentiates war conditions from those of peace. If it were not for the possibilities of inflicting and receiving casualties in war, our tactical training would be on a par with our boyhood games of Red Indians played against Tommy Jones of the house next door amongst the gorse bushes, and there would be no justification for it whatever. Nevertheless, it is playing at Red Indians that we largely do. Very rarely indeed do we pay much consideration to this particular aspect of tactics, in spite of its dominating character. While making every effort to avoid receiving casualties, ought we not constantly to practise *in the majority of our schemes* the correct procedure on receiving casualties, on the assumption that preparedness for the worser evils renders lesser evils still less evil?

To do this at present is difficult. It calls for much more umpiring and more careful arrangement of schemes. It is suggested, however, that the practising of casualties could be made easier and more realistic.

The existing system of employing red and blue screens does not produce the results required. An attacking unit told to put up red screens is thereby rooted to the ground, and no chance of trying individually to work forward is allowed. Initiative, and the will to get closer are petrified and the scheme becomes intensely boring to the troops who have thus been red-flagged.\*

It is submitted that the creation of actual casualties would be much more efficacious. The following is a suggested method of doing this :

Each umpire carries a number of coloured discs strung on a small stick. These he issues indiscriminately to men whom he wishes to make casualties. He can do this quite easily and quickly from his horse. The discs, which can be made of card-board, are coloured red, blue and white. Of the red discs there would be not more than, say, 15 per cent. and they would denote that the recipient is dead. Blue discs, perhaps 35 per cent. of the whole, denote that the recipient is a stretcher case. The white discs, comprising the remaining 50 per cent. would be for walking wounded cases.

The recipient of a disc would be required to act in accordance with its significance. Red disc men would remain where they were

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\**Editor's Note.*—We cannot altogether agree with this interpretation of Training Regulations. Sec. 71, para. 2.

and take no further action. Blue disc men would provide practice for stretcher-bearers and would be dealt with as in actual practice. White disc men would proceed to R. A. Ps. on their own. Some very useful instruction could be imparted to these latter regarding when and how walking cases can go back to R. A. Ps. and the idea would also be instilled that a slightly wounded man can effectively fight on for a long time if it should be necessary.

Much other useful instruction could also be imparted, such as collection of ammunition, reorganisation of units, etc. No restrictions would need to be imposed by umpires regarding halting or advancing. Junior Commanders would require to keep thinking and working the whole time. Sections would still try to infiltrate forward, and Platoon Commanders would try to gain their objectives with their depleted forces by some means or other. If the umpire did not agree with a Platoon Commander's methods he could make this clear by dealing him out some more discs. Junior leaders, and senior leaders too, would be faced with situations approximating more to those of real war, and constant practice in dealing with such situations would increase their initiative, self-confidence and general cunning. It would also tend to make tactical exercises a more interesting pastime.

As regards the casualties themselves they could be collected, if desired, and sent forward as fresh reinforcements. If it was desired for purposes of instruction to join up the casualties with their units again, this could be easily effected by, for instance, blowing the hospital call followed by the "close." In any case, unless ordered specially not to for some specific reason, casualties would rejoin their units at the end of parade on the "no parade" sounding.

It is possible that abuses of the discs might occur. Old soldiers, said never to die, might obtain possession of nice red discs and gently fade away till the no parade sounded in a peaceful "death."

Blue and white disc men would give up their discs on arrival at R. A. Ps., and some arrangement could doubtless be made regarding the collection of the red ones.

The above rather visualizes plains warfare. In hill warfare it could be applied with equal effect. For instance, a blue disc could be secretly pressed into the hand of some intelligent individual about to proceed to a piquet with instructions to give it effect some time during his piquet's withdrawal. Other piquets would not know

which piquets, if any, were going to have casualties. The interesting problems would then arise as to (1) how the covering troops are to know that a casualty has occurred, (2) how other piquets, one or two of whom may also be on the move, are to be informed and those on the move stopped and got back again to their newly vacated positions, and (3) how, when the casualties have been got off, the whole withdrawal scheme is best put in motion again. So far no one has produced a really good solution to these problems. Constant practice might provide the answers.

### *Compendium Strengths*

These have come to stay, and are the official recognition of three facts :

- (1) That the strengths of units of the Indian Army during the leave and furlough season inevitably fall very considerably short of their authorised Field Service establishments, and that, therefore, they cannot during this season take the field at anything approaching those establishments.
- (2) That these reduced strengths of units are sufficient, as a rule, to deal with the type of Frontier warfare that is nowadays normally likely to be encountered.
- (3) That, of late years anyhow, it is during the furlough season that units are most commonly being called upon for service on the Frontier.

At first sight it would appear that the only effect upon the minor tactics of the troops in question is a reduction in size of existing sub-units and that the methods of their employment remain unchanged.

It is contended that this frequently is not the case.

How does the normal compendium strength work out in an Indian Army unit ?

The establishment is approximately as follows, though a few minor variations may occur amongst various units regarding distribution of certain individual men—

5 British officers  
11 Indian officers  
89 N. C. Os.  
400 Riflemen

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Total 500 Indian Ranks

These are distributed as follows—

	<i>B. O.</i>	<i>I. O.</i>	<i>N. C. O.</i>	<i>Rfn.</i>
H.Q. Wing ..	4	3	10	66
Support Coy. ..	1	2	13	82
Rifle Coys. ..	..	2	22	90

The actual appointment of the fifth *B. O.* is a matter for unit preference. It is submitted that four *B. Os.* should be allotted as follows—*C. O.*, Adjutant Quarter-master, and Support Company Commander. How the fifth *B. O.* is employed depends upon whether the unit prefers to have one *B. O.* and two *I. O.* Rifle Company Commanders, or three *I. O.* Rifle Company Commanders. The latter is frequently more convenient for the issue of orders, etc.

It is proposed to consider the composition of the Rifle Company in considerable detail. There are 22 *N. C. Os.* and 90 riflemen. From this total of 112 men, several are employed outside their platoons in the shape of Coy. Hav. Major, Coy. Runners, Coy. *Q. M. Havr.* and assistant, *B. Os'* and *I. Os'* orderlies (usually very essential as officer's private servants frequently cannot accompany the unit), police, men for water duties and stretcher-bearers. The Company is almost certain to be commanded by an *I. O.* and the other *I. O.* will be Company 2nd in Command. Thus each platoon is commanded by an *N. C. O.* It may be possible to save on some of the above extra-duty men (more probably, though, the number will be increased), but the Platoon Commander will be very lucky indeed if the full strength of his platoon comprises more than 6 *N. C. Os.* and 18 riflemen. These will include the Platoon Commander himself, his runner, and the platoon havildar.

The full strength of sections in the platoon will, therefore, be 1—4 with perhaps 1—5 in the *L. A.* section. On the face of it this appears to be adequate, but in actual practice the four riflemen per section inevitably dwindle to three or even two as a result of demands for guards, line sentries, etc., or on account of injuries or sickness.

The Platoon Commander is left, therefore, with sections of 1—3 or 1—2, and sections of this size are too small for use as such in Frontier warfare. One might go further and say that sections as small as this are potential sources of great danger. To make his platoon function with any degree of safe effectiveness the Platoon Commander has to reduce his sections to three, *i.e.*, two rifle and one *L. A.*, and at once his tactical methods have to be adapted to

correspond. His customary reserve is no longer there under his hand. All sorts of little awkwardnesses arise at times when he does not expect them. Unfortunately, on the Frontier, little awkwardnesses have a nasty habit of turning into bigger awkwardnesses, and it is therefore most desirable to eliminate as many of their causes as possible by practice in peace time.

The same thing applies to the Company Commander. Quite apart from the fact that he must allow for the reduced composition of his platoons he will of a certainty have additional complications. His Company will be very fortunate if it is not finding up to ten or more N. C. Os. and men for guard duties, camp piquets, etc. etc. To find these from the Company as a whole creates weaknesses everywhere. A more convenient method is often to find all these extra-company duties from one or other platoon each day and reduce the company composition to three effective platoons rather than retain four that are seriously weakened. If he does this a 3-unit basis is forced upon the Company Commander also. This is, admittedly, a perfectly workable composition. From time to time during the last few years, various authorities have advocated the advantages of "threes" over "fours." It is not proposed to argue about this. What is contended, however, is that a sudden transition from "fours" to "threes" will bring all but the most cunning and experienced of Company and Platoon Commanders up against unexpected snags if they have not thoroughly practised with this distribution beforehand. The pretty little games of leap-frog which work so sweetly with four units have to be seriously modified. They can be modified comparatively easily, but not at a moment's notice, especially if that moment is already fully occupied with the enemy.

The Battalion Commander also has his problems. He has to modify his ideas and his requirements to what his Rifle Companies can safely execute. The one inexcusable thing on the Frontier is to be "caught out." Not only must he himself realise the limitations now imposed upon his Battalion but he must be quite certain that his Brigadier realizes them also, and the reason for them.

#### *Ammunition Supply*

Economy in expenditure of ammunition and a knowledge of how ammunition is replenished in the field is an essential item of the soldier's training. The difficulties of replenishment should be fully appreciated by him and the system of replenishment frequently

practised. This is not very easy to do because expenditure of blank ammunition is strictly limited and the allotment of dummy rounds per company is also not unduly lavish.

For the ordinary rifleman the question is not of such particular importance. Moderation in expenditure can be instilled into him in a number of ways, and in any case the occasions demanding prolonged rapid fire from his rifle are comparatively few. It is the Light Automatic that eats up the ammunition, and which requires an efficient replenishment system. The impression of unlimited ammunition is apt to be instilled into the average L. A. gunner on manœuvres when all he is called upon to do is to create a distinctive noise. Almost invariably the rattle or other creator of the distinctive noise is kept going almost incessantly.

The following is a suggested method of practising ammunition supply by the L. A. sections. It is worked out on the basis of the L. G. magazine but can be adapted equally well to the V. B. gun.

The full complement of L. G. magazines is 18 per gun. Eighteen magazines per gun are therefore filled with dummies at 40 rounds per magazine. This uses up most of the dummies of the company, but there should be enough over to provide two chargers per rifleman. N. C. Os. who should not normally fire anyhow, are not issued with any dummies. If the dummies over will not run to two chargers per rifleman, the rounds per magazine can be slightly reduced.

When the section goes into action, No. 1 fires the gun, and the Section Commander creates the distinctive noise. As the gun fires, No. 2 removes the dummies from a magazine in groups of five or six rounds and drops them into a sack or a sand bag. As magazines up with the gun are thus emptied, more full magazines come up the ammunition chain in the normal manner, and the sack will gradually become filled. Eventually sacks are collected and taken back to Company Headquarters by men specially detailed for this duty, and the ammunition thus collected at Company Headquarters will be used for reissue as replacements. It will be regarded as having come up from Battalion Reserve.

As his ammunition begins to run short, the L. A. Commander informs his Platoon Commander who then makes a demand for more ammunition upon the Company Commander. Normally this demand would probably include ammunition for rifles as well as for automatics, but only the latter is considered in the scheme. The

ammunition for the Lewis Gun should be sent to the L. A. magazine refilling point, which is generally where the mule is. To send a large bag or box full of ammunition up to the gun itself would probably cause the latter great inconvenience and might be unnecessarily hazardous. The ammunition is therefore sent out to the mule, where it is loaded into magazines by the appropriate gun numbers and sent up on the ammunition supply chain. The Company Commander of course must inform the Platoon Commander that he has done so, and the news must also be sent up the chain by the gun numbers to the Gun Commander as soon as the ammunition arrives at the magazines loading point.

This may sound all fairly easy, but in actual fact it requires considerable practice to make the system work sweetly and efficiently, and during the perfecting of it numerous little snags will be encountered. These, in due course, will be overcome, and it is submitted that in so vital a matter as ammunition supply, the snags should be overcome and the whole system perfected before a real enemy is engaged.

In conclusion, and in justification of this article, one can only refer again to that implacable Indian Brave, Tommy Jones, and the fierce combats we used to wage with him.

Sometimes we scalped his men and sometimes they scalped us, but in either case both sides always got home all right for tea. A timely shout of "pax," too, frequently obviated what otherwise might have turned into an unfortunate debacle.

But shouting "pax" is no good to us now—certainly not on the Frontier. It is no use shouting out "you cad" if the enemy hits us rather harder than we bargained for.

He is a cad, and he is only too ready to hit us either above or below the stomach as opportunity offers. A timely appreciation of this fact combined with a systematic preparation for the *worst* that may befall us, may save us much trouble and sorrow later.

## WITH THE TIBET DETACHMENTS

By "MUGGER"

In 1933 I was unexpectedly ordered to command the detachments of my battalion that were to proceed to Tibet in relief of another unit. I did not relish the idea of a year's exile, but there it was, and I had to make the best of it.

In August we entrained at Peshawar for Calcutta; and thence, after a short halt to collect stores, onwards to the Darjeeling-Himalayan Railway rail-head at Giellakhola. After that the journey was by road and mountain-track. It is a 210 mile march over some terrific country before one reaches one's destination, namely Gyantse. The condition of the Trade Route is in many parts execrable, and the march over the formidable barrier of the Donkya range, crossed by the way of the Jelap La, 14,100 ft., must remain a nightmare in the memories of many of us.

There are two detachments, one at Yatung, 10,000 ft., 18 miles on the Tibetan side of the Sikkim-Tibet border, and the other at Gyantse, some 130 miles further North in Tibet proper.

After dropping the Yatung party, the column climbs to the Tibetan plateau, 15,000 ft. The odd 200 pack-animals, mules, ponies, donkeys and yaks cause it to get very strung out along the rough track; and when, after 18 days marching, Gyantse is at last reached, everyone feels very glad indeed to have arrived.

The Gyantse detachment, 80 strong, is housed in a small square fort, in which all ranks spend most part of their twelve months' tour of duty. The British fort is about two thousand yards from the "Jong" (Tibetan fort) on the North side of a smallish river, and stands roughly in the middle of the Gyantse plain, which, although over 13,000 ft. above sea-level, strange to say, manages to raise good crops of barley, mustard, peas and potatoes. Green vegetables are hard to come by, and here it is that the detachment's gardens come in very useful. A Political Officer, an I. M. S. doctor, and the two B. Os. of the detachment, comprise the entire white population of the place, the provision of escorts to the Political Officer supplying the *raison d'être* of the troops.

The intense cold of the Tibetan winter kills most kinds of "bugs" and in consequence, if one is not adversely affected by the great

altitude, one normally keeps quite fit. The winter is a very severe one, the average minimum being about 40 degrees below freezing. You can imagine, therefore, how much Jack Sepoy has to accommodate himself to his changed conditions of life. You will find him performing his routine duties clad in a Balaclava helmet, tinted goggles, a great-coat, fur lined gloves and Gilgit boots, or else endeavouring to skate on the local ice-rink and finding the ice very hard indeed. In spite of the hardships, however, much entertainment can be got out of life in this country of high altitudes and low temperatures, and although Arctic winds may blow periodically, the winter days are brightened by a warm sun. The summer is warm, and with its coming, the countryside assumes a verdant hue, and everyone must experience at least something of the *joie de vivre*.

You might naturally ask what there is to do in a place like this. Well; the detachment work takes up a good deal of the time. The C. O. will find that he has a host of small matters to attend to. The maintenance of the 25 M. I. ponies, and the training of their sepoy-sowars adding to them considerably.

Life there, however, must not be taken as being of the all-work-and-no-play variety; there is a social side too. Quite a number of Tibetan officials of high rank live in the neighbourhood, and these, being as hospitable as they are, give one the opportunity of seeing something of the domestic side of the life of the country. One learns to eat with chopsticks and to partake of one's share of shark's stomach, sea-slugs, snails and sea-weed, and to drink the country beer, "Chung," a brew made from fermented barley. The Tibetan higher classes strike one as being very "Chinese" in looks, dress and habits. They are of course all Buddhists, their lives being completely dominated by their religion. Most families give a son and a daughter to the church and a goodly proportion of all crops go towards its upkeep annually.

Religion in fact, dominates the whole country which is full of monks and monasteries, and one gets full opportunities of close inspections of them both. A not-too-close inspection is however advocated, as all lamas and lamaseries are best described as being of an extremely "Fruity" order.

The whole atmosphere of the country being one of peace and reflection, makes it ideal for the officer who wishes to study the theoretical side of his profession and, through the opportunities

available when out on "shikar," some good practical training is also obtainable.

For all but the officers serving in the country, shooting is strictly prohibited. It is always very hard work, as one is very soon up to an altitude of 16,000 ft. or more, and this tells a lot on one at the end of a long day. In the way of small game, geese and many species of ducks are abundant in March and November, as they are in transit to and from their breeding grounds. A large number of bar-headed geese breed locally. The Ram Tso, a lake about 20 square miles in area, altitude 15,000 ft., on the Trade Route between Gyantse and Yatung, is their breeding ground and later a shooting one for the garrison. As the Yatung garrison has to be periodically inspected, it is of course in the shooting months that the O. C. finds it necessary to make his tours of inspection. Magnificent sport may be had by lying up on a promontory and taking the birds as they come past on their flights up and down the water.

As regards big game, gazelle are to be had within a few miles of Gyantse fort, bharal are to be found in the mountains a short distance off the Trade Route, and ovis ammon somewhat further afield.


In mentioning sport in connexion with the Tibet detachments, a reference to polo is necessary. The King of Sports is played there with no little enthusiasm, the Civil annually competing with the Military for the honours. The sturdy Mounted Infantry ponies learn the game very quickly, and when once the dangerous thrusters have had their rougher edges rounded off, a reasonable standard of play is obtained. Polo days were always eagerly looked forward to by all ranks.

I should mention that each battalion that has had a detachment in Gyantse has had its regimental crest painted on a shield and hung on the wall of the Mess dining-room there. This custom started in 1904 and has been kept up ever since. Many of the old regimental numbers are in evidence, such as the 40th Pathans, the 113th Infantry and others. Considering the large number of crests displayed, it is surprising how seldom the Tibet Detachments are ever heard spoken of in the Indian Army.

What makes it all the more surprising is the fact that occasionally British officers make Gyantse their objective for a trek, and during my year's tour of duty, two such parties reached there. As a trek, although access to the forbidden city "Lhasa," is indeed forbidden,



The Agency Buildings (British Fort), Gyantse.



The Jonj (Tibetan Fort), Gyantse.



it is well worth while undertaking, even if only to Phari. The track, after passing through the densely wooded and precipitous valleys of Sikkim, leads onwards to the bleak and barren Tibetan plateau. Near Phari, some 40 miles over the border, the Great Himalayan Range is crossed at the Tang La, 15,300 ft., where the White Mountain Goddess "Chomalhari," 24,000 ft., calculated as inaccessible even by the Everest climbers who pass that way *en route* to their own lofty goal, towers sheer, a solid wall of ice and rock, 9,000 ft. above the traveller's head. Rifle shooting for the traveller in Tibet is prohibited but he that is provided with a camera, or better still a cine-camera, will be able to get some shots that will compensate him for the other kinds of trophies that have been placed beyond his reach. A two months' privilege leave would give sufficient time with a little in hand, for anyone who wishes to undertake this journey.

## LEAVE IN CHINA AND JAPAN

BY MAJOR W. H. PIKE, I.A.O.C.

For those who can secure two months leave from India in the spring or autumn, a visit to China and Japan is strongly recommended as an interesting and inexpensive holiday.

The round trip from Bombay to Yokohama and return can be done in 58 days. The rate of exchange in Japan is markedly in favour of the tourist (1 Yen=1-2*d.*, instead of par 2 shillings), and from beginning to end everything is made easy for the traveller. In addition the period of absence from India re-acts favourably in the income-tax column of one's paybill.

Those interested are advised to consult a steamship company or travel agency. The writer travelled with his wife by 2nd Class "P & O" for which two return passages he paid the equivalent of £62. This represents a little over 10/- per head per day during the voyage, for which sum one is adequately housed, fed and transported. It is worth while securing a good cabin and arranging that it may be allotted for the round trip. If this arrangement is recorded on the ticket issued by the shipping company, some bother may be saved later on.

Five interesting ports are touched at on both the outward and homeward voyages, these being Colombo, Penang, Singapore, Hong-Kong and Shanghai; and, as the duration of stay in port varies from 6 hours to 54, ample time is afforded to look round and to take short trips into the interior.

As a rough guide to expenses the following figures are given, based on a holiday taken in the autumn of 1935 by two people:—

Two 2nd Class return passages—

Bombay to Yokohama ..	..	£62
Cash for outward voyage ..	..	£20
„ „ 14 days in Japan ..	..	£40
„ „ homeward voyage ..	..	£20
Total ..		£142

The above figures cover everything, and include an ample margin for shopping.

It was found convenient to take £100 worth of Travellers' cheques of £5 denomination ; those issued by a recognised Bank bearing a 2d. stamp on each cheque being the easiest to negotiate.

Passports require a Japanese *visa*, but not a Chinese one. The former can be obtained in India through the shipping agency, and is available for one year. It can also be arranged for in Hong Kong or Shanghai, but this will take up time otherwise available for sight-seeing.

Resist all suggestions to take out a Chinese *visa*. These are comparatively expensive, and were found to be unnecessary for through passengers. Actually the writer was requested to exhibit his passport only in Bombay, Colombo, and at the port of arrival in Japan.

For leave in the autumn, both thick and thin clothing will be found necessary on board ship ; and thick clothes only for the fortnight ashore in Japan. While on shore the remainder of one's luggage can be left on board ship. Dinner jackets and evening frocks are worn by a proportion of 2nd Class passengers during the voyage, but these will not be required in Japan, even in Tokyo, by the traveller who stays in hotels. Here the ladies appear for dinner in afternoon frocks, while the mere male dons the lounge suiting, which has probably languished for some time past in a uniform case in India.

A word about electric irons which may interest the fairer sex. On board ship a room for ironing is provided : throughout Japan it is useless to expect to be able to use the travelling iron, which has probably been squeezed into an overcrowded suitcase, as the electric fittings in the hotels are apparently designed especially to defeat this project.

Topis were not found necessary east of Colombo during October and November.

For travelling in Japan by train and motor-car about two suitcases per person, or less, will be found a useful basis to work upon. Railway carriages are well provided with racks, and the writer, who was not travelling as lightly as he might have done, was always permitted to take everything in with him.

On arrival at Kobe the first port of call in Japan, a choice can be made of disembarking for the trip on shore, or of going on to Yokohama. Actually this matters little, the distance between the two ports being only one day by sea, or ten hours by rail. From Kobe it is recommended that visits be made to Kyoto, Hakone,

Miyanoshita, Nikko and Tokyo in that order, and the ship then rejoined at Yokohama.

A visit to Messrs. T. Cook in the Oriental Hotel at Kobe will be found helpful, and here a tour can be mapped out, and the hotel accommodation booked in advance without the traveller being bound to adhere strictly to dates should he subsequently not wish to do so. It is not necessary to stay more than a few hours in Kobe on this occasion, as the ship will remain for thirty-six hours in that port after leaving Yokohama on the return journey to India.

Before leaving Kobe for Kyoto it is suggested that a report of arrival in Japan be made to the British Embassy in Tokyo in accordance with para. 889, R. A. I., and that an application be made at the same time for permission to see the Imperial Palace at Tokyo. As much notice as possible is required for this.

The "P & O" agents issue a concession railway ticket for one journey between Kobe and Yokohama or *vice versa*, which is worth securing. One and-a-half hour's journey in a good electric train takes one from Kobe to Kyoto and here the Miyako Hotel is recommended. A 10 per cent. reduction is made by this hotel to Army Officers. Application to see the Imperial Palace at Kyoto should be made in the hotel immediately upon arrival.

Three to four days can be well spent in Kyoto visiting Nara, Mount Hiei, the Hodzu Rapids, and shopping in the Shinmonzen. A walk should be taken down Theatre Street after dinner, and a nine-hole golf-course is within easy reach. Visits can also be made to small local factories to see the production of lacquer, damascene work, cloisonne, Satsuma pottery, and silk weaving. Kyoto was the capital city for over one thousand years, and is the birthplace of those arts and crafts of old Japan which are known all over the world.

From Kyoto to Numazu is six hours by train, and from here it is recommended that a motor-car or bus be taken to Miyanoshita *via* Lake Hakone. This car drive lasts two hours, and involves the crossing of a 3,000 ft. pass from which a view will probably be seen of Mount Fujiama (12,300 ft.).

There is a hotel on the lakeside at Hakone, and a larger one at Miyanoshita, an hour's journey further on. The latter is an unusually good hotel with natural hot water laid on from convenient springs. Attractive expeditions can be made cheaply and easily from Miyanoshita to various lakes and passes which all command views of

Mount Fuji. Fair golf is available. However, the best sights are still ahead, and probably after two full days the traveller will decide to leave for Nikko.

The temples and shrines of Nikko are exceptionally fine, and are said to surpass all others in Japan. In addition there is lake and mountain scenery where the autumn colours may be seen to the best advantage. An annual temple procession takes place on 17th October. Two full days at least should be spent in Nikko, one for the temples, and another for Lake Chuzenji and the Kegan Waterfall. More time can be spent there with advantage.

To reach Nikko from Miyanoshta, half-an-hour's car ride is made from the hotel to Odawara station from where the rail journey to Tokyo takes less than two hours. Ample time occurs to change trains in Tokyo, and Nikko can be reached in good time for dinner. Here a good opportunity arises of staying in a Japanese inn. The Japanese Tourist Bureau recommend the Konishi, and here the tourist of either sex can live very cheaply, and by no means uncomfortably, should he or she wish to try an interesting experiment. The Konishi is next door to the one European style hotel in Nikko which incidentally charges rather highly for the accommodation provided.

Fast trains connect Nikko with Tokyo in a little over two hours, and here the Imperial Hotel will be found cheap and comfortable. There are many sights to be seen in the capital city, some that should not be missed being Ginza Street by day and by night, and the Takarazuka theatre next door to the hotel. A visit to a large department store such as the Matsuya will be found worth while, and a view of Tokyo can be had from the roof. A drive should be taken round the city with an English speaking chauffeur, and it may be possible to visit the Imperial Palace if this has been arranged beforehand. The writer found the course of the Tokyo Golf Club at Asaka quite first class.

To rejoin the ship, Yokohama (Sakuragicho Station) is reached in thirty-five minutes by electric train from Tokyo. Twenty-four hours after sailing the ship arrives at Kobe, where a stay in port is made of a day and a half allowing ample time to see the sights. Visits are recommended to the Motomachi and Theatre Streets, and easy excursions by cable railway can be made to two local mountains. Both Kyoto and Osaka (the Manchester of Japan) are within easy reach by electric train.

In addition to golf at Mount Rokko a few miles away, there is a course at Hirono, one hour's motor drive from the Oriental Hotel, which is of outstanding merit. The writer very strongly recommends a day here to those interested.

To summarise, everything is made easy for the traveller, and the Japanese are always most helpful and polite. Lack of knowledge of the language presents no real difficulty, and a few simple phrases regarding the cost of articles for purposes of shopping are easily memorised.

The following notes may be found useful —

*Changing money.*—It is recommended that English money be changed when necessity demands, and the balance of local currency changed back into English money before leaving the country concerned. Money changers, official and otherwise, come on board at every port; and authorised offices will be found on every quay.

*Passports.*—Japanese *visa* required. No other *visa* necessary for through passengers.

*Guide-books.*—The shipping company provide passengers with useful small books and pamphlets for China and Japan and for each port touched at. The official guide-book published by the Japanese Government Railways is well worth buying. Present price Yen 6.

*Laundry.*—Clothes can be washed on board ship, but this is rather expensive. A better way is to utilise the services of the dhobies who come on board at practically every port, and who wash well and inexpensively.

*Customs.*—Difficulties are unlikely. The Japanese authorities require lists of all books imported. A brand new camera might suffer duty, but old ones are not charged for. Cigarettes are limited to fifty, and tobacco to half a pound. Cigarettes can be purchased everywhere in Japan, and will be found not too bad if persevered with.

*Photography.*—The writer took photographs almost daily, and no difficulty is anticipated if common sense is observed. Naturally foreign visitors with cameras are not encouraged in the fortified areas near the ports.

*Railways.*—First Class carriages are few and far between, only 2nd and 3rd Class being in common use. As mentioned

before a concession ticket can be obtained from the "P & O" agents.

*Hotels.*—Most hotels offer either the American or English plan, and the traveller must decide for himself whether it will best suit his pocket to pay a fixed rate per day to include everything, or whether he will pay for his room only and feed *a la carte*. Evening dress is not required in Japan.

*Tips.*—Hotels and restaurants add 10 per cent. to the bill.

On the ship it is best to tip twice, *i.e.*, once before disembarking in Japan and the second time at the end of the return trip. This covers the possibility of having different cabin and table stewards on the way back to India.

A few notes are added on the ports touched at outside Japan—

*Colombo.*—There is good bathing at Mount Lavinia, and good golf on the Ridgeway course. Ladies may play here on weekday mornings, but are not permitted to even walk round in the afternoon. Visitors can save money by engaging motor-cars outside the entrance to the Customs House.

*Penang.*—Visits are recommended to the summit of the Hill, to the Waterfall Gardens, and the Swimming Club. An introduction is needed for the latter.

*Singapore.*—Has much to interest. The Naval Base can be visited if official arrangements are made beforehand. The shops are attractive, and the Swimming Club and the golf course at Bukittima are both unusually good.

*Hongkong.*—Here a call will probably be made upon the Command Paymaster, and he will be found on Seven-and-Sixpenny Hill, which is on the island a short ride in a rickshaw from where the ferry steamer starts. His office is closed on Wednesday afternoons.

Excellent bathing can be had at Repulse Bay, which is easily reached by good bus service from the Hongkong Hotel. The Peak can be climbed by railway or motor-car, and good golf at Fanling is served by frequent trains starting from Kowloon Station close to where the ship is moored at the wharf.

The shops and bazaars are very interesting, and this is a good place to buy camphor wood chests. Several shops making them will be found at Kowloon close to the ship.

*Shanghai.*—Visitors should not fail to see the Chinese native city, where a guide will be found necessary on the first visit. Many good shops will be found near the Cathay Hotel, and the Thieves Kitchen will repay a visit especially between tea and dinner. There are excellent shoe shops, and Yates Road is celebrated for ladies underwear. The large department stores have many English speaking assistants, and English-run shops selling dresses and hats are of an up-to-date quality not generally found in India. Shanghai is reported to possess sixty-nine clubs. Horse-racing, dog-racing, and Hai-Alai (pelota) can all be enjoyed. Night clubs and cabarets abound, and a visit is recommended to a Chinese theatre and a Chinese *Palais de danse*. By this time the tourist will probably have made so many purchases that at least one new suitcase, if not a cabin-trunk, will be required to bring them back to India. Shanghai is a good place to purchase this article.

## WEAPON TRAINING AND THE ARMY RIFLE ASSOCIATION

BY MAJOR R. H. STEVENS, 5TH BN., 7TH RAJPUT REGT.

Owing to its repetitive nature, military training runs considerable danger of becoming somewhat humdrum, and one of the primary concerns of a commander is to devise means to stimulate interest and to combat any tendency towards staleness and consequent boredom.

Weapon training, ultimately one of the most important branches of the training of the man, is not immune from this danger; a company is "struck off for annual W. T." fires, and, unless results are startling one way or the other, passes on to other work without particular comment.

Now, one of the greatest incentives to interest and keenness is undoubtedly the introduction of a competitive element, and, as far as weapon training is concerned, the A. R. A. provides, ready to hand, a most excellent stimulus to weapon training competition of every kind.

Long and enthusiastic participation in A. R. A. activities has convinced the writer that, once they have started competing, the men take the very greatest interest in A. R. A. matches. These matches offer scope for battalion, company and platoon teams and their equivalents. Those who cannot yet aspire to shoot for the battalion, hope at least to do so for the company or the platoon. In this way, interest percolates throughout the unit, and the results of this interest are reflected without any shadow of doubt in a very marked improvement in the general shooting efficiency of the unit participating.

Yet, in spite of this, the number of units which regularly enter teams is remarkably low. A perusal of the A. R. A. handbooks of the last few years will reveal the same handful of the faithful, and the very high standards they reach in the results are proof, if proof is needed, of the benefit they derive.

What is the cause of this lack of enthusiasm? Frequently it is the lack of some enthusiast to start the ball rolling; but the answer most often given is that modern conditions make too many demands

on officer and man as it is, and that the teams which do win are "pro's who live on the Range, do nothing but shoot and crack off unlimited thousands of rounds of extra ammunition." The argument is specious in the extreme. A little forethought in planning its A. R. A. campaign will enable any unit to participate fully in the matches without any appreciable increase of work for officer or man, or undue extra expenditure of ammunition. Even if they do not at first win cups and medals (they won't: "nerves" will play havoc with the first year's attempts), nevertheless, the men will have great fun and the standard of shooting will rise steadily.

Most units rough out a general basic programme for the year showing approximate dates of Individual Training, Weapon Training, leave, etc., of all companies. It is then easy to foresee at what times various sub-units will be available for A. R. A. matches. The next step is to select the matches for which to enter. The following is suggested as good all-round value—

- (a) The 88th Carnatic Cup .. A Battalion Rifle team
- (b) The Rawlinson Shield .. A Company Rifle team
- (c) The Cawnpore Mills Cup .. A Platoon Rifle team
- (d) The Prince of Wales Cup .. A Platoon L. A. team
- (e) The Mother Country Cup .. A Battalion V. G. team

Then there are the aggregate matches of which there are two:

(1) The Command Challenge Cups.—A cup in each Command to the unit with the best aggregate in matches (a), (b) and (c) above, and

(2) H. M. The King-Emperor's Cup.—For the best aggregate in (a), (b) (c) above, together with a fourth match, the Francis Memorial Battalion Revolver Match.

Well, we are already entering teams for the other matches which count for the aggregate cups; we must therefore have a try at the Revolver match as well.

Under the Rules governing these aggregate matches, should a unit enter more than one team for any of the relevant matches, it is the highest score which is counted towards the aggregate. For "sub-unit" matches therefore, *i.e.*, for (b) and (c) above, we will enter one team per company, thus decentralising interest, letting every company have the dual opportunity of winning the Company match and of representing the battalion in the aggregate matches, and finally ensuring that the best company and platoon represent

the battalion in the aggregate matches. Although the platoon L. A. match does not count in the aggregate matches, we may just as well allow each company one entry for that as well. For the battalion matches we will at first content ourselves with one entry per match.

Our final list of entries is therefore—

The 88th Carnatic Cup	..	} Battalion teams, one entry each.
The Francis Memorial Cup	..	
The Mother Country Cup	..	
The Rawlinson Shield	..	3 entries
The Cawnpore Mills Cup	..	„
The Prince of Wales (Malerkotla) Cup	..	3 „

At first sight, this is, perhaps a formidable array; but, in reality, it need not be so.

The following is suggested as the most satisfactory way of carrying out the above programme:

(1) *Sub-unit Matches*.—Each company will fire its matches immediately on the conclusion of its annual Weapon Training Course. This will enable a Company Committee of, say, the company and platoon commanders to select without any difficulty teams for the three matches in question. All that then is required is two or three trial runs of the teams under match conditions prior to the actual firing of the match; that is to say, an extra ten days on the range for each rifle company. The teams are small in numbers, other duties are not therefore likely to be affected to any appreciable extent, and additional ammunition expenditure is reduced to a minimum.

(2) *Battalion Team Matches*.—The V. G. Mother Country Cup will be fired in the same way, immediately after the annual course. The Battalion Rifle team will fire when most convenient, probably in the interval between the end of the Individual Training season and the beginning of Collective Training. The Revolver Match also will be fired as opportunity occurs. The hour between breakfast and office affords an excellent opportunity for practice, and it is astonishing how rapidly revolver shooting improves (usually, admittedly, from a zero standard!) with a little practice. (The writer recently saw a team improve from an extremely poor individual average somewhere in the forties, to the quite respectable average of 80 in ten short days with an expenditure of some two thousand rounds.)

(3) *Ammunition*.—It is next proposed to examine what additional ammunition expenditure is involved in the above programme.

*Sub-unit Matches*.—The company team consists of 24, the platoon team of 16, and the platoon L. A. team of 5 men. The practices of the matches require 20, 15 and 40 rounds per man, respectively, or, 480, 240 and 200 per team—a total of 920 rounds. Some provision must be made for reserves, and a round figure of 1,100 rounds will probably meet the case. Allowing for two or three trial runs, each company will therefore require roughly 4,000 extra rounds. For the Battalion Rifle and V. G. matches an additional 2,000 each should suffice.

The additional expenditure for the whole twelve teams is then :

3 Rifle companies at 4,000 each	..	12,000
1 Battalion Rifle team	.. ..	2,000
1 Battalion V. G. team	.. ..	2,000
		<hr/> 16,000

plus, say, 3,000 rounds of revolver ammunition.

(4) *Finance*.—The entrance fees for the A. R. A. matches are very modest, and the total for all the above matches amounts to Rs. 100.

It is submitted that the interest, amusement and improvement which will accrue from the above venture will more than justify the small additional expenditure of time, trouble and money involved.

#### H. M. THE KING-EMPEROR'S CUP

This cup is presented for the aggregate match, and the winning unit may justifiably regard itself as the best all-round shooting unit of the Indian Army. An analysis, on a percentage basis, of the aggregates obtainable by respective weapons in this match gives the following figures—

Rifle	approximate	..	85%	of possible points
Revolver	"	..	15%	" " "
V. G.		..	Nil	
L. A.		..	Nil	

In view of the great and increasing importance of automatic weapons, which may well be deemed to be the bases of the fire plans of a battalion and a company, respectively, it is suggested that they should be incorporated, in some form, in the aggregate or championship match.

A further analysis of recent results of the matches at present included in the aggregate reveals the following—

<i>Match</i>	<i>Comment</i>
88th Carnatic	.. Battalion Rifle team. No comment.
Rawlinson and Cawnpore Mills	.. Company and Platoon Rifle teams. Results show that, as far as the King-Emperor's Cup is concerned, the same company supplies always the paramount influence in both matches, as the following table shows—

<i>Rawlinson</i>	<i>Cawnpore</i>
1930-31 "C" Coy. 2/14th Punjab R. (1st)	No. 9 Pl. 2/14th (1st)
1932-33 "B" Coy. 4/10 Baluch R. (2nd by 6 points)	No. 5 Pl. 4/10th (1st)
1934-35 "B" Coy. 2/14th Punjab R. (2nd. Winners [H. Q. W. 2/15th] not eligible for Cawnpore)	No. 5 Pl. 2/14th (1st)
1935-36 "B" Coy. 2/14th Punjab R. (2nd)	No. 5 Pl. 2/14th (1st)

The object of the inclusion of a platoon match in the aggregate match is presumably distribution of a share in it to lower sub-units; but results show that this object is usually defeated, and it seems, in the nature of things, that this is inevitable.

The Francis Memorial

.. It is submitted that the revolver, particularly for the Army in India, is a weapon of very minor importance.

In view of the above comments, it would appear that the inclusion of the platoon match in the aggregate match is redundant, and that the Revolver match should not be included in the King-Emperor's Cup. The exclusion of these two matches would not in any way reduce their value or the interest taken in them as individual matches, but it would allow the inclusion of the V. G. and the L. A. without increase in the number of the matches constituting the aggregate match. The following, therefore, are suggested as matches

to count for H. M. The King-Emperor's Cup—

- (1) The 88th Carnatic Cup,
- (2) The Rawlinson Shield,
- (3) The Mother Country Cup,
- (4) either The Prince of Wales (Malerkotla) Cup  $\times 4$ , or (better) the inclusion of a company rifle and L. A. match on the lines of the old Luckock Cup.

One further minor suggestion is ventured. Perhaps the best practice fired in any match under A. R. A. auspices is the combined snap and rapid practice in the Cawnpore Mills Cup. It is suggested that this practice be substituted in the Rawlinson Shield match for the present second (snapshooting) practice.

It is suggested that an Aggregate Cup on the above lines would give a truer reflection of all-round shooting efficiency, and more satisfaction to the unit which wins it.

## LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

## MECHANISATION

SIR,

After reading the article in your January number entitled "A Short Review of Mechanisation," one hopes that it does not reflect too accurately the official spirit animating our policy of mechanisation and our doctrine of the tactical employment of armoured fighting vehicles. What follows is not an attack on the author's views, as he only quotes those of a school of thought. It is a plea for a positive attitude.

The author balances his arguments with the strict caution and impartiality of a legal judgment. The direction which he gives his jury, your readers, may assist them to appreciate these problems, but does not lead to a definite verdict which effectively condemns mechanisation or sets it free to expand in its native environment of modern applied science. We English have developed a genius for conceding something to every point of view—for compromise; but it is significant that this trait becomes conspicuous in the post-war period when our unilateral disarmament rendered this virtuous pose a necessity.

Two examples only of this mental attitude are taken from the article in the order in which they occur. There are others.

- (i) "...on the other (hand), the more cautious and conservative regard the A. F. V's. as at best an auxiliary arm of yet unproved capability and of doubtful future. Total mechanisation, they maintain, is financially impossible, and, in any case, unsuited to any Army that must be prepared to fight in almost any quarter of the globe."

Perhaps A. F. V's. are "of yet unproved capability and of doubtful future," because they are still an auxiliary arm? Would the Royal Air Force have attained its present efficiency if it had remained a part of the Army? It is not suggested that our mechanised troops should become a fourth Service in our defence forces, but it is maintained that they should be allowed full freedom to develop in mechanical design and tactics unfettered by the limitations of the more vulnerable and less mobile arms. Common sense demands

that the latter should be auxiliary to the Royal Tank Corps. Again, why permit compromise to stifle enthusiasm, retard progress and jeopardise our Imperial safety because a mechanised force is unsuited "to fight in almost any quarter of the globe?" The next battle vital to our Empire will be fought in Europe, not in the North-West Frontier of India or in Ethiopia. We shall need mechanised forces then, the best that science can design and in the greatest numbers our industries can produce. Let the infantry sit in forts and on the mountains where they will be really useful. Are we reducing or neglecting cavalry in India because they are expensive to maintain and unsuited for employment either in mountain warfare, or in aid of the civil power, or because mounted infantry could do their work efficiently and at less cost? Then why adopt this timid conservatism towards our mechanised arm?

- (ii) "Co-operation between A. F. V's. and the other arms had not achieved in the last war conspicuous success; chiefly because no general agreement on their respective rôles had ever been reached."

No general agreement on the tactical employment of any arm is to be expected from men who think for themselves. Was it not because the experts were ignored and a compromise was sought among the ranks of the unqualified that the mechanically very imperfect tanks of the Great War were not the "conspicuous success" they might have been? Does the development of artillery tactics wait on a "general agreement" in the Army on this subject? Our field gunnery has reached its present high efficiency, thanks solely to the unfettered efforts of our ballistic experts and enthusiastic Royal Artillery officers. Infantrymen never command cavalry or artillery units, or cavalry formations. Yet the tactical development of Royal Tank Corps units and formations still depends upon those who must always be thinking in terms of co-operation with the older arms and who are comforted by "general agreement."

To sum up, the vital needs of Imperial Defence demand a force of A. F. V's. as mechanically and tactically efficient, if not as numerous, as that of any potential enemy in Europe. The greatest progress towards this end can be attained only by freeing the Royal Tank Corps from those tactical fetters which bind it to the older, slower and more vulnerable arms; by entrusting this development to experts and enthusiasts; and by trying our utmost to discard timid conservatism when these experts ask for our co-operation in our logical rôle, *i.e.*, as auxiliaries to the R. T. C. I am, sir, not a member of the British Service.

Yours faithfully,

EDWARD RAMEL,

12th February, 1936.

## REVIEWS

## THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR, 1904

*A study of the strategy and tactics up to 24th August, illustrating the principles of war and Field Service Regulations.*

BY LIEUT.-COL. A. KEARSEY, D.S.O., O.B.E.

(Gale and Polden, Aldershot 5/)

This is a small book packed with information. Into its 150 pages are crowded an account of six months' intensive fighting, the author's criticisms on plans and battles, and liberal quotations from Field Service Regulations. The resulting style reads rather like a collection of notes, and the book fails to present an interesting account of the campaign or a sufficiently full examination of battles, commanders and conditions to serve as a book of reference. For this latter purpose the index is hardly adequate; the reader requires more of a clue to the particular passage he wants than is afforded by a mere string of page numbers after each name.

The Russo-Japanese War was fought over 30 years ago, by armies whose organization and equipment differed greatly from those of the present day. Moreover, the country and the names are so little familiar, that unless a student has previously read a certain amount about the War he will find it difficult to get a good grasp of the campaign from this book, even with the aid of the six maps provided. On the other hand, the comparative strengths of the opposing forces in each engagement are clearly expressed in common terms of squadrons, battalions and guns.

The author's method of making his illustration is to introduce *verbatim* quotations from Field Service Regulations at intervals into his story or his criticisms. This interrupts the already over-concise descriptions of battles, especially as many of the extracts are too long, and also results in a somewhat random selection of principles and tactics to be illustrated. The tactical lessons generally are very apposite, but in some cases the fighting of thirty years ago is criticised in the light of modern tactics, such as fire plans, predicted artillery concentrations, etc. There is a sameness in the conclusions drawn regarding principles; nearly every battle brings us to the unfitness of Kuropatkin's character of a Commander-in-Chief.

There are signs of haste in compilation. The opposing objects at the outset of the campaign are stated and re-stated in almost the same words ; on successive pages Asada's detachment is said to belong to the First and the Fourth Japanese Armies, without any mention of its transfer ; in successive paragraphs the I Siberian Corps is placed on the East and on the West of the Russian position.

R. M. H.

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**" Practical Horsemanship "**

BY MAJOR J. L. M. BARRETT

(Published by H. F. & G. Witherby, Ltd., 326, High Holborn W.C.  
*Six shillings*).


In this compact book the author deals with his subject in a simple but sensible manner. Many adults and most children would learn a great deal by reading it. Casualties and cases of lost nerve would be avoided amongst child riders in India if parents would study the appropriate chapter in this valuable book.

There are a great many books dealing with equitation in all its aspects, but in selecting a suitable guide for the average reader we must put " Practical Horsemanship " near the top of the list.

G. M. D.



Lieutenant-General Sir WILLIAM H. BARTHOLOMEW, K.C.B., C.M.G.,  
D.S.O., Chief of the General Staff in India.



# The Journal

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### EDITORIAL

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Italy and  
Abyssinia.

On May 9th, 1936, the annexation of Abyssinia by Italy was formally announced, and the world and the League of Nations were thus presented with a *fait accompli*. Addis Ababa had been occupied by Marshal Badoglio on May 5th, and Harrar fell shortly afterwards, the main campaign in Abyssinia being brought to an unexpectedly early and successful conclusion.

"Italy has at last got her empire, a Fascist Empire, which bears indestructible signs of determination and the power of the Roman emblem . . . . This empire is the goal to which for 14 years the eruptive energies of the young generation of Italy have been disciplined." These words, spoken by Signor Mussolini when announcing the annexation, are a full confession of the true reason for the invasion of Abyssinia, which began in October 1935 with the ostensible object of safeguarding Italian interests, and which has been persisted in, despite the resistance of the Abyssinians and the efforts of the League to call a halt. At the time of publication of the last number of the Journal it could not be foreseen that the war would be ended with such rapidity; the distances yet remaining to be covered by the Italians, the difficulties presented by the country and the consequent administrative problems, the apparently unbroken morale of the Abyssinians, all tended to show that decisive Italian success could not be expected before the summer rains broke.

It would appear that the first real error on the part of the Abyssinians was their abandonment of guerilla tactics in the battle of

Tembien in February, and that after the defeat of the Emperor at Mai Chio on April 2nd, all organized resistance ceased, on the northern front at any rate. In Ogaden there was considerable opposition till Sasa Baneh had been captured on April 30th. The Italians were thus enabled to push forward mobile columns which encountered very little opposition, some delay being caused by the state of the roads and by the break of the rains in April. The extensive use of gas sprayed from the air by the Italians from the month of March onwards seems to have destroyed the morale of the Abyssinian forces, since these were totally unprotected. The defection of many of the tribes to the side of the invader possibly also contributed to the final collapse of the northern front and the ringing down of the curtain with the flight of the Emperor on May 2nd. The decision to use mustard gas was a definite breach of the Geneva Gas Protocol of 1925, and its employment, though unscrupulous, was very successful. Whatever criticism can be made on this score, there is no doubt that the boldness displayed by the Italian Commander and the speed with which he brought operations to a decisive conclusion reflect great credit on him. In spite of the occupation of Addis Ababa and of the publication of a constitution for Italian East Africa, it is doubtful if all the Italian problems in Abyssinia are settled as yet or will be for some time. The Abyssinian main forces have been dispersed, but there is always a possibility that guerilla warfare will continue. Though this may not affect seriously the ultimate issue, it may delay the pacification and exploitation of the country. An immediate problem is that of supply; the roads leading from Makalle are liable at present to break down in the rainy season and it seems that the Italians will have to rely largely on the Djibouti-Addis Ababa Railway. As the sea terminal of this is controlled by one of the sanctionist powers, the situation is curious, if not delicate. Assuming that the country will be quickly pacified, a problem that awaits Italy is that of the dispersion of her forces in Abyssinia. Will she withdraw the majority and demobilize them, or will she attempt to colonize Abyssinia with her victorious soldiers, as has been rumoured in the Press? There is no guarantee that the latter will voluntarily remain in large numbers, and if they return to Italy and are demobilized it is possible that the unemployment problem will again become acute. We do not envy the Duce the task before him.

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In the October 1935 edition of this Journal, mention was made of the object of sanctions and of the fact that all sanctionist nations hesitated to apply an "oil sanction" in case it lead to a spreading of the Italo-Abyssinian conflict to Europe. An embargo on the supply of oil to Italy has never been enforced, in spite of the setting up of a special committee in March this year to study the subject. Up till very recently the policy of the League has been that those sanctions which are in force should continue to be applied, but lately there has been an increasing feeling in many quarters that sanctions have ceased to be of any value. That is, they were applied to help a member of the League who was the victim of aggression on the part of another member, and now that Abyssinia has been conquered the maintenance of sanctions only serves to embitter Italy and achieves no useful purpose. Not only has the continuance of sanctions recently been described by a responsible statesman as "Midsummer madness," but the British Government has declared in favour of abandoning them. Whilst this decision will probably be regarded by many as a betrayal of the League and as a mere attempt to save face, it is considered that the reasons for the decision are very sound. The length of time needed to make sanctions effective, the fact that Italy has defeated Abyssinia and can only be driven from the country by military action, which no nation is prepared to take, and the fact that such action would, in all probability, lead to a war in the Mediterranean, all tend to show the danger of their continuance. It is gratifying to note that France is prepared to follow the lead given her, and that both countries will recommend the discontinuance of sanctions at the League meeting to be held in the near future. The truth is that the imposition of sanctions implies the will and the power to back up the embargo with armed force, if necessary. As no sanctionist nation is prepared to run the risk of war, either singly or collectively in support of Article 16 of the Covenant, the sooner the whole status of the League is reviewed and, if necessary, revised to come into line with present-day conditions, the better.

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Not only has the League failed to prevent aggression on the part of Italy, but up to date no solution has been found to the German reoccupation of the Rhineland. Germany sent a delegation to attend the meeting of the League Council on

Sanctions and  
the League.  
Germany and  
the Rhineland.

March 19th, at which her representative attempted to justify Germany's action. It was then declared by vote that Germany had infringed Article 43 of the Treaty of Versailles and the Treaty of Locarno.

On that date the Locarno Powers (excluding Germany) drew up a memorandum which announced the institution of General Staff talks to study certain technical aspects of the problem and, amongst other things, suggested that Germany should lay her case before the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague, and that an international conference should meet to examine the system of collective security, the problems of colonial equality and of the divorcing of the League Covenant from the Versailles Treaty.

Strengthened by the result of the German elections on March 29th (this was really a foregone conclusion), the German Government sent a reply on April 1st which rejected the Staff talks, refused to submit the case to the International Court of Justice and proposed various pacts as a solution to the problem. It also stated that Germany was willing to re-enter the League if the questions of colonial rights and of the separation of the Covenant from the Versailles Treaty were settled.

The French Government issued a reply on April 8th, which was not a very helpful solution, but largely advocated the establishment of an international police force or the strengthening of sanctions.

The General Staff talks were held on and after April 15th, in spite of the German protest, to make plans for action in case of an unprovoked attack by Germany on France or Belgium.

On May 6th a despatch was sent by the British Government which asked if Germany was ready to enter into definite treaties, drew attention to various contradictory statements in the German note and asked her to confirm that the pacts proposed by Germany could be operated within the framework of the Covenant of the League.

It was to be anticipated that there would be some delay in the preparation of a reply to this despatch, but so far no answer has been given to this demand for a clear and frank exposition of policy. It is to be hoped that the German reply, when it eventually does arrive, will make an effective contribution to the restoration of confidence in Europe and to the settlement of the many problems now before the League. Whilst it is satisfactory to note the proposed improvement and expansion of our fighting forces and the intention (as stated

recently by the Foreign Secretary) to maintain a stronger defensive position in the Mediterranean, we trust that the desire to solve the Rhineland problem and to restore to the League its full authority will not involve us in any further commitments before we are ready fully to play our part. The Palestine situation and the question of making a treaty with Egypt which is acceptable to both parties, though, perhaps, describable as minor commitments, are factors affecting the safety of our Imperial communications which seem to need urgent attention.

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In view of the general discredit into which the League has fallen in Europe as the result of the successful direct action taken by Italy and Germany to release themselves from situations which had become irksome, it is pleasant to note that Turkey still has sufficient faith to submit her case for refortifying the Dardanelles for discussion at the Montreux Conference. Taking into account the general rearmament in Europe and recent activity in the Eastern Mediterranean, her desire for increased security is very understandable. It is to be hoped that the Conference will reach an agreement at a very early date.

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From articles published recently, and in this number of the Journal, it is patent that more interest is now being taken in the improvement of rifle shooting. It has been appreciated for some time that training in rifle shooting should be made more akin to the use of the rifle in war; and with this object a new rifle course evolved by Waziristan District is being fired as an experimental measure during the current Weapon Training Year. We are therefore publishing an "Address to officers of Razmak Brigade by the District Commander" on the subject. It is understood that no reports on this experimental course have as yet been received by Army Headquarters, and consequently no indication can be given of any decision that is likely to be reached in regard to it. The factors which led up to the experiment are, however, of interest.

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The Information Bureau, Army Headquarters, has recently published the final edition of its "Summary of Information" for the benefit of War Block and other officers of the Indian Army. The information contained in all the

The War Block.

earlier editions has been brought up to date and many additional facts and figures of a useful nature have been included.

Whilst such a publication cannot claim to answer all the questions which an officer about to retire would be likely to put, it should prove of great use for several years to come to officers who are faced with the difficulty of making up their minds whether to retire at home or to settle in one or other of the British Dominions Colonies.

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## A RETROSPECT : 1920—1935

BY MAJOR H. C. S. MINCHIN.

*General.*

1. Fifteen years ago Germany signed the Treaty of Versailles, and, for the time being, was left negligible as a fighting power.

At the same time Great Britain turned to the idealistic concept of the League of Nations and became as non-militaristic as it was possible to be.

2. During these fifteen years the vital necessity and probable certainty of Eternal Peace has been emphasised *ad nauseum* by public men ; our army, navy and air force have been reduced to bedrock ; the mention of future war has been graded as akin to blasphemy.

3. To-day conditions have changed. Germany is re-arming and Great Britain is at least taking some steps, however apologetic, towards the goal of bringing her defence forces up to a reasonable standard.

4. The fifteen years, therefore, since the signing of the treaties marks a definite epoch in military history—an epoch when one of the most virile and militaristic of European powers was forcibly disarmed, while our own military forces remained in abeyance, following the dictates of a political ideal.

5. It may be of interest to summarise the history of that period in order that we may evaluate the circumstances which have brought back to politicians a desire, however mild, to depend again on our own military forces, and not exclusively on the good offices of the League.

## THE PEACE SETTLEMENTS OF 1920

*(A) Financial Enactments*

6. These comprised the payments of Reparation, War debts, etc. The payments were based, or should have been based, on economic factors. These factors are incomprehensible to the layman, and appear comprehensible to the expert only in so far as to convince him that the opinions of other experts are erroneous. There are those who are convinced Germany was asked to pay too much. There are those who deny this. The matter is now immaterial. Suffice to say that the history of reparations and war debts falls into three clear-cut phases.

(i) *Phase i.*—\*During this phase Germany indulged in passive resistance to payment. The French retaliated by marching into the Ruhr, the indirect result of which was the crippling of German industry mainly fed from the raw materials of that region. The mark crashed; the powers intervened; the Dawes plan laid down definite and reasonable payments to be made by Germany; the French left the Ruhr, and the Locarno pacts ushered in a period of comparative peace.

(ii) *Phase ii*, 1925—1929.—During these years, the boom period of post-war history, the German plan was one of classical simplicity. She borrowed (mainly from America) sums far exceeding the amount payable in Reparations, etc. She paid the Reparations, etc., out of the borrowed money and spent the rest in magnificent schemes of social relief, construction of housing centres, swimming pools, etc. She made no attempt to put her financial house in order.

Then came the economic "break" in America, and in 1929 the flow of American money to Germany ceased. Bereft of its life blood, the German market began to totter. It is obvious that since America had poured money into Germany, German bankruptcy would produce further American repercussions. In fact (intentionally or not, as the case may be), the reckless borrowing and reckless spending of Germany had tied America to her. Germany appealed to America, but at the same time brought up the question of improving her financial position by the formation of a tariff union with Austria.

In this latter step France saw or imagined she saw, the first step to the dreaded Austro-German political union, the hated "Anschluss" elsewhere discussed, and she at once blocked the proposal for a moratorium brought forward by Mr. Hoover, and later blocked international attempts to aid Germany, by insisting on quite unacceptable political guarantees.

The Germans, bereft of help, were left to face the financial blizzard unaided, the miseries of which led direct to National Socialism and Hitler.

*Phase iii.*—At least, however, the second phase led to the third and present phase when War debts and Reparations are dead. Even the French were forced to acknowledge that the Germans were unable to pay Reparations after 1929, and as Reparations died so did War debts.

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\*Cf.—"A Short History of International Affairs, 1920—1934. (Gathorne Hardy.)

7. The history of the post-war financial jumble need, therefore, hardly have been considered except that it brings out the fact that seems so clear in any retrospect of post-war history, namely, that while everyone has talked of peace, actually there has been no peace. Even in financial enactments the Germans fought the French as hard as they had ever fought them in the war, and the French twice smashed the Germans more completely than they had ever done during the war. The International Amity of Mr. Wilson seemed to have gone astray.

*(B) Territorial enactments*

8. The pre-war diplomatic system was based to a large extent on the factor known as the "Balance of Power."

9. As Mr. Gathorne Hardy has pointed out, there is really not a tremendous difference between the Balance of Power system and the League system. The latter says, in effect, "thou shalt not make war." The former system merely started further back and said, "thou shalt not grow too powerful." This meant, in effect, that whereas the Great Powers were not particularly interested if Guatemala fought Ecuador, or even (all things being equal) if Italy seized Abyssinia, nevertheless they were all vitally interested if the policy of any one great power amongst them was likely to give her so much strength as to make her dangerous to the others. Against power they would ruthlessly combine and the balance would be restored. In the 16th century world domination by Spain was stopped by a combination of France and England, in the 17th and early 18th France was resisted by the world, and in the same century a combination of forces temporarily robbed England of her naval supremacy and thus permanently lost her the United States.

10. Now it is an oft-repeated assertion that this Balance of Power system led to the late war. The facile theory put forward is that the Great Powers (apparently from sheer wilfulness) grouped themselves in opposite camps, a race of armaments started, and war came as a result. No opinion could be more erroneous.

Actually, losing sight of the Balance of Power, in the excitement of industrial expansion or of internal Parliamentary activity, the Great Powers permitted Germany (Prussia) to run three short and highly successful wars—against Denmark, against Austria and against France. From that time on the phrase "thou shalt not grow too powerful" was an empty one. Germany *had* grown too powerful.

"She grew so powerful that like the mass of the Sun she attracted satellites into her system and the final stage before the Great War was not the application of the principle of the Balance of Power but a frantic and hopeless attempt to redress a balance for which no sufficient counterpoise was now available." (*Hardy*.) In short, *it was the surrender of the balance of power, and not the balance of power, which caused the last war.*

11. Mr. Wilson, however, thought otherwise, and to defeat the Balance of Power system he formed the League—an international concept and his major objective.

12. Unfortunately Mr. Wilson had a minor objective known as Self-determination. All who desired to retire into themselves and make for themselves a little nation of Poles or Czechs were to be helped to do so. In other words (though Mr. Wilson failed to see this), the spirit of burning nationality was to be encouraged. The situation, in short, was as if a sentimental school-master implored his pupils to pull together for the sake of the Dear Old School (The League) and at the same time urged a few of them to display their individuality at all costs (Self-determination). It is impossible to be violently individualistic and to fit in with team work; it is equally impossible to be violently national and to fit in with an international concept. Mr. Wilson was barking up two unparallel trees.

13. Moreover, by the formation of the new countries of East and South-East Europe (Poland, Baltic States, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, etc.), Mr. Wilson was in fact stressing the effectiveness of war as an instrument of national or racial liberation. The Horrors of War-cum-Pacifist school is a large one, and all of them sincerely believe that any argument on war can be clinched by pointing to the losses, which accrued to all (as they argue), in the Great War. They forget that the late war spelt salvation to Poles, Czechs, Slavs, Rumanians, etc. "When . . . one passes German, Austrian or Hungarian frontiers, it is to enter countries for whose inhabitants the great conflict brought Liberty and Unity and in whose eyes the World War holds the same place as the American Revolution in those of the people of the United States."\*

14. Mr. Wilson and his colleagues tried therefore to make eternal peace when that peace was based on two conflicting ideas and was in itself an excellent advertisement for war. This is in itself

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\*Frank H. Simonds.—"Can Europe Keep the Peace?"

difficult, but it is when the Self-determination theory is examined in detail that the real difficulties of Mr. Wilson's self-appointed task become apparent.

15. The nations of Western Europe—France, Germany, Spain, England—are separated, one from another, by clear-cut boundaries, the isolation ensuing resulting in a series of clear-cut races with distinctive civilizations and languages. In Eastern and South-Eastern Europe the exact reverse is the case.

It is impossible in the confines of this article to enter into the hopeless intermingling of races in East and South-East Europe, but suffice to say that when, in such a region, Mr. Wilson attempted to carve out in the name of Self-determination a geographical entity fit for (say) the Czechs, he was forced to include in that area a large number of alien races, mostly Germans.

Germans live under foreign rule in Italy, Poland and Czechoslovakia; there are Magyars in Rumania, in Czechoslovakia and in Yugoslavia, there are Russians and Lithuanians in Poland.

Before the war Alsace Lorraine was an international danger point simply because it consisted of a group of individuals who wished to be under French rule, and were, in fact, under German rule.

Mr. Wilson and his colleagues in drawing up the peace treaties formed an Alsace Lorraine in every country in East and South-East Europe, and even at first sight it was hard to believe that the danger points had not been multiplied.

#### THE MORAL STANDARD (POST-WAR)

16. It might, however, have been argued, at that time, that the difficulties referred to above were immaterial provided that the League spirit of international amity had permeated Europe.

17. Unfortunately the exact reverse appears to have been the case. It has already been pointed out that, on the financial side, idealism failed to survive. A study of the political side of post-war history brings this fact into even greater relief. There can have been few periods of history where hard, determined, self-seeking diplomacy coupled, where necessary, with cold international banditry has flourished so successfully.

The last fifteen years in retrospect appear a strange mixture of pious hopes and impious acts, and of conferences to end war which merely served to show that Europe in general still contained all the

differences in national outlook, and all the points of contact of national ambition, which have caused war throughout history.

We may examine the moral post-war outlook, and estimate the conciliatory (or otherwise) spirit of the Nations in—

- (a) The actions of various powers since the Peace Treaty.
- (b) History of disarmament conferences.
- (c) Attempts at evolving Peace Pacts.

(a) *The actions of various Powers since the Peace Treaty*

18. Quite apart from recent exploits by Japan, Mussolini and Hitler, the following acts followed the formation of the League :

- (i) The Burgaland dispute between Austria and Hungary.  
The details need not be discussed. Suffice to say that Hungary "jumped" a territory containing a majority of Austrians from Austria.
- (ii) The Italians seized Fiume with no legal right. In the same epoch the murder of an Italian on Greek soil caused the Italians (quite unnecessarily), to bombard Corfu and land there. They were eventually paid to remove themselves.
- (iii) The Poles, in open defiance of all treaties, first largely increased their territories at the expense of the Ukrainians, and later wrested Vilna from the Lithuanians.
- (iv) The Lithuanians, who appear intelligent, at once perceived the trend of modern diplomacy and seized Memel, which was under League control and predominantly German.

19. Instances could be multiplied, but the above suffice. As Mr. Hardy remarks, "the moral likely to be drawn from the circumstances narrated, augured ill for the prospects of a new world based on the renunciation of force . . . . In practically every instance in which a nation had resorted to force or the threat of it, its ends had been promoted if not wholly achieved." These words were written before the exploits of Japan, Mussolini and Hitler. It is interesting to note, therefore, how precisely they apply.

(b) *History of Disarmament Conferences*

20. It is quite impossible in the confines of an article such as this to summarise effectively the thousands of pages which must have been written on this subject. Suffice to say : (i) the Naval Disarmament Conference of 1930 started with a flourish of trumpets. It ended with a wrangle between the French and Italians, the latter

claiming the right to naval parity in the Mediterranean, the former denying this right: (i) The Washington Conference of 1922 has been extolled as a triumph of post-war diplomacy, and has been a matter of much self-congratulation. Unfortunately all post-war historians hasten to point out that, before this particular conference was held, all political differences between contracting parties had been settled. Japan had no intention of attacking America; America had no intention of attacking Japan: England had no desire to attack either country. In these circumstances it is easy to make a treaty.

21. But in conferences on military disarmament in Europe, where mutual political trust is lacking, the situation was entirely different to that of the Washington Conference. Each nation saw its own point of view, and no other.

The French, for example, demanded an International Commission to supervise disarmament. The Italians and Americans refused to countenance such an idea.

The French then advanced the theory that one should consider "War Potential." They maintained that military efficiency is not only effected by the number of guns, etc., but by such matters as birth-rate, raw materials, railways, etc., and that these should be taken into account. A most logical suggestion, but quite impractical.

The British on the contrary put forward the view that one should take into account the potentialities of trained reserves. One would have thought that no one would have the temerity to argue against this self-evident fact. But in international conferences anything seems possible and France and all conscriptionist countries repudiated the suggestion.

Finally, in the last disarmament conference of 1932-1934, there were two opposing and conflicting ideas. The French held out for an International force; the Germans for equality in Armament. Many attempted solutions were advanced. None was acceptable to all, and finally Germany walked out of the Conference and the League. Disarmament was dead. Ten years of Disarmament Commissions have ended with the whole world (less England and Germany) armed to the teeth.

(c) *Attempts to evolve a Peace Formula*

22. (i) The Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, 1922.—An idea produced by Lord Cecil and the French in combination.

It suggested, roughly speaking that, whereas everyone should frown extremely darkly at anyone who tried to make aggressive war, and the aggressor, if he did not mend his ways, should be crushed by combined military intervention, no one was forced to join actively in this military intervention unless situated in the same continent as the aggressor. It was rejected by the British, as their dominions extend into every continent and as, under the above system, they would be subjected to a wholly disproportionate share of the burden of resisting aggression in all parts of the world.

(ii) The Geneva Protocol.—Fostered by the Labour Party of 1924. It meant, in short, that if two nations quarrelled, they should be asked: "Are you ready to arbitrate?" The nation which refused or proved recalcitrant should be attacked by all. Unfortunately by arbitration the Labour Party implied that both parties should accept some sort of compromise. (Typically British.) Unfortunately the problems that cause difficulties in Europe are such that no compromise is possible. For example, either the "Polish corridor" remains Polish to the eternal annoyance of the Germans, or one can attempt to return it to Germany, at which the Poles would mobilize. One cannot compromise.

*The Kellog Pact.*—100 per cent. American idealism. Of itself the Kellog pact undertook to do two things—to make war illegal, and to pledge nations to renounce war and settle all disputes by arbitration. This pre-supposes that nations have acquired the League spirit. There is nothing in post-war history to support such a contention.

*The Locarno Pact.*—It would seem unkind to say anything against this pact since it did bring temporary peace to a troubled world, but, as Mr. Hardy points out, by its form, we as a nation are tied to attack the aggressor on the Franco-German or Belgo-German frontier. In short, we have no definite ally, but a choice of alternative allies. We might find ourselves called upon to attack Germany or to attack France. "A democracy can hardly resort to war without the support of national opinion, and while it is comparatively easy to enlist this on the side of a known ally, the existence of two alternative allies or opponents complicates the situation. During the crisis preceding an outburst of war, sympathy may well have rallied to the side which eventually proves to be the aggressor. A sudden *volte face* is then difficult. It is still more probable that, in such a

case, public opinion would be hopelessly divided." Locarno, in short, is not quite the masterpiece it is claimed to be.

*Signor Mussolini's Four-Power Pact.*—Stated by the author to be the way to eternal peace. Actually, in order (as we see now) to obtain a free hand in Abyssinia, he wished to placate Hitler whom he recognised as a prototype. He had no wish that Germany should interest herself in South-East Europe, as he himself had interests in that region. It was, however, immaterial to him if Germany expanded in the Polish direction. Apart from moral sentiment it was equally immaterial to Great Britain.

If, therefore, he could arrange a pact between England, Italy, France and Germany, which would tie Germany for ever with regard to her Western (French) frontier, but made no mention of her Eastern frontier, it would leave Germany with a free hand in the East, take her attention off the South-East, and leave Italy to her expansionist designs.

The nations were, however, more honest than Signor Mussolini expected. His suggestions raised a storm of protest, were emasculated out of all significance and signed. Even its signature in this emasculated form so annoyed the bellicose Poles that from that time they drifted away from France and towards Germany. This was the last of attempted Peace Pacts, and they would hardly be worth mentioning were it not to show the difficulty which has existed in any international peace undertaking.

23. In short, a survey of the *actions* of Nations during the war seems to show the aggressive spirit increased rather than decreased; the history of *disarmament conferences* shows a total lack of international agreement, while the practical value of *Peace Pacts* is so small that one wonders why they were ever signed, and why each was greeted as a step towards Universal Peace. Mr. Simonds, unfortunately, can give the answer in his shrewd but scathing remarks, in which he explains the unenviable position of the modern statesman in the new open post-war conference as opposed to the old pre-war diplomacy:

"Their prestige being engaged, because they have prepared their publics for achievement, they are condemned to sustain the illusion of progress, to continue to hold out the promise of success, and in the end, in the face of a failure always inevitable, to claim a triumph which is promptly disclosed to have been lacking. Thus that secrecy

and unweracity, which were the worst features of old-fashioned diplomacy, have been adopted and even exaggerated by the new."

24. Since this inability of nations to agree must spring from divergent policies, it may be of interest to trace the post-war policies of the powers and to attempt to estimate if international agreement, which has pathetically failed in the past, has any chance of succeeding in the future.

#### THE POST-WAR POLICIES OF THE POWERS

##### *Germany*

25. Whatever Herr Hitler may say to-day there can be little doubt that behind all German policy lies the fixed intention to obtain Treaty Revision. The Revisionist programme has two main planks :

(i) Revision of her Eastern frontier, at the expense of the Poles, Baltic states or Russia—the *Drang nach Osten* of pre-war days. To quote Von Kuhlmann, a former Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the German Government—"Above all stands the fact that the Peace of Versailles created most unfortunate frontiers between Germany and Poland. *It must be stated quite frankly that these frontiers injure the vital interests of Germany so profoundly that the revision of them will remain a standing demand of German policy no matter who happens to be responsible for its conduct.*"\*

For years the prophets pointed to the Polish corridor as the "cockpit of Europe." In 1934, however, Hitler confounded the prophets by signing a Pact with Poland, swearing off all aggression for ten years. It is, however, difficult to believe that Von Kuhlmann's words are not still true. It appears probable that as his next step Herr Hitler prefers to fish in the troubled waters of South-East Europe, and Poland (for the moment) can wait. In history ten years is no space of time.

(ii) Political union with Austria or Anschluss. This word creates more panic in Europe than most words. A glance at the map will show that if Germany combined with Austria, it would bring a sea of Germans round the jerry-built products of the Peace treaties and especially round Czechoslovakia, herself with a discontented and downtrodden German minority. Political domination, if not annexation, of the Little Entente, would be merely a question of time.

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\*The Foreign Policy of the Powers, p. 45.

Moreover, it would bring the German Empire against the Italian border which is itself populated by Germans, who since the war have endured the most brutal Italianization. It would be impossible for Italy to hold this frontier were the Germans their immediate neighbours. There is no doubt that Germany has actively worked for this union, which is, of course, forbidden by the peace treaties. The revolution of Austrian Nazis in 1934 was indubitably backed, if not actually set on foot, by Germany. Had it been successful, union with Germany might have followed without further ado.

The murder of Dr. Dollfuss, for which German propaganda was also responsible, temporarily alienated the Austrians; but, as will be shown later, eventual political union is by no means universally unpopular in Austria.

#### *France*

26. It will be noted that neither the move of Germany to the East nor the political union directly affects the territorial integrity of France.

In fact, it may be said without doubt that Germany has no territorial ambitions against France in Europe. She has no desire to reconquer Alsace Lorraine. The Germans held that province for 47 years "during which the Reichslanders—German speakers and French speakers alike—had remained subjects of Germany without ever becoming bone of her bone or flesh of her flesh. Germany's failure to win their hearts had become a European laughing stock . . . . \*The Reichsland brought its conquerors neither prestige nor strength."

If, therefore, France has nothing to fear territorially, it may be wondered why the slightest move by Germany causes such an ebullition of anti-Germanic sentiment in France.

The answer is also given by Mr. Toynbee, who points out that if Germany advances both in the East and South-East "she would dwarf and overshadow France so completely that she might be able to dictate to her and to dispose of her resources without needing to annex any of her territory. This was the nightmare that tormented French imaginations during 1934."

We must acknowledge, therefore, that France has the right to be apprehensive, and may examine the methods adopted by the French to allay this apprehension.

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\*Survey of International affairs, 1934. Toynbee.

27. At the termination of the war, France hoped for an Anglo-American guarantee. This was denied her.

She fell back on alliances with Poland and the Little Entente (Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania).

These alliances had various repercussions:

(i)—They gave her a dominant position in the League. She was able to resist all attempts at German revival (see para. 8, Phase III).

(ii)—On the contrary she soon found that it was no sinecure to be tied irrevocably to the ultra-national, ultra-excitables products of the war. She was henceforth forced to become the champion, not only of her own *status quo*, but also of the *status quo* of every new-formed frontier in Europe.

These pacts were, moreover, purely political and military. There was no economic backing behind them. France has neither the need to buy nor the ability to sell in South-East Europe, her allies being actually in the economic orbit of Germany by reason of unalterable geographical circumstances. The French alliance, from the point of view of these countries, therefore, is merely a matter of military or political convenience and, if it suits them, they are perfectly ready to play fast and loose with France. The history of Poland proved this.

France can almost be said to be the creator of modern Poland. The Ukrainian war was backed by French money and munitions. The new port of Gdynia was built by French money. Yet, when it pleased them to do so, the Poles, as stated, allied themselves in a ten-year non-aggression pact with Germany. Their reasons for this action, such as they are, will be considered later, but gratitude to France for past favours simply did not count.

As it was with Poland, so it would be, if it suited them, with her other South-Eastern Allies.

The French alliances, in short, bring her no particular comfort.

(iii)—Not only, however, are these alliances uncomfortable in themselves, but they bring discomfort elsewhere. Italy, at the end of the war, hoped for economic penetration in South-East Europe. But since the new states had concluded the above treaties with France, were backed by French money and safe in French support, they were able to treat the blandishments of Signor Mussolini with considerable insouciance, a state of affairs quite intolerable to that godlike being, and which considerably incensed him against France.

France, therefore, in gaining the above alliance lost the friendship of Italy which she much desired. Lately, it is true, the recovery of Germany and the fear that her next step may be towards Austria has caused Signor Mussolini to unbend sufficiently to form an alliance with France, guaranteeing the independence of Austria. A recent historian has remarked: "This marriage of convenience for the purpose of adopting the orphan child, Austria, was registered with almost indecent haste, and in view of the antipathies which had existed between France and Italy . . . one was left wondering whether indeed the age of miracles was still in being."

Finally, and even more surprisingly, France has allied with Russia.

(iv)—These alliances with Russia and Italy in their turn irritated Poland and Yugoslavia, the former being violently anti-Russian and the latter violently anti-Italian. Poland went deeper into the German alliance. Yugoslavia formed an economic agreement with Germany.

28. Enough has been said to show the amazing difficulties of France. Refused security by the hoped for Anglo-American treaty at the end of the war, "recognising in her heart of hearts that, fundamentally and intrinsically, twentieth century France is no match for twentieth century Germany," seeing the latter (as France believes) slowly working towards European dictatorship, France is forced to dash round Europe seeking any or every alliance which will, to some extent, counter-balance the Germanic superiority. This in turn involves her into pandering to the nationalistic tendencies of the new nations, and forces her into unending political complications and military commitments in every field.

29. It is for this reason that the French have always demanded an International Force to back the League. It is not only that they suspect that such a force could only and would only be used against Germany, but it is because such a force would relieve them of the necessity of these unending and wearying alliances with minor but exigent powers.

### *Italy*

30. So much has been written on Italy lately that it would appear presumptuous to write more.

Shortly, from her point of view, the situation would appear to be:

(i)—She has a real economic need for colonies. This is admitted, especially since immigration has been restricted,

(ii)—She received no colonies at the end of the last war.

(iii)—Since political influence leads to economic gain, she attempted to obtain political influence in the Mediterranean. She was rebuffed by the French.

(iv)—Thwarted on the sea she attempted economic exploitation in South-East Europe. The Yugoslavians, however, have been incensed with the Italians since the peace treaties because—

(a) The Italians obtained by the treaties a considerable portion of the Yugoslav coastline, a most ridiculous provision and one calculated to cause endless complications even between well-meaning races.

(b) The Italians, as stated, seized Fiume. The Yugoslavians, therefore, led the Little Entente, backed, as stated, by French money, against any economic supremacy by Italy, and the Italians were again thwarted.

(v)—Finally, Signor Mussolini made his bid for Abyssinia and at the same time did his utmost to deter Germany from any move towards Austria and the Italian border—

(a) By the treaty with France already mentioned in para. 27 (iii).

(b) By an Italo-Austrian-Hungarian pact which also guarantees the independence of Austria.

31. *The Little Entente*—Yugoslavia, Rumania, Czechoslovakia — created after the late war by the process of dismembering Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria. They all possess large minorities and they all oppress them. These minorities, of course, clamour for local self-government and look for help to their kinsmen across the border. In particular this refers to Rumania which contains  $1\frac{1}{2}$  million Hungarians, and Czechoslovakia containing 3 million Austrians. To grant local self-government is difficult since national feeling is so great in Central Europe that any concession to national sentiment is dangerous. The internal situation then of the Little Entente is one in which compromise seems impossible. It is difficult to imagine that Austrians and Hungarians will ever be content to be ruled by Czechs and Rumanians, etc., of a lower grade of civilization. It is even more difficult to imagine that the Czechs and Rumanians are likely to give the Austrians self-government. As stated, each of these countries, therefore, contain a minor edition of pre-war Alsace Lorraine.

32. Externally the only consistent policy of the Little Entente lies in a fixed determination not to yield one inch of territory gained. They would ally with any one or break with anyone in order to promote this end. They are not concerned with the higher ethics of the League of Nations, and merely regard it as an excellent device for maintaining the *status quo*.

33. Actually the members of the Little Entente have little in common provided the words "treaty revision" could be forgotten. Czechoslovakia is geographically a part of Central Europe, a natural ally of France against any threat of German expansion. Rumania is mainly concerned with Russia, and Yugoslavia with Italy and the Adriatic.

But with Hungary, Bulgaria and Austria in the background, the words "treaty revision" cannot be forgotten and a common fear of these countries has bound the Little Entente together. Two of its members, Yugoslavia and Rumania, are also members of the Balkan Pact, together with Greece and Turkey, which is directed in particular against the revisionist claims of Bulgaria.

Moreover, since German and Italian influence in South-East Europe is inclined to be disruptive, both these powers having political ambitions in this sphere, the Little Entente, as stated, have irrevocably turned to France with results already noted.

#### *Poland*

34. Her only policy is to keep what she has. According to Mr. Toynbee, her late coldness to France and alliance with Germany has been mainly caused by—

- (a) "a swift appraisal of Germany's recovery to strength,
- (b) "a private prognostication that Germany was destined to increase and France to decrease, and
- (c) a determination to be once more on the winning side."

The last of these reasons could apply equally easily to any or every action of the Little Entente.

#### *Hungary and Bulgaria*

35. Were ruthlessly sub-divided up at the peace treaties to create the new countries. Commenting on lands removed from Hungarian control, Mr. Simonds remarks: "No frontier, of all the many traced at the Peace Conference, was at once as fantastic and as inequitable as that which . . . cut off three quarters of a million of Magyars from Hungary, and without ethic or economic

justification transferred them . . . to Czechoslovakia. Not less wanton were the mutilations incident to the satisfaction of the Rumanian demand to possess . . . strategic railways . . . which created still another Magyar minority."

Many other similar mutilations occurred and, in all, three million Magyars were transferred to Slav and Rumanian rule.

The Magyars, from the signing of the peace treaty to the present date, have fiercely demanded Treaty Revision, and the Little Entente have as fiercely denied it. At present, ringed round by the anti-Revisionist powers, Hungary is helpless, but should Germany obtain influence in South-East Europe by union with Austria, affairs would be quite different.

36. The Bulgarians are in like case, their principal causes for grievance being the handing of Macedonia to Yugoslavia, while their outlet to the Aegean sea was given to Greece. If *ex victis* was the order of the day, the Bulgarians would have no complaint. But if self-determination is the order, the Bulgarians have every complaint, since the above territories are ethnically purely Bulgarian. The only Bulgarian policy, therefore, is aimed also at Revision of treaties.

*Austria.*

37. The key of the situation in South-East Europe. Was left ruined by the peace treaties. The conglomeration of states in the old Austro-Hungarian Empire was not a mere dynastic coincidence. The region was a natural economic entity and its financial and economic heart was Vienna.

Its division (against all the dictates of geographic factors) into the fiercely nationalistic fractions of the Little Entente, each of whom introduced tariff walls for their own benefit, which were, *ipso facto*, to Austria's detriment, blocked and impeded the lines of Austria's trade communications. "Factories which lay within Austria's territory had drawn their oil from Gahaa, their coal and many of their material resources from what is now Czechoslovakia, which was, in any case, the centre of her former industrial activity," and when the routes between these places and Austria were dammed by the tariff walls of a jealous economic nationalism, Austria was ruined.

In 1931, in order to find a way out of her difficulties, she attempted to conclude a customs union with Germany, a movement which raised fury amongst the French and anti-Revisionist countries

(see para. 6, Phase *ii*). Various other attempts have been made to right her position, but all have failed owing to the self-centred national spirit of her neighbours.

38. It is, therefore, not surprising that a certain percentage of Austrians would willingly unite with Germany even on the certainty of Austria becoming that country's appanage. Such a union would bring economic salvation, though against the dictates of patriotism. That virtue, however, does not flourish on an empty stomach. At the moment the somewhat blatant efforts of Germany to obtain command of Austria by the Nazi revolution and the murder of Dr. Dolfuss has caused an anti-German reaction, but these matters will be forgotten in time.

39. Another section of Austrians, not desiring union with Germany, wish for the return of the Hapsburgs. It is hard to see what economic advantage would accrue, but the Hapsburgs would certainly prove a rallying point for Austrian sentiment.

As this would stir up the sentiments of those Austrians now in the Little Entente this solution is as abhorrent to those countries as the Anschluss. Threats of mobilization follow any suggestion of it.

40. Austria, therefore, has no policy except to wait for help from someone, and unless others give her help in time the Germa-Austrian union will come, or at least will be attempted.

#### *Great Britain*

41. In this turmoil of pact and counter-pact, where does Great Britain stand? Should we state our own opinion we might be accused of prejudice. We will, therefore, quote Mr. Simonds, an unprejudiced American:

"It is a nation which, although victorious in battle, unmistakably lost the war. Traditionally and inherently a great power, it is to-day physically and morally unable to play its historic rôle . . . (and) . . . it is to-day quite impossible to foresee whether the Britain of the latter half of the 20th century will be a world Empire or little more than another Holland."

He then proceeds to describe British war weariness in 1918, and adds: "As a consequence the British people, with amazing swiftmess, swept away their huge military establishment. . . . *But when this transformation had taken place, a voluntarily disarmed Britain was actually almost as destitute of power as a forcibly disarmed Germany.*"

It is not in our province to criticise the policy of our statesmen, and as an offset to Mr. Simonds we may acknowledge that the country has emerged in 1936 with a financial stability and an internal solidarity which is the envy of the world. For that our statesmen are entitled to their just reward.

We have, however, asked ourselves if, in the future, as apart from the past, international co-operation can succeed.

When (to summarise the article) we consider the history of the last fifteen years and we see the fierce aggressiveness which helped towards the financial ruin of Germany and the even more fierce aggressiveness of Germany, Redivivus, when we note the total lack of political morality exhibited in the land-snatching exploits of the post-war powers, the inability of statesmen to produce any tangible agreement in disarmament, the practical futility of peace pacts, and finally, the hopelessly divergent ambitions of the Powers, we can only, with Mr. Hardy, doubt the benefit of striving for International Peace and we can only agree with him when he says, "if the world does not possess the requisite . . . cohesion, then we had better abandon our dreams of a warless future, and revert to the limited objective of 'peace in our time.' " That, however, is the affair of the politicians, and except for wishing Mr. Eden every success in his attempts to form a garden after his own name in the far from serpentless expanse of Europe, we will say no more.

But when we note responsible politicians still inveighing against our totally inadequate rearmament scheme, on the grounds that we are militating against that Eternal Peace which the treaties are said to have ushered in, we can only say that we are unable to discover the grounds on which their contentions are based. Certainly not on the facts of history.

OPENING OF HOSTILITIES IN THE RUSSIAN-JAPANESE  
WAR WITH COMMENTS ON THE BATTLE OF THE  
RIVER YALU, 30TH APRIL-1ST MAY 1904.

BY COLONEL A. H. C. KEARSEY, D.S.O., O.B.E.

It is first necessary to introduce this battle by running through the main points leading up to it, and to consider the characteristics of the Arms of the opposing forces engaged thirty-two years ago.

Korea was vital to Japanese policy and strategy. The Russians, by various pretexts, remained there after they had agreed to evacuate it. They wanted an open port, and so planned to stay in Port Arthur to develop Dalny and to establish a navy to safeguard their interests in the Far East. The Japanese, therefore, built up and trained their navy and army for the definite object of fighting for their existence. There was a unanimous national feeling that these forces must be as fit as possible to carry out the nation's policy of taking Port Arthur, of controlling Korea, and of driving the Russians from Manchuria.

In every way their training increased their endurance and self-confidence, strengthened their self-control and made them recognise their own possibilities. Their soldiers thus became loyal, efficient, and full of resource, as well as expert in the use of their arms. Commanders carried out the orders of superiors thoroughly, intelligently, and without criticism. They co-operated with one another and with the Higher Command.

They were, thus, able to defeat the Russians, whose resources were considerably greater and whose trained land forces were four-and-a-half million men.

With reference to the employment of the different arms, the following points may be noted—

*Cavalry.*—On the Japanese side they acted defensively, and did not go far ahead of the infantry, as the Japanese were reluctant to risk them against the superior numbers possessed by the Russians. Also they were at a disadvantage with the Russians, as they had no horse artillery and they were badly mounted. Had the Japanese larger numbers of cavalry they might, during this period of the campaign, have been able to turn some of their successes into complete victories.

On both sides the cavalry acted dismounted for the most part. However, they covered their front and prevented their opponents from seeing their movements up to the battlefield, but except at the Battle of Telissu, the action of the cavalry was not an important factor in the fighting on either side.

*Artillery.*—As to the artillery, the Japanese guns were inferior to the Russians' in weight and range of projectiles, and in rapidity of fire. They did not closely support the infantry by moving forward in the attack. This was partly due to the difficulties of the ground and to their dislike of moving guns by daylight. The Japanese did not concentrate their guns. This, again, may have been due to the difficulties of the ground, but it was also due to their anxiety to gain concealment and to bring enfilade fire to bear on to positions from two sides. They nearly always made use of indirect laying in order to save casualties, but they lost in fire power at the crisis of a battle.

*Engineers.*—As to the work of the engineers, the Japanese used them with the artillery to improve their lines of advance and to construct cover. In the attack they facilitated the advance of the infantry by removing obstacles, and even in the firing line they helped to fire mortars.

*Infantry.*—As to the infantry, the Russians were trained in shock tactics with the bayonet. The value of fire and movement was not properly appreciated. Their reserves were not in close touch with the forward troops to enable them to exploit success, and they did not make full use of their mobility to combine frontal and flank attacks. Local commanders did not, as a rule, show initiative in taking advantage of an adversary's mistake or in carrying out the spirit of an order. On both sides the infantry carried 250 rounds of ammunition. The Japanese infantry were trained to make good use of cover during their advances. They carefully reconnoitred the ground over which they were going to attack with trained men, and they always endeavoured to gain accurate information as to the extent and weak parts of an enemy's position, where the flanks were, and what obstacles there were to the advance.

At first they were extended in their firing lines to one yard per man, and later up to five yards. The Russians always advanced in close order. The Japanese maintained a steady advance up to about 1,000 yards from the enemy's position, when they tried to

obtain superiority of fire before advancing by rushes to an assaulting position. The Russians in their attacks did not endeavour to obtain this superiority of fire to support their advance to the final assault. The Japanese always endeavoured to combine flank with frontal attacks in order to increase their morale and fire effect. The Japanese used their reserves boldly, often engaging their whole force in the firing line. The Russians, on the other hand, as a rule, had a passive defence, and did not use their reserves.

The difficulty of passing from the offensive to the defensive was emphasised in this campaign. Such an operation was often employed by Wellington, Lee and Jackson, and notably by Napoleon at Austerlitz. At first the Russian infantry took no steps to conceal their trenches; later they took more trouble in siting them. The Japanese entrenched during the advance to the attack within decisive range of their enemy, and as soon as the position was captured. They carried entrenching tools, and could dig when lying down.

The Russians used their machine-guns effectively to bring flank fire to bear against the lines of the advancing infantry. The Japanese used their machine-guns in depth to cover their flanks during an advance, and to be a reserve of fire power in the hands of unit commanders. They were normally used in pairs. The Japanese carried out night operations usually when they had not been able to capture a position by day. Then they were, as a rule, within assaulting distance, and could plan with accuracy what their operations would be under cover of darkness. Otherwise they made an approach march up to the enemy's position by night preliminary to an attack at dawn. It was found that night or dawn attacks against an unknown position, which had not been reconnoitred, were hazardous and costly.

The lesson from all the fighting in this campaign appears to be that morale, discipline and training will always be a paramount part in obtaining a victory if developments of armament and science are fully utilised; for men, nature, and strategy always remain very much the same. In this campaign the strategy of both sides was complicated by Port Arthur; especially for Japan by a desire to secure Korea, as Oyama had then a double objective—the Russian field army and Port Arthur. He gained the advantage of the initiative owing to the local weakness of the Russians. His strategy then was dictated for him. He had to make a converging movement from

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Korea and from Port Arthur and in order to maintain contact between armies advancing from Kuan Tung and Korea, a central army must advance in a northerly direction to assist the converging movement.

The Japanese, however, might have advanced more rapidly, as every day the Russian reinforcements arrived, and their isolated armies were liable to defeat in detail. They might have brought their 7th and 8th Divisions from Japan to add to the strength of their field army.

The Russians could have concentrated at a central position, and could have carried out the principles of forces acting on interior lines. However, they had to endeavour to relieve Port Arthur. This necessitated a detachment from their central force. Other detachments were sent to delay the Japanese advancing from Takushan and from the Yalu. The result was that, though they had numerical superiority at the first big battle in which each side had full strength under their respective commanders, yet they had lost morale in their continued retreats. This affected the Commander-in-Chief and his subordinate commanders.

In addition, the Russian Commander-in-Chief was not well informed as to the strength of the Japanese. He made, accordingly, no definite plan. This led to a weak offensive in the use of his reserves in a desire to prevent defeat. The basis of the Japanese success was their co-operation and determination to win at all costs.

In 1875 Russia had been forced by the Japanese to give up Saghalien Island.

In 1891 Russia began to build a railway across Siberia to join up with her territory in the Far East.

By 1895 the Russian railway nearly reached Lake Baikal. After a war with China in the previous year, Japan was granted a lease of the Kuan-Tung Peninsula from Chinchow to Port Arthur. Korea was declared independent. The Russians wished to obtain an ice-free port in this area.

France, Germany, Austria and Russia forced Japan to give up her lease in return for a money indemnity. Russia also obtained permission from China to extend the railway through Manchuria to Vladivostok, instead of along the left bank of the River Amur.

Russia had joined up the trans-Siberian railway with the Pekin line at Yingkou by 1897.

The Russians also leased Port Arthur from China, and gained the concession of building a line from Yingkou through the Liao-Tung and Kuan-Tung Peninsulas.

By 1900 the extension of the railway from Harbin to Port Arthur was completed.

Russia occupied Manchuria to protect her railway.

In 1902 the Anglo-Japanese alliance was concluded. Each of the signatories agreed to help the other if either was attacked by two powers.

By August 1903 the railway was completed to Port Arthur. Russia sent more troops into Manchuria and did not carry out the agreement to withdraw from the occupied territory. Russia nominated Admiral Alexieff to be Viceroy and Commander of the Provinces and garrisons of their Far East possessions.

On the 11th December, the Russian Government replied to Japanese protests that they would not discuss the Manchurian evacuation.

On the 13th January 1904, Japan presented a final draft treaty to the Russian Government on the Manchurian question. No reply was sent by Russia.

On the 6th February, Japan recalled her Ambassador from Russia. The Japanese began to embark at Sasebo for Chemulpo.

On the 8th February, Japan sent a torpedo flotilla into the harbour of Port Arthur, where two Russian battleships and a cruiser were torpedoed and seriously damaged.

Four Japanese battalions arrived at Chemulpo.

On the 9th February, Admiral Togo, commanding the Japanese Fleets, opened fire on Port Arthur. His object now was to confine the Russian Fleet in Port Arthur harbour. One Russian battleship and three cruisers were injured. At Chemulpo a Russian cruiser and a Russian gunboat were destroyed.

Two Russian cruisers at Chemulpo were sunk. Two Japanese battalions began to march to Seoul.

On the 10th February, Japan declared war on Russia. Her object now was to secure Korea, to regain Port Arthur, and to prevent the Russians from controlling Southern Korea. The Russians wished to gain an ice-free winter port in the Far East, and to control the sea communications from Vladivostok.

It was essential for Japan to take the offensive as early as possible before the Russian Fleet at Port Arthur was reinforced by their Baltic Squadron. Otherwise, as the initiative lay with the Japanese, it would have been better had they commenced the war when all the ports of Manchuria and Korea were ice-free. The Russians would then not have had three months in which to collect troops for the first battle.

The Japanese plan was to capture Port Arthur, and after obtaining control of Korea, to make a converging movement with the bulk of their troops (*i.e.*, with the first, fourth, and second armies), while they left one army to besiege Port Arthur. Their active army and first reserve totalled 380,000 men.

Their second reserve was 200,000 men. Their trained conscript reserve was 50,000. Their untrained conscript and national reserves were 4,250,000 strong. Their trained national army was 220,000 strong. Of these numbers, their immediate fighting value was 257,000 infantry, 11,000 cavalry and 894 guns, divided into thirteen divisions, 13 Kobi, 2 cavalry, and 2 artillery brigades.

A division consisted of two infantry brigades, each of three battalions, a cavalry regiment or three squadrons, an artillery regiment of 36 guns, and an engineer battalion.

A Kobi brigade consisted of two 2-battalion regiments and one 6-gun battery. The Russians had four-and-a-half million trained soldiers, of whom three-and-a-half millions were in the active army and the reserve. Actually in the Far East, however, they had 92,000 infantry, 5,000 cavalry, 196 guns and 2,700 engineers, 7,780 fortress and 11,400 railway troops.

A European Russian Corps consisted of 28,000 infantry, 3,400 cavalry, and 124 guns, divided into two divisions, one cavalry division and Corps Engineers. The division consisted of two brigades, each of two regiments of four battalions each, an artillery brigade of 6 or 8 batteries, each of 8 guns, and an Engineer Company. The Russians had four cruisers at Vladivostok, a cruiser and a gunboat at Chemulpo; the remainder of their fleet was at Port Arthur. Each of the combatants had seven battleships. The Japanese had no reserves and no means of building battleships. They possessed, however, four naval bases.

The Russians could reinforce their fleet in the Far East from the Baltic with twelve cruisers, nine destroyers, and eleven battleships,

The Russian plan at first was defensive. They determined to garrison Port Arthur and Vladivostok, to delay the advance of the Japanese in Korea by a detachment, while they concentrated the bulk of their forces in Southern Manchuria.

The Japanese decided (a) to secure the safety of their transports by keeping the Russian Fleet in Port Arthur, and (b) to pursue a double objective, namely, the siege of Port Arthur and the Russian field army. They, therefore, landed troops in Korea in order to draw off part of the Russian field army from Port Arthur, they landed troops in the Liao Tung Peninsula to besiege Port Arthur, and they subsequently made a converging movement against Kuropatkin's field army.

On the 14th February, the Japanese torpedoed a Russian cruiser in Port Arthur.

On the 16th February, the Japanese 12th Division began to disembark at Chemulpo.

On the 23rd February, Korea made a treaty allowing Japanese troops to pass through the country.

On the 24th February, the Japanese made a first attempt to block the entrance to Port Arthur.

The Japanese 12th Division completed disembarkation on the 27th February at Chemulpo.

Admiral Kaminuras' squadron bombarded Vladivostok.

On the 11th March, the 2nd and Guard Divisions left Japan for Chinampo. The 12th Division began to march towards Ping Yang.

The Japanese Guard and 2nd Division completed disembarkation at Chemulpo on the 20th March.

This First Army, consisting of the Guard, 2nd and 12th Divisions, assembled in the vicinity of Chinampo and marched towards Anju.

On the 27th March, Kuropatkin took command of the Russian Manchurian Army, consisting of 57 battalions, 34 squadrons and 140 guns. Linevitch commanded the Ussuri Corps of 10 battalions, 6 squadrons and 4 guns, at Vladivostok, and Stoessel commanded at Port Arthur, where the garrison consisted of 43,000 men and 540 guns when the investment began. All these troops, as well as the fleet, were under the Viceroy Alexieff.

The Japanese made a second attempt to block Port Arthur.

On the 28th March, the First Army was in touch with Russian cavalry at Tiessu, west of the Chechen River.

On the 1st April, the First Japanese Army reached Anju and began to march on Wiju, being much delayed by the effect of the heavy rain on the bad roads. Kashtalinski's 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division was by this date at Antung.

The Russians now decided to concentrate the Manchurian Field Army near Liao Yang, where they would wait for reinforcements, so that they could then have superior numbers at the decisive place.

On the 3rd April, the Russian cavalry retired to the west bank of the River Yalu. The movements of the Japanese up to the date of the Battle of Yalu were, therefore, not accurately known to the Russian Commander.

On the 13th April, Admiral Makarov issued with the Russian Fleet from Port Arthur. His flagship was destroyed by a mine and he was killed. The Russian Vladivostok Squadron sank two Japanese transports and one troopship near Gensan and then returned to harbour.

On the 13th April, the head of the 12th Division, leading the march of the First Army, reached Wiju.

On the 20th April, the Japanese First Army reached Wiju. Kuroki sent a detachment to Chyangsyong. His outposts were south of the river. Kuropatkin now had his headquarters at Liao Yang. In this vicinity he had five divisions and two Cossack regiments. At the Yalu River there were 2,940 mounted troops, 62 guns, 8 machine guns, 16,300 infantry on a front of 170 miles from Pitzuwo to north of Chyangsyong. These troops were two East Siberian divisions and a Cossack Division. The garrison of Port Arthur was three divisions of approximately 43,000 men.

In Vladivostok was a Cossack brigade and the infantry and artillery of two divisions.

Japanese ships began to cruise about the mouth of the Yalu River.

On the 21st April, the Russians sent cavalry under Madritov to raid the communications of the First Japanese Army. They crossed the Yalu near Chosan. The Japanese First Army concentrated at Wiju.

Zasulich assumed command of the Russian Yalu detachment. Kuropatkin told him to avoid a decisive battle, as he did not want any of his advanced troops to be defeated in detail.

Alexieff, on the other hand, ordered Zasulich to make a stubborn resistance. Kuroki had clear orders to advance in a north-westerly direction up to Fenghuangcheng and entrench there, and wait until the Second Army had finished its disembarkation south-west of Pitzuwo. Zasulich occupied a main position between Antung and Chiuliencheng and Chinkou with 16 battalions, 640 mounted men, and 40 guns, in addition, a detachment watched the coast from Pitzuwo to the mouth of the Yalu. There were outposts on Kanshi Island and Tiger Hill, and 1,000 infantry and 1,200 cavalry and 8 guns north of Anpingho. His reserve was behind his right centre at Tientzu.

During 25th April, the Japanese collected bridging materials for crossing the Yalu. During the night they occupied Kyurito and Kinteito. General Trusov withdrew his troops from Tiger Hill. The Russians also evacuated Oseki Island.

On the 26th April, a bridge was made to Kintei Island by the Japanese.

On the 27th April, three more bridges over the Yalu were completed.

On the 28th April, orders by Kuroki were issued for his 33,000 infantry and 128 guns as follows :—The 12th Division was to cross at Suikuchin and march south-west to cover the crossing of the other two divisions of the army. They were also to send a detachment to threaten the Russian retreat. The 2nd Division was to cross by Kyunri, Oseki and Chukodai Islands, covered by their guns from Kintei Island. The Guards were to follow the 2nd Division and to operate between the other two divisions. There was to be a general reserve on Kyuri Island.

On the Russian side Kashtalinski succeeded to the command of the left centre, holding it with 5,200 infantry, 240 mounted men and 16 guns, from the south-west of Chiuliencheng to the north-west of Chinkou.

*Battle of the River Yalu, 30th April-1st May.*—The 12th Division crossed at Suikuchin and advanced towards Anpingho. The 2nd Division took up a position on Kintei Island, the Guards extended the position to Litzuyuan, where the 12th Division continued the line in a northerly direction.

On the 1st May, at 6 a.m., an artillery duel began. At 7 a.m. orders were issued by Kuroki for a general attack. By 8 a.m. the Japanese attacks developed on their whole front, so that by 9-15 a.m.

Kashtalinski had retired west of the Ai Ho, slowly followed by the right of the 12th Division, while the 2nd and Guards Divisions halted on the right bank of the river.

At 1 p.m. the 12th Division again attacked. Kashtalinski was now in position west of the Hantuhotzu brook holding Hill 570 south-east of Hamatung. Zasulich did not reinforce his left flank, which was driven back. Zasulich made no active defence, the demonstrations by the Japanese ships at the mouth of the River Yalu detained the Russian right centre at Antung.

The Russians with a loss of 3,000 men, 21 guns and 8 machine-guns withdrew to Fenghuangcheng. Kuroki did not press the pursuit.

Kuropatkin sent forward detachments to Lienshankuan and to Saimachi

1. *Value of information.*
2. *Value of offensive action.*
3. *Influence of topography on operations.*
4. *Value of security.*
5. *Value of surprise.*
6. *Value of maintenance of the objective.*

1. Zasulich, who commanded the Russian detachment at this battle, owing to his ignorance of the intentions of the First Army Commander, disposed his troops over a frontage which was too extended for the troops available. Thus he had 2,500 infantry, 400 mounted men, 8 guns, with outposts on Kanshi Island, from Antung, for ten miles south-west towards the sea; further north, up to Chiuliencheng and Tiger Hill, there were 240 mounted men, 5,200 infantry and 16 guns under General Trusov.

The position was continued in a north-easterly direction along the Hushan Hills up to Anpingho. In this sector there were 1,200 cavalry, 1,000 infantry and 8 guns. He was thus weak everywhere.

Zasulich, owing to lack of information as to the general situation, did not dispose his general reserve in rear of that portion of the position which offered the best line for the eventual counter-stroke. He placed this reserve of 5,200 infantry and 16 guns at Tientzu, and kept it there until after Kashtalinski, on his left flank, had fallen back from the Ai Ho behind the Hantuhotzu brook. This was owing to the presence of Nakagava's flotilla at the mouth of the Yalu, where he thought that the Russians might land troops in order to turn his right flank.

While Zasulich was waiting to be attacked, ignorant as to the strength and direction of the blow, Kuroki, being fully informed of his enemy's position and numbers, was able to issue definite orders on the 28th, in ample time for all ranks to know them, for an attack to be carried out on 1st May.

Kuroki was able to attack the left flank of the Japanese position with the 12th Division against Kashtalinski holding the Ai Ho position with 5,200 infantry and 16 guns and to bring superior numbers to bear against him.

During this phase of the battle, owing to lack of information, Kashtalinski found his position untenable and was unable to take counter-measures in time for them to be effective, as he was unaware that the Commander on his northern flank had retired from Chinkou and that his communications were thus threatened. Kashtalinski, therefore, had to withdraw on Hamatung.

2 (a) The value of offensive action is illustrated by the operations of the Japanese at this battle. The basis of Kuroki's plan was an offensive action by his three divisions to be resolutely carried out with the 12th Division crossing at Suikuchin and advancing on to the Hushan Hills from the vicinity of Anpingho towards Chinkou. On their left, the Guards were to advance in the centre towards Makou *via* Kyuri and Oseki Islands.

On the left of the Guards, the 2nd Division was to advance also through Kyuri and Oseki Islands, Tiger Hill and Chukodai Island towards Chiuliencheng.

By the 30th April, the 12th Division crossed at Suikuchin and marched towards the Ai Ho, covered by the guns of the 2nd Division bombarding at first Chiuliencheng and then the whole Russian position.

By 7 a.m. on the 1st May, the three Japanese divisions were in position to continue the offensive towards the Ai Ho. In spite of the fact that the attack was a frontal one, the Japanese maintained the progress of their advance, and in spite of losses forded the Ai Ho and were able to get their guns across to Chiuliencheng and to Makou by 1-15 a.m.

By 1 p.m. the pressure of the 12th Division on the Russian northern flank was felt when the Russian position, west of the Hantuhotzu brook, was turned and the 2nd Division moved on Antung.

The Japanese continued their offensive in a general advance on Hamatung. The Russians by this time were routed, having suffered 3,000 casualties and having lost 21 guns. Thus, in spite of the fact that the frontage on which Kuroki attacked was unduly extended, that his formations were dense, and that he had 867 casualties, he was successful owing to his resolute offensive action.

(b) Offensive action on the part of a battalion of the 11th Rifle Regiment, about 2 p.m., north of Hamatung, enabled the Russians to organize resistance at this place and to secure their retreat.

(c) The fear of offensive action by superior numbers from the vicinity of Liao Yang prevented the First Army from pursuing the Russians on the 1st May. Their main body did not move, after this battle, till the 5th May, and it was not till six days afterwards that this army was billeted in Fenghuangcheng.

3. *Topography.*—(a) The loam soil and the absence of metalling on the roads made progress very slow. Kuroki's army took a month to march 125 miles from Pingyang.

(b) The Yalu, from its source to the sea, forms the boundary between Korea and Manchuria. Steamers drawing over 13 feet cannot proceed above the mouth of this river. Native junks can reach Antung. The Yalu is unfordable in the area of these operations. It was, therefore, a strong line if held by the Russians, for whom the Hushan heights and Tiger Hill, Chukodai, Kanshi and Oseki Islands were specially important.

The direct communications between Chiuliencheng and Chingkou were bad. The road between these two places runs through Hamatung, four miles west of Chiuliencheng. Therefore, Zasulich could not move troops quickly from one locality to another. It was, therefore, essential for him to gain early and accurate information, to keep a large reserve in a central position, and not to spread out the bulk of his troops on a wide front.

By neglecting to hold the Hushan Hills and Tiger Hill, Zasulich afforded every opportunity to Kuroki to surprise him, nor could he prevent the passage of troops over the River Yalu north of Wiju.

Once across the Yalu, the Japanese with Tiger Hill in their possession to cover their further advance, had no serious obstacles in front of them, as the Ai Ho was everywhere fordable.

4. *Security.*—(a) Early in April the Russian cavalry retired to the west bank of the Yalu. In consequence, they did not secure

the Russian front, and enabled Kuroki to reach the river with his strength and dispositions unknown to the Russians.

By the 20th April, Kuroki was east of the Yalu, from Wiju in a southerly direction.

Every precaution was taken to protect and cover the front with outposts on the river. The positions were hidden by artificial screens and all natural cover was utilised. The Russians, on the other hand, freely showed their positions and did not assimilate their trenches to the surrounding country.

(b) On the night of 25th-26th April, when Kintei and Kyuri Islands were captured, respectively, by the 2nd and Guards Divisions, the Japanese secured their crossing of the Yalu in this area.

At this time the weak Russian outposts on Tiger Hill and Oseki Island failed to secure their own front, as they evacuated their positions.

(c) Kuroki added to the security of his position on the 29th by erecting six bridges over the River Yalu.

(d) Owing to defective intelligence, Alexieff ordered Zasulich to make a desperate resistance against the Japanese. Kuropatkin told him not to fight a decisive action against superior numbers.

Owing to these conflicting orders, Zasulich had great difficulty in carrying out a rôle to satisfy both sets of orders and at the same time to secure the safety of the troops.

(e) The Russian position west of the Ai Ho, though naturally strong with a good field of fire commanding the river, was not adequately secured. The flanks were not strengthened, lateral communications had not been made, wide, shallow trenches were on the forward slopes of the hill, and they were not concealed; nor were the numbers, available for holding the position six miles long from Chiuliencheng through Makou and Potetientzu to Chinkou, adequate.

5. *Surprise.*—(a) In order to safeguard the lines of communications and to enable the First Army to land at Chemulpo preparatory to their advance to the River Yalu, Admiral Togo's fleet escorted the first transports. The Admiral completely surprised the Russian Fleet in Port Arthur on the 8th April. During the night two Russian battleships were torpedoed.

At Chemulpo, the Japanese squadron surprised two Russian ships, which they attacked. The Russians sank their ships. Part

of the 12th Division, was, therefore, able to land at once and to occupy Seoul.

(b) The feinting by the Japanese flotilla at the mouth of the Yalu misled the Russians as to the direction of the Japanese attack. Zaslulich did not, therefore, move his reserves from behind his right centre at Tientzu in time to make his defence active, nor did he strengthen the left flank where the Japanese made their decisive attack.

The Japanese naval demonstrations gave the impression to Zaslulich also of a crossing below Wiju. The 12th Division was thus able to cross at Siukuchin on the night of the 29th-30th April and to march down the west bank of the river to cover the passage of the Guard and 2nd Division.

6. Zaslulich did not maintain his objective. As he had occupied a defensive position, he should have occupied the best ground in the vicinity chosen for defence. He should have utilised his cavalry to cover and watch his front east of the Yalu, then to protect his flanks, and to operate against the right flank of the 12th Division. He should have used his reserve actively. He should not, at 9-30 a.m., have ordered his troops holding his right centre at Antung to retire.

*Conclusion.*—It must be noted that the Japanese had been extremely cautious at a time when their strategy demanded rapidity of action. In view of Kuroki's superiority of numbers and his knowledge of the Russians' dispositions and resources, he might have acted with vigour and less caution soon after he first gained contact with the Russians at Wiju on 20th April. He was delayed for ten days by a Russian force with half as many guns and approximately twenty thousand less rifles than his own.

Kuroki attacked with the bulk of his army deployed for the first encounter, so that he had little reserve in hand with which to exploit success. The result was that there was no effective pursuit. It was not until the 6th May that the Japanese cavalry, followed by the main body of the First Japanese Army, reached Fenghuangcheng. By that time Zaslulich had been able to withdraw his force unmolested to Panshuiling Pass, seventy miles from the Yalu battlefield.

Had Kuroki kept a strong reserve in hand at the initial encounter, he would have had the opportunity later of making his success decisive at the time when Gromov retired to a second position about 9 a.m. on 1st May.

Had success been exploited in this area with a fresh Japanese reserve on the left flank of the Russian position, the collapse of the whole Russian system of defence might have been caused.

Success here would have meant ultimate success at all points, as the whole Russian position would have become untenable and their line of retreat would have been in danger.

By the skilful use of command of the sea, Kuroki had gained the initial advantage of creating a false impression as to his intentions in the mind of the opposing Commander, who was thus induced to keep his reserves on his right flank where they were of no use. Had Kuroki kept a reserve in hand and used it to break down the enemy's resistance at the vital point where their line of retreat was threatened, the Japanese reserves could have closed the Hamatang defile so completely that the bulk of the Russian force would not have been able to reach Fenghuangcheng safely on 2nd May.

On the other side, it must be noted that the Russian Commander did not show either by his original dispositions, or by his handling of his troops during the operations, that he had any clear idea as to how he could achieve his object.

If his object was to delay the Japanese, he should have retired when they were deployed for action on 29th or 30th April.

Zasulich's force was outnumbered and unsupported.

No victory was possible against such strength as the Japanese had in front of them. A defeat would considerably embarrass Kuropatkin, and would enormously add to the morale of the Japanese in their first encounter with a Western power.

Zasulich, however, decided to hold his position and fight a battle in spite of the telegram received from Kuropatkin stating that he was not to fight a decisive action against superior forces.

None of the requirements for carrying out a rear-guard action were fulfilled by Zasulich's force.

Zasulich made no attempt to withdraw until he was engaged on the whole front from Makou—Potientzu—Chinkou by the 2nd Guard and 12th Japanese Divisions.

His force then was in serious danger of being destroyed by the superior numbers on his front and by the enveloping movement of the 12th Japanese Division towards Luchiakou.

No lines of withdrawal or positions to be occupied in rear were reconnoitred or prepared. Nor was there any attempt made to co-ordinate the withdrawal.

For a constructive criticism from the point of view of Zasulich the following points may be noted, namely, that he had in his front an obstacle admirably suited for delaying action.

He could, therefore, have checked the crossing of the Japanese on their extended front of attack between Chinkou and Chiuliencheng with the minimum of his force.

He could have concentrated superior numbers against their 12th Division in the vicinity of Luchiakou and Chinkou.

In such an encounter he must have been successful against troops as they crossed the Ai Ho. Success at this point would have been a death-blow to the whole Japanese plan of attack, as the Japanese pinned their hope on envelopment.

If their enveloping force, the 12th Division, had been overwhelmed their whole scheme would have foundered, and their Commander in the first engagement of the campaign would have been shaken in his belief as to the infallibility of an enveloping movement leading to victory.


The result might have been far-reaching on the whole campaign.

At this battle, if the Japanese offensive had been checked at one point, the whole operation would have collapsed. Zasulich would then have realised where his greatest danger lay, namely, not on his right flank but on his left and centre.

His reserve could then have been moved to a more central position, where he could operate vigorously against the heads of the advancing Japanese columns as they crossed the Ai Ho.

Even the Japanese superiority in artillery should not have enabled their infantry to cross such a serious obstacle as the Ai Ho under the close and effective fire of the defenders, especially as their infantry were operating on such a wide front with no reserves available for action at any one point.







## A PILOT FOR A PASSENGER

BY CAPTAIN A. J. STAPLES, 8TH PUNJAB REGIMENT

Let it be clearly understood from the beginning that the suggestions to be put forward in this article are intended to apply primarily and particularly to Indian infantry.

That they apply equally to British infantry there is little doubt, but it is only proposed to touch on that subject at the conclusion.

*It is considered that the appointment of second-in-command of an infantry battalion is an anachronism and should be abolished.*

In the past a second-in-command was a necessity for several reasons, but it is maintained that the necessity has now disappeared.

With the introduction of the three years period of command, during which time a commanding officer is not permitted to take leave other than privilege, the necessity for an understudy no longer arises.

Moreover, few seconds-in-command nowadays ever remain for any appreciable period of time with the one unit. Numerous instances can be quoted of seconds-in-command who remain only a few months with a unit before transfer elsewhere, of others who are appointed on paper, but remain seconded on different employment. Very few officers at the present time are ever given this appointment in their original battalion, or even regiment.

With this lack of continuity it is considered that such a second-in-command can be of little practical value to a commanding officer, either as an understudy or as a potential source of advice; indeed any company commander with continuous service in the battalion would be far more useful.

In the past it was possibly normal for a second-in-command to be considerably senior to most of the company commanders; nowadays it is seldom more than a matter of a few months, the difference being so small as to be negligible should the question of command in an emergency arise.

The writer well remembers hearing of the answer given by a General Officer some years ago when asked whether it would be all right if both the C. O. and second-in-command of a certain unit were to go on leave at the same time, leaving a captain of fifteen years service to command the battalion for two months. The gist of the

reply was that if a captain of fifteen years service was not fit to command an infantry battalion for two months he had better get out!

When the matter is carefully examined it is apparent that a second-in-command has now no real duty to perform; that is, no real duty that cannot be as easily undertaken by some other officer in addition to his own.

The accounts and battalion institutes can easily be divided amongst company commanders and the quarter-master, whilst the training of young officers is a matter which it is considered should be the responsibility of the Commandant, assisted by any p. s. c. officer in the battalion, if necessary.

To maintain an officer for whom there is no real employment is waste, and in these days of ever-increasing pressure and efficiency waste cannot be afforded.

A question of vital importance which must here be considered is that of the relations between the Commandant, his second-in-command and his adjutant.

The old saw that two is company and three is none is no less true in this case than in other aspects of life, in other words one of these two staff officers is liable to be in the nature of a sleeping partner.

In the past, when the service of the average adjutant varied between five to ten years, this question did not arise so frequently, unless the adjutant happened to possess an exceptionally strong character and the second-in-command the reverse.

Now, however, the situation is completely changed. Out of 118 infantry battalions in the Indian Army, 76 have adjutants of over ten years service, and in 36 the adjutant has over fifteen years service! When it is considered that a large number of seconds-in-command have just twenty-one years service the change is apparent.

The difference in the length of service between commandants and seconds-in-command is now, in the majority of cases, very slight and, human nature being what it is, this equality of seniority is bound to intensify any degree of friction which may exist—and friction frequently does exist to a greater or lesser degree.

It is maintained that at the present time commandants are coming to rely upon their adjutants to an ever-increasing extent, not only on account of the reasons just quoted, but because in

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questions of policy they can obtain the advice of an officer with several years continuous experience in the battalion as opposed to that of an officer who, in so many cases, is a newcomer and also frequently a quick "goer" !

It has also been noticed in recent years that a custom has arisen, at least in some regiments, of consulting all officers in the battalion on any question of policy which has been considered beyond the scope of the Commandant and his staff to settle, even absentee officers being consulted in writing, and what could be a better way of arriving at a sound and popular decision ?

The question must now be considered as to whether the tactical duties of the second-in-command are still essential and, if so, whether for this reason only the appointment must be retained.

It is suggested that, at the present day, the Support Company Commander is the officer most concerned with the layout of a defensive position or a subsidiary position upon which the battalion can fall back, and that this being so he should be the man sent back by the C. O. to select such a position. As the Support Company Commander is nowadays always a senior and, *ipso facto*, a reliable and efficient officer, the necessity for a second-in-command to perform this tactical duty would appear to have vanished.

To conclude the arguments in favour of the abolition of the appointment of second-in-command in an infantry battalion, it is considered that many heart-burnings would be saved to those who see themselves unfavourably placed and their juniors sometimes obtaining the appointment in other battalions and regiments before they themselves do, and that the loss of Rs. 50 per mensem would not be greatly felt, whilst it is considered that the said Rs. 50 allowance could be more profitably employed in a manner which will be now suggested.

*If the appointment of second-in-command be abolished it is obvious that one officer per battalion is thus available for other employment.*

In these days the growth of mechanization is ever increasing, and our weapons and training become yearly more elaborate and technical.

The machine-gun is of paramount importance. We now have the Vickers-Berthier, and the advent of an anti-tank weapon and the infantry mortar to India may only be a matter of time ; training in defence against gas is universal, and it cannot be long before the

signallers of infantry battalions are issued with portable wireless sets.

*In view of all this it is submitted that the time has come for the appointment of a specialist officer in every infantry battalion who must be an expert, and who shall be the adviser in the use of, and responsible for training with, these new weapons.*

Such an officer should have between ten and eighteen years service, have passed all the necessary courses and should be permanently on battalion headquarters staff for a period of three years, drawing the Rs. 50 monthly allowance at present drawn by the second-in-command. It is considered that three years should be the maximum period of tenure for this appointment to preclude staleness, and to avoid the possibility of the officer becoming out of date in his training; four years being too long and two years too short when the question of the number of specialists in the battalion proceeding on annual leave and furlough is considered.

This specialist officer should never, in any circumstances whatever, be called upon to do any office work—there should be none for him to do—and so one officer at least could be kept solely for training and not expected to spend the major part of his soldiering performing the duties of a babu. It must, of course, be realised that a specialist officer in an infantry battalion is only intended to exist in peace. On active service ordinary training naturally ceases, but, should occasion arise when the battalion is not engaged in active operations and the services of such an officer were required, sufficient officers should exist from the ordinary three years turnover, irrespective of casualties, to supply the need.

How these suggestions would work if introduced into the British infantry the writer does not propose to state, not being sufficiently conversant with the conditions pertaining to that service.

It would appear, however, that the position must be much the same and that the substitution of a specialist officer for the present senior major (it must be remembered that in British infantry a second-in-command, as such, does not exist) would be of even greater value owing to the more rapid progress of mechanization in the British than the Indian service. It is, however, considered that the period of tenure of appointment of specialist officer in the British service might well be two years instead of three for the reason that British troops in India do not get annual leave or furlough, so that specialists

would always be present ; and also because of the greater number of officers in a British than in an Indian battalion, which allows a quicker turnover.

In conclusion, it must be realised that the Army to-day is no place for the retention of worn-out institutions, either for sentimental or any other reasons, and it must be seriously considered whether the appointment of second-in-command in the infantry does not come into this category.

If it be proved to have passed its period of usefulness, then let it be scrapped forthwith. It is suggested that the appointment of an adjutant with not less than ten and for preference with more nearly fifteen years service, plus a specialist officer of between ten and eighteen years service would prove far more valuable under modern conditions.

It may be argued that continuity would be broken by the fact that many adjutants of between ten and fifteen years service would obtain admission to the Staff College, and that therefore the ideal length of service would be nine to thirteen years. Whilst admitting the possibility, it must be remembered that whilst many are called but few are chosen, and it is not considered that casualties from this cause would be so numerous as to outweigh the manifest value to a C. O. of the extra one or two years of his adjutant's seniority.

## HOW'S THE EMPIRE ?

BY BRIGADIER F. DICKINS, C.I.E.

It is a commonplace that modern war enmeshes the whole population of a state. Not only is every individual exposed to merciless attack or to the risk of starvation, but the entire energy of the country has to be directed to one end—the successful prosecution of the war. Universal sacrifice is demanded, and there is no room for the *bouches inutiles*. Journalists, pamphleteers, professors, politicians, soldier-scribes, scaremongering amateurs—they all repeat the same blood-curdling prophecies. But it is difficult to ascertain how thoroughly the grim story is assimilated by the vast bulk of those who read their sensational forebodings. The general effect is probably much the same as that derived from an Edgar Wallace penny-dreadful; a temporary titillation of the senses, coupled with the pleasing assurance that it is the previous generation to whom we owe the present unstable condition of the world.

If all the races of the world had reached the same level of social and moral progress at the same time, there would be some reason for blaming the unfortunate Edwardians and Victorians. But, considering that contemporary generations in different countries are, at a given date, at different levels of social evolution and are possessed of different standards of social conduct, it is really quite ridiculous to father on the inhabitants of any one country, living during a particular reign or period, all the ills which are festering in the body-politic of the modern world. Moreover, the individual members of a state are themselves at different stages of social evolution at any given date. There has never been, so far, a universal dead level of human conduct, and it is extremely problematical whether there ever will be. Considering also that the overwhelming majority of a population does not, in normal times, exercise, or desire to exercise, or is capable of exercising, any real control over the policy of a nation, it is equally ridiculous to blame a whole generation for the faults and miscalculations of the minute proportion which in reality sets the policy and guides the action of that generation.

The "little man" is at the mercy of forces, not only beyond his control, but quite beyond the grasp of his intellect. He is led into the mazes of free trade, of protection, of subsidies, of output

restriction, of inflation or deflation of currency, of national isolation or combination, of war and peace, not because of conviction based on his own very restricted knowledge and experience, but because the tide has turned and he has to drift with it. And the tides of world events are not controlled by any cold aloof moon, but by just a few men who think, and plot, and plan, or who plot and plan without much deep thought. The measure of the true utility of these few men to the world is the extent of their knowledge, capacity, and honesty and decency of purpose. The measure of their personal success is the distance to which the multitude drift in the required direction, and the unanimity with which they throw themselves into the stream.

With the growth of education and the levelling of caste and class that is so marked a phenomenon in the civilized world, it would be natural to think that the difficulties in the way of the emergence of small controlling bodies were almost insuperable. Yet in point of fact, never, since the days of Napoleon, and, to a less extent, of Bismark, has the power of one individual man to hypnotize the masses been so strongly exemplified as in these post-war days. Hitler, Mussolini, Pilsudski, Mustapha Kemal, Reza Shah, Ibn Saud, Marsaryk, Lenin, Roosevelt—what will be the verdict of history on the generation which produced these super-men? What share has the generation in the good or ill that arises from the actions of these men? Without them, what would the generation have achieved?

What may be the secret of their power, beyond implacable fixity of purpose, no man can say. The fact remains that they have the power and know how to exercise it, and that millions obey them unquestioningly.

The fact that they have emerged, and still persist, is evidence, if any further such were required, that the world is not yet ripe for the League of Nations, at least as at present constituted and operated. The growth of a world-conscience is necessarily a slow affair; so slow, indeed, as to be almost imperceptible.

The wise citizen will therefore accept the paradoxical situation that, in a civilized world where knowledge and education appear to have made remarkable progress, the capacity for discrimination, for individual judgment and foresight, does not seem to have progressed in equal measure. On the contrary, the multitude, in spite of its demi-semi-education, bears a remarkable resemblance to a flock of

sheep. Thinking and planning are done for them ; practical organization and effective action are done for them ; all they have to do is to follow their leader, or leaders, down any slippery slope or up to any difficult height indicated to them. A syndicated or controlled press sees to it that propaganda is properly distributed.

It is only because of the extreme individualism that has hitherto been so marked an English characteristic, due, doubtless, largely to geographical accident, that the emergence of a leader, a führer, a dictator, has yet to be chronicled in our island history. Where individuality is common property it is obviously more difficult for a super-individual to impress himself. Hence, in England, the loud voiced vendor of a national or international social panacea can seldom hypnotize more than a minority of the population. We have an instinctive dislike of the strange or unusual, and the old saying, "' Ere's a stranger, ' eave 'alf a brick at 'im," is indicative of a fair average of mentality in England even to this day.

Artistic, scientific, literary, philosophic geniuses—in fact any sort of intellectual genius—appeal to certain esoteric circles and perhaps achieve world-wide reputations. But the enthusiasm of the public is reserved for some preposterous film-star, and their interest is excited by football and racing results, by spectacular pageant and devastating noise, by insensate speed, but by nothing that gives cause to pause and think. The dislike of the English for the abstract is deep-rooted and illuminating. There are certain grounds for self-congratulation that such is the case. A people of this character is less likely to be led astray by national hysteria than one which allows its thoughts and actions to be entirely regimented. It is not until the "little man" in England is persuaded, generally by force of circumstances beyond his control, that he really must give thought to his next step, that he will take the trouble to consider the future. There is less cause for self-congratulation here, as by the time he has decided what ought to be done, circumstances may have nearly overwhelmed him, and in his efforts to escape the consequences of his own former indifference the "little man" may become very hysterical indeed. We do not believe in the possibility of national danger until we actually experience it. In spite of the lessons of history, a subject on which perhaps ninety-nine *per cent.* of our population is either ill-informed or not informed at all, we always hope that the storm-clouds on the horizon will clear away. Our attitude towards the

laws of cause and effect bears a remarkable resemblance to that traditionally ascribed to the ostrich.

It is true that there are signs that we are beginning to wonder whether our position is quite so secure as it used to appear to be, and that some of us at least are growing distrustful of the capacity for "rugged individualism" to shape the nation's policy with permanent success and so stabilize her position. We have not made so complete a *volte-face* as that which is being engineered by President Roosevelt in the U. S. A., where, to atone for the mischief of quite insensate individualism, the strong individuality of Mr. Roosevelt seems to have stepped into the breach. But there are comforting signs that in England there is slowly developing a recognition that collective security within the boundaries of a country, or of a comity of countries, is a necessary prelude to the establishment of collective security between nations throughout the world. There is even to be heard occasionally expressions of regret—and astonishment—that so far we have not produced THE MAN to guide us, a sure indication of the first faint stirrings of an element of—fear.

The fact is that we have lost faith, or are in the process of losing faith. We have lost faith in our old political creeds and party cries, and to a large extent in our old social structure and our methods of government, but so far have found no substitute. We distrust our political and social guides, together with their circumambient quacks and hacks, because we have a suspicion that they are only opportunists in disguise. They all contradict one another, and even when members of one party they are unable to agree as to ways and means. Indeed, they appear unable to distinguish one definite and common objective. So that, not unnaturally, we are beginning to wonder whether it would not be better if we could produce a single individual, one-idea'd and clear-idea'd, above all party ties and class prejudices, who could give us something better than the half-measures and compromises of which we are beginning to tire. Alas! we have no 5-year plan, no 10-year plan, no real plan at all. From year to year we drift and, if we do not awake to our situation, the strong tides of Welt-politik may drift us towards a very grim lee-shore.

Are our Parliamentary institutions the best that can be devised? Is Cabinet rule the ideal machinery for framing policy? Oh, shades of Gladstone, Disraeli, and Sir Robert Peel! What a change is there!

It is a strange paradox. To settle the bewildering doubts and fears that have sprung indirectly from the excessive individualism of the past, we are forsaking our old fixed ways, and even go so far as to deplore the fact that we have not produced The Man, The Individual, The Führer, who can indicate to us the way out of the maze of trouble. We distrust the men whom we ourselves elect to govern us and, I suppose, expect that Providence will work in some mysterious way and will produce the Man for the Occasion. Although we hastily deny that we could accept a Hitler, a Mussolini, a Lenin, yet we wonder why we can't be delivered of a super-man. We are likely to go on wondering.

Now, if we examine the attitude of their followers we will find that these three outstanding personalities, have been invested with almost god-like attributes. Their commands must be obeyed, their teaching must be imbibed, their principles must be followed, in exactly the same spirit as a god must be feared, obeyed, and worshipped. There must be no questioning of their sayings and doings, and they take good care that there can be none. The vast multitudes who obey them and are prepared to follow them to the death, do so because they believe in them. The faith in an omnipotent, omniscient, infallible Deity, that science and philosophy have so largely contributed to destroy, which formerly served to keep large bodies of men together as united entities, and to which the futile massacres and the universal distress of the Great War gave so rude a shock, has, in certain countries, been transferred to a national man-deity, a demi-god. In reality it is only an exhibition of that pathetic, universal need of all mankind—a safe and permanent anchorage, something to believe in—Faith. Without faith the world must perish. Not necessarily a religious faith, but some universal belief in a universal standard of ethical conduct between nations.

It is fear that has produced these men : it is faith which maintains them in power.

Fear of national economic disaster, of loss of national prestige, power, and position, fear of the blight of communism or of the tyranny of capitalism—here is the breeding-ground of the Dictator, who is sustained by the faith of his people, but who maintains the position of his country by inspiring fear throughout the world. The vicious circle is complete.

The time and the occasion have produced these men, and in the

process of time the occasion may disappear or the faith may die. But what then? What will take its place?

There can never be any assurance that, when one frightened country has been soothed and satiated, some other one will not be seized with panic and follow the same uneasy path, and elect its own man-deity to trouble the peace of the world—or can there?

Whatever precautions we in England are forced, by fear, to take in these unstable times, when shall we be justified in abandoning them because the world has found stability? In other words, when will collective security be so universally understood and practised that all national safeguards may be universally dropped? Idealists and fanatics will say that it can be done now. The very existence of the man-deity gives them the lie. So does the existence of a new religion, a new faith, in the Far East. The spirit of *bushido* that permeates Japan, the worship of the Flag, here takes the place of the worship of the man-deity. The form of the worship is different; its cause, its objective, its effect are precisely the same. Fear is its cause, national supremacy its objective, and its effect is the death of collective security.

In dealing with the disillusioned and cynical inhabitants of the modern world, to undertake to instil new faith into them in any cause whatsoever is no light task. But the answer to that is that it is a waste of time pleading a cause unless you can inspire faith in it. The whole object of pleading a cause is to establish faith in it, and the greater the difficulty the greater must be the effort. If, then, the objective of a movement is to establish Empire unity, that movement must be supported by proof that it is worthy of faith, and those who preach must be possessed of absolute faith themselves. It is desperately easy to give lip-service to a cause.

The word propaganda has deservedly acquired a somewhat unsavoury reputation, so much so that it is associated in the mind of the "little man" with the cruder expression—"damned lies." "Crusade" unfortunately connotes an impression of failure. "Gospel" sounds too purely religious, but derivatively it just means "good news." The word has this advantage it connotes the impression of faith.

Earlier in this article it was stated that the vast majority of a population has no voice in the normal policy of a nation. On special occasions, however, public opinion has confounded

governments; and even on normal occasions governments prefer not to run counter to public opinion when strong expression is given to it. They know that there is a latent power in the will of a people which is stronger than any government. But strong expression is only given to it when feeling runs very high, when the occasion is of extreme importance, when great danger or great injustice is in view, when the people have been deliberately instructed and their feelings worked up. Public resentment is a spirit not to be summoned light-heartedly, and difficult to exorcise, as many governments have discovered. And, therefore, in spite of the fact that the public in most cases appears supine and indifferent, yet a careful eye is always kept on public opinion and, if the occasion warrants it, steps are taken to feed it according to the prescribed recipe. When the necessity is urgent, steps are even taken to influence public opinion and so invest the preconceived policy of government with the glamour of a cause inspired by the people. No one knows this trick better than does your dictator! The difference between the actions of a constitutional government and those of a dictator is a difference, not of kind, but of degree. The dictator's methods are more crude, more direct, more ruthless—that is all the difference. The one sometimes tries to persuade, the other always bullies.

If there is any truth in the preceding paragraph, then we must accept as a fact the futility of attempting to spread the gospel of Empire unity without first exciting the interest and arousing the sympathy of the people of England and the Dominions. Their attention must first be focussed, then their understanding helped, and, finally, their faith established. The practical methods of translating faith into work will then be simplified. In this sort of business the dictator has an advantage, for he has his personality to conjure with, and no corporate body, such as a government or a cabinet, has personality, while the dictator has no need to argue with partners, no need to effect compromises. He speaks with one voice—he just dictates.

Where stands the Empire in this paradoxical modern world? According to some observers it is standing on feet of clay. It is interesting to recall that during the Boer War a favourite French sneer was—"le colosse à pieds d'argile." Nobody is more prone to cry down his own country than is a certain type of Englishmen, but their judgment must generally be discounted on account of religious

or political prejudice. It is safer to rely on the judgment of a skilled, professional observer whose impartiality can be relied on. Such a one is the well-known American writer, Mr. F. H. Simonds. A few quotations from Chapter XII of "The Price of Peace," by Simonds and Emery, may be worth consideration. Indeed, the whole of that chapter might be read with advantage by all those to whom the British Empire means something greater and better than mere Imperial greed and selfishness.

"Only a rash prophet would undertake to forecast early or even eventual dissolution of the British Empire politically, although economic separation proceeds apace. Not impossibly the Dominions would fight again for the Empire as they did in 1914—1918." (It should be recalled that they would not at the time of the Chanak bluff.)

"Nevertheless, it is self-evident, that the old relation between them and the mother-country has largely disappeared and politically no substitute has yet been established. As a consequence, the British Empire is to-day the greatest question mark on the map of the world."

The greatest question mark! Can this indeed be so? It is a statement that cannot be lightly disregarded. If there were no doubt as to Empire unity there would be no necessity for the continual investigation that is being taken as to ways and means for composing conflicting interests within the Empire. There would be no reason for uneasiness at the trend of certain policy on the part of the Union of South Africa during recent years, at the policy of Mr. Mackenzie King with regard to Canada's relations with the U. S. A., at the continued recalcitrance of the Irish Free State, at the declared policy of the Republican party there, at the separatist movement that is so vocal in India, at New Zealand's concern about the quota system as applied to her products, at Australia's determination to become industrially self-supporting. All these are symptoms, not necessarily of any desire for complete national independence of Empire ties, but at least of causes which lead to friction and so to dissolution rather than to cohesion. The seeds of dissolution are certainly there. It should be our concern to prevent their germination.

Again —

"In international conferences, the voice of Britain has lacked its ancient note of authority. In Europe, France, and not England,

has exercised the predominant influence in the post-war era. In the Far East, Japan has enhanced her prestige at British expense. To the United States, Britain has voluntarily conceded a naval parity which could no longer be denied in the light of the superiority of the financial resources of the American Republic. Yet a concession which disclosed wise statesmanship did not conceal a decline in world power. And, at bottom, all of these circumstances simply reveal the fact that, imposing as the Empire is in outward aspect, it does not possess that unity which once assured Britain of her position of primacy in the world, alike politically, financially, and industrially."

Well, that is a statement over the details of which much furious argument could be raised. But to its general tenor no exception can be taken. In our unity lies our strength, and this very competent observer considers that our unity has weakened. It is also evident that the key-stone of our unity is the strength of England herself, and that by our strength are we assessed by foreign nations. Also it appears that our deeds of wise statesmanship are forced on us by the weakness of our position: they are the children of necessity, not of wisdom.

On the other hand, only in yesterday's newspaper I read the headline—"Britain called upon to give a lead." That is, a lead to the Council of the League of Nations. It is an interesting speculation as to what would our action have been in the various crises of the last few years had we been a free agent and not bound, morally, by the famous Covenant. Dare one voice the heresy that the old system of a balance of power might possibly be a better one after all than the present one? As a matter of fact, the system of the balance of power still does exist in spite of the League. By no manner of means a perfect system, but a more adaptable, a more easily operated system. One may even go a bit further in one's speculation. Would it not be better, perhaps, to postpone the high ideal of the League of Nations system, and to concentrate on the more practical ideal of a League of Empire? To achieve the lesser before attempting the greater task? And, finally, is it possible to reconcile these two ideals; can they co-exist? Is it possible for a united Empire to exist within the League of Nations?

One should have some clear conviction in one's mind on these points before one can venture to consider the matter of Empire unity. We have, according to Mr. Simonds, lost our primacy in the world.

Is that a bad or a good thing for the world? Have we any right to try and re-establish that primacy? Have we really lost it? Does not a League of Nations pre-suppose parity of strength and prestige? One could multiply such questions almost *ad infinitum*, and no two people would answer them in exactly the same way. Not one can be answered without some qualification or reservation. But, to build up faith in Empire unity, we should attempt to answer them.

Once more: "And, although Britain still remains an Empire upon which the sun never sets, nowhere in that vast domain does the sun shine to-day with quite the same brilliance as in the closing years of the nineteenth century."

One should ask oneself whether this is really true, and, if so, is it a matter of importance?

Perhaps in this following and last extract the murder is out.

"And, as a consequence, for a decade and-a-half after the close of hostilities, British policy continued to be deeply and profoundly influenced by a spirit of defeatism."

I cannot congratulate Mr. Simonds on his "deeply and profoundly," two words which, to the uninitiate, appear to mean precisely the same thing. But I do think he has hit the right nail on the head—the spirit of defeatism. And a nasty, mean, tawdry, cowardly spirit it is too, that "craven fear of being great" which is mistaken by the wizened in intellect for a beautiful spirit of Christian renunciation, for an acceptable sacrifice, for a proof of a spirit of brotherly love. It leads to no greater stability, it ensures no better equity, it binds the world together with no stronger ties, than does the spirit of imperial militarism. It merely dissolves existing entities and leaves them at the mercy of any power which repudiates the spirit of defeatism. That which disintegrates cannot strengthen, and were defeatism ever to become endemic in the world all national existence would become flabby.

That such a spirit did become epidemic in the post-war years cannot be denied, and we now see that this American observer considers that it is due to this spirit that the prestige and strength of our Empire have diminished. Evidently he does not think much of it, and by implication I think we may assume that he reasons that our "primacy" has disappeared, not from any uncontrollable disruptive forces within the Empire, but merely because of a state of mind induced in a war-weary generation. There seems to be a glimmering

of hope here. All that has to be done to retrieve our position is to prevent such a spirit from ever making itself felt again. And it is just as well to realize that there is still a school of thought, very active in its propaganda especially amongst the young at school and college, which deliberately spreads the gospel of defeatism.

Before we can expect faith in Empire unity to be established we must exorcise this spirit of defeatism. This seems so obvious a conclusion that it may be asked why trouble to mention it. But the point is, not that a certain conclusion has been arrived at, but that something must be done about it. One cannot just sit down and expect things to happen. One has got to do something. It would be interesting to learn what is being done about it, in the home, the school, the college. It is a species of warfare and concentrated, planned attack is necessary. It is really no use just saying "pish" and "tush." It is no good leaving the job for somebody else to tackle.

One of the pet points of the defeatist is the doubtless deplorable fact that, in the acquisition of our Empire, the stricter laws of international morality and justice were sometimes disregarded. He seeks to stir our conscience and to guide us along the paths of atonement. Even the U. S. A. had its conscience-stricken period, and is proceeding with great rapidity to divest itself of its white man's burden in the Philippines. The quite unexpected result of this quite worthy action is that a section of Philippine political thought took fright at the looming spectre of Japanese ambition, and suggested that they would be safer if they were admitted into the British Empire! What was the fate of this gesture, I do not know. At any rate, it is some consolation for us to realize that we are not considered effete in every quarter of the globe.

It is quite immaterial to speculate from an ethical view-point as to how the Empire grew. On the whole, it grew very much like Topsy. What nation, or empire, or republic in the world can look back to its growing pains without some mental reservation regarding morality of purpose and method? Certainly some pages in our Empire history were better left uncut. But what has that got to do with the Empire as it is to-day? Certainly we pirated and profiteered. But what of our principles and actions to-day? For goodness' sake let the past bury its dead, the sinners with the saints, and let us occupy ourselves with the present, praying that we may produce MEN of a

calibre equal to that of the best of those who have gone before. What has Botany Bay got to do with the Australia of to-day? Doubtless, we were hardly inspired with the highest motives in starting that Opium War with China. But who would benefit if we surrendered Hong Kong now? If we should renounce because of past misdeeds, then let every country in the world renounce also, especially their contemplated misdeeds. Cromwell at Drogheda is something for tears. The atonement of 1921 has not built up a dry-eyed Ireland, nor endowed her with greater prosperity.

We will assume, then, that the Empire is worth while conserving, that it is an essential ingredient for the stability and prosperity of the world, that its disintegration would lead to a more chaotic world-condition than even the present one, that its strength and orderly progress set an example and form a central rallying point, that it is a shield against the too numerous disruptive forces both latent and active at the present time. In order to persist, its components must achieve some form of permanent unity stronger than any shocks to which they may be exposed; they must be the same throughout, possess the same outlook, the same ideals, implement the same policy, suffer and prosper together.

There have been plenty of events since 1918 which support this contention. Indeed, it seems a self-evident fact. But it is a fact, nevertheless, which, though accepted in rather a light-hearted way, is not realized as presenting immediate and pressing problems which call for investigation and action. If there are disruptive elements, bemoaning them will not eliminate them. The growth of national consciousness and national pride, involving the development of economic and political independence, is a definite potential solvent. At the same time it is a perfectly natural phenomenon, and will tend to increase unless practical steps are taken to bring home to the people the possibility that complete independence can be achieved only at the loss of something greater than independence. There must be some limit beyond which independence may invite collapse. When it is considered that there has recently become vocal a school of thought which deliberately counsels the partition of portions of Empire among more needy nations, the familiar story of the "have-nots" claiming a right to the possessions of the "haves," we begin to realize that there are artificial as well as natural disruptive forces at work. But perhaps the most dangerous, because the most insidious

and intangible, of all is the force of ignorant, selfish, and narrow-minded indifference. The "little man" will not see the clouds on the horizon, or, if his attention is drawn to them, will not take the trouble to visualize the possible effects of the impending storm. He has little imagination.

In those countries which have given birth to men-deities, this smug tendency on the part of the "little man" towards stupid indifference has been eradicated by means with which we are all familiar. He has literally been kicked awake and beaten into action. He has not been allowed to remain indifferent. The operation has been made all the easier in these countries, because they have experienced a more acute condition of chaos, unhappiness, poverty and fear than we in England have so far experienced, bitter though our experience has been. And the "little man" on the Continent has, by force of circumstances, been brought face to face with the necessity for some form of action. We, so far, have only seen the flashes on the horizon and heard the distant thunder. But the atmosphere is heavy and stifling, and we are beginning to stir uneasily. We have even gone so far as to commence, at long last, the erection of a few shelters against the threat of storm. We may be lucky if we shall have erected them before the storm has burst.

But, with that extraordinary capacity for *laissez faire* which we possess to so intolerable a degree, with that school-boyish dislike for employing whatever imaginative capacity we may possess, with that Lower Fifth attitude of contempt towards Sixth form problems, we have neglected to raise the strongest storm-barrier of all—an Empire unity, based, not on empirical expedients devised temporarily to compose conflicting interests, but on conviction shared by all that the disruption of Empire would be a catastrophe for the whole world and that the ties which bind it together should be stronger than politics or economics. It is probably quite impossible to compose to the satisfaction of all parties the conflicting interests within the Empire. It is equally probable that the attempts to do so have merely disclosed the fact that these differences are even more acute and irreconcilable than was at first supposed, and that any attempt to settle them, in one quarter merely raises fresh complications in another. Such, at any rate, seems to be the lesson learnt from the results of the Ottawa Conference. After all, to approach the problems of Empire on a purely utilitarian basis is to confess that there is no real unity in the

Empire, that it is merely a loose confederation of countries owing to one another no allegiance of kinship or tradition, a sort of artificial League of Nations within the very artificial League of Nations; and that to keep together at all recourse has to be made to rather squalid bargaining. It will lead nowhere. Trade pacts, quotas, Empire preference—all these are temporary expedients which the least political storm may blow away into nothingness.

It is doubtful whether strategical unity would be lightly abandoned by any Dominion. Here the instinct of self-preservation would come into play, and for this reason the Dominions would presumably appreciate an England strong enough to defend them from attack. But here again something more than a purely utilitarian understanding between the various General Staffs is required, something more than strategical plans, which, incidentally, against certain combinations, might prove difficult to implement with existing material. Strategical agreements are, like any others, at the mercy of political experiment and charlatanry.

The unity that is required is of a nature comparable to that which binds together the counties of England, that makes England one country. The Empire must be one country. Obviously, in the face of the admitted independence of any central authority of each Dominion, such a unity is extraordinarily difficult to obtain. There must be some spheres within which independence cannot be admitted. There can be no independence of some single objective, some common purpose of life, some common standard of mutual conduct. There may be physical and legal independence but there can be no spiritual independence.

All this involves a readiness to subject local pride and ambition and greed to the requirements of the Empire as a whole, to the factors which give reality to its existence. This is asking a great deal of young, strong countries, conscious of their capacity and value, and anxious to assert themselves. Experience still lies ahead of them and always is there more knowledge to be acquired. In ignorance, indifference, and self-conceit lies the real danger. The unity that is indicated cannot be measured by any hard-boiled balance sheet, and reduced to terms of financial and economic gain. The latter is but incidental. Its real value and strength is the faith that is in it.

Presumably, no one would seriously wish to contradict the opening sentence of this article. But it is rather a nasty shock to

have to confess its truth. It upsets all sorts of pleasant philosophic diletantism, all sorts of metaphysical philanderings; disturbs all sorts of lazy meanderings down the quieter back-waters of life; in short, it substitutes uneasy fear for placid self-satisfaction; it is a call for action on the part of people who dislike having to face up to brute fact; it is a call for sacrifice on the part of people who have had no occasion to learn the meaning of the word; it is a disturbing revelation that here, at least, is an occasion—WAR—where your duty to your neighbour is of more importance than your care for yourself.

One definition of war is that it is merely a continuation of policy, and, in spite of the existence of the Kellogg Pact, it still remains as good a definition as any other. The final recourse against strong opposition to policy affecting nations must be war—you may dignify it by the expression "sanctions" if you like; must be war if there is any real determination behind the policy. The very existence of Article 16 of the Covenant seems to confirm this statement. And close analysis does not disclose much moral difference between a gas-attack and the cutting off of essential supplies, the economic starving of an obstinate opponent. The innocent suffer either way.

War, then, is but an expression of policy, good or bad. But why should it be the only policy in furtherance of which the co-operation of the whole population is accepted as a necessity? Surely, if the success of any national policy is to be ensured, national co-operation is an essential ingredient of quick and complete success.

In parenthesis, it may be noted that co-operation does not automatically stifle individualism. What is required is co-operation in framing policy. The individual will still have to exert himself to give effect to that policy, to put in motion the various activities; but he and the other individuals will be working to one common end, each in his own particular sphere. Individualism must work on converging lines of approach, not on the parallel lines of Euclid. Co-operation that admits of freedom of individuality is good co-operation; individualism which hinders co-operation is bad.

It seems quite logical, then, to postulate that national co-operation is as essential for the establishment of peace as it is for the prosecution of war. And if the preservation of the British Empire is a stabilizing factor in world affairs, then we in the Dominions and in England should have our heart and soul in the cause of the unity of Empire. All our efforts should continually and undeviatingly be

diverted to that end. It must be remembered that, not only abroad, but also within our own island coast-line, there is at work propaganda the thesis of which is that the Empire is a standing menace to the peace of the world. Are we to stand by in smug and idle self-satisfaction? On the other hand, the Socialist Premier of France has just announced that he considers a strong England to be the greatest factor of stability on earth. It is queer that some of us in England cannot see that. Well, if the opponents of this type of defeatism do not do something about it, how can they expect their principles to win?

It is a pure waste of time to try and visualize what the world of humanity will be like a thousand years hence. No one has even the slightest claim to be in a position to speculate within the smallest degree of accuracy what it will be like; no, not even what it will be like a hundred years hence. Even if we could boast of such wonderful long sight, yet we, in the present, are not even remotely interested in so distant a future. We are concerned with to-day and to-morrow, and future generations must build up on whatever foundations we are able to lay to-day. It is undeniable that a world inhabited by men all motivated alike by the highest principles would be an admirable world, though we may venture to doubt whether it would not be rather dull. It is equally undeniable that the world of to-day falls somewhat short of so beautiful an ideal. So short, indeed, does it fall, that it is merely fatuous to behave as if the goal were in sight, the ways all smooth, as some good people would have us believe.

The Empire which we should aim to build, therefore, is one which will be able to exist in the world as it actually is and is likely to remain for a good many years yet, not in the world which President Wilson thought he had conjured up; an Empire which can negotiate on terms of equality, which can oppose equal force to force, whose constitution is framed with regard to the cold facts of an imperfect world; which has the will, and is in the position, to do right in a world where injustice, intolerance, tyranny, and rapine are as rife as they ever were and apparently ever will be. There are no signs of any real and permanent economic recovery throughout the world, no signs of any real and permanent political settlement, no signs that the pressure of population is diminishing and that the problems of equitable distribution of production are nearing solution, not the slightest hint that financial adjustment of exchange values is within sight.

Standards of living still vary, as do those of conduct. Indeed, where is there one single tittle of evidence that international barriers have been broken down or that there is any real, deep-seated will to break them down?

In so unhappy and disturbed a world it should be a matter for pride to be a member of an Empire that stands firm and unmoved as a rock amid all the shouting and squabbling. But such an Empire will not be established until all its people rise superior to their own petty self-sufficiencies, and drop that attitude of indifference, based either on stupidity, ignorance, or conceit. It is deplorable to ascertain by questioning how lightly, indeed how scoffingly, responsible and presumably educated people regard the potential dangers that the condition of the modern world contains for the Empire. To such the only item of importance in the world is—themselves. It is time something was done about it.

Early in his life the late King uttered a warning. "Wake up, England," was his exhortation. On his death-bed he anxiously enquired, "How's the Empire?" What is our answer?

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NOTE.—Anyone who is even remotely interested in the subject of Empire Unity should read Professor Coatman's "Magna Britannia." I can commend no better book. Unfortunately I had not read it myself before I wrote this article.

## MORE ABOUT AUSTRALIA

BY MAJOR J. S. D. LLOYD, THE SUFFOLK REGIMENT

I was very interested to read, in a recent issue of the Journal, an article by Lieut-Col. R. H. Mylne—"Privilege Leave in Australia"—firstly, as I had just done the same trip myself and, secondly, because I returned on the same ship as the writer. I might add that I agree with everything he has written and strongly endorse his remarks.

My only excuse for attempting a similar article—after such an excellent one—is to offer, as I was considerably longer on shore (six weeks), some hints as to how to spend the time that may be of use to any officer contemplating making the trip and who may be wondering how to spend his time to the best advantage.

Being then stationed in Southern India I made the outward trip by the Orient Line from Colombo, returning by the P. and O. For those similarly situated I can strongly recommend this method and particularly lay stress on making the *outward* voyage by the Orient as, I was given to understand, more Australians travel by that line than by the P. and O., and it is the Australians one should endeavour to become acquainted with during the voyage rather than one's own kind; also few army officers travel by that line, so it is pleasant to get away, if only for a very brief spell, from the atmosphere in which one may have lived for so many years.

I have said that it is the Australians themselves that one should endeavour to get to know during the outward trip. They are all extremely kind, delighted to meet visitors to their country which, rightly or wrongly, they consider the finest in the world bar none, and are open-handed in their hospitality to the stranger within their gates; in this respect they are far more American than English, and as Col. Mylne has said, "Shipboard acquaintance develops into friendship on shore."

As likely as not some of them may invite you to stay on their "Stations" (an opportunity to be grasped with both hands), or, if business men, to look them up when visiting their particular town; this is not mere politeness but intended to be accepted in the spirit in which it is offered—in this respect they differ considerably from the Home stock. So much for the voyage.

Each State has its Government Tourist Bureau, located in its capital, which exists to assist travellers to see their own particular State ; very often, however, there is a representative from a neighbouring State in the Bureau who can and will assist if a combined tour is required. The officials in these Bureaux are helpful to a degree, will suggest things to do, places one ought to see, and make all arrangements for one. All the traveller has to do is to express his wishes and pay the fees (which are very reasonable especially when the exchange is taken into consideration) and he will be " picked up " at his hotel and returned to it at the termination, whether it be long or short.

The cars provided are exceedingly comfortable, and their chauffeurs excellent drivers as well as being first-class guides. They point out all places of interest as they pass them, if required, and take a keen and lively interest in their passenger's comfort, wishes and enjoyment. To sum these drivers up—all I met, and I met many, were the most excellent fellows.

It is not generally known, I think, that during the Australian winter, winter sports are available in many places in Victoria and New South Wales and, compared with European centres, are comparatively cheap.

I mention two, Mount Buller in Victoria and Kosciusco in New South Wales, and will say a few things about the latter as I spent a fortnight there.

I made all my arrangements through the New South Wales Tourist Bureau by telegraph on reaching Fremantle, confirmed it by letter and by a personal visit as soon as I reached Sydney, when I found all arrangements made for me. (I might add that I received a telegram from the Tourist Bureau on arrival of the ship at Adelaide saying that accommodation had been arranged.)

There is an hotel only at Kosciusco (the nearest township being some 30 miles away) which is very comfortable, comparing quite favourably with those at Swiss winter resorts. It is at an elevation of 5,000 feet. The sports facilities afforded there are comparatively poor. If, however, the traveller wishes to " play at " winter sports and is keen on the social side of things, then he should remain there, but if he is at all experienced and keen on ski-ing, I recommend that he spend one night at the hotel (which he will have to do on account of the time of arrival there) and move on to the Chalet, 6,000 feet

and ten miles away at the head of Charlottes Pass, the next day on skis. This is the only means of getting there; the only method of communication is by dog-sleigh which takes over food, mail and light luggage for a small charge, daily—weather permitting.

All sports kit, with the exception of clothes and "skins," can be hired at the hotel and the small cost is included in the Tourist Bureaux bill.

If one wishes to go direct to the Chalet this must be made perfectly clear to the Tourist Bureau at the outset to enable them to make arrangements, as it only has limited accommodation and is often engaged for a week or so at a time by one of the many Ski and Alpine Clubs which abound in Victoria and New South Wales. Whilst there one is accommodated in dormitories, according to sex, holding as many as 16 to 20 in "double decker" beds, so there is little privacy. The feeding at the Chalet was, curiously enough, better than at the hotel.

This dormitory drawback is, however, well worth while as the ski runs to be obtained are excellent, and compare very favourably with those in Swiss resorts. One has to be very careful when out "on tour" as clouds, fog, wind and snow play the very devil and one may find that the visibility on the return route has been "blotted out" during the climb, and if not near a hut the situation may be rather dangerous. All huts are connected by telephone to one another, also to the Chalet and the hotel, and generally have a stock of "iron rations" hanging in sacks, and also a stock of wood. Many of them are exceedingly comfortless, but any port in a storm.

One point to be carefully considered if contemplating winter sports is: Is it worth while, having travelled so many thousands of miles to the Antipodes, to waste ten days or a fortnight ski-ing when it might be much better spent seeing as much of the country as possible? Personally, I afterwards regretted having done so, not that I did not thoroughly enjoy myself.

For those who wish to see as much of the country as possible, a motor trip from Sydney to Brisbane by the Tableland route, returning by the Pacific Highway, or *vice versa*, a journey of something like 1,000 miles, or doing a similar trip from Sydney to Melbourne either by the Coast road (Princes Highway) or *via* Canberra, has much to recommend it.

The former return journey takes seven days in all and costs £15-15-0 Australian. This, however, includes all expenses, *i.e.*, being picked up at one's hotel, meals and all hotel expenses *en route*, and being deposited at the door of one's destination on arrival. The passengers generally "tip" the driver 2s. a head—this being the recognised sum, and this need be the only "out of pocket" expense.

The return journey by rail would take one-third the time, but by the time all expenses were paid would amount to, roughly, the same figure, or perhaps very slightly less.

Personally, I consider the journey by road has much to commend it if the traveller can spare the time. The whole trip is done in daylight so that one can see all the country through which one passes. One sees many country towns, some big, some small; stays at country hotels, some of them amazingly good and comfortable with excellent, though plain food (in this respect Australia is far ahead of the Old Country in my opinion), and rubs shoulders with all sorts and conditions of mankind one might otherwise never meet.

In every way it is preferable and also very interesting.

The trip to Melbourne *via* Canberra (which every traveller ought to see in early September, if possible, when all the flowers and flowering shrubs are in bloom) takes three—and by the Coast route four—days, and costs, roughly, £8 Australian.

These are all regular runs and cars leave the capital cities so many times a week according to the season of the year. The drivers are excellent, the roads surprisingly good, and the cars, which hold twelve, very comfortable. Some of the cars are fitted with wireless sets. The amount of light luggage one is permitted to take is naturally limited but sufficient.

No visit to Australia would be complete without a visit to some "Station" up country, for that an introduction or some kind ship-board acquaintance is necessary.

I was fortunate and spent a very happy and interesting four days on a sheep station of 40,000 acres in the Riverina District of New South Wales.

I have said that Australians are an extremely kind and friendly people, and to prove my statement I will give two examples.

I was very anxious to visit a Citrus Fruit Farm, and not knowing anyone in that line of business I approached the Travel Hostess in the Victorian Tourist Bureau in Melbourne (a very charming and

helpful woman). It was a very unusual request and outside her usual run of business, but she was not a bit nonplussed. She remembered having met the owners of two such estates and rang them both up, both said they would be delighted to see me, a complete stranger, and show me round.

I actually visited the largest Citrus Fruit Farm in Australia of 200 acres—the normal size is 20 to 40 acres. On arrival I was met by the son of the house, taken round and shown everything (after a cup of tea), all my many questions were answered to the best of his ability, and at the conclusion of my visit I was taken in for a drink and had no little difficulty in getting away.

On another occasion, hearing that sheep shearing was going on in the neighbourhood and wishing to see it, I approached a taxi-driver and asked him if he knew of any station where it was being done. He did not, but said he would find out, and find out he did. On arrival I walked into the shed and asked the first man I saw (who happened to be joint owner) if I might have a look round, and he said, "Certainly." His brother came along, took me in hand and showed me everything, answered my innumerable questions, and at the end of the shearers' two-hour spell asked me to stay to lunch, an invitation I had, most regretfully, to decline as I had a train to catch. I do not know his name to this day.

If the traveller has the time, the trip to Tasmania should be undertaken. It is only a twelve-hour sea trip from Melbourne, and I was given to understand that Tasmania is more akin to the Old Country in every way than any of the other States. On account of my fortnight of winter sports I had not the time unfortunately.

For those who may visit the Commonwealth with "an eye to the future" I was given to understand that Western Australia and Queensland were the two States with the greatest possible future as they are both still comparatively unexploited, whilst the possibilities of Victoria and New South Wales are generally well known.

## THE PROTECTION OF TANKS IN BATTLE

BY CAPTAIN G. W. RICHARDS, M.C., ROYAL TANK CORPS

In March 1934, when submitting the Army Estimates to the House of Commons, Mr. Duff-Cooper stated, "It is at least possible that in a few years time the most heavily armoured cars or tanks would be as vulnerable to the rifle and machine-gun fire of the future as a wooden caravan would be to the rifle and machine-gun fire of to-day."

With the recent invention of the anti-tank rifle and the introduction of the 2 pdr. anti-tank gun this prophecy has, to all intents and purposes, come true.

We have only to delve into history to discover that it was bound to be so.

In the era before the rifle, armoured man dominated warfare for about a thousand years. However, the penetrating power of the arrow was constantly being improved. As a result the mail-clad knight, by a constant augmentation of his armour, gradually sacrificed mobility for protection and faded into oblivion.

At the commencement of the American Civil War the "Merrimac," the only armoured ship in existence at the time, was supreme for a short period. She engaged the Northern sloop "Cumberland" and the frigate "Congress," sinking them both. Later we read of the engagement between the two armoured ships "Merrimac," and "Monitor," in which these two vessels fought for over two hours at very close range with little effect on each other.

This situation was not allowed to continue; the rifled gun and improved shell soon put armour into second place again.

All Tank Corps officers, who served in the Great War, will readily admit that a direct hit from a shell would penetrate the armour of a tank, and, more often than not, put it out of action. This was so where guns had not been specially designed for use against tanks.

Although great strides have been made in the resisting power of armour-plate since the war, the gun and the rifle have made even greater strides in penetrating power.

The problem facing the tank is to avoid being hit by an armour-piercing bullet which can be fired from a rifle or gun, however

mounted. We cannot rely on armour alone, so let us examine the other means available.

### *SPEED*

#### *1. The Pace of the Actual Vehicle*

The last war showed that guns always saw tanks before the tanks saw the guns. I doubt whether you will find a single war-time Tank Corps officer who located a battery before it opened fire. An obvious example of this was the action round Flesquieres. Another was an incident which occurred at the Drocourt-Queant Switch battle on the 2nd September 1918, when a battery of German Horse Artillery galloped into action, knocked out 8 or 9 tanks of "G" Battalion, and were themselves dispersed by a diving air squadron, all in about two or three minutes. Not a single tank fired a round at them. Modern methods should ensure that many batteries will be discovered for the tanks, but mobility should assist materially in preventing a repetition of these incidents.

The war-time Mark IV and V tanks, moving at less than five miles per hour, were big and cumbersome and proved a fairly easy target for an enterprising gunner. At the battle of Cambrai the depth of penetration was limited by the mobility of the tanks. Owing to their small radius of action, tank units had to be given very limited objectives, then return for refilling and minor repairs before being committed again. This delay allowed the enemy to reorganize his defences, and at Fontaine, during the battle of Cambrai, "F" Battalion lost several tanks on this account. If the tanks had had sufficient mileage (there was nothing there to stop them) to have reached beyond the German detraining centre at Cambrai (the Germans say they detrained 730 train loads of troops there during the battle), there is little doubt that subsequent operations would have taken a different course.

It is interesting to note that on August 8th, the enemy were expecting tanks of the Mark IV pattern, and did not realise the extra speed and handiness of the Mark V model and the Whippet Tank. Consequently the German gunners were surprised and failed to stop the tanks, though most of their guns were trained with that object in view. It is doubtful whether many tanks of the Mark IV pattern would have passed their batteries.

In Palestine, the only time an armoured car sustained a direct hit was when the commander halted his vehicle to engage an enemy

battery. The Turks never succeeded in obtaining a direct hit on a moving armoured car, although twenty of these vehicles were often under shell fire from 1915 to the armistice.

Maintain mobility, and the target becomes far more difficult for the enemy gunner. But mobility is relative; as the gun improves in handiness so must the tank increase in speed and ease of manœuvre.

2. *Manœuvrability, i.e., R/T. Control and a Combination of the various types of Tanks.*

The machine should be built for its rôle as are destroyers at sea, or bombers and fighters in the air.

Secondly, a distinct homogeneity must be maintained in our tanks to ensure that they are designed to act together. During the Russo-Japanese War the Russian Navy consisted of ships of varied types, sizes, coal endurance, speed and armament. This seriously interfered with their employment in large squadrons, although the individual units were generally formidable and stood up to severe punishment.

The chief rôle of the tank is to drive a gap through the enemy lines, if for some reason it is impossible to get round the flank.

It was impossible in the last war to drive a gap through the enemy lines without A. F. Vs. for three reasons:

- (i) Machine-gun fire;
- (ii) Wire and mud;
- (iii) The troops had insufficient strength and endurance to fight and march the distance that complete penetration of the enemy lines entailed. (The Germans made a big gap in our lines in March, 1918, but had not sufficient endurance to complete their victory.)

The tank is immune from machine-gun fire, unaffected by wire and mud, and can do the distance, carrying its arms and ammunition, very much quicker than other arms.

There remains opposing the tank only direct hits from artillery and anti-tank guns, against which armour is little defence. But both artillery and anti-tank weapons are very susceptible to machine-gun fire; tanks must therefore carry machine-guns. In war the tank machine-gunner will rarely see the target until after the artillery and anti-tank weapons have opened fire, and then it is usually too late. To overcome this difficulty, tanks must be prepared to put down a curtain of machine-gun fire in front of them as they advance,

so that the anti-tank weapons, both seen and unseen, are involved in it as soon as the tanks arrive within effective range. The attack should be at the highest speed consistent with the cohesion of the attacking force, and should go right through the enemy lines. Once through, there is adequate safety for reorganization and further attack, where necessary or required. The writer was behind the Turkish lines in Palestine, passing through at the same time as the cavalry in September, 1918. What impressed him most was the comparative safety when there. Officers of the 17th Armoured Car Battalion, who were behind the German lines during the battle on the 8th August, have told him the same thing.

Machine-guns are essentially a part of tank armament, but the increase of even one gun to a tank must be very carefully considered before being installed. It may increase the weight of the vehicle enormously.

It is considered that post-war policy in A. F. V. design concentrated too much on armament to the detriment of mobility, control inside the tank and comfort of the crew.

Secondly, tanks must be able to defend themselves against enemy tanks and attack them when required to do so. We must, therefore, have a tank equipped with an armour-piercing gun in an all-round traversing turret.

Thirdly, smoke is a very important feature of tank requirements. This can be supplied by other arms to support the tank attack, in the initial stages, but smoke will also be required by the tanks for—

- (i) Blinding unlocated batteries or anti-tank weapons after the attack has begun ;
- (ii) Supporting the tank attack after the tanks have passed beyond the support of other arms.

A certain number of tanks, armed with smoke mortars or projectors of some kind, form part of the establishment of tank battalions now, and will continue to be required.

From the above, it will be seen, that three types of tanks are necessary—

- (a) The small, extremely mobile type carrying a machine-gun, which can produce the maximum frontal fire, and armour-proof against small arm fire. Any extra weight in an armour or armament is unnecessary and leads to lack of mobility.

- (b) To oppose enemy tanks, a medium tank is needed. Its obstacle-crossing performance must be good and it must be superior in speed to any other medium or heavy tank it is likely to encounter. To obtain this mobility, only the vital parts of the vehicle should be protected from armour-piercing bullets. The proportion of medium tanks to light tanks must be carefully weighed. It depends on many factors, the chief one being the type of enemy we are to fight.
- (c) Smoke tanks must be available in sufficient numbers to render quick support to medium and light tanks when needed. Light tanks should also carry a small smoke bomb or cartridge which can be fired from the vehicles to cover their immediate withdrawal or "jink" when confronted by anti-tank guns. The weapon to propel this only requires a range of about thirty yards and should take up very little space in a tank. Some light tanks are already fitted with a suitable weapon.
- (d) All tanks should be fitted with radio telephony. Only a certain percentage require two-way sets, but all vehicles must be able to receive. Efficient wireless control of a tank force increases its mobility considerably.

### 3. *The Effect of Speed on the Morale of the Enemy*

Although probably we still retain our foremost position in tactical handling of tank formations, our post-war superiority in tank design has been lost owing to financial stringency. Now that the defence problem has come to the fore again, this superiority must be regained and maintained. It should give us a great moral ascendancy over our enemy at the beginning of the next war. Speed of approach is always most demoralizing to the defenders.

It is doubtful whether sufficient credit is given to the moral factor of tanks in war. Ludendorff admitted that it was the presence of the tanks that made victory impossible for them. "August 8th was the black day of the German Army in the history of the war . . . Divisional staffs were surprised in the Headquarters by enemy tanks."

Again he said, "Mass attack by tanks and artificial fog remained hereafter our most dangerous enemy."

The influence of nervous strain and other battle factors on the tank and anti-tank gunners must not be overlooked. This will affect the man in the open, *i.e.*, the anti-tank gunner, even more than the tank crew, the latter are given protection by armour and movement, factors denied to the former. Again, the noise of the machinery inside a tank prevents the crew hearing the enemy gun fire. Under these conditions the crew behave more normally than they would do otherwise.

We must regain our former place in tank design in the world. This, combined with the efficient handling of the tank by those concerned, will ensure a moral ascendancy over the enemy at the beginning of the next war.

#### COVER

##### 1. *The Use of Ground*

In the past it is questionable whether sufficient attention has been paid to the use of ground by tank units. Ground should invariably be made use of to protect tanks from artillery and anti-tank fire.

Quite a common manœuvre by tank commanders is to lead their tanks on to high ground in order to benefit from the slope of the ground to gain speed when carrying out the actual attack on the enemy. The main reason for this was the slow climbing capacities of the war-time and post-war medium Vickers tanks, which offered an excellent target to the enemy gunner when moving uphill. Now that tanks are being produced that can climb and "jink" without great loss of speed, this manœuvre should be adopted with caution. In a tank *versus* tank battle the side which gains the high ground will be favourably placed to make the enemy conform to the movements. But in an attack where enemy tanks are not expected to be encountered, every effort should be made to protect the flanks of the tank attack by the use of ground. Anti-tank weapons capable of being brought to bear on the tanks will then be confined to a narrow frontage.

At Cambrai the frontage of the tank attack was selected so that the enemy could not interfere with either flank.

On August 8th the tank force was assembled without unduly alarming the enemy. During the attack the tanks on each flank were checked by enemy flanking fire.

Insufficient use had been made of the ground in this case to protect the flanks, but fortunately the frontage was sufficiently wide

to prevent the enemy action on the flanks affecting the centre of the attack.

## *2. The Use of Bad Visibility*

Smoke is a very important feature of tank requirements. This can be supplied by other arms to support the tank attack in the initial stages and great assistance can be rendered by the air in the later stages, but smoke will also be required by the tanks for—

(a) Blinding unlocated batteries or anti-tank guns after the attack has begun ;

(b) Supporting the tank attack after the tanks have passed beyond the support of other arms.

A few rounds of smoke might have dealt effectively with the German guns which caused serious damage to our tanks on numerous occasions during the war.

The use of twilight for attacking, and darkness for moving up to the assembly positions should always be given weighty consideration.

A bad light always makes accurate aiming difficult and most of the German moves prior to the March 1918 attack were successfully carried out during darkness.

## *FACTORS APPERTAINING TO A SUCCESSFUL TANK ATTACK*

With the above considerations before us, the main factors relating to a successful tank attack appear to be—

1. Assembly and deployment of the tank attack at the highest speed so that little time is given to the enemy to move supports or make arrangements to meet it. The employment of other arms in various ways to obtain surprise is essential and should form part of the plan of attack. Marlborough's moves prior to piercing the " ne plus ultra " lines make an excellent example.

2. Selection of an area and/or method where all the attacking tanks can devote their attention to their front without being affected by hostile flanking fire.

3. The tank attack must be of sufficient strength to overwhelm the frontage attacked and to pass right through the enemy position. In the initial stages the curtain of fire, behind which it will advance, can be supplied by other arms. After the attack has penetrated beyond this range the frontage of the tank attack should be contracted, if necessary, so that the tanks themselves provide a

curtain of machine-gun fire and smoke in front of them when anti-tank fire is likely to be met, behind which the advance will continue.

4. If the enemy possesses tanks he will probably attack us when we have been successful and are through the enemy position. A sufficient force of the heavier type of tanks must be kept intact to meet this, otherwise the light tanks, which may have been disordered by the attack, will be destroyed.

In conclusion, it will be seen that tanks, like other arms, must depend very largely for protection on—

- (a) Ability to manœuvre quickly in suitable formations ;
- (b) The use of ground ;
- (c) Bad visibility and covering fire.

It is true that metallurgical improvement which produces superior penetration of armour, tends, at the same time, to produce better tanks (by improving the power for weight ratio of engines and the resistance of armour).

I would ask the advocates of the infantry tank to consider the above points. Should we not rely on the more mobile tank, supported by artillery and the Air to effect a break through, with the infantry available to hold the positions gained ?

Too much reliance must not be placed on armour for protection, otherwise the tanks may follow the heavily armed Roman infantry and the Knights of the Middle Ages into oblivion.

## THE OBJECTS OF THE A. R. A.

By "ASLIM."

An article appeared in the April number of this journal entitled "Weapon Training and the A. R. A." In this article the writer advocated support of the A. R. A. and encouraged units to take more interest in the competitions offered by that Association. It may be agreed that the A. R. A. is well deserving of support; it is an association which endeavours to keep abreast of the times, which welcomes suggestions for improvement and considers carefully any new ideas which may make membership more attractive and promote the aims for which it was founded.

What are the aims for which it was founded? Does the article referred to suggest methods of furthering these aims? The A. R. A. (India) explains in the Foreword to its Handbook that its object is to encourage team shooting as opposed to individual shooting. That is all right as far as it goes, but the real object is set out much better on the outside cover of the A. R. A. (Home) Handbook:

" . . . Maintained with the object of promoting interest in Small Arm Shooting for service purpose by means of individual and collective competitions, framed as far as possible to induce practice in methods which will lead to increased EFFICIENCY ON THE BATTLEFIELD."

The capitals and emphasis on the last words are those of the A. R. A.

The Rifle Associations do their part in improving shooting, but in the nature of things they cannot do the most important part. They have little personal contact with the man who actually fires and whom they wish to make efficient on the battlefield; in organising competitions their rules must be bound by an uniformity which is not the ideal in producing the type of efficiency required; nor can they take advantage of the varying conditions which can locally be directed towards that efficiency. It is questionable, therefore, whether indiscriminate support of the A. R. A. competitions is the best way of supporting the aims of the A. R. A. How then must we temper our support?

There is such a thing as over-enthusiasm which defeats its own object. An enthusiast finds unlimited interest in his own hobby and is apt to drive others, regardless of the fact that their interest may not have been aroused. This is where failure so often occurs in rifle shooting. Drive, assisted by discipline, is a necessary compulsion in a certain degree. It is an indispensable adjunct to early training both for a school-boy and for a recruit; without compulsory groundwork there can be no progress. Later in life a certain amount of compulsion and discipline is necessary to justify the emoluments attaching to a profession; a parson must hold his Sunday services, a financier must study prospectuses and markets, and a soldier must fire his annual course however much it bores him. Beyond that, discipline is seldom the best method of attaining a higher standard; it is interest which produces theological theses and works on economics and the gold standard, as it does enthusiastic rifle shots: not drive from outside coupled with discipline. In trying to improve shooting in a unit, therefore, we must guard against the officer, himself an enthusiast, who drives his men to enter for competitions, blind to the fact that it is discipline which produces the teams, not enthusiasm; and though his efforts will probably result in turning a greater number of men into more efficient range shots, he may have killed the latent enthusiasm which would produce efficiency on the battlefield.

It is to be noticed that men, officers and soldiers, will frequently spend hours of labour improving themselves in pastimes which matter far less professionally. Some will spend nearly all their spare time training ponies, others casting a fly on the lawn, others playing about with a football or a hockey stick; some are keen on photography or their gardens. Why, it may be asked, do comparatively few spend their leisure hours in improving their musketry? Before considering this point it must be realised that rifle shooting, like any other pastime, will have its maniacs who will be desperately keen in the face of the most adverse circumstances; and again, as with other pastimes, there will be a number whose interest cannot be aroused in any conditions. This state of affairs must be accepted in regard to rifle shooting as much as to cricket or horsemanship. The object must be to inspire enthusiasm into the majority, and it is suggested that a curbing of the maniacs, or a wise direction of their energies, is one of the essentials to achieve this,

There are many reasons for this lack of keenness. Amongst others may be mentioned that of unintelligent encouragement which leads to boredom. More will be said about this later; at the moment one may remember that rice pudding is an excellent body builder but loses its attraction when forced upon one daily. Another is the attention which has been paid for many years now to the development of new weapons; we must not, however, lose sight of the fact that the rifle is still the basic weapon, and so long as the rifleman retains his existence he must be as efficient as training will make him. The main answer, however, as to why this lack of keenness exists is twofold. Firstly, it is a nuisance arranging for musketry, a nuisance not only to the man himself but to others. Others are implicated in the procedure of obtaining ammunition, of firing on the range, and in some cases even of obtaining the rifle. One or all of these others may legitimately be expected to discourage the enthusiast; their leisure is made unproductive. It is difficult to put forward a useful suggestion for curing this evil; but it should be borne in mind and ameliorated as far as range facilities and local conditions permit. Secondly, most pastimes offer a reward in the form of personal satisfaction within a reasonable measure of time. The horseman looks forward to the thrill of sticking a pig, the fisherman to landing a large mahseer. But the rifleman has no reward to look forward to beyond the satisfaction of knowing that he is an efficient soldier. The small-game shot has the pleasure of seeing a snipe or a partridge bowled over; if the rifleman knew that he would occasionally be taken "enemy shooting" or game shooting his enthusiasm would increase by leaps and bounds. It is, therefore, the duty of the officer to overcome, as far as is possible, these two obstacles. Let him produce the enthusiasm, and the desire to enter for range competitions will follow. But if he drives men into competitions he will be putting the cart before the horse, and suppressing the enthusiasm which it is the object of the A. R. A. to promote.

It is this lack of tangible satisfaction which is the real factor militating against enthusiasm in rifle shooting. This has to be artificially created, and for its creation no rules can be laid down—by the A. R. A. or anybody else. It is a personal matter between the instructor and the instructed; and it depends on many factors, personal, psychological, topographical, which can be applied only by the imagination and sympathy of the "man on the spot."

Certain things which the man on the spot must avoid have been indicated, and may be summarised in the statement that he must not enlist military discipline to facilitate the pursuit of a hobby which gives pleasure to *him* and not to his men; compulsory parades out of working hours are a sure way to kill enthusiasm. Again he must avoid extending the boredom which necessarily attaches to mere disciplinary efficiency achieved in the annual course; in the existing state of things a sufficient number of unpleasantly hot hours have to be spent compulsorily on the range during the hot weather; to add a further compulsory ten days to this period is another effective way of damping enthusiasm.

What the man on the spot must do is much more difficult to suggest. As has been explained, it is an individual matter depending upon materials and personalities. No real peace time substitute for enemy shooting can be produced; regulation fig. 2 and fig. 6 targets will serve their purpose in the technical annual course, but are no real substitute for an enemy. It is not of much practical value giving details of a field firing practice and saying "carry this out; you will find it interests the men." The root of the matter is that nearly all practices will interest a man once; some will bear a good deal of repetition. But the essence of interest is variety. Some men will be tickled to death at seeing a chattie full of water burst occasionally; knocking over a falling plate appeals to others; sinking a kerosene tin floating down a river can be amusing; various forms of snap shooting will arouse interest in another aspect. An occasional pool shoot on the range can produce an incentive in a tangible reward combined with a visible result. Above all introduce as much variation as possible. When enthusiasm has been roused men will willingly devote their spare time to rifle shooting, and will be training themselves for what is needed—efficiency on the battlefield. But until they have become enthusiastic confine musketry to parade hours. There are many occasions throughout the year when a few minutes musketry can be fitted in. How often does it occur that there are so few men for parade that it is difficult to know what to do with them? and how often is the answer "squad drill and rifle exercises?" Why not a little musketry? The men will not grudge the time spent on rifle training, when the alternative may have been "left, right; left, right."

To conclude with repetition;

Don't expect to get enthusiasm by entering teams for the A.R.A. competitions; get your teams by developing enthusiasm; develop enthusiasm by interesting variety spread over the year.

## THIS NEXT WAR BUSINESS

By "MOUSE."

I don't think I have ever been so terrified in my life. From all sides I hear that either I or my relatives at home, will be bombed or gassed in our beds before the 11th November 1940. Every statesman, every military correspondent, every cavalry subaltern and every woman I know are now certain that Armageddon—having missed fire in 1914—is now on the crack of eruption.

I don't believe it. I cannot imagine that the so-called statesmen who control the destinies of their nations could be such blood-thirsty fools. It is inconceivable that even party politicians of all countries could use their electoral and cheap power to goad their opponents into some silly dramatic act (which would mean war), to uphold some trivial question of nationality, of prestige, of so-called national honour. Gone are the Fashoda days; gone, I hope, are the days of singeing a monarch's beard.

Being a good soldier I am a pacifist. A few years ago—how far behind the times we all and the War Office were!—the outlook of the Empire's Defence Forces were defined as police duties. This meant peace within the territories of the Empire with an occasional crack at the recalcitrant marauder on our borders. It showed to the world that all we wanted was pacifism in its best sense. Nobody paid the slightest attention to our childlike gesture; for ten years we retained our world power by our City of London money, and two men and a dog.

All that has changed. The money is still there. The forces—even police forces—are absent. So now, we all have to view, with either the exasperation or the philosophy of our various temperaments, the sight of England spring-cleaning her Defence Forces. To me—a pacifist with a deep-rooted instinct that the last instrument of any policy should be Force (*vide* F. S. R.)—this spectacle of the British Government rushing at the last moment for a poker when confronted by well-known burglars is sickening.

But there it is. We are now confronted with a world situation far more serious and far more inflammatory than the 1909—1914 period. The Government at home appear to be not asleep to the situation and have appointed a Defence Minister to co-ordinate

all systems and schemes of Imperial Defence. What a lovely job ! We are increasing the Navy, Army and Air Force. We are entering into Staff talks with continental powers. We are, in fact, impressing the man in the street with our readiness and our ability to wage war in Singapore, the Suez Canal, or the Rhine, the seven seas and the Bosphorus. I hope the man in the street, bless his tax-paying heart, believes it.

Obviously all this demonstration of power is bluff, and incidentally one of the few signs recently evident of British statesmanship. Bluff is the Joker in the greasy pack of cards with which the Foreign Minister plays at Geneva ; our Minister has drawn it far too infrequently, although often when he has had it in his hand he has been too gentlemanly to use it. I don't think one should be a gentleman in Geneva.

This brings me to the League of Nations. It is such an easy target for ridicule that all the gutter-snipes in the world throw stones at it. And yet in the bottom of my bones—a vast unexplored region of unsorted thoughts—I cannot help feeling that if civilisation and progress in our common humanity is to exist a League of World Powers, represented by the elderly statesman type of Lloyd George, Hindenburg, Woodrow Wilson, Smuts and Gandhi might prevent another damned silly war.

When I survey the wondrous cross-word puzzle of the world at the present moment, I hesitate to comment. Indeed, I am frightened that some hard-working officer, sweating for promotion or the Staff College, might think my words are inspired. There is so much confusion, so much thoughtless criticism, so much undigested and indigestible matter being flung in front of us by our newspapers every day that I almost fear to sort out my own impressions.

First of all, I think it a fair basis for anything in the way of a discussion on world affairs to state the ordinary chap's standpoint. I think the O. C. would say, "The British Empire, as it is painted, however red, on the map, must stay; if any other nation tries to grab any portion of it, I'll fight him." This blatant, public-school assertion may offend the ears of all sorts of people and peoples—but, paradoxically enough, I think if the peoples of the British Empire uttered these bellicose sentiments at sunrise and sunset and taught them to their children at even prayer there would be a great striving of other nations to hold their hands, if not their tongues.

To get the British Commonwealth of Nations to speak with one tongue is a task seemingly beyond the power of the British Government. That is our greatest weakness, but there are now signs that the great Dominions, Canada, South Africa and Australia, are realising that the great Cow England has teats which may run dry. The U. S. A. are making overtures to Canada; these are to be welcomed as they may be the forerunners of an English-speaking (or American, if you like) Union in the world, which is the obvious and inescapable solution of World Peace. South Africa, so uncomplaisant, so hard to woo, so suspicious, is now trimming her sails to the storm on her horizon. Australia, having given her best in the last war and then been mauled by the economic slump, felt for a while that London, like Delhi, was very far away and could, if necessary, be disregarded, is now taking a more rational and personal view of her imperial position. Whether they like them or not, I always feel the Australians take their imperial responsibilities to heart. As for India, it is difficult to size her. I am very prejudiced in my judgment. Apart from Ulster and New Zealand, I don't think there is any other country in the Empire so loyal, so ready "to unsheath the sword" in the defence of a wantonly attacked weaker nation than India. The peoples of India have a lovely chivalrous streak, inherited individually, often directed in the mass unwisely, but which at times of stress could, guided and controlled, produce a force almost incalculable in its power. That, for me, is a big thought, and I don't think I am being sentimental.

This concludes the main argument; solidarity of the British Empire. If that can be achieved privately, and then shown publicly and unmistakably that our motives are complete union and a shoulder to shoulder front, the first battle in the next Great War is won.

Unfortunately, this does not extricate us from the grip of all our continental girl-friends. We are up to our eyes in the Treaty of Versailles, Locarno and Stresa. We are the only nation which has—good old Eton—tried to play to the rules. The rules were drawn up in the middle of a dirty game in progress and gave temporary satisfaction to the excited onlookers, but the umpires, it must be admitted, never thought that the idling goal-keepers, Mussolini and Hitler, would become centre-forwards.

Behind Mussolini and Hitler there is such a surging, tumultuous, kaleidoscopic background of European pieces of coloured glass that

every time one tries to focus them into shape the pattern changes, sometimes into a quiet church window, more often into an incomprehensible chaos of clashing colour. We all ask each other the meaning of these technicolour silly symphonies, and wish to God for some intelligible answer.

Personally, I don't think there is any answer. Dictators cannot, from their very nature and power, be answerable to any human chord or conception; they must live on their own fat, vanity and personal achievements; they must conceal their failures by their successes; they must be successful. Mussolini succeeded beyond his wildest dreams and established a new Roman Empire in the face of all the sanctions imposed by the League. Hitler, gaining confidence from his ruthless and admirable colleague, is now driving a reluctant and unattractive Britannia into the arms of a love-weary France. France (politically), a ripe prey to Communism, has already succumbed to the overtures of a suddenly discovered white Russia. Turkey is busy in the Straits and Japan goes from strength to strength in China.

Britannia should now waive all the rules. This is a very saddening subject, and it is not for me to criticise what is being, or has been, done to alleviate our distress and manifold wickedness. All the same I would like to see two things tried energetically or purposefully—

1. Get the British Empire together, and
2. Have an *Entente Cordiale* with the United States of America—

the joint slogan being "Peace" for the overture, and for the finale "Hell let loose" if necessary.

## BREAKING A DOG

By MAJOR G. A. MITCHLEY, 4-2ND PUNJAB REGIMENT.

The use of the word "breaking" is yet another instance of the inaccuracy of the English language. A word which nearer fits the process under discussion is "bending."

My article is not intended for people who keep gun dogs for shooting purposes; they make use of text-books and normally have a well-trained dog. Further they are dealing with a highly intelligent animal, who for generations has been the assistant of man.

I am mainly addressing my remarks to those people who occupy the next room to one at a hotel or an adjoining flat, whose dogs yap furiously at all times of the day and night, and who, in defiance of the shrieks of their owners, do every thing they ought not to do. Also to the owners of another type of dog which invariably drags its master along the road; and to the owner of those dogs which suddenly dash off into the blue and are found again only after a long and tiresome search. I would also include those owners whose dogs, though obedient, obviously are not happy. No one but will admit that the habits I have outlined are reprehensible in the extreme and do not add to the joy of the owner nor his neighbours, and I very much doubt whether the dog gets much fun out of his disobedience.

A factor one can always bear in mind in dealing with a dog is that whatever master does or says is right, and that a dog, if handled in the right way, will take a pleasure in any thing he does.

The object one sets before oneself in breaking a dog is to make him obedient to certain orders, capable of performing certain actions, and to be possessed of character and individuality.

Stated in detail, a dog should when trained—

1. Come when called, and stay until sent away.
2. Lie down when ordered, and stay until released.
3. Walk at heel until ordered away.
4. When roaming at large, to stay within call with one eye on master.
5. Respond immediately to encouragement or discouragement.

To break a dog there are certain essentials without which success is impossible.

Firstly, patience. If you lose your temper with your dog there is no hope of success. Secondly, understanding of the dog's mind. Thirdly, ability to impress your own superior nature on the dog.

Probably the most frequent cause of failure in breaking a dog is due to misapplied thrashings, reprimand, or encouragement. I don't say that thrashing is not necessary but certainly the less physical force applied, the better. Mistakes occur because the owner does not look at the question from his dog's point of view.

Take, for instance, walking at heel. You have got your dog there, when suddenly he shoots off. After much irate shouting and running you collect him, rate him soundly and beat him; you say for leaving your heel. He says for coming back to you, and that the "come here" call or whistle is not to his advantage.

Before proceeding to definite methods of attaining the perfect dog, let us settle the question of beating and reprimand. It is fatal to call a dog to you for a beating; coming to master should always be connected in his mind with some thing good. It's no good running to catch a dog. He has the legs of you every time, and it creates in the dog's mind a sense of superiority over you. A method many trainers adopt is to make the dog lie down and then taking him by the collar lead him away for a few yards: and then thrash him. In this way you stop him from connecting lying down with a thrashing. But you must be certain in your mind that the dog knows the cause of the thrashing and you must be sure that your dog will benefit by a thrashing. Another point, after a thrashing try to wait until the dog shows penitence before you show forgiveness. Now let us take the five things a dog should know and do:

1. *Come when called and stay until sent away.*

That means come at full gallop because he likes coming, and stay until ordered away because you have impressed your will on him.

In all training the system should be by reward. You call the dog and when he comes give him a reward, pat him and tell him what a good dog he is. Do not let him go away until you tell him to do so. As you are presumably training a puppy you will at first have short lessons, increasing the length later. The dog must not get bored at the idea of coming to you. Later, kind words replace rewards and eventually the dog acquires the habit of liking to come to you and will come whatever the distraction.

If in the puppy stage your dog will not come to you, never run after him. A successful trick is to run away from him calling as you go; it is almost invariably successful. If, however, the dog will not come, you must stay in your place calling the dog and have somebody bring him to you.

2. *Lie down when ordered and stay until told to go.*

Here again rewards and kind words achieve the desired end. Gently put the puppy in the desired position saying, "Drop, drop, good dog, good dog," or some such words whilst you keep him down. Later, he will lie down to the word "drop" as he will realise that drop means a piece of meat. When he has learned to drop, increase the distance between you, at the time of giving the order, and the time you keep him down. Later, test him by running away from him and by going round a corner out of his sight. He will at first fail to pass these tests, and on such occasions it is essential that you put the dog back on the very spot where he committed the error.

3. *Walk at heel until ordered away.*

This is a trial to most energetic young dogs. First have the dog on a lead and start by insisting that he is actually behind one knee, not with nose poking round your leg, for that shows he is wanting to get away. Lessons at first must be very short with frequent reward, and here again repeat the words "Heel, good dog" so that he learns the order. If you catch him actually escaping, a sharp tap will assist, but it is no good beating him once he has got away and other ideas have entered his mind. This does not mean that you should overlook a fault. To overlook a fault is fatal in dog training. In this case, as in similar ones, you must content yourself with reprimanding the dog.

4. *When roaming at large, to keep within call with one eye on master.*

As I have said above, a dog always has the legs of his master, but master has the superior mind. From puppyhood never let the dog see that you are worried about his whereabouts. Make him find out where you are. During a walk, at a suitable time hide from him. If he comes, misses you and returns to find you, the lesson has well begun, otherwise call him. When he comes rail at him for losing you. Repeat the process and you will soon have a dog who will not turn a corner without looking back to see if you are following, and

such a dog will not suddenly shoot off into the blue, nor disappear when let out at night.

5. *Respond immediately to encouragement and discouragement.*

This will be a recognition of the encouraging words "yes" and "good," and the discouraging words "no" and "bad," by which a dog is kept under control in all his actions. They are words which will enter into training naturally, and their teaching will result in the dog looking to its master for instructions.

As I said above, each item of training is twofold in nature. First, the performance of an act, and, secondly, the submission to his master's will. The dog is taught to come readily and, having come, to await his master's pleasure. Here is exemplified the great secret of training animals, *i.e.*, impressing one's own superior nature on the lower animal.

During all training this should be borne in mind. If the dog is lying looking at you, stare him out. If away from you, direct your gaze and thoughts at him until he turns towards you. Will him to come to you. This is the way of making an obedient, but not a cowed dog.

From the action of sending a dog away arises another point. Like children dogs need play and here again you as his master should keep him in control during play time by providing the form of amusement, and exercise your control by calling him from amusement, to come to heel or to drop. The amusement may be carrying a stick, chasing and recovering a ball or dashing ahead to investigate the scent of birds hidden in bushes. Whatever it is, do not let him go wild.

Now, the dog's vocabulary. However intelligent a dog may be, he does not understand your conversation. He responds to intonation readily, but the less words he has to learn the better. The following will cover most situations:—

No	.. A deterrent.
Yes	.. An encouragement.
Good	.. Praise.
Bad	.. Reprimand.
Come here	.. To come.
Seek	.. To go and play.
Drop	.. To lie down.
Heel	.. To come in to heel.

Whilst on this subject, remember that in choosing a name for a dog, do not select a name ending with "No" and select one which is not difficult to shout. For instance, Slip or Spot are bad names though popular with dog-owners, Rover and Sandy are easily sounded. Do not try training a puppy in company with friends or other dogs. Take him away by himself where there are no distractions. Later, when training has progressed, you can run him with other human beings or dogs and so perfect his training.

In this short article I have tried to show the main accomplishments a dog should possess, the mental outlook of the dog towards that most difficult subject punishment, the principles on which breaking must be based and the methods of producing the results.

Every dog presents a different problem. Some resent a beating, some thrive under it. Some are timid and must be encouraged, and some are boisterous and must be restrained; but bearing in mind always the principles and your own dog's peculiarities, you will by these methods achieve obedience and trust, and produce a happy and well-mannered dog, who looks to you for his games and amusement and who looks on you as something most marvellous.

## THE WAZIRISTAN EXPERIMENTAL RIFLE COURSE.

*An Address to the Officers, of the Razmak Brigade by the District Commander.*

1. Our object in war is to kill.
2. What arms have we got with which to do this killing?

### *Artillery*

The targets presented being usually small, vague and elusive, the effect of the 3.7" howitzer is mainly moral. Targets like those at Pioneer Piquet in 1919 are rare exceptions. The Mahsuds, at any rate, learnt a lesson they will never forget.

### *Machine guns*

Their effect is largely preventive. They prevent hostile movement. They force the enemy to keep his head down, whereby they help our own movements. Targets on which really destructive M. G. fire can be brought down are rare and then are highly fleeting.

### *Rifle*

There remains the rifle, which, in competent hands, used to be and must again become the real casualty inflicter in war. To do this we must restore the confidence in this weapon lost in the war, due, partly, to siege conditions but even more to the untrained men then in the ranks who lacked the skill to use the rifle effectively hence all belief in its value as a man-killer. The inferiority complex, thus begotten, must be got rid of. When confronted with an enemy, the tendency is still for the rifleman to look over his shoulder for the M. G. or the automatic to do his killing for him. Whereas he can and must exterminate them himself without more ado.

3. Now to hit anything with reasonable certainty we must see it clearly; and to do that we must be comparatively close—say within 300 yards of head and shoulder targets.

At longer ranges, we need to eliminate the factor of human error, to increase the stability of the barrel and to make up for the loss of visual clearness, hence of accuracy, by increasing the volume of fire.

Here the automatic comes in, especially to produce covering fire, which is its special rôle.

4. If we are to achieve our object and improve our killing capacity on the hill-sides, as indeed in all wars, we have got to set ourselves an ideal. And here it is.

The rifleman must never fire a shot except with the firm and reasonable intention of killing.

Otherwise, his virtue as a killer becomes debauched and his confidence in himself deteriorates.

Firing to frighten, prophylactic fire are utterly taboo ; apart from the waste of ammunition, which on the frontier we cannot afford, it heartens the enemy to find we are noisy but harmless.

5. Our rifle training must aim at ability to hit targets which are both small and inconspicuous with only brief exposures ; often coming as a surprise ; usually uphill or downhill and not on the level ; moreover they may have to be engaged whilst on the move.

So here is a second ideal to work up to.

In the conditions just given, if we can score one hit out of three shots, inside 300 yards, we shall unquestionably win our fights.

6. How are we to reach this efficiency ?

The Bisley method with its wholly artificial conditions ; the large conspicuous target, indefinitely exposed to a firer on a smooth platform, over level ground, bears no relation to the needs of training for war.

The firer can dally till a cloud shadow has passed, till a puff of wind is over, till his breath and heart-beats are just right, till his sights and trigger pressure are perfect.

Then and not before does he release his bullet.

Such methods, if not overdone, have their value in the preliminary introduction of the recruit to his rifle ; thereafter having no relation to war conditions, they become positively harmful.

We have got to unlearn a lot of what we have drummed into our men before they can become effective snaphooters.

You will find this very much so with the use of the sights, wherein we have got to get nearer to shotgun methods.

7. To start with the most difficult form of snaphooting, from the soldier's standpoint, namely, when on the move. Try out the following procedure :

(a) He must come to a standstill, facing his target, with his left foot and left shoulder forward.

Unless his foot-work is right he will not be balanced, without which good shooting is impossible.

*Forthwith, he must point at the target with his left hand.*

- (b) The weight of the rifle must be *between* the hands; this is impossible if the left hand is at the "point of balance," hence push the left hand forward as far as the sling will allow.

The rifle must be horizontal or the impetus of the swing, when coming up to the aim, will cause wild shooting; keep both elbows close to the sides: this is a position which can be maintained without any strain on the muscles.

- (c) When mounting the rifle to the shoulder it must be kept horizontal, the left hand constantly aiming at the target.

In snapshooting the smooth mounting of the rifle is far more important than smooth trigger pressure.

If the left hand has done its job, and after a little practice its accuracy is remarkable, only small adjustments of alignment will be necessary after the butt has been brought firmly to the shoulder. Then, without any pause, the shot is fired.

The men must be taught to aim low, at the ground line of their targets, to overcome the usual tendency to fire high; even if they do shoot low the ricochet or stones thrown up may strike the target.

This aiming low is doubly necessary in poor light conditions.

8. As to snapshooting when halted—

The position adopted must suit the ground and the cover available; the less strain it imposes on the muscles the better.

Here again, the left shoulder must be forward, the rifle horizontal and the left hand be aimed at the target as soon as it appears.

Again, we need swift, smooth mounting of the rifle to the shoulder and the firm bedding of the butt.

Due to the tribesmen's love of being on higher ground, most of our shooting will be uphill and unless a sangar is available the best position is probably lying on the stomach.

For downhill shooting that position is unsuitable—the blood runs to the head and the neck muscles are strained. So try lying on the back with legs crossed and feet locked, the rifle resting between the knees, the butt in the right arm-pit.

For accurate shooting without a rest, this latter position has no equal.

Another useful position both downhill and on the level is sitting with the feet crossed and inter-locked, thereby making the knees a firmer support than when sitting with the feet apart.

Do not merely try and then discard these suggestions because they are unfamiliar to you ; they are worth a full trial.

In this matter, don't have cut and dried notions. What suits a long, supple fellow will not necessarily suit the short sturdy type.

9. Try working the men in pairs ; whilst the one shoots, the other observes the enemy and the strike of the bullet.

Before a battalion starts this course, I suggest the need of forming a British Officers cadre to show the way, to find out the difficulties and to overcome them.

10. Remember this course is still in an experimental stage ; we hope to become wiser and to be able to improve it as we proceed. In this, I look to you for help. You know the object which is to make our shooting battleworthy.

Apply this acid test to any suggestion you think of putting forward.

It is not enough that you should put your men through this course as a routine. I want much more than that. I ask for your enthusiasm, that you should believe as firmly as I do in the need of restoring our rifle efficiency in battle to its proper place, and that in this experimental course we have the nucleus of a method, if no more, whereby we can achieve this important, indeed this vital object.

## THE CITY OF LONDON AND REGIMENTAL PRIVILEGES

By C. GREY

The privilege claimed and exercised by certain English regiments and the Royal Marines of marching through the City of London in "panoply of war" is one whose origin is impossible to trace, there being absolutely no documentary evidence as to its grant in the records of the regiments concerned, the War Office, or the City of London. All the claims are based on an original connection with the armed forces of the City and its Liberties (adjacent suburbs), these being the "Trained Bands," or the garrison of the Tower, both existing before the institution of the regular Standing Army.

All these forces being local troops, composed of citizens, both officers and soldiers, paid (when necessary) by City funds or subscriptions, were what may be called a domestic body, never likely to use their assembled armed formations to the detriment of their fellow citizens. Hence it was a matter of course that they should march fully armed and with the military music of the period, through the City they were armed and trained to defend at need. Why this matter-of-fact ceremonial should be so highly prized by those who claim descent from the Civic troops is a mystery to those who do not know or realise the supreme importance regiments attach to anything which singles them out from the mass.

At present there are four regiments which claim and exercise the privilege on opportunity; these being the Grenadier Guards, the Buffs or East Kent Regiment, the Royal Fusiliers or City of London Regiment, and the Royal Marines. Up to the late decades of the last century the only one said to be entitled to the privilege was the Buffs, but since then it has been claimed by and conceded to the others. Before proceeding to analyse these claims, the evidence on which they are founded and the possible origin of the ceremonial, it will be useful, in view of so many of the claims being based on descent from the London Trained Bands, to give some brief account of that once justly famous body of Citizen soldiers.

The Trained Bands of the Counties and Cities were composed of men selected from the general body, liable to military service and trained to the use of arms and military movements by experts. Those of London were controlled and maintained by the City itself (including

the Liberties) and no other troops were permitted to enter the City without special permission, for in those days an apparently peaceful progression might turn into a sudden assault or armed occupation. Hence the present privilege of certain regiments may be taken to mean that they are adopted by it (the City).

Even now the right of the City to forbid entrance to any armed body other than of their own men, is perpetuated by the fact that even the King, when he has occasion to enter the City with his escort, asks formal permission from the Lord Mayor at Temple Bar Memorial. After the institution of the Standing Army, no troops belonging to it were allowed to enter the City, either as regiments or recruiting parties, without displaying a written request from the Secretary of State in Council to the Lord Mayor. It seems to me that it is from these recruiting orders permitting small parties to enter the City with arms, drums and colours (of sorts) that the present elaborate procession of a whole regiment has evolved. "Great trees from little acorns grow."

This supposition is confirmed by the admissions of the historians of the Buffs and the Royal Marines, both of whom have been unable to find any orders relating to the passage of troops through the City since the coming of the Standing Army, other than those for what were called *beating up* parties desirous of obtaining men in the City. Such parties invariably consisted of a small party of soldiers of the regiment, a drum and fife, the company colour, so long as they existed, and later a regimental flag of sorts, the whole under command of a sergeant or subaltern officer. They are frequently mentioned in the works of Smollett and Fielding.

Each was provided with an order of which the following is a copy. With one exception all these orders on the City were for the one occasion and a limited number of men specified therein. That exception, which also relates to the Buffs,<sup>1</sup> will be mentioned later.

*Charles Rex*

"Wee doe hereby authorise you John Mowat, one of the Serjeants of Captain Manleys Company of the Holland Regiment, now in garrison at the Isle of Jersey, to raise by beat of drum thirty-two volunteers for the said Company. Provided that, in case you beat your drum in the City of London or the Liberties thereof, you shall, before you beat the sayde Drum, shew this our Warrant

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<sup>1</sup> History of the Buffs, pp. 143 and 153.

to Our Right Worthy and well beloved the Lord Mayor of London . . . ." The rest which relates to billeting, passage, etc., may be omitted. The exception runs—

*Charles Rex*

"These are to authorise you, Colonel Thomas Howard, to give orders to Captaines Henry Pomeroy and Baptist Alcock respectively, of the Holland Regiment under the Command of Our Trusty and Well beloved Colonel Sir Walter Vane, to raise, by beate of Drumm twenty volunteers apaiice for the recruiting of their Companies. And also to *give orders, from time to time to anie captaines of the sayde Holland Regiment*, by beate of Drumm, to raise volunteers for the recruiting of their companies. Provided always that when, and soe often as anie of them shall goe about raising the sayde volunteers within Our Citty of London they shall first show this Our Warrant to the Major (mayor) of the Citty of London and the Liberties thereof and *that they shall raise no more than will be sufficient to complete their establishment* . . . .

Given at Whitehall the 29th Day of April 1672

Arlington (Secretary) "

The order to Serjeant Mowat is dated September 1670. Though it is known that such orders for recruiting were issued to the Guards and other existing regiments up to the end of the Century, that to Colonel Howard is the only one giving a general and unlimited sanction. It is on this that the Buffs apparently rely to shew that their claim on London as a birthplace was acknowledged. Having in mind the fact that the first time they made such a march was not until the middle of the Nineteenth Century, which may have been for want of opportunity, certainly, Line regiments being very seldom quartered in London, it would appear that the then Colonel, knowing the history of the regiment, took the opportunity of being stationed at the Tower to *chance* a march and, having got away with it, established a precedent. I see no other solution.

Let us now enter upon the account of the Trained Bands as being one essential to an understanding of the claims. The earliest mention of the armed forces of the City of London is in 1509<sup>1</sup> when Henry VIII reviewed 3,000 Bows and Bills at Cheapside where they had marched from the Conduit through the City and home again to their assembly ground at Moorfields. This is the first known mention of any procession of troops through the City. In 1539<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Mackay's History of London, p. 201.

<sup>2</sup> Stow's Annals of London, p. 39.

he again held a review at Westminster of no less than 15,000 soldiers with "drums, music, etc.," they having marched there through the City.

A few months later the Honourable Artillery Company was formed from these forces, whose claim on it was recognised by the fact that the governing body must, according to the Rules of 1659<sup>1</sup> always include four Field officers of the Trained Bands. In 1562 Queen Elizabeth reviewed 3,000 London soldiers in Hyde Park, and in 1572<sup>2</sup> (February) she gave orders in Council to the City to select and specially train 3,000 of the best men in view of danger from Spain. These men she reviewed at Greenwich on May Day 1572, and what then happened is thus described by Roger Williams, one of them:

3" On this time there was a faire muster of Londoners before the Queens Maiestie at Greenwich. Amongst them were divers capitaines and soludgers who had served some in Scotland, some in Ireland and some in France and, having nothing to doe with the help and countenance of great men who favoured the cause and the Deputties of Flushing Captain Thomas Morgan levied a faire company of 300 men of whom many were officers who had commaunded before together with manie gentlemen to the least of 100 of whom I was one. This band was the first that served the Netherlanders and arrived in good time for them (a week later) Flushing was in great distress."

This body of Trained Band men was the first of the many score thousands which England sent over during the next 90 years, many from London which at times furnished complete regiments, and always a greater or smaller number of recruits as needed. Many of the survivors returned to London, there to retake their place in the Trained Bands and, by example and precept, bring them up to that excellence which made them the best of all the troops engaged on the Parliamentary side in the Civil War<sup>4</sup>. The Muster Roll of the City troops in the year 1588 shews them as consisting of 45 Companies of 150 men in each, of which 40 belonged to the City and 5 to the Liberties.

Though those of the City were classified into East, West, North and South regiments, that was not strictly correct; for each company

<sup>1</sup> Journal Army Historical Research, Vol. VII, p. 5.

<sup>2</sup> History of Buffs, p. 7.

<sup>3</sup> Actions in the Low Countries, H. B., p. 7.

<sup>4</sup> J. A. H. Research, Vol. IV, p. 64.

was independent under its captain and flew its own colour of different combinations, the only thing in common being the Red Cross. Westminster only had a Captain and Colonel to each company. The total was 7,150, of whom a third carried pikes. For the Armada menace London contributed 10,000 men, of whom the 1,000 at Tilbury appear to have been brought back (temporarily) from Holland. By 1599<sup>1</sup> the companies had dropped to 15, having a total strength of 3,375 men. In 1612<sup>2</sup> a revival set in, the men being now assembled in regular regiments complete with Colonel and staff and trained by officers and soldiers returned from Holland.

There were eleven regiments in all, these being the Red, Blue, Yellow, Orange, Green and White of the City itself, the Red and Blue of Westminster, and the First and Second Tower Hamlets. Strype<sup>3</sup> records that they became regular academies of military training, outsiders resorting there for training which proved useful in the Civil Wars when such men largely officered the Parliamentary regiments. Increased to 15 full regiments numbering 18,000, the City troops under the command of Phillip Skippon, a veteran of the Dutch Wars, were the most reliable of the Parliamentary troops until the institution of the New Model Army. Of them Clarendon<sup>4</sup> wrote :—

“The London Trained Bands and auxiliary regiments, who men till then had held too cheap in estimation, behaved themselves to a wonder and were in truth the preservation of that army that day (Newbury). For they stood as a bulwark and rampire to defend the rest and, when their wings of horse were scattered and dispersed (by Rupert), kept their ground so steadily that though Prince Rupert Himself led up the choice horse to charge them he endured their storm of small shot, but making no impression on their stand of pikes was forced to wheel about.”

They behaved similarly well at Naseby and Marston Moor, and it was a tribute to them that Phillip Skippon,<sup>5</sup> who had risen from private to Captain in the “English Dutch Brigade,” was selected to raise and train the New Model. After the war he returned to London as Captain General. The next we hear of the Trained Bands was when they were called out to quell the Fifth Monarchy Rebellion

<sup>1</sup> J. A. H. Research, Vol. IV, p. 69.

<sup>2</sup> Old and New London, Vol. I, p. 161.

<sup>3</sup> Old and New London, Vol. I, p. 161.

<sup>4</sup> Old and New London, Vol. I, p. 161.

<sup>5</sup> Old and New London, Vol. I, p. 198.

in which, though at first driven back by the insurgents,<sup>1</sup> they rallied and held them until the arrival of the Guards whom they assisted to break and capture the rebels.

In 1662 Charles II had the Militia Act passed, though it only affected the Trained Bands by changing their titles and by taking away the Tower Hamlets Regiments for the Lieutenant of the Tower. But the old title still held good in general until the force was broken up in 1784. In 1688 they were called out for the defence of London. Incidentally, one of their Companies<sup>2</sup> rescued Judge Jeffries from the mob, while two regiments held strong points in the City. In 1692 the City forces were increased to 9,000 in view of a possible invasion by the French, but were not required, whereon the additional men were discharged.

The Muster Roll of the Militia of London and its Liberties in 1710<sup>3</sup> shews six regiments in London City and two at Westminster. Each was commanded by a Knight and consisted, with the exception of Westminster, of eight companies of 120 with three officers. The Red Regiment of Westminster had 12 companies, and the Blue 9, the total strength being over 7,000. They were called out for the Jacobite rebellions of 1715 and 1745, after which we hear no more of them till the Gordon Riots of 1780, when they were again called out. The new Militia Act of 1784 removed the old Trained Bands entirely from the control of the Civil authorities, thus ending a body of citizen soldiers who in their time had served both London and their country exceeding well. We now turn to the connection of the regiments claiming the privilege, with the Trained Bands.

The English soldiers who had served the Dutch for so many years, were, after the Peace of Munster in 1648,<sup>4</sup> reduced to the regiments that had been permanently instituted in 1595. In 1664 these numbered about<sup>5</sup> 60 officers and just over 1,700 men, all on garrison duty. Besides these there was a Scots Brigade of about 45 officers and 1,100 men, similarly employed. Though these Brigades had been left untouched during the war of 1652, it was now resolved to give them the option of renouncing their British allegiance, uniforms, colours, etc., or immediate dismissal.

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<sup>1</sup> Mackay's History of London, p. 309.

<sup>2</sup> Old and New London, Vol. I, p. 136.

<sup>3</sup> J. A. H. Research, Vol. XII, p. 103.

<sup>4</sup> History of the Buffs, pp. 78-79.

<sup>5</sup> History of the Buffs, p. 87.

All but three Scots officers accepted the terms, but of the English only 25 officers, most of whom had served the Parliament, and a small number of men accepted. All the *recusants* were immediately disbanded in Holland, but being repatriated were, soon after arrival in England formed into the Holland Regiment under one of their old Colonels, Robert Sydney. They were placed on the Naval establishment as an additional Maritime unit, and as such remained until 1667 when they came on the land establishment of the Standing Army. As the "Holland Regiment" they remained until 1689, when on the Duke of York's Regiment being *broken*, its then title of Prince George of Denmark's passed to them as the next senior.

It is, therefore, fairly evident that the Buffs may claim descent from the Trained Bands. We will now take the case of the Royal Marines, who claim to inherit from the Duke of York and Albany's Maritime Regiment of Foot, raised for sea service on the 28th of October 1664.<sup>1</sup> It was commanded by Sir William Killigrew, though he was then still the Colonel of the 3rd Regiment of the English-Dutch Brigade, and during the interval between the disbandment of the English Regiments in Holland and their re-formation in that country seems to have taken into its ranks the repatriated privates.

It also passed into the land service in May 1667, dropping the title of Maritime, though it was for some time still occasionally called the Lord Admiral's Regiment. It is said that this regiment was largely recruited from the City Trained Bands, which is doubtful, as by that time these had dropped back to their normal composition of employees and apprentices of the merchants, etc., of London, and were hardly likely to have enlisted as temporary soldiers—the regiments of those days being greatly reduced after the end of a war. Probably they got a number of London-born men as they were known to have *beaten up* in the City.

As the Duke of York's Regiment it served afloat and ashore (in common with all other existing regiments) also providing companies for emergency regiments, formed from the Guards and Holland itself, for service in France, Virginia and at Tangiers. Now, though on his accession, James II relinquished the honorary Colonelcy of the regiment to Prince George of Denmark, husband of the future Queen Anne, he still considered it his own and, in accordance with

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<sup>1</sup> History of the Buffs, p. 113.

his policy of Catholicising the Army, introduced a number of Catholic officers and men into it ; a policy which ended it in 1689 and caused it to be kept in the background during the troubles which ended in his deposition.

After the accession of William III, he decided to retain his Dutch Guards and the English and Scots Dutch Brigades (newly formed in 1674, three regiments in each), and to replace them in Holland by those thought or known to be dissatisfied. Amongst these were the Guards, the Royal Scots, the Prince George's Regiment and the Holland Regiment. The Guards were humiliated by the inglorious part they had taken in the late revolution, the Royal Scots had Stuart sympathies, the "Prince's" Catholic officers and men, and the "Holland" had recently been commanded by a Catholic nobleman.

These regiments and others were ordered to different ports for embarkation in February 1689. The Royal Scots mutinied at Ipswich on the way to Harwich and turned back for Scotland. Being at once pursued, they were rounded up and brought back to Harwich where they embarked only 300 strong, nearly all of whom deserted to the French later. The others eventually embarked except the "Prince's" which now disappeared, the only trace being an order for its payment as having been "Broake" on the 28th of February 1689,<sup>1</sup> and another order transferring men to the Coldstream Guards. No reason is given, but it would appear that the sailing of James II with an invading force precipitated the end.

The order is laconic enough, as contained in a Treasury Pay Roll, merely stating that the regiment was "broke" on the 28th February and directing payment "of such further sums as you have paid the sayd regiment from the first of March 1689 to the date of their disbandment." This apparently refers to the men mentioned in the following order :—

"Our Will<sup>2</sup> and Pleasure is that the Sevell private soldiers and non-commissioned officers of the Prince George of Denmark's Regiment now at Gravesend be put aboard the ships bound for Holland and incorporated, as they are hereby incorporated in Our Coldstream Regiment of Foot Guards."

"Given at Whitehall the 19th Day of March 1689."

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<sup>1</sup> History of the Buffs, p. 280.

<sup>2</sup> History of the Buffs, p. 281.

The title of the disbanded regiment passed to the next senior, "The Holland," which henceforth dropped its old title. The fate of the officers is nowhere explained. Probably many had already deserted to the deposed King, and the others accepted their dismissal quietly to avoid further trouble. By the mention of *ships* it would appear that there were still a number of men to be turned over to the Coldstreams, these probably being the Protestant soldiers. As will be seen by the foregoing, the men passed to the Coldstream, and the title to the Holland, thus making these regiments, especially the former, heirs to anything the old Maritime Regiment could claim.

The only historian who gives any reason for the sudden and unadvertised disbandment of the regiment is Hannay in his "History of the Navy" who states that it was due to its "being too much attached to the deposed King," which was undoubtedly the real reason. A further difficulty in the claim of the present Marines is the fact that, between 1689 and 1755, there were many other regiments of Marines raised and disbanded. These were *Pembroke's*<sup>1</sup> and *Torrington's* in 1690, disbanded two years later. Next come four regiments (unnamed) that lasted only a year. We now find *Holt's* and *Harmon's*, raised in 1702 and disbanded in 1711. Then comes a gap of 28 years, when six regiments<sup>2</sup> *Moreton's*, *Wynyard's*, *Lowther's*, *Douglas'*, *Robinson's* and *Wolfe's* were raised, to be also disbanded in November 1748.

As the present regiment was raised in 1755, it would be interesting to have the reasoning which bridges these ditches and climbs the fences, or levels them to form an unbroken connection with the regiment of 1664. The only thing we can find in connection with the claim of the Marines is the following anecdote quoted in the history of the Buffs, which curiously enough takes it as proof. All it does really establish is that a party was recruiting for the Marines in the usual manner, and that these were one of the Marine Regiments disbanded in 1748. It runs:

"In the year 1746<sup>3</sup> as a *detachment*! of Marines were beting along Cheapside, a magistrate came up to the officer and told him to desist from disturbing the peace of the City with his drumming. The officer immediately replied 'Sir, we are Marines.'

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<sup>1</sup> J. A. H. Research (Army Lists), Vol XI, p. 155.

<sup>2</sup> J. A. H. Research (Army Lists), Vol XI, p. 155.

<sup>3</sup> History of Buffs, p. 155.

‘Oh Sir,’ said the magistrate, ‘I did not know that. Pray continue.’”

The claim of the Grenadier Guards is based on the allegation that their 3rd Battalion was raised in London, mainly from the Trained Bands. I can find nothing for or against it in the general military history of the City, so at that must leave it for the Royal Fusiliers or City of London Regiment. As this was raised in 1685 from a nucleus of three old companies of Independents garrisoning the City, and as they have also absorbed the Tower Hamlets Militia as auxiliary battalions, their claim to be considered “sons of the City” seems indisputable.

## LETTER TO THE EDITOR

THE CHANGING ASPECT OF OPERATIONS ON THE NORTH WEST  
FRONTIER

DEAR SIR,

Shpagwishtama's article on the above subject, which was published in your April number, is very interesting reading and there is much food for thought in the various points he brings up. I think, however, that he overstates the case when he remarks on "the vast strides made by the Pathan in sniping," at any rate, as far as sniping at night is concerned. It is a curious fact that the tribes inhabiting the country North of the Kabul river have always expended a vast amount of ammunition in night sniping during frontier operations in comparison with the Afridis, Orakzais and Mahsuds of the South, who are much more canny in this respect. Those who took part in the Mohmand Expedition of 1908 will have vivid recollections of sniping at night, and I think I am right in saying that, beyond Ghalanai, every camp occupied during the operations was heavily sniped, sometimes only for an hour or two and at other times nearly all night. In those days there was less ponderosity and steam-roller business in frontier operations than at present, and in the course of three weeks two brigades traversed practically the whole of Mohmand country. The result was that, as troops were never in one camp for more than a night or two, it was almost impossible to initiate anti-sniping measures which, to ensure success, require an intimate knowledge of the ground and a close study of the habits of the snipers. On one occasion a party was sent out (from Nahakki camp as far as I remember) to snipe the snipers, but the result was most regrettable. They were Afridis, all volunteers for the job, and instead of stalking the snipers they stalked off to their homes in Tirah, taking their Government rifles and ammunition with them. Again at Rustum camp on the Buner border in 1915, the sniping was very heavy every night for about a week, until the lashkars occupying the passes into Buner had dispersed and all opposition ceased. There the snipers were Bunerwals and Hindustani Fanatics, the latter easily recognisable by their cries (in Hindustani) of "Takra ho jao," to which our men would reply: "What are you doing in our latrines? Come out and show yourselves," and other remarks of an indelicate nature. What Shpagwishtama describes as "a 1935 invention" was tried at

Rustum with complete success, the target being a wooded graveyard within 200 yards of the perimeter, which snipers were in the habit of occupying. One night, as soon as sniping started from this locality, a section of field guns loosed off ten rounds gun-fire from the perimeter; whereupon the sniping stopped abruptly and the graveyard was never again occupied. Another expedient which was tried with success at Rustum was the construction, by an ingenious sapper, of a Heath Robinson fougasse, operated by a trip wire and located in a likely place. It went off with a roar the very first night and next morning a sword and a pair of blood-stained chaplis were found on the site. Yet another expedient was the digging of a deep pit, filled with spikes and covered over and camouflaged with grass and sand, in a *nullah*-bed close to camp. This was successful in so far that a would-be sniper fell plumb into it—and no doubt got the shock of his life—but he left no blood or other trophies behind him. A very important item for protection at night, of which Shpagwishtama makes no mention, is light, which the Pathan hates above all things and will not face. At Rustum we successfully blocked a *nullah*—which had been regularly used by snipers—for a night, by the simple expedient of placing a hurricane lamp shaded with a kerosene oil tin so that it lit up the *nullah*-bed. The second night, however, the lamp was hit by a bullet (as was inevitable sooner or later) and smashed to smithereens.

Then we got hold of a searchlight, which in those days was a curiosity on the frontier; and thereby hangs a tale!

The camp was situated on open ground, easily defended on all sides except the east, where a number of small *nullahs* converged to within 75 yards of the perimeter. To guard this flank a camp piquet was built overlooking the junction of the nearest two *nullahs*. The searchlight was placed on the perimeter behind this piquet and it was arranged that as soon as the piquet commander telephoned that the snipers had arrived (they used to creep up extraordinarily close as we had no bombs), the light would go on and the piquet open fire. This sounded grand and both O. C. Piquet and O. C. Searchlight were all of a "doodah" in anticipation. As soon as it was dark, Searchlight could be heard at intervals whispering hoarsely down the telephone: "Sister Anne, Sister Anne, are they coming, are they coming?" And eventually the reply came from Sister Anne "By Gum, they've come. Turn on the light." On flashed the light—a

pause—and then BANG from the piquet. “Did you get him?” says Searchlight. “I don’t think so,” replies Sister Anne, “the blighter keeps bobbing about. Hang on a minute.” Another nerve-wracking pause—then BANG—BANG. Searchlight, with his eyes popping out of his head and his ear glued to the phone, heard a gurgling noise and the voice of Sister Anne who sputtered: “Damn, I’ve been shooting at my own shadow.”

So that was that! But nevertheless the searchlight proved invaluable and sniping at short range ceased forthwith.

*Note.*—Sister Anne is not, like the writer, a sojourner in the sloth-belt—one of the “By Jove boys” mentioned by Shpagwishtama—but is still serving bravely upon the Bloody Border and should these lines catch his eyes, he will no doubt blushing recall the searchlight incident and be able to vouch for the truth of it.

Yours faithfully,

“SHIGGADAR.”

## REVIEWS

**Mountain Warfare on the Sand Model**

BY MAJOR D. B. MACKENZIE, B.A. (OXON.)

*(Messrs. William Clowes, London) 5sh.*

This book gives a series of sand model exercises, designed to teach the more elementary routine and tactics of mountain warfare. It should help to overcome the difficulties of this type of training in stations where suitable ground is not available.

The introductory sections and the full notes which accompany the exercises and solutions give a clear picture of the problems which troops operating on the frontier can only overcome if properly trained.

There is much sound practical advice in the book, which, though perhaps common knowledge in units with long experience of frontier warfare, should prove very useful to units and individuals new to frontier conditions. There are also a series of questions and answers suitable for N. C. O.'s examinations.

The Advanced Guard exercise is open to the criticism that adequate covering fire has not been provided by the Advanced Guard Commander, in that a vital piquet is moving up with no machine gun support. This may be due to the author's desire to teach one lesson at a time and to keep the exercise simple. There is, however, danger in neglecting to arrange for covering fire to be immediately available.

One other small criticism concerns the loading of pistols. The point of only loading five chambers is to avoid accidents. The chamber under the hammer should be empty and not the one "next for duty" as the author suggests on page 47. The danger of accident lies in the pistol falling and striking the hammer when equipment is removed. When the trigger is pulled it should be for business, and there may be no chance to pull it twice!

Major Mackenzie's book should prove of value to units both on and off the frontier, and will be found very useful for the training of junior leaders in the individual training period.

R. L. G.

**The Liao-Yang Campaign**

BY A. H. BURNE

*(Messrs. William Clowes, London, 1936) 5sh. nett*

The writer excuses himself for adding to the literature on this campaign by the fact that the Russian Official History has received too little attention: a translation of this—and then only in French—did not begin to make its appearance until after our own Official History. A study of the Russian History naturally throws more light on the personalities of the Russian Commanders than was previously available.

The book sets out to study leadership and the clash of personalities on the Russian side, and the human element receives far more attention than usual. By cutting out tactical and other irrelevant details, the writer succeeds in his task and gives a broad view of the campaign in a very easily read narrative.

Being wise after the event, historians have been prone to attribute every failure to Kuropatkin's incompetence. In the introduction we find a suggestion that Kuropatkin may have been a Jellicoe where a Beatty was required: the text does not attempt to maintain this over-statement, but it is refreshing to find Kuropatkin getting a fair deal.

The dangers of political appointments to command in the field, the resulting lack of team work, and the lack of initiative in subordinate commanders which follows upon repeated interference from above are amongst the lessons which are excellently brought out.

No one is more fitted to write an introduction than Sir Ian Hamilton, who gives the book his blessing.

J. M. H.

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**Survey of International Affairs, 1934**

BY A. S. TOYNBEE AND V. M. BOULTER

*(Oxford University Press, London) 28 shillings*

This is the latest in the series of volumes on this subject published under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. In effect it is a world history of the year under review, and is full of detail which would hardly find a place with the ordinary historian. There are four main sections: World Economic Affairs, The Middle East, Europe and The Far East.

In the section on Economic Affairs, Mr. H. U. Hodson deals in a lucid manner with the many occurrences of 1934, starting with the devaluation of the American dollar and its results. The European countries still on the gold standard have a chapter to themselves, as have German financial affairs. Perhaps the most interesting part of this section deals with the progress of the British Empire towards economic recovery. The whole section is well written and particularly easy to follow, while the conclusions drawn are such as to give rise to much speculation.

In the section dealing with the Middle East prominence is given to the problems of Iraq and Palestine, the latter being of more than usual interest at the present time. The march of events in Austria and the relations between Austria and Germany form the subject of a long article in the Europe section, as do the history of the Franco-German relations in the Saar and the development of the foreign policy of the U. S. S. R. As regards The Far East one would have wished for more on the subject of China and Japan, though 1934 was a year in which affairs in this area were more quiescent than they are to-day.

This is definitely a book for the student rather than the casual reader. It is a mine of information, but the very prolixity of the subjects dealt with and the detail which it contains make it difficult to assimilate. An invaluable reference book, its subject-matter can only be absorbed in small doses.

D. H.



His Excellency Sir HARRY HAIG, K.C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.,  
Governor of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, India.



The Journal  
OF THE  
United Service Institution of India  

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**EDITORIAL**

After intermittent discussion, which had lasted for over five months, the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance was signed in London on the 26th August. Before commenting on the provisions of this treaty, it seems desirable to recapitulate very briefly the attempts, all of them unsuccessful, which have been made during the past fourteen years to arrive at a solution satisfactory to both Governments.

The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance

In 1919 a strong nationalist movement was set on foot in Egypt with the object of ending the British Protectorate and obtaining the recognition of the country as a sovereign state. From 1919 to 1921 various conversations were held, but no agreement was reached, and matters came to a head in the winter of 1921-22. Owing to the efforts of Lord Allenby in February 1922, the Declaration of Independence of Egypt was published at the end of that month. By this Declaration, the British Protectorate was abolished, and Egypt was declared to be an independent sovereign state in which the Sultan took the title of King. It is important to note that the following subjects were declared as absolutely reserved to the discretion of His Majesty's Government until such time as it was possible to conclude agreements by friendly discussion on both sides:

- (a) The security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt.
- (b) The defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference, direct or indirect.

- (c) The protection of foreign interests in Egypt and the protection of minorities.
- (d) The Sudan.

It had been hoped that the Declaration would prove to be a preliminary step in a constructive policy, and that agreement on the four reserved points would be reached at an early date, but Egyptian political sentiment refused to admit the validity of what it termed a unilateral instrument. A period of violent agitation followed, which terminated in disturbances in the Sudan and in the murder of the Sirdar, Sir Lee Stack, in November 1924. As a result, all Egyptian troops were withdrawn from the Sudan. A further discussion with a view to reaching a settlement was held in that year, but it came to nothing.

The period 1924 to 1927 was one of political ferment in Egypt in which governments succeeded one another with some rapidity, and in 1927 fresh negotiations were opened with a view to settling the four reserved points. It was hoped that, owing to the friendly attitude of the Egyptian Premier, agreement would now be reached. After submission of draft treaties by both sides a third draft was agreed upon which established an alliance, undertook to secure Egypt's entry to the League, and recognised Great Britain's right to maintain a military force in Egypt. The question of the Sudan was left for future discussion. Owing to the influence of the Wafd, the official opposition party, these negotiations finally fell through in March 1928.

Further discussions took place in 1928 and 1929 which had no better luck than their predecessors, but in the early part of 1930 an Egyptian delegation, which appeared to have a full mandate to conclude a satisfactory treaty, proceeded to London. Agreement was soon reached on the subjects of the termination of military occupation, including the location of all British forces in the Canal zone, and on British support of Egypt's application for League membership, but no agreement could be reached on the Sudan. The British Government could not accept the Egyptian claims to unrestricted immigration into the Sudan and to the virtual abolition of the Condominium. Consequently the negotiations fell through, and the British Government reverted to the position represented by the Declaration of 1922. Although the attempt to make a treaty failed, the Egyptian politicians felt that a happier understanding had been arrived at.

From 1930 to 1935 there were no further attempts to arrive at a settlement, but in September 1935 Egyptian politicians realized the necessity for deciding what action should be taken if Egypt was required to collaborate in measures to counteract the Italian threat to peace. In December 1935 a Note was presented which requested the British Government to reopen negotiations. It was stated that Egypt was ready to conclude the treaty negotiated in 1930 and "to settle questions on which agreement is not reached in the same friendly spirit." The Note did not mention the Sudan. The British Note in reply drew attention to the need for settling the military questions and the Sudan, the latter being treated as especially important in view of the recent events in East Africa. Preliminary discussions began in March 1936 in Cairo and the Egyptian delegation proceeded to London in August.

The main clauses of the new Treaty are briefly as follows :

- (a) The military occupation is terminated and an Anglo-Egyptian alliance is established. This alliance is to continue for 20 years, after which it is subject to revision at the request of either party. Negotiations for revision may be commenced after a decade, if deemed necessary.
- (b) Each party agrees to come to the aid of the other as an ally in the event of war, subject to its obligations under the Covenant of the League and the Pact of Paris. In this connection, Egypt agrees to accord Britain all facilities of ports, aerodromes and means of communication, in the event of war or apprehended international emergency.
- (c) For the defence of the Suez Canal, Britain is authorised to maintain in the Canal zone forces not exceeding 10,000 land forces and 400 air pilots until the two parties agree that the Egyptian army is capable of ensuring the security of the Canal. These numbers may be increased in the event of an international emergency. If, at the conclusion of the Treaty period, the two contracting parties do not agree on the question of the capability of the Egyptian army, this shall be submitted to the League Council for arbitration.
- (d) The Egyptian Government will build barracks for British troops in the Canal zone, and improve communications between the Canal zone and Cairo and Alexandria. On

conclusion of this work all British forces will withdraw to the Canal zone, but those stationed in Alexandria will remain there for a period not exceeding eight years. This being the time estimated necessary for the construction of barracks and improvement of communications.

- (e) The British and Egyptian air forces will be permitted to fly on a reciprocal basis wherever they consider necessary for training. Adequate landing grounds and seaplane anchorages will be provided.
- (f) British personnel in the Egyptian army will be withdrawn, but the Egyptian Government will accept advice from the British Military Mission. Arrangements are provided for training of Egyptian personnel in the United Kingdom, and for a similarity in armaments and equipment.
- (g) The Condominium of the Sudan is to continue, but Egypt is allowed to take an increased share in the duty of garrisoning that province.
- (h) Other provisions allow for the disappearance of the European Bureau and Public Security Department, the eventual dissolution of mixed tribunals, and for British support to Egypt in an approach to other Powers with a view to ending existing restrictions regarding Egyptian legislation.
- (i) Britain will support Egypt's application for membership to the League of Nations.

The Treaty has yet to be ratified, but it will be seen that much has been achieved by a policy of give-and-take on both sides. Britain has given way on the question of the location of the garrison of Egypt and the Sudan, in order to appease Egyptian sentiment; whilst Egypt has made considerable concessions with regard to the movement of air forces and the use of Alexandria as a base. The Treaty should do much to remove misunderstandings and to place our friendly relations with Egypt on a firmer basis.

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On the 20th July a Convention was signed at Montreux by all signatories of the Treaty of Lausanne, except Italy, which had the object of regulating the navigation of the Straits in order to give more security to Turkey and the Black Sea Powers. At first there were some differences of opinion between

**The Dardanelles  
Convention**

Britain and Russia, but finally the following main points were agreed upon :

- (a) Commercial vessels remain free to use the Straits by day and night in peace, and also in war if Turkey is neutral. If they fly a neutral flag they may also use them by day, if Turkey is a belligerent.
- (b) Any external Power may send a force of "light surface vessels, small warships and fleet auxiliaries" up to a maximum of nine vessels and 15,000 tons, through the Straits by day, by giving Turkey a week's notice. This means that the heaviest type of ship which may pass is the "light surface vessel" defined as one of not more than 10,000 tons and carrying no guns heavier than 8-inch calibre.
- (c) The total tonnage of warships belonging to non-Black Sea Powers, which may assemble in those waters, is limited to 30,000 tons. If the Soviet Black Sea Fleet should be increased by 10,000 tons over its existing strength, then the foreign tonnage will rise proportionately to a maximum of 45,000 tons.
- (d) No single Power may send in more than two-thirds of the total tonnage, and then for a limited period of three weeks.
- (e) External Powers may, with Turkey's permission, also send in up to 8,000 tons "for humanitarian ends," but if the Black Sea quota is thus filled, the consent of other Black Sea Powers will be necessary.
- (f) The states within the Black Sea retain the right to send out their warships almost without hindrance, but these must pass through one at a time on the return journey, and be escorted by not more than two torpedo boats.
- (g) Naval forces from outside are exempt from tonnage restrictions when paying courtesy visits at Turkey's invitation.
- (h) In time of war, if Turkey is neutral, the Straits are closed to belligerent naval forces, unless they are executing missions ordered by the League against an aggressor; or, if the League has failed to act, they are proceeding to the help of a victim of aggression under "a neutral aid pact concluded within the framework of the League Covenant."

- (i) Turkey may close the Straits if she is at war or feels she is menaced by war, but the latter action is conditional on the approval of a majority of the League Council.
- (j) Civil aircraft may fly between the Mediterranean and Black Sea, if they give due notice and avoid prohibited zones.
- (k) The International Commission for the Control of the Straits ceases to exist.

Whilst there may be some misgivings that the freedom of navigation of the Straits is now a thing of the past, it is a matter for congratulation that Turkey has secured her aims by legitimate methods, and her desire for additional security at the present junction is understandable. It is to be hoped that Italy will eventually sign the Convention and that this Treaty will be an effective contribution to the maintenance of peace in the Mediterranean.

\* \* \* \* \*

In contrast to the satisfactory settlement of problems in Egypt and the Dardanelles, Palestine at the moment presents a rather gloomy picture. For five months the Arab population of that country has indulged in a strike, coupled with measures of violence, against the influx of Jewish immigrants. This has resulted in considerable loss of life and damage to property, and necessitated the increase in strength of the normal garrison from two battalions to that of nearly a division. The recent decision to carry out in full the mandatory responsibilities of the British Government, and to despatch a reinforcement of a further division, with the supreme military control of the country vested in a Lieutenant-General will, it is hoped, end the present state of disorder with little delay. Let us hope that the Royal Commission, which is due to sit as soon as the situation permits, will be able to clear up the grievances of both sections of the population and produce a settlement agreeable to all parties as early as possible.

\* \* \* \* \*

It is with great diffidence that we venture to comment on the extremely complex situation in Europe. The disastrous civil war in Spain is a calamity in itself, it is fortunate that other countries have agreed to a non-intervention pact. In the July number of this journal we mentioned the fact that Germany had given no reply to the British Note of May 6th with regard to a solution of the problem of the maintenance of peace in Europe. No reply

Europe

has yet been given, and the nervousness displayed by both Germany and Russia and the decisions made by both countries to increase materially their already large armed forces does not augur well for the success of the next meeting of the League at Geneva.

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Out of all the gazetted officers of the Civil Administration and of the Defence Services in India, only one entered for the Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition for 1936; there was one entry from overseas. We are sorry to notice this decline in quantity.

In order to encourage officers to express their views on defence problems and on current affairs, a choice of two subjects is allowed for the 1937 Competition. It is to be hoped that officers will enter in greater numbers in the future.

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## THE INDIAN REFORMS SCHEME

BY W. H. LEWIS, ESQ., C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S., ON THURSDAY, 30TH  
JULY 1936.

THE HONOURABLE MR. M. G. HALLETT, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.,  
IN THE CHAIR.

THE CHAIRMAN INTRODUCED THE LECTURER.

### *LECTURE.*

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

I am much obliged to Mr. Hallett for his exceedingly kind remarks. As he has indicated, it has been the habit for some years past of the United Service Institution to honour one or other of the officers of the Government of India Reforms Office with an invitation to lecture on constitutional reform. There must, I think, be some of you here this evening who will recollect with pleasure the two very successful lectures given to crowded audiences in 1930 by Sir James Dunnett, who took as his subject the recommendations of the Simon Commission, then recently published. On this occasion, too, had it been possible to arrange an earlier date, Sir James, who left for England this afternoon, would again have lectured. But, when it was known that he was leaving, I was asked to step into the breach.

In other years subsequent to 1930, when these lectures have been given, the Reforms proposals were still incomplete, the precise intentions of His Majesty's Government still uncertain. Much was forbidden ground on which, in these official surroundings, no lecturer might safely tread. Nothing could be said with certainty of the exact form the new constitution might take. The lecturer, in those conditions, could do no more than trace in outline the gradual but steady growth of representative institutions in India, and deal in a general way with the course of events at the Round Table Conference.

But now we are more fortunate. The period of incubation is over. The new constitution for India has been enacted by Parliament. Accordingly I have thought that, in speaking to you, I might best proceed by indicating the state of preparations for introducing the scheme; and then if there is time and you have the patience, I might examine, but very briefly, some of its main features.

The Government of India Bill was introduced in Parliament in January 1935. It followed closely the recommendations of the Joint Select Committee of both Houses of Parliament over which our Viceroy (H. E. Lord Linlithgow) presided with such great distinction. The Bill ran to more than 400 clauses and contained not less than 16 schedules. Never before on the basis of a single measure was the British Parliament invited to sit down to so vast a legislative feast. But its digestion stood the test; and right till the end clause after clause was consumed without appreciable loss of appetite. We may congratulate ourselves that we are not called to take direct part in political life. Let me give you this illustration. For some months before the Bill was passed, a very distinguished Under-Secretary of State, himself a member of the House of Lords, proved to his own satisfaction that no one, unless he were very foolish, would recommend a system of direct election to the Federal Upper House. But when the Bill reached the House of Lords, the pendulum swung the other way; the amendment was accepted by Government; and the same very distinguished Under-Secretary of State was left with no choice but to advocate with the same fervour the very proposal he had so vigorously condemned. However, except for some changes of detail and a few supplementary provisions, the Government of India Bill emerged from both Houses, in all its main substance, unchanged and intact. It received the Royal assent on the 2nd August 1935.

As near as may be, that is just one year ago. At the same time, you will have read in the papers that the date for the introduction of Provincial Autonomy is the 1st April 1937. In other words, a period of not less than twenty months must elapse from the passing of the Act until the date of its effective commencement; and then again we must wait a further period for Federation to complete the scheme.

Those of you who may be impatient to pass from the present to the new conditions may ask why so long a period is required to effect the transition from this constitution to the next. There are two main reasons why the passage could not be achieved in a less space of time. They may be described under the heads of the preparation of the Orders in Council, and the time required for the conduct of the new elections.

This procedure by Orders in Council marks an important change from past practice. The Act—it has since, by subsequent legislation entitled “The Government of India Reprinting Act,” been divided into two Acts, one for India and one for Burma; that Act though far more detailed than any other written constitution, necessarily leaves large gaps uncovered either by its specific provisions or its numerous schedules. The Act of 1919, our present constitution, also leaves large gaps uncovered by the sections of the Statute. At present we proceed to fill those gaps by rules made by the Secretary of State in Council. This procedure has the merit of flexibility. But, under the new conditions, as the Secretary of State recedes into the background, it would not be appropriate to retain him as the authority to fill the gaps. For that reason, Parliament has decided that the gaps in the constitution should be filled by orders made by His Majesty in Privy Council. But at that point we seem to discern a certain distrust on the part of Parliament of future Secretaries of State. Thus it is not left to the Secretary of State directly to advise His Majesty as to the Orders he should make. On the contrary, there is the most explicit provision that no action whatever is to be taken on these Orders in Council until they have first been approved by affirmative resolutions in both Houses. By this device the direct authority of Parliament is maintained in full vigour over the entire constitutional structure. Nor is it without significance that these affirmative resolutions are required from both Houses, since it follows that future changes in the Indian Orders in Council, which are themselves an important part of the Indian Constitution, are not left to the whim or the caprice of the changing political elements in the British Lower House.

We need to clear our minds, with reference more especially to the introduction of Provincial Autonomy, as to how much the Act gives us and how much it leaves to be filled by Orders in Council. The Act makes a complete distribution of powers between the Central and Provincial Governments. It provides for the setting up of provincial executives. It deals in great detail with the composition of the provincial legislatures. The Schedules of the Act regulate the franchise qualifications. On the other hand, the delimitation of constituencies and other electoral matters are left to be filled by Orders in Council. The Act deals partially only with the distribution of resources between the Centre and the Provinces. The selection of excluded and partially excluded areas is made by Order in Council.

The whole adaptation of the statute law of India is again a matter for an Order in Council.

For the purpose of introducing Provincial Autonomy a carefully planned programme was required. In the arrangement of this programme there were three governing considerations. In the first place it was estimated that the time required for the conduct of the new elections would be somewhere about eight to ten months. It followed in the second place that the more relevant Orders in Council must be passed through Parliament somewhere in the course of this summer, in June or July. Thirdly, it was early apparent that no date would be suitable for the change-over to the new constitution other than the first day of a new financial year. To introduce the scheme by the 1st April 1936 would have been impracticable. In the circumstances, the 1st April 1937 suggested itself as the only suitable and possible date.

There has been much incidental work of a varied kind; for instance, the Provinces of Sind and Orissa were set up from the 1st April last under a transitional form of government, but you will perhaps find it easier to keep in mind just the two broad divisions of the preparations of Orders in Council and the time needed for the conduct of the new elections.

For some of the Orders in Council specific investigations and enquiries in India were necessary. Thus we have had the committee, over which Sir Laurie Hammond presided, for the delimitation of constituencies. We have had the financial enquiry of Sir Otto Niemeyer. The work of the one is now contained in the Electoral Orders in Council, the work of the other in the Distribution of Revenues Order in Council. There is also a third very important Order in Council, to which I shall again refer, known as the Commencement and Transitory Provisions Order in Council, which fixes the date for Provincial Autonomy and also contains a number of provisions designed to remove difficulties which arise when we pass from one system of government to another. All those Orders in Council early this month received the final approval of Parliament and were made by His Majesty. As soon as they were passed the stage had been set for the electoral machinery to be put in motion. It is therefore to the electoral programme that I now turn.

Under the present constitution, in the British Indian Provinces (less Burma), the provincial electorate numbers somewhere about

seven millions. If, for no other reason, a wide extension of the franchise was needed to support a system of responsible government. Assuming that the calculations made work out correctly, we shall now have provincial electorates numbering somewhere about 36 millions. That would mean the enfranchisement of 14 per cent. of the total population of India—men, women and children. It would mean the enfranchisement of 40 per cent. of the adult male population and 27 per cent. of the total adult male and female population. This has been a large step in advance. The numerous administrative problems connected with it have for some time past engrossed the attention of the Provincial Governments. But up to the time of these Orders in Council everything they have done has been on a provisional basis. It was only when these Electoral Orders in Council were made that this electoral work was brought into its true constitutional and statutory setting.

It is not only a question of an electorate increased in size. The new franchise qualifications themselves are by no means simple. For instance, you have qualifications dependent on taxation and qualifications dependent on property. These are the two main bases of the future franchise. But in addition to these there are differential qualifications for women, and differential qualifications for Scheduled Castes, in order to bring them in sufficient numbers into the new electorate. Then again a number of qualifications are dependent upon application by the would-be elector.

However, here we now are at the end of July and the position which has been reached is that every Provincial Government is ready for what is called the first publication of the electoral rolls. At this stage, under the normal procedure, claims and objections are heard. It will take some weeks to dispose of these, but by the beginning of October, the final electoral roll will, according to expectations, have been published in every Province.

When that has been done, we shall come up against another of the complications arising out of the new constitution. I refer to the primary elections for the Scheduled Castes. The Scheduled Castes are, as you know, our old friends the Depressed Classes. Their representation on the scale allotted to them in the new legislatures is according to what is called the Poona Pact. The Poona Pact was a compromise reached in September 1932 by the leaders of the Depressed Classes and the leaders of the caste Hindus. You will remember

the part played in it by Mr. Gandhi, who started his "fast unto death," for the purpose of obtaining an agreed solution. As a result of the compromise, the Depressed Classes secured a considerable increase of representation in the legislatures, and at the same time there was introduced this new system of a special primary election under which the Depressed Class electors first vote as a separate electorate, and choose panels of candidates for their reserved seats. Then, when these panels have been formed, the Depressed Classes and the caste Hindus vote together as a single electorate. Seats are reserved for these Depressed Classes in every Province except the North-West Frontier Province and Sind. These primary elections for Scheduled Caste candidates will take us to somewhere in December. At that point every existing provincial legislature will be prorogued and the stage will be set for the general elections to take place some time in January or February next year.

At this point let us take what we may call a forward glance. Let us forget that we are in July 1936 and imagine ourselves somewhere in the beginning of March 1937. Let us assume for a moment that all these general preparations have been successfully completed. There will still be a host of matters to which the Governor of each Province will need to give his attention, if he is to be ready for the introduction of Provincial Autonomy on the 1st April 1937. One of the first matters to which he will naturally turn will be the selection of his future Ministers. If the Governor is wise and prudent—and all Governors are *ex officio* wise and prudent—he will first consult the Act. On turning to the appropriate section he will find provision that the Ministers will be "chosen and summoned by himself, that they will be sworn of the Council, and will hold office during his pleasure." The tenure of the Indian Ministers will thus in all material respects be similar to the tenure of the British Cabinet Ministers at Home. It may be expected that the Governor would then consult his Instrument of Instructions. This Instrument is what is called a prerogative document. It is given to every Governor by His Majesty at the time of his appointment. It confers on the Governor no new powers, but instructs him as to the manner and spirit in which he should exercise the powers conferred on him by the Statute. At the present time the Instrument of Instructions, though it has been published for information, is in draft only, and there is special provision in the Act, that the draft Instrument must, like the

draft Orders in Council, be approved by both Houses of Parliament before it is submitted to His Majesty for issue. The Governor, when he receives his Instrument of Instructions in the form in which it will have been approved by Parliament, will find in it very specific instructions as to the manner in which he is to choose his Ministers. He will be told in the document that he should first select that person who, in his opinion, is best calculated to command a stable majority in the legislature; and in consultation with him to choose those persons whom he thinks best qualified to command the confidence of the legislature. He will be further instructed, so far as possible, to include representatives of important minority communities in his Cabinet. Neither in the Act nor the Instrument is there any reference to a Provincial Chief Minister or Prime Minister, but it is clear that the person in consultation with whom the Governor will choose his Ministers, that person will in effect be the Provincial Prime Minister. Having studied these documents the Governor will then, we may suppose, scrutinize very carefully the election results and set about forming his Cabinet in advance, though the Ministers will not, of course, assume office until the 1st April 1937.

When the Cabinet has been selected there will be a great number of matters which the Governor will wish to arrange in consultation with them. For instance, he will have to decide the date on which the new legislature should be summoned, whether early or late, after the introduction of the new scheme. He will need to consider with them the business he should place before the legislature, and to consult with them as to the arrangements to be made for the budget of 1937-38.

As you know, in India the practice is that the budget proposals are put before the legislatures and passed in the closing months of each financial year, and come automatically into effect from the first day of the next financial year. At Home, the position is entirely different. There the financial year starts like ours, at the beginning of April, but the estimates do not go to Parliament before the middle of that month. They are sent first to what is called the Committee of Supply which is a committee of the whole House of Commons; and then to the Committee of Ways and Means, which again is the House of Commons under another name. The Appropriation Act which makes effective the financial provision for the year, is not

ordinarily passed until towards the end of the summer session. This means that at Home there is a gap from April to July which must be filled, and the practice is that in the closing days of March there is rushed through Parliament the Consolidated Fund Act which makes available votes on account required for the purpose of filling the interval until the Appropriation Act is passed.

I mention this difference in procedure between Home and Indian practice because, for the purpose of starting Provincial Autonomy, a modification of Home practice has been adopted. It was thought inappropriate that the existing legislatures, themselves unrepresentative and expiring, should pass the budget for the following year, when they would have no responsibility and would have ceased to exist. It was also felt to be wrong that the existing legislatures should sit and transact business at the time when the general elections are being held. It was not of course possible to introduce exactly the Consolidated Fund Act procedure, but in the Commencement Order of Council, which I have mentioned, provision is made to empower the Governor in his discretion to authorise such expenditure as he deems necessary to carry on the provincial administration for a period which is limited to six months. That is to say, the new Finance Minister is given time to consider and pass his own budget through the new legislature, and, in the meantime, he will have been put in funds by the action taken by the Governor on his own responsibility, but after at least in formal consultation with the Ministers. In March next the Governor will ascertain from his Ministers the date on which they expect to be ready with their budget, and he will adjust his own grant on account accordingly to bridge the gap.

When all these preliminaries have been completed and the 1st April 1937 dawns, the Provincial Ministers, subject to safeguards in the Governor, will assume responsibility for all provincial subjects. We may leave them with our good wishes for success in their endeavours, since the use they make of their new opportunities will be the kernel of the whole matter. If any of you have been reading Sir Austen Chamberlain's book entitled "Down the Years," you will find in it a story of a British Minister of Education who recorded a portentous note, which he concluded by saying "And this is the *COLONEL* of the whole matter!" The original of the note is said to be carefully preserved in the Board of Education.

I would like, if you will allow me, to say a few words on the implications of Provincial Autonomy. The term is misleading. It suggests change in the Provinces and none elsewhere. The term in the Act is "the Commencement of Part III." But that phrase again is one of those legal fictions with which the lawyers are pleased to entrap us. So far from Provincial Autonomy being merely the Commencement of Part III, it is in fact the commencement of all the fourteen parts of the Act less Part II, which is the part of the Act which refers to Federation.

But first there are certain geographical changes which will take place on 1st April 1937, which you should not overlook. On that date Burma will be separated from India. Burma, as has been said, is not India. The ancient rulers of India never ruled in Burma. Hitherto under British rule Burma has been treated as one of the British Indian Provinces simply for reasons of administrative convenience. It would have been impossible to fit Burma appropriately into an Indian Federation. The Burmans themselves, by a majority, favoured separation. Separation has been accepted by Parliament, and Burma has been given a constitution not less progressive than the constitution for India.

Again, on the 1st April 1937, Aden will be separated and will become a Crown Colony under the Colonial Office with an Order in Council constitution which contains provisions to protect Indian interests.

Again, on the 1st April 1937, Sind and Orissa, the two baby provinces, will have completed their term of pupillage and will enter the new constitution on exactly the same terms as any other Governor's province.

What then are the constitutional implications of Provincial Autonomy? In effect, as soon as Provincial Autonomy is introduced, the unitary features of the 1919 constitution will disappear, and in its place we shall have the federal conditions of the new constitution. At present, if you refer to the 1919 Act, you will find that the Indian Legislative Assembly is empowered to make laws for "all persons, for all courts, for all places, and all things." I have always liked that phrase. It has a grand air about it. But that now disappears. In place of the Legislative Assembly which, in law, now has those superior powers, the legislative jurisdictions of the Centre and of the Provinces will now be regulated in the main by exclusive lists and

enumerated powers, though over a comparatively small selected field the legislative power will be concurrent. At the same time, in the sphere of executive action, the most important unitary aspect of the present constitution, namely, the superintendence, direction and control, which the Central Government now exercises over Provincial Governments will also disappear. There will be a measure of Central control, but in future the directions will not be given by the Central Government, but they will pass from the Governor-General to the Governors, and not from the Central Government to the Provincial Governments.

One way of describing the situation, which will arise in British India on the 1st April, is to say that, we shall have Federation, minus the States and minus the federal executive and federal legislatures. That is a brief way of putting it. It means that, until Federation is established, we shall have at the Centre or rather in all the relations between the Centre and the Provinces the permanent conditions of the new Federation. But that temporarily and until Federation is formed by the accession of the States the executive at the Centre will be exactly the same as it is now; the legislature also will be unchanged. But there will be important changes at the Centre which the short description given above does not cover. Thus the Central authority is at present all in the hands of the Governor-General in Council, but from the 1st April 1937 these functions will be distributed between three authorities, and H. E. the Viceroy figures in each of these three. The Governor-General in Council will, as now, administer the Central Government, but within its new demarcated field. But as an authority distinct from his Council the Governor-General personally in his own discretion will discharge a number of very important functions not the least of which will be his control over the action of the Provincial Governors in the sphere of their special responsibilities. The third executive authority at the Centre will be His Excellency again, but in the new capacity of Crown Representative for the conduct of relations with Indian States. It is one of the paradoxes of Federation that when the Princes first took up the idea it seemed to them that it was a very good way of escaping from Paramountcy, but as the scheme developed, no one was more insistent than the Princes on the use of Paramountcy as a buffer between themselves and the Federal Government, in which they would themselves be partners. At the time of the first Round

Table Conference, the Princes were given an explicit assurance that in all matters outside the Federal field the conduct with them of the relations of the Crown would not, as in the past, be in the hands of a Department of the Central Government, but would be entrusted to the Viceroy personally and persons acting under his authority. To implement that promise, this new position has been created of the Crown Representative. In ordinary terms it means that, from the 1st April 1937, the Political Department will cease to be one of the departments of the Government of India and will be a separate agency under the Viceroy for the conduct of relations with Indian States.

Now let us turn to the Secretary of State and the changes in his position. At present the Secretary of State is the statutory head of the Indian administration. But for the purposes of our new constitution all powers, including those hitherto vested by statute in the Secretary of State in Council, are resumed by the Crown. Being resumed, they are then distributed to the Governors of Provinces and to the Governor-General. Some of them, as I have just explained, have been entrusted to the Crown Representative. There is also a further set of powers which the Crown will confer on the Governor-General by Letters Patent outside the specific provisions of the Act. All this rearrangement tends to leave the Secretary of State in the air. Instead of being, as now, the statutory head of the Indian administration, he becomes, with some exceptions, no different from any other of the principal Secretaries of State at Home. Excepting in matters of his own Services he loses his administrative powers. But we should not think, because of that, that we are rid of the Secretary of State. Though he loses the power of direct administration, he retains undiminished his powers of control over the transitional government of the Centre and throughout the conditions of the Federation he will have his powers of control over the Governor-General and, through the Governor-General, over the Governors. These changes have other important consequences. The India Office is at present borne on Indian estimates with contributions from the Home Treasury. Under the new conditions, and as from the 1st April 1937, that position is reversed. The India Office will become one of the civil departments of His Majesty's Government and will be paid for by the British Treasury. Only if the Secretary of State discharges agency duties for the Government of India will any contributions be made to the India Office from the Indian Treasury.

Then again there is the India Office building. As you know, it is a treasure-house of pictures, of objects of art, and of other things of value. Though the India Office building will now vest in the Crown for the purposes of His Majesty's Government, special provision has been made in the Act that the Home authorities may not part with any of these treasures without first obtaining the approval and consent of the Governor-General. The India Council disappears on the 1st April 1937 and in its place the Secretary of State will be assisted by Advisers.

This is a very sketchy outline of some of the changes that will come in on the 1st April 1937. The immediate object is Provincial Autonomy, but plans and preparations have at once to be got ready also for Federation, since until Federation is established the general scheme is incomplete.

I have already taken enough of your time. There is not time now to deal with these Federal aspects. But I would like in conclusion to leave one sentiment with you. We are told that the normal span of a man's life is three-score years and ten. It is only four-score years since, with the repeal of the Charter Acts, the responsibility for the administration of India was formally assumed by the Crown. Study the constitutional history of these few years and you will find in India an epitome of the progress of public and personal liberty which has carried us through the centuries of our own history. Under the safe ægis of the British Crown political institutions have been set up in India expanded and developed on lines parallel to institutions of our own country. Do not look to me for an anticipation of events before they occur. But remember that we stand now at the centre of a great historical development; and when you consider the political changes on which we are embarked, be sure of this, that this general plan of self-governing units and a federation embracing the whole continent has been constructed with a fine and splendid purpose. The traditions of the British Empire and its strength are bound up with the progress and liberty of *all* its elements. That is its purpose, inexorably sure and eternally true.

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The customary vote of thanks to the lecturer was passed by acclamation.

## SHOOTING FOR BURIALS—NOT BULL'S-EYES

BY MAJOR S. W. BOWER, 7TH RAJPUT REGIMENT.

WARNING.—*All True Believers in Bisley and Bull's-eyes, painstakingly amassed by calculated changes of aim, should avoid this article as it is rank heresy.*

It appears from the last report on Individual Training that the range course fired by riflemen is under revision. The present moment therefore appears opportune to consider whether our methods of training are correct.

The one aim of peace training is to prepare for war and the efficiency of training methods can be judged by only one standard: whether they are the best to produce the effect we require in war. Let us therefore start by looking at war.

We see a picture where fire predominates and where the section is the fire unit, fire being controlled by the section commander as long as may be possible. It is at once evident that the efficiency of our fire is centred round the section commander. We find him in the forefront of the battle, surrounded by distracting circumstances and much personal danger. Here he is called upon to make rapid appreciations of a situation of which he can normally see little. He has to estimate ranges accurately, frequently from a prone position, and describe targets which, particularly in the attack, are inconspicuous. Having opened fire he has to issue corrections to men now intent on pumping lead into what they hope is the enemy.

To summarize—it is the section commander who *applies* fire in battle, and no mean task it is. Many Generals would consider their job the easier when they had tried his just once.

We talk of fire and movement being the bedrock of infantry tactics. When it comes to training the man on whom falls the task of applying this bedrock to minor tactics, we allot only a small proportion of the ammunition available to his instruction. If you assume that half of the fifty rounds allotted to Part III, Table "B" are employed in collective field firing it means that a beggarly 16 per cent. has been devoted to his instruction.

Now for the individual rifleman. He is also provided with "front seats" for the show. Bullets are distracting things and we

can rest assured that action which has not been made instinctive by good training will be forgotten or badly executed.

The rifleman has to obey intelligently the section commander's orders and, when actually firing, to *maintain a constant aim at the spot which has been indicated to him*. In range parlance he *groups*. Under modern conditions he never sees the strike of his own bullet—in fact Small Arms Training goes as far as to warn us that the section commander may even have difficulty in picking out his section's beaten zone.

If in battle the rifleman *never applies* his fire then there appears no valid reason why we should spend 48 per cent. of the ammunition devoted to his annual range training to Application practices. They appear to me to be *misapplication* practices.

Having proved, I hope, that we pay too little attention to our section commanders and waste a great deal of time and ammunition on practices of no value to the rifleman in war, I will outline what I feel would be a more practical training system.

We have first to strike a balance between the demands of the section commander and his riflemen.

If we had totally inefficient section commanders in command of marksmen our controlled fire would probably be totally inefficient. The accuracy of the riflemen would merely accentuate the effect of incorrect ranges and bad indication of targets.

On the other hand highly efficient section commanders in charge of third class shots would be sadly handicapped by the dispersion of the section's beaten zone. In both cases the riflemen would be useless unless they had a high standard of fire discipline.

Moderation, as usual, seems to pay best, so let us divide our 155 rounds per man roughly between the two, our aim being to produce a well-disciplined rifleman not below our present first class standard with a section commander brought up to the highest pitch of efficiency obtainable.

Up to the present I have dealt with controlled fire only. As the two sides get closer and closer in battle, probably from about 300 yards range downwards, the control of the section commander will decrease and decrease until he will have no power to influence the fire of his men and will only be able to control movement. Targets during this period will be of a fleeting nature and *snaphooting* will provide suitable peace training to ensure that fire remains effective.

During both controlled and uncontrolled fire the power of the rifleman to produce rapid and accurate fire, when required, will remain as heretofore.

At the end of this article the reader will find my suggested Table "B." Table "A" would naturally be based on it.

Table "B" has been drawn up keeping in view those two essentials of all good training: simplicity and progress. Practices will be fired in the order given. Grouping at slow rates of fire is completed before speed is introduced. Snapshooting practices are placed before rapid grouping as it appears logical, and of tactical value, to teach a man to get off his first shot accurately before you ask him to fire a number of accurate rounds in quick succession. Except in the first elementary grouping and the fire discipline practices, firing takes place at two ranges only; at 600 yards, the normal limit of effective rifle fire, and 300 yards, the range about which control is likely to break down. To fire at intermediate ranges appears an unnecessary complication. It does not teach judging distance as conditions are too artificial and in my system a man has not to learn the behaviour of his rifle at the various ranges—a behaviour which the conditions of active service soon change. Where, as in Practice 3, the number of rounds is shewn as 2 plus 3 the man will start loaded with two rounds and will reload with a full charger of five rounds after the first three rounds have been expended. He will, however, fire only two rounds from the second charger.

The rapid and accurate adjustment of sights has been introduced into Practices 8, 9 and 11. Thus the elements of fire discipline are introduced at an early stage without detriment to the pure range training. In tactics we place much importance on enfilade fire. From a rifle training point of view this means a crossing target, and it therefore appears logical to introduce one into our range table. Practice 11 provides the soldier with more advanced training in fire discipline.

The classification practices are marked with an asterisk and in these no coaching would be allowed.

A soldier would be classified as "Efficient" if he reached the standard laid down in Practices 3, 6, 9, and either 10 or 11. Otherwise he would be classified as "Inefficient."

The pool of 21 rounds is placed at the disposal of the Company Commander for zeroing rifles and repeating any man in any practice

(including classification) as many times as he likes and ammunition permits.

It may be argued that the standard of shooting will be lower by this Table. I disagree. I consider that the simplification of training will raise the *general* standard and, although there may not be as many marksmen, there will certainly not be a tail of indifferent second-class shots. If it is considered desirable, men can be encouraged to do better than just become "efficient shots" by the judicious use of prize money. Our object must be to produce riflemen whose shots will produce in war an efficient beaten zone. Once this has been accomplished the whole of our energies and resources must be devoted to producing a highly efficient section commander.

We have now expended 85 of the 155 rounds allotted and have 70 left with which to train the section commander. I see no reason for devoting any of these rounds to individual battle practices. The rifleman should have received on the parade ground instruction in the drill of fire discipline—there will have been a lot more time available to do this—and on the range he has received opportunity to put this drill into use. The collective battle practices will provide him with plenty of further instruction.

Collective battle practices are outside the scope of this article. Sufficient that increased ammunition and time has been produced so that adequate training can be given to the section commander in his highly important and difficult task in war.

Some method of judging the efficiency of a unit is necessary. I suggest that the Figure of Merit should consist of half the percentage of "efficient shots" to men trained, plus up to 50 marks for the skill shewn by section commanders in collective battle practices. Brigade Commanders would, by regulation, be bound to set and watch test schemes for at least the section commanders of one Rifle Company. Marks would be allotted on the result of this test and not on written reports.

I contend that the training outlined above would produce higher efficiency in war than our present system, and at no increased cost. Section commanders themselves, experienced in the observation and tactical application of fire, would have at their disposal a section of well-disciplined riflemen capable of producing highly efficient fire.

When control of the section commander broke down the individual rifleman would be fully capable of carrying on the fire fight.

Our mountain warfare experts may shake their heads and say, "This would never do for our warfare."

I beg to differ. Against the Pathan offensive action is essential, and the offensiveness of fire is measured by its *volume* rather than by its duration.

The fleeting nature of the targets offered again demands *volume*. My system is designed to produce *volume*, and at short notice.

Finally, why do automatic weapons have such an influence over the modern battle-field? Mainly because they can produce rapidly a very effective beaten zone. Let us learn from this that we do *not* want in war individual marksmen, we want *sections that have the above characteristics of an automatic weapon*.

TABLE "B."

No.	Range.	Rounds.	How fired.	Standard.
<i>Slow Grouping.</i>				
1	100	5	Lying .. ..	6 in. group.
2	300	5	Lying .. ..	2 ft. group.
3*	300	2 plus 3	Lying .. ..	18 in. group.
4	600	3 plus 2	Lying .. ..	3 ft. group and one wide.
<i>Snapshooting.</i>				
5	300	2 plus 3	Kneeling behind cover ..	3 hits.
6*	300	3 plus 2	Ditto .. ..	4 hits.
<i>Rapid Grouping.</i>				
7	300	3	Lying .. ..	2 ft. group.
8	300	3 plus 3	Lying, sights to be adjusted	2 ft. group and one wide.
9*	300	5 plus 5 plus 5	Lying, sights to be adjusted	2 ft. group and three wide.
<i>Movement.</i>				
10*	300	2 plus 2	Kneeling or standing behind cover, 2 shots at each run of the crossing target.	2 hits.
11*	400 to 200	4 plus 2	Lying at 400 yards. Kneeling at 300 yards. Standing at 200 yards. Two shots fired at each range.	3 hits.

## NOTES.

Total rounds 64; add 21 for Company Commander's pool; Grand total 85 rounds.

Bayonets to be fixed at 300 yards and lower ranges, except in Practice 1.

Targets made of the same materials as now. For all grouping practices up to 300 yards a six-foot target with an aiming mark the shape and size of a Figure No. 5. At 600 yards an eight-foot target with a Figure No. 4 aiming mark is required. The snapshooting target to be 3 ft. in diameter, with a Figure No. 5 aiming mark and an invisible 22" scoring circle. The present snapshooting target is unsatisfactory in that a man seldom knows where his shot has gone and is therefore unable to detect his faults. An enlarged target would permit of shots which are near, but outside the scoring circle being indicated by means of spotting discs. Similarly for Practices Nos. 10 and 11 a No. 6 and No. 2 Figure respectively would be pasted on to a six-foot target.

The above targets accustom the man from the beginning to a service type of aiming mark.

I have not added time for rapid and snapshooting practices and the standard groups are suggested with great reserve. Both would require experiment and experience before a satisfactory standard could be evolved. An allowance for wind must be made in the grouping practices, especially at 600 yards.

## AN EVEREST DIARY, 1933

WITH A FEW COMMENTS ON PAST AND FUTURE ATTEMPTS.

BY CAPTAIN E. ST. J. BIRNIE.

As this article is being written, news has been received that yet again Mount Everest has been victorious and sent another party back from its glaciers, having failed in its attempt on the summit. The deepest sympathy will be felt for Mr. Ruttledge who might certainly have been entitled to feel that the reward of a successful expedition was his due, for with the experience of 1933 behind him, a successful reconnaissance by Eric Shipton in 1935, and a wealth of material to choose from, he was in the strongest position to take such a party to Everest that could hardly fail in its task.

That his party was in fact a very strong one, proved at high altitudes, and magnificently equipped against all emergencies, is an undisputed fact. Yet this expedition, equipped with wireless not only at the Base, but for its high Camps, and with every device to fight the cold and the rarified air of high altitudes, with scientifically selected food, and the accumulated experience of four expeditions, accomplished less than any of its predecessors.

When an expedition takes seven months and costs somewhere in the region of £10,000 it becomes a matter of great importance to study carefully the factors which may cause just such a disaster as occurred to the 1936 Expedition.

Though there are a number of experienced travellers, including Dr. and Mrs. Visser, the Dutch explorers, who consider that an attempt on Everest should be made in late September and October, most of the members of the various Everest Expeditions are unanimous that the best time to attempt the Peak is in the six weeks just previous to the breaking of the monsoon. At this time the terrific winds of February and March have swept the North face clear of snow and rendered it safer for climbing. It has therefore been the aim of previous expeditions to arrive at the Base Camp about the 20th April, to establish the North Col Camp by the 15th May and so have a fortnight to three weeks in attempting the summit. In this, I think, a great mistake has been made; Everest weather does not remain tolerant for long, therefore the whole of that six weeks should be

spent in the vicinity of the North Col Camp. This should be established by April 26th at the latest and all the assault parties ready to advance from the Col by the 1st May, taking the first opportunity of fine weather. It was therefore decidedly a shock when we heard that the 1936 Expedition was to start later this year than in 1933, and that the North Col Camp was established on May 15th, a week *earlier* than they had intended to establish it. Little things have far-reaching effects and it is a matter of speculation as to what would have happened had the 1936 Expedition arrived at the North Col in time to start from it on May 1st. The weather this year, in strong contrast to 1933, was exceedingly good and mild and it seems inconceivable that they could have failed had the party been above the Col from May 1st to May 15th.

A failure caused by weather conditions was to be avoided at all costs; this was the main reason for the failure of the 1933 attempt, and if failure it was to be, then it was naturally hoped that it would be caused by the severity of conditions at, say, 28,700 feet, rather than the danger of the North Col slopes after monsoon conditions had set in, the one as yet an unknown quantity, the other already too well known.

There appear to be only two factors which govern the issue, firstly, is it possible to reach Base Camp from India by April 10th and, secondly, is it possible to move up the glacier in time to establish the North Col by April 26th?

The answer to the first question must certainly be "Yes," the second would depend on snow conditions for the year; but even then I am convinced that it can be done, if necessary, by making provisionally five Camps to Camp III. Once the assault party is established with its high altitude gear and rations, consolidation of the Camps behind can quickly be carried out and the Camps reduced as soon as the trough of the East Rongbuk Glacier begins to melt.

The plans for the establishment of the higher Camps and the assault of the Peak need careful thought and I do not myself think that the correct policy has been carried out in the past. The guiding principle must certainly be the careful nursing of the experts who will be required eventually to put forth their utmost efforts between 27,000 feet and the summit.

Unfortunately the North Col slopes are sufficiently difficult to insist on the necessity of the experts being called upon to make the

route, but even here all the step-making should be done by those who have not been selected in the first two assault parties, and the more difficult portions only should be the work of the experts. Once this route is established the first two assault parties should undoubtedly remain resting no higher than Camp III at 21,000 feet, while the lesser lights should speedily push on, establishing Camps at 25,700 feet (Camp V) and 27,400 feet (Camp VI) and stocking at Camp VI one light tent capable of holding two persons; for I am convinced that the chances of success will be far greater if the first assault party on leaving Camp VI concentrate entirely on merely getting themselves and two porters across Norton's traverse and the great couloir, and bivouacing for the night as far up the final pyramid as possible, leaving a maximum of 800 feet for the final day's climb. The chief difficulty of a third Camp above the North Col lies in the problem as to whether any porters can be found who will sleep at a second Camp and advance on the third day. In 1924 this was not thought probable, but the morale of the Porter Corps has increased so much since those days that there is little doubt now that it would be accomplished.

In 1933 eight porters stayed 3 days and nights in an almost continuous blizzard at 25,700 feet. Of these one had a complete mental collapse, three had their hands frostbitten and two had their feet frostbitten, only two were fit to continue the attack, yet in two days' time 9 men, including Anturki, who had been amongst the previous 8, immediately volunteered to carry on to Camp VI, and an hour later three more men came forward to complete the 12 required.

The desirability of a third Camp lies in making a certainty of the final assault and not risking a whole expedition in finding out the still unknown quantity of what happens above 28,500 feet. Everyone who has been over 24,000 feet has experienced the sudden change which occurs at that height, the difficulty of climbing becomes suddenly far greater in proportion, which seems to show that the difficulty of progress does not increase evenly. Smythe in 1933, while still nearly 1,150 feet from the summit, was so well acclimatized that he considered he was doing 250 feet an hour, when at 28,000 feet the loose snow on the slabs of Norton's traverse became so dangerous that he was forced to turn back. It was then 10 a.m., and had he been able to continue he would have had approximately 9 hours of light in which to reach the summit and return to Camp VI. Allowing

him even in his exhausted condition  $2\frac{1}{2}$  hours for the downward journey, this would have left him only  $6\frac{1}{2}$  hours to reach the summit, an *average* of 180 feet an hour. It is certain that one great effort above 28,000 feet is all any man can make in any one expedition, so that it is more than possible that had conditions allowed him to continue he might have suddenly, at 28,500 feet, found himself reduced to a limit of 100 feet an hour with no possibility of reaching the summit and yet getting safely back. To turn back under those circumstances would require a great mental effort even at those heights where the wish to go downwards is predominant, for he would well know that he could not repeat his effort; yet he would be forced to abandon the attempt, for to reach the summit in face of certain death, besides being unsound mountaineering, does not form part of the policy of Everest Expeditions.

If Smythe could sleep for 12 hours on his third night at 27,400 feet in 1933 as he did, he could most certainly have a good enough night's rest at 28,300 feet and so be fit to make the summit a certainty on the next day. If it is considered that no porters on the expedition are capable of crossing the traverse, an effort to establish the Camp should be made by spare members of the party. Needless to say, it would assist the climbers materially if a *Sahib* is established as cook at both Camps V and VI.


The discovery of a possible route up the west side of the North Col is of great interest and, if it proves a fact, will shorten the line of communications by two Camps; but, of course, the real importance of the discovery will depend on whether the ascent and descent of the possible new route is definitely a safe one in avalanche conditions. It is only this fact which will make the discovery of any marked importance, and at present there does not seem to be any definite information regarding this.

So much for suggestions; none are new and it is certain that a future expedition will do all in its power to prevent a recurrence of the unlucky events of 1936.

Let us hope that negotiations will quickly be opened with the Thibetan authorities for permission to grant another expedition to go while Mr. Ruttledge is available to lead yet again and those with experience above the North Col are still fit and young enough to compete.




CHOMULHARI FROM PHARI




KAMPA DZONG FORT





SHEKAR DZONG MONASTERY



EVEREST FROM RONGBUK CAMP



*Everest Diary, 1933 (Extracts).*

March 12th . . . . . Left Kalimpong.

\* \* \* \* \*

March 18th . . . . . Crossed the Natu La into the Chumbi Valley and Thibet.

\* \* \* \* \*

March 26th . . . . . To Mating . . . . . 15,300 feet.

A lovely morning. We started across the plain rather vaguely north-westwards from under Chomulhari at 7-15 a.m., breakfasting in the open. The wind started at 8-30 and by 9 we had a real taste of what the Thibetan plateau can do in March. The snow was blown in our faces in a blizzard and our ponies had considerable difficulty in crossing several deep drifts of snow. A bad day for the porters who came in still very cheerful and uncomplaining.

\* \* \* \* \*

March 29th . . . . . To Kampa Dzong . . . . . 14,500 feet.

Marched by the southern route up a valley which looks about 4 miles long, and is actually nearer 9 miles, to the Pass which is approximately 17,600 feet. We saw masses of gazelle at close range and rode amongst them on our ponies; there were also 30 to 40 *kiangs* (wild asses) though they kept further away from us. We climbed the ridge to the south of the Pass and lay there watching the wonderful panorama spread before us. The Bavarian Ridge of Kanchenjanga dominated the view to the south and was surrounded by the many peaks of the Llonak valley. Over 100 miles to the west the Everest group stood out with the magnificent snow-covered south-east face of Everest plunging down to Nepal. At the foot of the valley we turned suddenly south-westwards into Kampa Dzong with its lovely fort situated on a rock high above the village.

\* \* \* \* \*

April 10th . . . . . To Shekar Dzong . . . . . 14,500 feet.

Again about 15 miles. Following a winding valley we crossed the river by a good bridge and started across an open plain for Shekar, already visible some 6 miles distant. The monastery is built on a rock which rises 600 feet above the plain, and is the nearest thing one can imagine to the castles of Fairy Tales. There is a most fantastic fortress on the summit of the hill, and the town itself, consisting

of a cluster of white houses with black windows, is built on the rock some 200 feet above the plain. By moonlight it looks incredibly lovely.

\*                      \*                      \*                      \*                      \*

April 17th                      ..                      To Base Camp                      ..                      16,800 feet.

The entire Expedition visited the Rongbuk Monastery for the blessing ceremony and afterwards started for Base Camp, which is about  $4\frac{1}{2}$  miles from the Monastery.

\*                      \*                      \*                      \*                      \*

May 7th                      ..                      At Camp III                      ..                      21,000 feet.

A most unpromising day. We (Hugh Ruttledge, Longland, Smythe, Shipton; Boustead and myself) started, however (without crampons), for the North Col, Nima Tendrup and Pasang carrying rope and pitons. The latter was unwell, so was sent back. The whole of the upper glacier was one sheet of blue ice and a strong gale was blowing across it. It was quite impossible to work on the Col itself, so we dumped the rope and started back. Eric (Shipton) appeared to enjoy sliding about on the slippery descent, but most of the rest of us came down very cautiously. It is decided to move four people and an arctic tent to the foot of the Col to-morrow.

\*                      \*                      \*                      \*                      \*

May 9th                      ..                      At Camp III                      ..                      21,000 feet.

Went up to IIIA with Wyn Harris and Waggars. "Policee," our Thibetan mastiff, accompanied us. In spite of 52 degrees of frost last night she refuses to come into a tent and lies curled up in the snow all night. More snow is falling which may make the North Col dangerous to work on. There are still the same anxieties—

1. The continued bad weather which is delaying us considerably.
2. The lack of porters (the Sola Khombu men have still not arrived).
3. The difficulty of the route to the North Col, the immediate establishment of which is essential if we are to have sufficient time to make two or three attempts before the monsoon arrives.

\*                      \*                      \*                      \*                      \*

May 12th                      ..                      At Camp III.

Went up with 15 porters to IIIA, the whole party out working on the Col. Frank and Eric in front reached the ledge on which we may place Camp IV. Jack (Longland) Wyn and Yula Kita on

another rope and Waggars, Hugo (Boustead) and Qusang on a third, all helping to rope the route, the two porters worked splendidly.

\* \* \* \* \*

May 13th .. To Camp IIIA .. 21,800 feet.

Hugh (Ruttledge) and Ferdy (Crawford) have returned to Camp II, the former's throat being still very bad. Frank (Smythe) and Eric came down from IIIA to fetch kit and onions! I went up with Raymond (Greene), Eric and Frank, all carrying small loads and going well. Tom (Brocklebank) accompanied us half the way. George (Wood-Johnson) very upset at not being included in the original assault, but he is doing invaluable work at III.

\* \* \* \* \*

May 14th .. At Camp IIIA.

A stormy night with a high wind. Hugo, Frank, Eric and I started at 10 a.m. to escort the first 12 men to the North Col Camp. The route has been splendidly roped by the advanced parties, and it's a mystery to me how Frank first surmounted the ice wall which is perpendicular for 12 feet and then slopes steeply upwards for 30 feet more. The porters behaved splendidly on the extremely steep route and with the help of the fixed ropes returned singly to Camp. Eric *will* go to sleep in my hat.

\* \* \* \* \*

May 15th .. To North Col Camp .. 22,700 feet.

A very stormy night, one pole of our arctic tent came loose, so we spent rather a hectic night wondering whether the whole tent would be blown down on top of us. Made out a final plan for establishing Camps V and VI which Jack is taking down to Ferdy who has arrived at III. Started late and reached Camp IV in the evening. The tents are pitched on a ledge about 20 yards long and 20 feet broad with a high protecting ice wall above; to the east we look straight down to IIIA and far away in the distance the whole of the Himalayas are spread below us. There are five of us here—Boustead, Smythe, Shipton, Wyn Harris and myself.

\* \* \* \* \*

May 18th .. At North Col Camp .. 22,700 feet.

The sun shining and a fairly strong wind on Everest. No movement yet from below, but we hope they will try and come up as every day delays the establishment of V and VI. This is the third day now that we have been cut off from below. After lunch we

visited the top of the North Col. The route is a very steep snow route which will have to be roped. The ridge itself is quite narrow, dropping gently westwards for 50 feet to rocks and then perpendicularly to the main Rongbuk Glacier. The views of snow ranges are magnificent.

\* \* \* \* \*

May 20th . . . . . At North Col Camp.

A fine morning. As loads arrived yesterday Wyn, Hugo and myself started with 11 porters (one unloaded) to try and dump 10 loads at Camp V. As soon as we were on the ridge the wind started, the porters carried splendidly in spite of it, but on reaching the top of the snow-tongue, at about 24,800 feet, some of them were so affected with numbed hands and feet that I decided it would be best to dump the loads there rather than risk loss of efficiency from frostbite and fatigue. The establishment of V could not be affected as 20 loads were required there and 20 fit men, half going unloaded to the dump on the 22nd should make the establishment safe in two days, according to the plan already made. Wyn and Hugo decided to reconnoitre towards V, but after a short distance the latter was overcome by the altitude and both decided to return.

\* \* \* \* \*

May 22nd . . . . . To Camp V . . . . . 25,700 feet.

A lovely morning. Hugh had arrived from III the previous evening. Everyone up by 5-15 a.m., and I stood by the porters until everything was ready at 6-45. Hugh then made a speech and away the party went under Wyn, Waggars, Hugo, Jack and Raymond. I stayed behind to get my breakfast. Left at 8, but met Hugh just above Camp on his way down from the Col and sat talking until 8-45. Two hours later met Jack escorting Yula Kita, the latter very sick with stomach trouble and vomiting frequently. Near Camp V, which had been pitched after a splendid carry at 25,700 feet, I met Raymond coming down, his heart was affected by the climb and he had decided to return. Trying to sleep two and two in small Meade tents at 25,700 feet with a quantity of Everest's stones sticking into one's back will not be too easy. We have eight porters here, all seemingly cheerful for to-morrow's great carry to VI as near 27,700 feet as we can manage.

\* \* \* \* \*



PORTERS AT CAMP IV



EVEREST "TIGERS" FOR CAMPS V AND VI





CAMP V—25,700 FEET



MAJOR BOUSTEAD AT CAMP V (*collapsed*)



May 23rd . . . . . At Camp V . . . . . 25,700 feet.

A very stormy morning, no chance at all of going on to VI. Wyn and Waggars very gallantly went 100 feet down the mountain to place our "no advance" signal on the rocks. Did not sleep well last night, too many stones combined with lack of breath. . . . Frank and Eric have turned up unexpectedly; we have had an emergency conference. Wyn and Waggars are going down to IV and the remainder of us will attempt VI to-morrow.

\* \* \* \* \*

May 24th . . . . . At Camp V.

A very stormy night, the snow blew continually into the tents. Hugo and I had an amusing midnight episode searching the "property box" for candles and matches while taking a sip each from the Thermos of tea we had prepared for the morning. Much refreshed with aspirin also, I believe we did actually sleep a little. A move towards VI was quite impossible, the wind increased to a gale and no food support even could reach us from below. Lakpa was unwell and we intended to send him down but the conditions have become too bad, the rest of the porters are putting up a brave show and smile cheerfully when we visit them. Their rations are finished this evening, but they say they are willing to carry to VI in spite of this and then get down to IV. We have given them Ovaltine and ginger biscuits, but have very little left for ourselves, the chief difficulty is to make the porters eat at all. We have a wonderful view now, but the wind is still very strong.

\* \* \* \* \*

May 25th . . . . . To North Col Camp.

Hugo woke me up at 1-30 a.m. in a temporary lull and said he thought it was time to get the porters going! I soothed him down and we again drank some of our Ovaltine brew. The storm, which had been so strong that we had doubted whether our tents could stand the strain, now subsided completely and we managed to get a little rest until 4 a.m. when Hugo insisted on dressing and at 4-20 went out and "started the porters going." He really did wonderfully, taking food to the men and trying to make them eat. He then returned and slept. The wind had started again but we were all dressed and loads ready by 7-15 a.m. We all collected ready to start for VI, but it was bitterly cold and Frank eventually decided against going. His decision was undoubtedly correct, the men

were bitterly cold and would certainly not have gone far. We bundled the men back into the tents and spent an hour warming hands and feet. We started down after striking the tents in one of the strongest and coldest blizzards I have ever experienced. Our fingers were frozen stiff and it was necessary to work them continuously to prevent frostbite. Half-way down we met a party trying to come up but they were forced to abandon the attempt. On the way down I slipped badly during a glissade, and losing control, went for some 150 feet before a porter stopped me: no damage except a sprained left leg. The casualties of this reverse were a great deal more than we liked, six of the eight porters were out of action with frostbitten hands and feet, and of the remaining two only Anturki is keen to go back.

\* \* \* \* \*

May 26th . . . . . To Camp IV-A . . . . . 23,000 feet.

A very warm night, about 6" of snow fell and there were several ominous roars of avalanches. As one avalanche would swamp our ledge it is decided to move Camp to the top of the Col. Smythe, Shipton, Wyn Harris, Waggars, Longland and myself to go up and the remainder down to III. I was asked to review the porters and in spite of severe casualties nine are willing to return to the attack.

Mid-day.—A dreadful shock, the porter selected as head of the assault men has suddenly caved in and says he cannot move, it is really quite understandable after the hammering the previous party have had. Coming at this moment, however, from the leader, it is most serious, and I have regrettably been forced to ridicule him seriously. Datsering is appointed leader and the remainder are still staunch, which is remarkable. I have, however, taken the precaution of sending them up to IV-A with their beddings as first loads.

2 p.m.—A good influence from below, four excellent men have just arrived, all begging to go up, I have accepted three.

6 p.m.—Two arctic tents pitched at IV-A; the 12 porters extremely cheerful; we took a bottle of brandy into their tent and to-morrow is to be a rest day for us all.

\* \* \* \* \*

May 28th . . . . . To Camp V . . . . . 25,700 feet.

Wyn, Waggars, Jack and I started with 12 porters for V, eight to be retained. I immediately found myself going extremely badly with my sprained tendon and was well left behind, reaching V with difficulty after nine hours. The porters had again performed

a wonderful carry in five hours, the first four getting in in front of Wyn who is moving very well; only poor Qusang "Poggler" was forced to drop his load and return after trying very hard. The final eight were determined to do a record carry and joked heartily at the prospect; curiously enough they were practically all of one type, the tall, strong porter was out of it and we had eight small, tough, young men.

\* \* \* \* \*

May 29th . . . . . At Camp V. . . . . 25,700 feet.

At 5 a.m. I went out to rouse the porters and reported to Wyn. It was a lovely day, but we could not tell what the wind would do, so waited and kept the porters in their tents.

At 7-45 a.m. Wyn decided to move and away they went. Jack took my place and I stayed at V preparing drinks for their return. The men *did* their record carry, Jack stopped them owing to the time at about 27,400 feet, where Camp VI was pitched, a splendid achievement. Arriving back at V they drank their Ovaltine, collected their beddings and went on down to IV, with the exception of Kipa and Rinzing who were too tired to descend below V and are staying the night. Jack went on down with them having done a sterling bit of work. Frank and Eric have arrived from IV. Kipa, the next day on his arrival at IV, insisted that he was dead and was therefore unable to dress or proceed further. He persisted in this belief at intervals, even after reaching the Base Camp, and eventually followed Raymond faithfully about in the belief that he had brought him back to earth. He did splendidly all the way up.

\* \* \* \* \*

May 30th . . . . . At Camp V.

Frank and Eric went on up to VI. Although I went out frequently I saw nothing of the reconnaissance party who were presumably out somewhere between VI and the summit.

(Wyn and Waggers were actually out on Norton's traverse and reached about the same height as he did, 28,000 feet, finding conditions too dangerous they returned, Waggers visiting the ridge. They were led against their better judgment from making the reconnaissance of the "second step" by the seeming ease of the traverse.)

Spent the day melting down snow and cooking Ovaltine, hot milk, and tea, and storing them in Thermoses. By 5 p.m. I came to the conclusion that Wyn and Waggers had decided to stay at VI for

the night (we had two extra sleeping bags there and an emergency Marco Pallis tent), and so left the spare Burns tent collapsed and went to bed. At 7-15 I was awakened by voices, and in came the reconnaissance party. Luckily I had hot drinks for them, and we talked of their traverse of Norton's route. They then insisted on going to the other tent and I felt rather guilty that it was not ready for them.

\* \* \* \* \*

May 31st . . . . . At Camp V.

Woke early and took a brew of hot milk to Wyn and Wagers who looked comfortable enough wrapt in their sleeping bags. They left about mid-day for Camp IV. It has snowed above us all day but there was a warm sun. (Frank and Eric did not go out this day from VI because of the snow.) Spent the night alone, my seventh night at V.

\* \* \* \* \*


June 1st . . . . . At Camp V.

(Written on June 2nd at Camp IV-A.) Spent the day cooking as usual, saw nothing of the party above. At 5 p.m. the most terrific hurricane started, lasting about half an hour. Luckily my tent having collapsed on me the night before, I had secured it pretty firmly. Nothing could prevent the snow coming in and I soon had my cooking supply for at least a day lying around me. At about 6-15 Eric came in, having weathered the storm between VI and V; he was covered in icicles and obviously rather affected by his experience. Luckily a brew of soup was actually boiling and this was followed by the contents of all the Thermoses. We then did a very stupid thing and sat talking of his and Frank's attempt that day. The result being that when he went to bed the wind had sprung up again and he found he couldn't get into his tent, and that it was (of course) half full of snow and he didn't know which end the sleeping bags were. (Eric Shipton was just starting a temporary loss of memory which lasted for about 4 or 5 days eventually.) Twice he came back to me and we both got frozen trying to fix the wires of his torch; eventually I insisted on his staying in my tent in one of the extra sleeping bags there. He still tried to go and fetch another bag but I managed to stop him as already we were practically in a frostbitten state. I think that night the worst I have ever spent, with the one comfort of having Eric there. It was one continual blizzard and Eric and I talked all the night through. (Frank at Camp VI in contrast to



EAST RONGBUK GLACIER





DR. RAYMOND GREENE AND MR. LONGLAND IN THE TROUGH OF THE  
EAST RONGBUK GLACIER



us had four sleeping bags to himself and slept the clock round in comparative comfort). The snow came through the side of the tent and the door. My feet were frozen and it was certainly on this occasion that my frostbite became serious. The morning found us covered in about an inch of snow.

\* \* \* \* \*

June 2nd . . . . . To Camp IV-A.

A fine but windy day, Frank was coming straight from VI to IV. Eric and I were keen to go down as soon as possible, especially as it was probable that my feet, already numbed, combined with the sprained tendon, might delay our descent. Just after 11 a.m. I saw Frank some way above the Camp, we immediately started down ahead of him. What a ridge this is! we descended in a gale against which we could hardly stand up. Eric waited for me all the way down. Lower down it was better and we were met by Jack with a very welcome tot of hot water and brandy. Frank was close behind and had not taken advantage of the hot tea we had left for him at V.

Willie (McLean) is here at IV and put us straight to bed with hot soup, looking after us wonderfully. That ends the second assault. Everest wins again. Frank certainly, and probably Wyn also, would have reached the summit if falls of snow had not made the condition of the slabs unjustifiably dangerous. When Willie examined us, Frank and I were both normal and our pulses 62 each. This was about an hour after we reached IV. Eric had a slight temperature and higher pulse rate. My heart was out by about an inch but Frank was still perfectly sound.

\* \* \* \* \*

June 3rd . . . . . To Camp III.

All evacuated to III. Willie suddenly taken very ill and reached III with difficulty. We met the "She-Bear" (Shebbeare) on the old Camp IV ledge on his way up with a "permit" to visit the North Col ridge. As usual he was carrying a heavy rucksack, but managed to eat his lunch on the Col before the clouds arrived to hide the view. Willie's illness appears to be sheer altitude exhaustion, and seems hardly possible after all the cooking and doctoring he did for us yesterday.

At IV-A yesterday, after our arrival, Frank decided to take oxygen for 20 minutes to see if it affected his pulse. After about 5 minutes

I remarked that as the whistle was not blowing the apparatus was obviously not working. Jack facetiously remarked that "it only blew when the patient was dying," and no further notice was taken. After 20 minutes Frank solemnly took his pulse and found it exactly the same, *i.e.*, 62. He remarked how strange this was and Willie, duly impressed, took out his note-book and made several interesting medical notes on the fact. We asked Frank if the oxygen had had any effect on him, and he said that it had soothed him but made his throat a little sore. Rather amusing—being all imagination.

Conference at III. It is decided to evacuate to the Base for a week to recuperate and then make a final assault.

\* \* \* \* \*

June 5th . . . . . At Camp II.

My feet now too sore to allow me to move, the others went on down. Hugh, She-Bear and Willie arrive from III, the latter very ill. In spite of this he writes round offering advice and apologising for not being able to come and see me.

\* \* \* \* \*

June 6th . . . . . To Base Camp.

Was carried down in turns pick-a-back all the way to Base Camp by 4 porters, it was not as exhausting as I had expected. Have just heard that during the consolidation of Camp IV poor "Policee" insisted on climbing to the foot of the ice wall (22,500 feet). While the porters were re-laying loads up the ladder she disappeared. It is most distressing as we had all become very fond of our Mascot, who would tolerate us but flew at any Thibetan who approached our Camp. As no barking or noise was heard by anyone it is hoped that in falling she was knocked unconscious and so died painlessly.

\* \* \* \* \*

June 14th—21st

Willie, George, and myself at Tashi Dzom, Willie quite ill with a patch of bronchial pneumonia, but is better now. It is very restful here, the trees a lovely green, and the grass six inches long. We have our tents facing into the garden and can watch the hare come nervously off the hillside in the early morning. To-day a female bhurrel walked into our garden and grazed 50 yards away in full view of our tents until a dog arrived and chased her away. My feet much improved, can walk about 100 yards now. Pasang is here and seems to enjoy his blackened fingers, two of which must come off.

In spite of the pain he still laughs all day and works hard, allowing no one else to touch my belongings. No news from above yet of the third attempt.

\* \* \* \* \*

June 23rd.

News at last from above. After continual snow and bad weather it is reported that Camp III has been evacuated yesterday, everyone returning to Base Camp. No progress was possible above III, this sounds like a final withdrawal.

\* \* \* \* \*

July 2nd.

A letter arrives from Hugh giving definite news of our plans. The Everest Committee has recalled the Expedition. Messages by wireless have been received from the King, the R. G. S., the A. C., Colonel Norton and others. The King especially mentions his hope that another expedition will be possible. Hugh's reasons for advising a withdrawal were cabled home, and as they are of considerable interest I reproduce here what he says in his letter to me :

"I have come to the conclusion . . . that Everest, in ordinary circumstances, remains a snow-peak and therefore unclimbable during the period July—September inclusive. This does not apply to lower peaks so much, but above 25,000 feet it seems almost certain that—

1. The air temperature never rises above freezing point, therefore clouds on Everest invariably imply snow.

2. The snow is powdery and never consolidates otherwise the North face of Everest would be like the South face—iced.

3. The sun has little or no power to melt snow except when there is a thin coating on slabs. Sublimation hardly occurs therefore.

4. The only agent for removing snow is wind, and this hardly comes into operation till the north-west wind establishes itself towards the end of September, by which time it is too cold to climb.

The Rongbuk Lama has sent me a special message to the effect that the snow never leaves Everest during the next three months. I attach no special importance to this but it is corroborative."

So all is over and we are to go back.

\* \* \* \* \*

July 27th.

Arrived at Darjeeling.

## TWO FURTHER LECTURES ON THE MESOPOTAMIA CAMPAIGN—4TH OCTOBER 1915 to 11TH MARCH 1917

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL J. E. SHEARER, M.C., 1/15TH PUNJAB  
REGIMENT.

### 1. *Scope of These Two Lectures*

These two lectures cover one of the Military History periods set for the Promotion Examinations in October this year and March next year, *i.e.*, from the commencement of General Nixon's unsuccessful advance on Baghdad in 1915 up to its capture by General Maude in 1917.

There are so many military lessons to be derived from this campaign that I shall have to concentrate on them and keep the narrative of events as brief as possible. But I would recommend all examination candidates to read the Staff College "Critical Study of the Campaign in Mesopotamia up to April 1917," copies of which are in every Station Military Library. It is an excellent and very clear book.

It is impossible to understand this campaign properly unless you have some idea of the unusual conditions of topography, climate, floods, mud, mirage, entire lack of drinkable water, except in the large rivers, and so on, in Mesopotamia (or Iraq as it is now called). I have tried to summarize these conditions as concisely as possible in two lectures of mine on the earlier part of the Mesopotamia Campaign which were published in the July and October 1934 copies of the Journal of the United Service Institution of India. I would recommend examination candidates to read the introductory pages of those two lectures, as well as Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the Staff College "Critical Study," in order to put themselves into the picture regarding the peculiar difficulties with which everyone had to contend during this very trying campaign.

### 2. *Phases of Campaign*

This campaign falls into six distinct phases. These are—

- (i) General Townshend's advance towards Baghdad and the battle of Ctesiphon.
- (ii) General Townshend's retirement to Kut-al-Amara and the siege of Kut up to Christmas 1915.

- (iii) The operation of the Kut Relief Force up to the surrender of Kut on the 29th April 1916, after a siege of 143 days. During this period the defenders of Kut were having a very bad time indeed, but the attentions of the Turks were directed mainly against the Relief Force and the determined efforts to take Kut by storm had ceased.
- (iv) From the 30th April until the 13th December 1916 there was practically no fighting. The heat was intense, and the original Relief Force was having a really wretched time through the almost entire breakdown of "Q" arrangements on the L. of C. But conditions improved steadily from the time General Maude was made Force Commander in August 1916, until he was ready on the 13th December to resume the advance upon Baghdad.
- (v) The period 14th December 1916 to 24th February 1917 was a period of intense fighting which resulted in the capture of Kut and the precipitate retreat of the whole Turkish Army towards Baghdad.
- (vi) The period 25th February to 11th March 1917 consisted of the pursuit of the Turks towards Baghdad, finishing up with the forcing of the River Diyala after hard fighting on the 10th March, and General Maude's entry into Baghdad on 11th March 1917.

I shall now go into each of these phases in as much detail as I can in the time available.

### *FIRST PHASE—GENERAL TOWNSHEND'S ADVANCE TOWARDS BAGHDAD AND BATTLE OF CTESIPHON*

#### *3. Opening Situation (vide Sketch Map No. 1).*

Our story opens with the arrival at Aziziya (60 miles by road above Kut-al-Amara), on 5th October 1915, of General Townshend in his attempted pursuit by river of the Turks, whom he had defeated a week earlier at the battle of Kut-al-Amara. The sudden drop in the level of the Tigris had delayed his pursuit and the Turks had got clear away to the Ctesiphon Position, some 20 miles further on. General Townshend had consequently.

•

through no fault of his own, finally lost his chance of hustling the demoralized Turks through Ctesiphon and entering Baghdad on their heels. So he halted and asked for orders.

#### 4. *Decision to Advance to Baghdad*

General Nixon, the Force Commander, was still full of optimism about General Townshend's ability to capture Baghdad, but he considered that he would require two extra divisions to safeguard it against recapture, once taken. He consequently asked for permission from the War Cabinet to advance to Baghdad, and requested the early despatch of the two extra divisions which he required.

General Nixon's optimism is nothing short of amazing. He cannot have forgotten the "Q" difficulties, because he was at that time repeatedly asking A. H. Q., India, for more river transport and for a railway, neither of which there was any likelihood of his obtaining in time. The transport situation was in a really perilous state. The Striking Force (6th Indian Division) was very short of 1st Line Transport. 2nd Line Transport was shorter still and consisted mostly of Arab sailing boats (Mahailas), while the river transport on the L. of C. could only deliver 150 tons a day to General Townshend, although his daily maintenance requirements were 208 tons a day. Yet General Nixon was proposing to extend his already over-strained river L. of C. by a further 200 miles. General Townshend protested, but his protest failed to shake General Nixon's optimism.

The details of the telegrams which passed between General Nixon, the War Cabinet, A. H. Q., India, and the Viceroy, before sanction for the advance on Baghdad was given, make wearisome reading. The argument took three precious weeks and was a chapter of misunderstandings. The War Cabinet did not realize the transportation shortage and so thought in terms of "G" only. The India Office and A. H. Q., India, knew the "Q" difficulties, but did not realize that the War Cabinet was ignorant of them. So the unfortunate sanction was given.

Anyhow, the lesson which this rubs forcibly into us is the old one which it is so fatally easy to forget in the enthusiasm of a successful advance; that the best "G" plans are useless in war unless the "Q" side of them has been given due weight in their preparation,

5. *Preparations for Attack on Ctesiphon Position*

While this correspondence was going on, Generals Nixon and Townshend were making all preparations for the advance. Drafts were sent up, supplies were dumped well forward, and the Turkish covering troops were driven in.

General Townshend received his last batch of river transport on the 18th November, and advanced towards Ctesiphon the next morning.

The five weeks delay at Aziziya were unavoidable, but this respite was invaluable to the Turks. The defeated 35th and 38th Divisions had pulled themselves together and had been reinforced by the 45th and 51st Divisions of real Anatolian Turks. These two divisions had a splendid fighting record and were of very different quality to the divisions which General Townshend had previously defeated.

The Turkish strength at Ctesiphon had risen from about 9,000 men and 30 guns to 20,000 men and 45 guns, whereas General Townshend had only 14,000 men and 30 land guns. The War Office had warned General Nixon that Von der Goltz with 30,000 men was *en route* for Mesopotamia, but he did not believe this report and estimated that there were only 11,000 to 13,000 Turks at Ctesiphon.

6. *Description of the Ctesiphon Position (called Sulaiman Pak by the Turks)*—(vide sketch Map No. 2).

The sketch map shows the position clearly. It consisted of two main lines of defence in the bend of the Tigris about Ctesiphon, and a third position six miles further back at the junction of the Diyala River with the Tigris. The first line of defence was fully dug in depth and wired, and had a field of fire of 1,000 yards cleared in front of it by burning the grass. The second and third lines of defence were only partially dug. The first and second lines were mainly on the left bank of the Tigris, but had extensions across the river defended by very broken nullah country which would have been difficult to attack over.

The northern portion of the first line of defence was strong, but the position had three weaknesses. These were—

- (i) The only communication between the right and left bank positions was one boat bridge behind the second line of defence.

- (ii) The southern portion of the first position could only be attacked in enfilade from High Wall, but it was of no great value to the defence, sited as it was.
- (iii) The outer flank of the first position on the left bank was too near the Tigris and so could be easily turned and attacked in flank.

The Turkish Commander, Nur-ud-Din, had, however, disposed his troops well (*vide* Sketch Map No. 2). His three forward divisions were in depth with adequate local reserves, and he had the whole of his best division and his cavalry brigade in general reserve. He was, therefore, ready to meet any emergency, and in fact handled his reserves most effectively throughout the battle.

#### 7. *General Townshend's Plan of Attack on Ctesiphon Position*

##### (a) *His Appreciation.*

General Townshend had originally intended to advance up the right bank of the Tigris, thus forcing Nur-ud-Din to abandon Ctesiphon and fight in some hastily prepared position elsewhere, but he abandoned this idea upon hearing of the difficulty going on the right bank.

He had no maps and so had to rely on eye sketches made from aeroplane reconnaissances, but these turned out to be reasonably accurate. He knew of the arrival of the Turkish 45th Division, but did not know of the 51st Division.

Taking all these points into consideration he decided to attack the left bank position from the north-east.

##### (b) *His plan was as follows—*

- ✓ (i) He split his force into four columns as under :

*Column "A"—Commander, Major-General Delamain.*

*Troops—*

16th Infantry Brigade (less 2 battalions),

30th Composite Infantry Brigade 3½ battalions plus the 2 other battalions of the 16th Infantry Brigade.

Two Field Batteries.

*Column "B"—Commander, Brigadier-General Hamilton.*

*Troops—*

18th Infantry Brigade.

One Field Battery.

*Column "C"—Commander, Brigadier-General Hoghton.*

*Troops—*

- 17th Infantry Brigade.
- 48th Pioneers.
- One Squadron Divisional Cavalry.
- One Field Battery.
- One Section Heavy Battery.

*Flying Column—Commander, Major-General Melliss.*

*Troops—*

- 6th Cavalry Brigade.
- One Maxim Battery.
- Two Armoured Cars.
- 76th Punjabis (with A. T. carts to carry half the battalion at a time).

General Townshend retained no General Reserve at all in his own hand.

(ii) *The role of each column was as follows—*

*Column "C" to make an ostentatious holding attack between Water Redoubt and High Wall.*

*Column "A" to capture V. P., from the east and roll up the Turkish first line of defence.*

*Column "B" to attack the Turkish second line about Qusaiba, from the east, to divert attention from Column "A's" attack.*

*Flying Column to outflank the Turkish second line and take up a position behind it.*

*The "Naval Flotilla," of all the gun-boats and heavy guns on barges, to enfilade the Turkish position upstream of Bustan.*

*Divisional Headquarters at Bustan.*

(iii) *Time Table of Attack*

*Column "C" to march ostentatiously to Bustan on the afternoon of 21st November to draw Turkish reserves south from V. P., and to commence attack at first light on 22nd November.*

*Columns "A," "B" and Flying Column to "Old Canal Embankment" on night of 21st/22nd November, dropping Column "A" 5,000 yards east of V. P., Column "B" 1½ miles further north, and Flying Column 1½ miles still further north.*

*Column "B" and Flying Column* to commence their attacks on the morning of 22nd November, as soon as Column "C's" attack had properly started.

*Column "A"* to attack V.P., as soon as the Turks' attention was turned towards Column "B's" attack.

#### 8. *Criticisms of General Townshend's Plan*

It is easy to be wise after the event, but this very elaborate and ambitious plan lays itself out to many criticisms. Perhaps the principal of these are—

##### (a) *The plan was not elastic enough*

The plan was complicated and rigid. The whole force was scattered in independent detachments over a wide area, and so the plan could not be modified at short notice to meet unexpected emergencies. This was very risky in view of General Townshend's distinctly vague and, as it happened, very inaccurate knowledge of the enemy strength and dispositions.

He risked defeat in detail and was only saved from that by the first-rate fighting qualities of his troops.

##### (b) *Each Column Commander's orders were conditional upon the action of some other column*

This again is risky, particularly in that country where lack of landmarks, and mirage, make it very difficult to keep direction. As it happened every Column, except Column "A," lost its direction more or less. F. S. R. specially warns us against conditional orders.

##### (c) *There was no General Reserve with which General Townshend could influence the battle, once joined. Compare Nur-ud-Din's wise precautions in this case.*

##### (d) *The whole Force was split into weak detachments so there was no real weight anywhere, either of infantry or guns, to force a decision. The weak columns gained their objectives through sheer grit and bravery, but at terrible cost, and after having to improvise their local reserves out of any men they could scrape together on the spot.*

##### (e) *Surely a concentrated Flank Attack of the whole 6th Division, supported by the co-ordinated fire of all its artillery, although much less Napoleonic and spectacular, would have won success more quickly and surely and at far less cost in*

valuable lives. Moreover, General Townshend would then have been able to modify his plan rapidly to meet the unexpected counter-attacks of the 51st Division, and his splendid troops might after all have obtained a victory in spite of the disparity of numbers.

9. *Battle of Ctesiphon—First Day (22nd November)* ✓

I have no time to give the details of this very interesting battle, which is well worth reading in the Official History. Column "C's" original advance was hesitating and bewildered, owing to the fact that their orders prevented pushing home their attacks; and because the Turks opposite them "refused to play" and withheld their fire until Column "C" had arrived within 800 yards of the position. Moreover, Column "C" started attacking towards High Wall in error, and so had eventually to do a costly flank march close to the enemy in order to capture their objective of Water Redoubt.

As Column "C" were failing to create the necessary diversion, General Townshend ordered Column "B" and the Flying Column to attack without waiting for them. But they also lost direction and attacked too close behind V. P. Nur-ud-Din had been fully aware of the night march round his exposed flank and was prepared. As soon as this attack started he counter-attacked with the bulk of the 51st Division. Neither side could make headway against the other and the result was a bitterly contested stale-mate on that flank.

Hearing the firing, Column "A" then commenced a most gallant attack on V. P. at 09-00 hours; and after a terrific "dog fight," in which our men lost terribly, and in which the 45th Turkish Division practically ceased to exist, Columns "A" and "C" had captured the whole of the Turkish first position by noon. But our casualties had been so heavy, and the remnants of units were so mixed, that we were only just able to hang on to the fringe of our gains against the determined counter-attacks by fresh troops of the 51st and 35th Turkish Divisions, which lasted all afternoon and evening.

At dusk both sides ceased firing, both too battered to fight any more; and General Townshend concentrated the remnants of his force at V. P. Thanks to the lack of reserves on our side the fight had been a most gallant "soldier's battle" with little generalship displayed, but with quite a lot of generalship on Nur-ud-Din's part.

10. *Battle of Ctesiphon—Second Day (23rd November)*

On the morning of the 23rd, reorganization was taken in hand. Column "C" held V. P., Column "A" (less 2/7th Gurkhas and 24th Punjabis) held Water Redoubt; Column "B" held High Wall while the 2/7th Gurkhas and 24th Punjabis (only 400 rifles altogether) held Gurkha Mound to protect our exposed left flank.

The day passed quietly in evacuating our wounded and preparing defences, but at dusk the Turks started a general counter-attack which lasted all night. However the Turkish attacks fell into absolute chaos, made no headway at all, and retired at dawn. The whole 35th Division attacked Gurkha Mound but failed to capture it.

11. *Battle of Ctesiphon—Third and Fourth Days (24th and 25th November)*

On this day General Townshend concentrated his whole force at High Wall, but took all day to do so on account of the Turkish shelling.

That morning an Arab patrol mistook the 51st Turkish Division returning from its night attack for a British Column advancing towards the Diyala. Nur-ud-Din believed this and ordered his army back to the Diyala. This move was actually carried out during the night of the 24th/25th but when he discovered in the morning that the British had not moved, Nur-ud-Din ordered his force back again to Ctesiphon.

This forward movement was reported to General Townshend by aeroplane. He thought the Turks were being strongly reinforced, and he, in his turn, decided to retreat, and reached Lajj on the night of 25th/26th.

12. *Comments on Battle of Ctesiphon*

During this battle the British lost 4,600 casualties, as opposed to the Turks' 9,500, but this represented 60 per cent. casualties in many of our units and a high proportion of British officers had been knocked out, so reorganization was very difficult.

This Turkish victory was undoubtedly due to Nur-ud-Din's efficient handling of his reserves, but even so, the fog of war was very heavy on both sides, and had General Townshend, in the first instance, obeyed the precepts of F. S. R. and concentrated his maximum force on the vital point, and kept a strong reserve in hand, it would seem reasonable to suppose that victory would have gone to him instead of to his opponent.

As it was, it was only the extreme grit and bravery of his troops that prevented a complete disaster to General Townshend's force. ✓

**SECOND PHASE—RETREAT TO KUT-AL-AMARA AND COMMENCEMENT OF SIEGE**

**13. *Retreat to Kut-al-Amara***

General Townshend at first out-distanced the Turkish pursuit, but information on both sides was bad, and the Turks caught up General Townshend's force at Umm-at-Tabul during the night of the 30th November and 1st December without either side knowing this. This strange situation could not have happened had the cavalry of either side been doing its job properly.

At dawn, both sides were amazed to find their camps only 1½ miles apart and in full view of each other, but General Townshend was absolutely brilliant in this emergency. Before the Turks could pull themselves together he carried out a rapid counter-attack, which relieved his force of all further pressure until after Kut was reached on the 3rd December.

But many supplies had to be abandoned at Aziziya, and owing to the low level of the Tigris, our shipping could not move fast enough to escape from the Turkish artillery fire. We consequently lost three gun-boats, a large river-steamer and some barges. *See*

**14. *Decision to Hold Kut-al-Amara***

We now come to another very controversial subject which I have no time to discuss (*i.e.*, was General Nixon right in agreeing to General Townshend's proposal to hold Kut-al-Amara?) The question is fully discussed in the Official History, Vol. II, Chapters XVII and XVIII.

**15. *Siege of Kut-al-Amara—First Phase (December 1915)***

On 4th December, the day after his arrival at Kut, General Townshend evacuated all his sick and wounded; and on the 6th December the 6th Cavalry Brigade was sent to join the reinforcements which were then just beginning to reach Mesopotamia. These were the 3rd and 7th Indian Divisions from France and Egypt; the 34th, 35th and 36th Indian Infantry Brigades from India, which were to form a new division.

On the same day the Turks first began to shell Kut, and by the night of the 7th the investment was almost complete. From the 9th to the 13th December the Turks made many determined but unsuccessful assaults. ✓

Von der Goltz had meanwhile arrived to take command of the Turkish Forces in Mesopotamia. He was nervous about the threat to Baghdad of our reinforcements which were landing in Basra, and of a Russian Army which was steadily advancing south-westwards in Persia. So he decided to starve out the Kut garrison, while moving his main strength downstream to oppose our Relief Force. He also sent a detachment to guard Baghdad from the Russian threat.

✓ However, the Turks made one final effort to take Kut by storm before finally settling down to starve it out.

✓ On the morning of Christmas Eve and twice more during the following night, they made the most determined attacks on "the Fort" (*i.e.*, the north-east corner of the Kut defences). These attacks were repulsed with great slaughter on both sides, and for the rest of the siege the garrison was left in comparative peace except for constant shelling and sniping.

✓ But General Townshend's firm belief that he would be relieved within two months had meanwhile led him into a fatal error. He had considered eliminating all "useless mouths" by sending all the civilian population of Kut away before the siege commenced. But he knew that this would mean that many homeless women and children would have died of cold and hunger, so he allowed 6,000 of them to stay. He had two months' full rations for his own troops and plenty of ammunition; and he calculated that the 6,000 local inhabitants could feed themselves for 3 months. So he was not in the least perturbed about the ration situation. Consequently he made the fatal blunder of not straight away commandeering all the civilian food supplies in Kut and of not putting civilian and troops alike on a reduced ration from the beginning of the siege. He had to do this much later, after much valuable food had been squandered or concealed by the local inhabitants.

### *THIRD PHASE—OPERATIONS OF THE KUT RELIEF FORCE AND SURRENDER OF KUT*

16. *Concentration of the Tigris Corps (Kut Relief Force) at Ali Gharbi (6th December 1915 to 3rd January 1916)—(vide Sketch Map No. 1).*

The story of the concentration of the Tigris Corps at Ali Gharbi and of the appreciations of the various British Commanders is most confusing reading, and most difficult to summarize clearly and briefly in the short space available in this lecture. The fog of the war was

great, and the administrative difficulties of the forward concentration and organization of the Tigris Corps almost insurmountable.

In packing the 3rd and 7th Indian Divisions into ships the mistake in the original despatch of our force to Gallipoli had been more than surpassed. That lesson had evidently not yet sunk home to our staffs. Economy in shipping appears to have been the only consideration, with the result that formations, and even units, arrived at Basra incomplete. Units arrived without their horses and vehicles, staffs arrived long after their formations, field ambulances arrived without their ambulances, which had been loaded into ships too large to cross the bar of the Shatt-al-Arab and had to go to Bombay for reshipping before they could reach Basra; and so on. Also, the three Infantry Brigades from India had been hurriedly scraped together by picking out units here and there. They had scratch staffs, inadequate ancillary services and no transport, and had not previously trained together. That was unavoidable as the situation on the N. W. Frontier of India, as well as the Internal Security situation in that country were deteriorating rapidly; so complete brigades could not possibly be spared from India at that time.

Added to this was the really appalling lack of river transport in Mesopotamia. There had not been sufficient river transport to maintain General Townshend's force before Ctesiphon. But there was now even less for a much larger force, as some had been lost during the retreat from Ctesiphon, and a certain amount had been retained in Kut.

General Gorringe had had the foresight to have a road of sorts constructed along the river bank from Basra to Amara between the 1st and 14th December. This relieved the congestion a little by enabling Infantry to march up to the Front with all their baggage in *mahailas*. But this was a slow process; and as the *mahailas* had to stop with all units as 2nd Line Transport, it took these *mahailas* permanently away from the transportation of supplies on the L. of C. (and incidentally, the Arab *mahaila* men were an excellent spy organization who kept the Turks well informed of our numbers and movements).

These were some of the many difficulties with which General Nixon had to contend when he hurried back to Basra after the battle of Ctesiphon to organize the rapid relief of Kut. (Chapters VII and

VIII of the Staff College "Critical Study" describe the administrative situation much more fully than I have time to do here.)

✓ The 28th Indian Infantry Brigade (7th Division) from Egypt was the first of the reinforcing Brigades to arrive. It was pushed straight up to Ali Gharbi by river steamer, where it began to concentrate on 6th December, and where it was joined the same evening by the 6th Cavalry Brigade from Kut. General Younghusband, the commander of the 28th Infantry Brigade, was promoted to command the 7th Division; and on 8th December General Aylmer, who had arrived from India the previous day, was put in command of the Tigris Corps, which consisted of the Kut Relief Force, plus the 6th Division in Kut. But there were no Corps or Divisional Staffs. These had to be improvised from officers already in the country, many of whom had had no previous staff experience or training. No staff at all could be found for the new division from India; so the 35th and 36th Infantry Brigades had to become Corps Troops, while the 34th Brigade was sent to General Gorringe at Nasariya, on the Euphrates, where the Arabs were showing signs of rising again and threatening Basra. Meanwhile the 3rd Indian Division were also beginning to reach Basra, and they and the 36th Infantry Brigade marched up from there piecemeal, as units arrived. ✓ These were much hampered by rain and floods which started about the New Year and turned the whole country into a morass, where wheels could scarcely move at all, and where infantry and pack animals could only move slowly, picking up pounds of peculiarly tenacious mud on their feet at every step.

✓ When the advance from Ali Gharbi to Sheikh Sa'ad commenced on 4th January 1916, the situation was as follows:

(a) *At Ali Gharbi*—

- (i) General Aylmer, with Headquarters Tigris Corps.
- (ii) 7th Indian Division (General Younghusband) consisting of 19th, 21st and 28th Infantry Brigades.
- (iii) 6th Cavalry Brigade and 35th Infantry Brigade, also under command of General Younghusband.

(b) *Scattered in odd units on march between Basra and Ali Gharbi*—  
3rd Indian Division and 36th Infantry Brigade.

(c) *At Nasariya (under General Gorringe)*—

12th and 34th Infantry Brigades (both incomplete).

(d) *Also various L. of C. units along the Tigris*, to protect our shipping and Advanced Base at Amara.

17. *Topography and Campaigning conditions of area of operations of Tigris Corps—(vide Sketch Map No. 3)*

*(a) Drinking Water*

The only drinkable water was in the Tigris, as all the marshes shewn on the sketch map were too strongly impregnated with Epsom Salts to be fit even for drinking by animals. So both armies were tied to the Tigris. Wide turning movements were ruled out through lack of the necessary land transport to form water columns. Consequently head-on collisions with the enemy were unavoidable.

*(b) Lack of Land Transport prohibits Strategic Manœuvre*

The Tigris was the maintenance L. of C. of both sides.

Generals Nixon, Aylmer and Townshend all made the mistake of thinking that the Turks' notoriously bad "Q" arrangements would tie them to their river transport in the same way that we were and that therefore, as their river craft could not pass Kut, the Turks could not maintain any appreciable force below Kut, in order to oppose the Relief Force. They were entirely wrong in this. The Turks had sufficient land transport to maintain practically their whole army several marches below Kut for as long as they wished to do so.

*(c) Strategic Effect of Marshes*

Looking at the map you will see at once what an ideal delaying position the defile between the large Suwaikiya Marsh and the Tigris gives to the Turks, when it is remembered that the water in the Suwaikiya Marsh is undrinkable; and that the distance round it is far too big to have allowed the Relief Force, without water, to turn the Hanna-Sannayat defile by that route.

Any attempt to turn that defile from the right bank of the Tigris would have been equally out of the question, as General Aylmer had not the transport to carry any bridging material there overland.

It seems amazing how Generals Nixon, Aylmer and Townshend all seem to have overlooked the importance of this defile. They all considered the possibility of the Turks holding the Es Sinn position, in which they had been defeated by General Townshend the previous September, but

I can find no reference to the Hanna-Sannayat defile. However, we must remember that General Aylmer had no maps at all, and he had as yet not seen the country. He was being worried by General Townshend for early relief before the Relief Force could possibly be concentrated. He had only two aeroplanes altogether, of which one only was serviceable; and the weather was too bad for aerial reconnaissance most of the time. Moreover, Generals Nixon and Townshend, who knew that part of the country, do not seem to have noticed that fatal defile either. So it is little wonder that General Aylmer also seems to have overlooked its importance. But Von der Goltz had not overlooked it, as we shall see.

(d) *Weather*

As I have already said, the rains had begun by this time, and the whole country was becoming a quagmire of deep, very tenacious mud, where free movement was almost impossible. The Tigris had not yet risen and inundated large portions of the scene of operations, but that too was to happen in February.

Added to this, the weather was bitterly cold, and there was no wood for fires for the men to dry their clothes. There are no trees in that part of the country, so *all* firewood had to come from India. This used up much precious space in the daily maintenance transport. Another resultant evil of the shortage of transport was that the Relief Force had to be put on short rations. So conditions were at their very worst both for manœuvre and for the powers of physical endurance of the men.

(e) *Medical*

The medical situation was unspeakable. The Medical Officers on the spot "worked like Trojans," but they and their material were hopelessly inadequate. The wounded suffered terribly and a great many died of neglect and exposure.

(f) *Intelligence* was bad, although General Townshend was able to report fairly accurately the movements of the Turks passing Kut.

(g) *Terrain* is absolutely flat and featureless, making it extremely hard to keep direction or see one's objective in the attack; while reconnaissance was made more difficult still by the daily mirage. The ground was soft and digging very easy, while deep trenches stood up without any revetment. So it was ideal country for the defence, and very bad indeed for the attack.

I think I have said enough to put you in the picture to a certain extent as to the very great difficulties against which both General Aylmer and his troops had to contend. But I do not think that anyone, who was not with that unfortunate Relief Force, can really visualize their difficulties and hardships fully.

18. *General Aylmer's Appreciation and Order for Advance to Sheikh Sa'ad* (vide *Sketch Map No. 3*).

The orders which General Nixon gave General Aylmer were to relieve Kut, as quickly as possible, and then to take up a position west of it and await orders regarding a further advance. General Townshend was to co-operate by sallying forth with as many men as he could. General Nixon thought that the Turks might hold the Es Sinn position to cause delay, and he knew that a few Turks were in position at Sheikh Sa'ad, but he thought that the Turkish main position would be found west of Kut and that the actual relief of Kut would not be strongly opposed.

General Aylmer decided to advance by the left bank because General Townshend wirelessly that he could only co-operate with 5,000 rifles at most, and that it would take at least 6 days to ferry them across to the right bank.

General Aylmer wanted to wait at Ali Gharbi until his whole Corps was concentrated about there, and then to make a methodical advance in force; but General Townshend's repeated requests for an early relief gave the false impression that Kut could not hold out beyond the 15th January. General Aylmer therefore decided that he *must* advance from Ali Gharbi by the 3rd January at the latest with what force he had ready by then. He calculated that that was the earliest date by which the 7th Division would be ready to move.

Actually Kut held out until the 29th April. But throughout the siege General Townshend kept forcing General Aylmer into premature attacks before he was ready, by giving him earlier dates beyond which Kut could not hold out. Had General Townshend

commandeered *all* food supplies in Kut on the 4th December, and put the local inhabitants on a definite ration straight away, he would surely have been able to make a more accurate forecast of the length of time his rations would last. That would have given General Aylmer time to develop his full strength for each attack, and so given him much more chance of relieving Kut.

General Nixon's final estimate of the Turkish dispositions on the 3rd January, just before General Aylmer's advance, was—

- (i) *On right bank, 9 miles west of Kut*—36th and 45th Divisions.
- (ii) *On left bank, round Kut*—38th, 51st and 52nd Divisions.
- (iii) *On left bank, possibly at Es Sinn*—35th Division.
- (iv) *Astride Tigris at Sheikh Sa'ad*—4 Battalions of Gendarmerie, 800 Cavalry and 1,200 Camelry.

*Grand total about 30,000 men and 83 guns*, but he again stressed that he thought the Turkish morale to be low and that he did not consider that the Turks would oppose General Aylmer west of Kut.

It was on this information, which we now know to be wrong, that General Aylmer based the orders for his first attempt at the relief of Kut. Actually the Turkish strength was more like 20,000 men and 50 guns, and they were mostly on the left bank directly opposing the Tigris Corps' advance.

General Aylmer had only 18,000 men and 46 guns, and the tactical advantage was all with the defence. So it is difficult to understand General Nixon's optimism about the early relief of Kut. General Aylmer was by no means so optimistic about the situation.

*Action at Sheikh Sa'ad* (vide *Sketch Map No. 3*)

General Younghusband advanced from Ali Gharbi on the 4th January with the 7th Division (less 21st Infantry Brigade), 35th Infantry Brigade and 6th Cavalry Brigade, with orders to choose and entrench a position at Sheikh Sa'ad. On the 5th January it was discovered that the Turks had at least 10,500 men entrenched astride the Tigris at Sheikh Sa'ad, and not only an advanced guard as previously reported. So General Younghusband was told to pin the Turks to their ground and await General Aylmer's arrival. He interpreted this order to mean that he must attack, and he did so on the 6th January.

His plan was to envelop the Turks on the right bank and drive them into the angle of the Tigris just beyond Sheikh Sa'ad, thus enabling the Turkish position on the left bank to be enfiladed. He

detailed the 28th Infantry Brigade and 6th Cavalry Brigade for the main attack on the right bank. On the left bank the 35th Infantry Brigade led the attack, with the 19th Infantry Brigade following one mile behind. The criticism seems justified that, as his right bank attack was his decisive one, he should have put more strength there than he did, and kept less for his holding attack on the left bank.

The fighting on the first day was indecisive. There was a thick mist in the morning, then a mirage; so the day ended with the 28th and 35th Infantry Brigades held up, in battle outposts, with the enemy not in the least shaken and their flanks still unlocated. The 19th Infantry Brigade had not as yet been used.

That night General Aylmer arrived with the 21st and 9th Infantry Brigades and took over command. He had a boat bridge which could be erected rapidly, and so had the advantage over the Turks of being able to transfer his reserve rapidly from one bank to the other. He had the alternatives of smashing the weaker Turkish detachment on the right bank or defeating their main force on the left bank.

He decided on the latter course for two reasons—

- (i) A defeat of the Turkish main force would be the surest way to ensure the rapid relief of Kut.
- (ii) If he transferred most of his force to the right bank the much stronger Turkish force on the left bank might overwhelm his holding force and play havoc with his shipping, as had happened to General Townshend's shipping at Umm-At-Tabul.

He consequently sent the 19th and 21st Infantry Brigades up to General Younghusband, about 10·00 hours on the 7th January, and ordered him to turn the enemy's left flank with them, while the 28th Infantry Brigade, supported by the 9th Infantry Brigade, made a simultaneous attack on the right bank.

But it must be remembered that the enemy's flanks had not as yet been located. As it happened the enemy were expecting a turning attack on the left bank and had dug a flanking position, 3 miles from the river, to stop any such attack. The result was that our outflanking attack on the left bank was itself outflanked and counter-attacked. Our men suffered very severely, but with great bravery hung on to the ground gained.

On the right bank the 28th Brigade captured the enemy front line and was then held up.

✓ The 8th January was spent in reorganization and further attempts to push on on the right bank, but the air reports, which reached General Aylmer throughout the day, were amazingly conflicting. It was raining hard, turning the ground to gluey mud, and there was also a mirage.

✓ On the morning of the 9th January it was discovered that the Turks had retired. It is not known why, because they had had decidedly the best of it, and had inflicted 4,000 casualties on us. Perhaps they were afraid of their supply columns sticking in the mud and so wanted to shorten the distance from their river transport at Shumran.

✓ This battle is a good example of the danger of staging an attack hastily on imperfect information. But information was always extremely difficult to obtain in the mirage in the featureless country of Mesopotamia. Both sides also proved the inefficiency of observed artillery covering-fire under Mesopotamian conditions. Under such conditions barrages would have afforded the only really useful artillery covering fire. But General Aylmer had neither enough ammunition  
✓ nor enough river transport to replenish his ammunition, if used in large quantities. So here also he was hopelessly handicapped by the deplorable deficiency of river transport.

I have described this first battle somewhat fully in order to give you some idea of the fighting problems of the Tigris Corps, but lack of space forces me to skim very rapidly over the rest of this phase of the Campaign.

✓ *Actions of Wadi and Hanna, followed by stale-mate up to the end of February 1916.*

✓ (a) *10th to 12th January 1916.*

After the fight at Sheikh Sa'ad General Aylmer had again to decide whether he would await his reinforcements or follow the Turks at once. By the morning of the 11th January he knew that the Turks were entrenching the Hanna Defile, but they still seemed to be giving him a chance, as a large number of them were in position between the river Wadi and the Suwaikiya Marsh. He therefore decided to try to overwhelm the Turks in this advanced position and get through the Hanna Defile on their heels. The longer he delayed the more time would the Turks have to make the Hanna position impregnable.

The distance from Sheikh Sa'ad to the Wadi is only 7 miles, and 4 miles on from there to the Hanna Defile.

✓ (b) *Action on the Wadi, 13th January 1916.*

After some feints on the 12th January to mislead the Turks, the 7th Division (less 28th Infantry Brigade), plus 35th Infantry Brigade and 6th Cavalry Brigade, did a night-march with the object of attacking the Turks on the Wadi from the North and cutting them off from Hanna. The 28th Infantry Brigade and gun-boats were to co-operate by a frontal attack along the Tigris.

But owing to the early morning mist, and to difficulties in crossing the unreconnoitred Wadi, the infantry attack did not start until after 10.00 hours and the artillery did not cross the Wadi until 13.00 hours. The Turks had been warned and had occupied flank positions in time to hold up our attack. Our observed artillery covering-fire was quite ineffective, as nobody could locate the new Turkish positions in the scrub-fringed irrigation channels, and in any case our artillery observers could not see through the mirage.

The day ended in stale-mate, but the Turks retired to Hanna during the night, having inflicted another 1,600 casualties on us.

Again the same mistake had been made of launching an attack hastily against an unreconnoitred position. And in planning the night march no allowance had been made for the delay in crossing the Wadi. The fact seems to have been overlooked that a rapid advance was essential after the Arab villages on the Wadi had been reached, if the advantages of surprise were not to be thrown away by giving the frightened villagers time to warn the Turks, as they evidently did do. And lastly, the 6th Cavalry Brigade allowed themselves to be held up by a little long-distance fire. They had a good opportunity for a mounted attack against the enemy's rear (such as was often entirely successful in Palestine in 1918), but they did nothing in this case.

(c) *First Attack on Hanna, 21st January 1916.*

On the night of the Wadi attack it began to rain again and continued almost incessantly for some weeks. The whole country soon became a morass of soft, deep, clinging mud, and there was a constant icy gale straight off the snows of the Pusht-i-Kuh mountains. Our troops had no adequate shelter, and no fuel to dry their clothes, so their condition was unspeakably miserable. Added to this, they were on reduced rations, and were tired out by making constant night advances under heavy fire to bring our front line nearer to that of the Turks at Hanna and they knew that if they were wounded they

could not be properly attended to. The troops from France had serge uniforms, but those from India were still shivering in khaki drill. So it says a very great deal for them all that their morale remained high and that they were still full of fighting spirit.

Meanwhile the 3rd Indian Division, under General Keary, was beginning to arrive in the Wadi area. General Kemball was afraid of a Turkish attack on the right bank of the Tigris on his shipping, and so ordered the 3rd Division to that bank to safeguard it and to enfilade the Hanna position from there, but his bridge of boats was broken by the storm three times between the 14th and 19th January. Meanwhile, every day's delay meant that the Turks were improving their defences in the Hanna Defile. So General Aylmer's problem was not an easy one to solve. As he was on the spot and saw all this first-hand he was naturally somewhat despondent; and he was not helped at all by a constant stream of acrimonious messages from General Townshend, who kept on insisting that he could see the Turks retreating daily past Kut, and complaining at not being relieved immediately. But General Townshend eventually told General Aylmer that he could hold out on half rations up to the 17th February. So that gave him a little more time.

General Nixon, at Basra, continued to be optimistic. He could not realize that the Anatolian Turks, who now faced the Tigris Corps, would not run away when attacked, as the Turkish Arab troops, who had opposed General Townshend before Ctesiphon, always did. So he ordered General Aylmer to attack without delay.

Consequently, after a whole day's bombardment, as intense as General Aylmer's inadequate artillery with their inadequate supply of ammunition could carry out, the 7th Division attacked the Hanna position on the 21st January. The enemy were holding a 1,300-yard front with unturnable flanks, so a direct frontal attack could not be avoided. Our infantry toiled gallantly through the mud up to the Turkish front line and were simply mown down by the Turks, who had not been in the least shaken by our inadequate preliminary bombardment. The attack was a costly failure, as it was bound to be under those conditions.

General Aylmer had lost 8,000 battle casualties in three weeks, and seemed no nearer relieving Kut than at the beginning. He was fighting the elements and our own bad administration just as much as he was fighting the Turks, with everything in the enemy's favour.

They were strongly entrenched in country ideal for the defence ; their morale was at its highest on account of their success in Gallipoli ; and their strength was fully equal to that of the Tigris Corps. Under existing conditions General Aylmer's task of relieving Kut by the 17th February was humanly impossible, as I am sure history will agree.

*(d) Changes in Control of Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force.*

On the 18th January, General Nixon, who had been ill since before Ctesiphon and had asked for relief, was relieved by General Lake.

On the 26th January the War Committee in England ordered the 13th British Division, which had been in Gallipoli, to be sent to Mesopotamia forthwith.

In February the War Committee reorganized the higher control of all operations in Mesopotamia and Persia. In future the Commander-in-Chief in India was to receive all instructions regarding policy and operations through the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, but India, under the control of the Commander-in-Chief in India, was still to remain the main base for the Mesopotamian Force, although the War Committee undertook to help India with material when necessary.

*(e) General Townshend Commandeers Arab Food in Kut*

On the 25th January, General Townshend altered General Aylmer's whole problem by telling him that he had purchased all the Arabs' food in Kut, and had now food for 84 more days (*i.e.*, up to 17th April). Had General Townshend known that before he forced General Aylmer to advance prematurely from Ali Gharbi, he would have saved the Tigris Corps all those unnecessary casualties in the January battles, and would have facilitated his own relief by allowing General Aylmer to give the Turks a real knock-out blow after his whole Corps had been concentrated.

*(f) Operations in February 1916*

Early in February the remainder of the 3rd Division and 36th Infantry Brigade had arrived at Orah, on the right bank opposite the Wadi. So General Aylmer left the badly-battered 7th Division at Hanna and continued his efforts to relieve Kut with the 3rd Division and 36th Brigade, which had suffered few casualties up to then. He first sent the 36th Brigade to wade about in the Suwaiqiya Marsh behind the left flank of the Turkish position at Hanna to try to

frighten the Turks into retiring, and to prove definitely whether a flank attack by that route was possible or not. It was *not* possible. (I was one of that wading party, and it was a most unpleasant business. Moreover, instead of being frightened by that threat, the Turks took no notice of us at all.)

General Aylmer then tried unsuccessfully to bluff the Turks out of Hanna by an advance up the right bank. On the night of the 21st/22nd February, the 3rd Division and 36th Infantry Brigade did a night march up the right bank of the Tigris to Abu Roman, opposite the Turkish third position at Sannayat. As dawn broke our machine-guns and artillery, spread all along the Tigris bank, opened a hot fire on the Turkish Camps behind Hanna. The 128th Pioneers staggered realistically down to the river bank with dummy pontoons made of packing cases and canvas, and pretended to launch them, to make the Turks think that a crossing was intended, but again the bluff failed and the Turks at Hanna refused to move. However, General Aylmer attained his real object of getting nearer to the Es Sinn position without awaking the Turks' suspicions.

✓21. *Second attempt to relieve Kut—Battle of Dujailah, 8th March, 1916*  
(vide *Sketch Map No. 3*)

(a) *Introductory Notes re. Battle of Dujailah.*

By the beginning of March the rain became less frequent and the ground began to dry up, enabling free movement of wheels almost anywhere on the Right Bank. But the snows in Persia were beginning to melt and the Tigris was rising rapidly. Soon the water level would be well above the surrounding country and very extensive inundations could only be prevented by the Turks and ourselves working incessantly at building and keeping in repair large "bunds" along the whole of the area of operations. There was always the danger of the Turks breaking the bunds just below their positions and flooding out the whole of the Tigris Corps area, so General Aylmer had to make his next attempt at the relief of Kut, while the ground was still dry enough for free movement. He had reinforcements of 12,000 men and 26 guns waiting at Basra for river transport to bring them up country, as the marching road was by now blocked by floods, but he could scarcely feed the force he already had at the Front, much less transport and feed these reinforcements. The expected large rise in the level of the Tigris arrived on the 15th March.

His plan was a bold one, which very nearly succeeded in relieving Kut. This was to carry out a night march from Orah with the 3rd Division and the 28th, 35th, 36th and 37th Infantry Brigades, and 6th Cavalry Brigade, to the Dujailah Redoubt (the extreme southern end of the Turkish Es Sinn position on the Right Bank), and roll that position up northwards. General Townshend was to co-operate by a strong sally across the Tigris south-east of Kut. Meanwhile the 7th Division (less 28th Infantry Brigade) were to hold our Hanna position and cover our Camps at Wadi and Orah. (*Vide* Map No. 3.)

I have only time to go very briefly into this very interesting battle with its many useful lessons, and its sad story of the successful relief of Kut thrown away by the error of judgment, at the critical time, of one subordinate commander. Those who are sufficiently interested will find a detailed lecture of mine on this battle in one of the United Service Institution of India Journals for 1927. As it happens, I "had a front seat" at this battle, for my battalion, the 26th Punjabis, was advanced guard during the night march. We were in two attacks during the day, and we were one of the two battalions which provided the covering party for the first stage of the retirement next morning. Also, I happened to be close to General Kemball when he made his fatal error of judgment at dawn on the 8th March and heard personally what happened then. Three months later, I was able to make a detailed sketch of the battlefield. I was thus able to clear up the extremely confused idea of the battle which I had carried away in my own mind at the time. A copy of that sketch is attached to the lecture in question.

You will also find pages 237 to 241 of the Staff College "Critical Study" very interesting. I think you will agree that those pages prove that wholehearted co-operation by General Townshend, on the 8th March, would almost certainly have enabled us to relieve Kut that day, but of course it is easy for us to criticise. We have not got the responsibility, which General Townshend had, of knowing that if his sortie failed, it would mean absolute disaster for his whole Division.

Now let us revert to the narrative.

22. *Brief Outline of Plan of Attack on the Dujailah Redoubt.*

(a) *The force was split into five main groups as follows :*

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| (i) Column "A"—36th Infantry Brigade.              | } Under command<br>of General<br>Kemball. |
| (ii) Column "B"—9th and 28th Infantry<br>Brigades. |   |

- (iii) Column "C"—3rd Division (less 9th Infantry Brigade) 37th Infantry Brigade } Under G.O.C.,  
3rd Division.

NOTE.—The Corps Artillery, under General Aylmer, also moved with Column "C."

- (iv) 6th Cavalry Brigade.

- (v) 35th Infantry Brigade.—To protect rendezvous for night march and then protect the 2nd Line Transport and Ammunition Reserve from Arabs.

(b) The whole (less 35th Infantry Brigade and 2nd Line Transport) was to night march 11 miles from the rendezvous to the Dujailah Depression (an ancient, dry, scrub-covered bed of the Tigris), and by first light (06-00 hours) deploy as follows :

Column "B" to attack Dujailah Redoubt from the south.

Column "A" to protect left flank of Column "B" and to move behind Dujailah position in readiness to cut off retreat of Turks from their ferry at Maqasis in second phase of attack by the 3rd Division on Sinn Abtar Redoubt.

Column "C" to feint against Dujailah from the east during Column "B's" attack thereon; and then to capture Sinn Abtar Redoubt from the south-east and roll the Turks into the Tigris.

6th Cavalry Brigade to protect the left and rear of Columns "A" and "B" from the swarms of hostile mounted Arabs who always hung round the outskirts of every battle in Mesopotamia, and to reconnoitre certain crossings over the River Hai.

(c) *Criticisms of this Plan*

- (i) This plan was a bold and desperate venture. It gambled on complete success in one day in order to let our troops get their drinking water from the Tigris at Maqasis. For there was no other drinking water in the area. This was risky, for no other attack since the arrival of the Anatolian Turkish Divisions had succeeded in one day. But after all, the plan came within an ace of succeeding.

- (ii) It contained all the points which have already been criticised in the plans for the battles of Ctesiphon, Sheikh Sa'ad and the Wadi. That is to say :

*It was not simple enough* for a country in which the keeping of direction and mutual co-operation in battle are particularly difficult.

*The whole force was spread over a 6-mile front in weak detachments under subordinate commanders; and there was no general reserve in the Corps Commander's own hands.*

*Its essence was surprise at dawn, but there was grave risk of such a large force not hitting off its exact forming up areas after such a long night march, without the Turks getting previous warning from Arabs or from their own outposts.*

*Again normal organization was broken in the formations of the various Columns.*

*(d) The Night March*

This was a really marvellous piece of work. The formation adopted is given on page 522 of the Official History, Vol. II. Yet this mass of men and animals, 160 yards broad and 2 miles long, *did* reach their appointed places at the right hour and *did* entirely surprise the Turks.

*(e) General Kemball's action at Dawn, 8th March 1916*

As the 26th Punjabis, the leading Battalion of Column "A," reached the bend of the Dujailah Depression, dawn was just breaking, and the Turks were obviously entirely unaware of our presence. At about 06-30 hours we consequently commenced to advance rapidly towards the Dujailah Mound, which was clearly visible. But General Kemball ordered us back to the Dujailah Depression, which soon became a seething mass of men and animals. The 28th and 9th Infantry Brigades were then ordered to come up to the front, keeping under cover in the Depression and to deploy for their attack, as previously ordered. Meanwhile, General Kemball ordered fire to be opened at the Turkish Camps and unsuspecting watering and grazing parties by our artillery and machine-guns. We then had the mortification of seeing the Turks hurrying out of their camps and running to man their defences against us. (We also saw large reinforcements of Turks continue to double up from the direction of Maqasis at intervals all morning until 13-00 hours. Meanwhile, soon after 06-30 hours Major Leachman, a Political Officer, dressed as an Arab, who had ridden round the Turkish position that morning, galloped up to General Kemball and tried to persuade him to advance at once, because he had seen that the Turkish trenches were then held only by weak piquets.

But it was not until 09-30 hours—after 3 precious hours had been wasted and the fruits of surprise entirely thrown away—that Columns “A” and “B” were allowed to start their attacks. It had taken that time for the 28th and 9th Infantry Brigades to thread their way under cover in the Depression through the close packed mob of men and animals in it, and to deploy for their attack.

It appears that General Kemball's hands had been tied by very detailed orders, which he obeyed. But the battle was already lost by the time he advanced at 09-30 hours. I do not think that anyone who was there has any doubt that, had he obeyed the spirit of the orders instead of the letter, and attacked straight at the Dujailah Redoubt with the whole of Columns “A” and “B” at 06-30 hours, without waiting for any previous reorganization of his columns, we would have captured the whole position at the first rush with few casualties. The Turks are slow thinkers in an emergency.

This is an admirable example of the danger of tying the hands of the Commander on the spot by rigid and inelastic orders; and also of a case where the Commander on the spot was justified in departing from the letter of his rigid orders in order to take advantage of the obvious unpreparedness of the enemy.

(f) *Battle of Dujailah and Retirement to Orah*

By the time Column “B” commenced its attack the mirage had come on again and the attack failed for the usual reasons (*i.e.*, inability to locate one's own position or that of the enemy properly. Consequently our artillery fired all day at the Dujailah Redoubt while Column “B” was really held up 1,500 yards south of it).

In the afternoon, Column “A” which had gained its first objectives west of Dujailah, was recalled, and attacked through Column “B” instead of coming in on its flank. That attack advanced our line a little, but was also held up.

In the evening the 8th and 37th Infantry Brigades assaulted the Dujailah Redoubt from the east and got into it with much gallantry, but were soon bombed out of it again.

At midnight, General Aylmer ordered the withdrawal to Orah, owing to lack of water, where we then were.

We had lost 3,400 more men and gained nothing, although we had been very near indeed to complete success.

23. ✓ *Final Attempts to Relieve Kut—and Surrender of Kut on 29th April 1916*

(a) *General Situation*

On 11th March, General Aylmer was relieved in command by General Gorringe, his former Chief of Staff. About this time, too, the 13th British Division (Commander General Maude) commenced to arrive; and the rest of the month was spent in building and repairing bunds to prevent floods, in consolidating our positions, and in bringing up food reserves; for river transport was insufficient to transport men and food at the same time.

By the beginning of April the weather became unsettled again and most attacks had to be postponed at the last moment on account of mud, while the Turks increased our difficulties on the right bank by flooding large areas there. The Turks still had the advantage, as their strength and General Gorringe's were equal—each about 30,000 men.

The defile between the Suwaikiya Marsh and the Tigris was now very strongly entrenched and wired. There were 3 lines of defence at Hanna, another at Falahiya, 3 more at Sannayat, and behind that many more defences right back to the Suwada Marsh. Moreover, a northerly wind was apt to blow the waters of the Suwaikiya Marsh southwards, thus still further narrowing our front of attack.

(b) *Capture of Hanna and Falahiya positions, 5th April 1916*

In spite of every effort at secrecy the Turks were aware of the projected attack on Hanna by the 13th Division, for when the latter carried out its attack on the night of 4/5th April, they found it empty. But unfortunately the 13th Division was not allowed to capture the Falahiya position, which was only lightly held, until that evening. This mistake caused disaster next morning to the 7th Division, as we shall see.

(c) *First Attack on Sannayat, 6th April 1916*

During the night of 5/6th April, the 7th Division relieved the 13th at Falahiya and then passed through to attack Sannayat at dawn. But they did not have any chance of success. The late capture of the Falahiya position resulted, firstly, in confusion in the dark in the relief, and then in the 7th Division having to do a night-march over an entirely unreconnoitred, entrenched area. The result was that at dawn the 19th and 28th Brigades were caught by the Turks in

Sannayat at close range undeployed, and they were decimated by fire in the first five minutes.

(d) *Second Attack on Sannayat, 9th April 1916*

The 13th Division carried out a dawn attack on 9th April, but with no success whatever.

The 7th Division remained to hold such of our Sannayat trenches as were not flooded, and the 13th Division were moved to the right bank for operations there.

(e) *Capture of Beit 'Isa Position and Turkish Counter-attack*

Meanwhile, the 3rd Division had been steadily gaining and consolidating ground on the right bank beyond Abu Roman, in spite of the floods. It was, however, necessary to capture the Beit 'Isa position before the Es Sinn position could be captured, because the Turks were controlling most of the inundations from Beit 'Isa.

The plan was for the 3rd Division to capture the Beit 'Isa trenches and be relieved in them early that night by the 13th Division. The 3rd Division were then to night-march to Dujailah and seize our old trenches there preparatory to an attack.

The attack on Beit 'Isa was successfully carried out on the 17th April, but the Turkish Force Commander, Khalil Pasha, getting nervous about the relief of Kut, collected every available man (10,000 of his best troops), and counter-attacked that night while the relief of the 3rd and 13th Divisions was in progress. There was unutterable confusion all night, and the Turks were driven off with great slaughter the next morning. But they had attained their object of stopping our offensive on the right bank.

After that the 13th Division made one or two abortive efforts to capture Chahela Mounds, but no other real attacks were made there before Kut fell.

(f) *Third Attack on Sannayat, 22nd April 1916*

Kut was now on minimum rations but they were kept going a little longer by 5,000 lbs. of supplies dropped by our few old-pattern, war-worn aeroplanes.

The s.s. "Julnar," one of our best river steamers, had tried to run the blockade with a cargo of food for Kut. It was a most gallant effort, but did not succeed.

So General Goringe made a last desperate effort to capture Sannayat on the 22nd April. The Suwaikiya Marsh had by then

flooded almost all "No Man's Land," and the attack was defeated by the mud. The 21st Brigade could not cross "No Man's Land." The 19th Brigade slopped bravely into the flooded enemy second line, knee deep all the way in mud and slime, but when the Turks counter-attacked, the muddied bolts of our men's rifles would not work at all, so they were pushed back again to our own front line.

*(g) Surrender of Kut on 29th April 1916*

With the fall of Kut the fighting on the Tigris died down. The Tigris Corps had done wonders in the time available, fighting under the greatest difficulties of lack of covering fire, lack of H. E. shell for trench destruction, shortage of food, clothing and firewood, and the maximum of difficulties from mud, storm, cold and mirage. In 4 months they had had 23,000 battle casualties (*i.e.*, 60 per cent. of their effectives) not counting many sick. So I do not think anyone can accuse us of not having done all that was humanly possible to relieve Kut.

Kut had held out for 143 days, but this time could have been appreciably lengthened had General Townshend taken the obvious precaution of commandeering *all* supplies on the 4th December 1915, and perhaps he ought to have been hard-hearted and evacuated *all* the civilian population then also.

He has been criticised for his entirely passive defence. After 24th December 1915 he was not attacked again and was contained by only 1/3rd of his own numbers. But it is very easy to be wise after the event. Very grave responsibility hung on his shoulders while none hangs on those of his critics. Also, we are not feeble from hunger, as his men must have been.

**FOURTH PHASE—PERIOD OF REORGANIZATION OF  
MESOPOTAMIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE—30TH  
APRIL TO 13TH DECEMBER 1916** ✓

*24. General Situation*

During this period there was no serious fighting. The heat was intense and the miseries of our forward troops are hard to realize by anyone who was not there at the time. Our men were in rags and in many cases without boots. Rations were inadequate, and no vegetables at all, except potatoes and onions, reached the forward troops. Even these were often too bad to eat; so the force was decimated by scurvy and other diseases to such an extent that battalions averaged

a little over 100 rifles. Luckily the Turks were so swollen-headed, as the result of their success in the early part of the year, that they underrated us, and they made no attempt to hinder our reorganization and preparations for a large-scale offensive in the coming winter.

#### 25. "G" Reorganization of Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force

The 35th, 36th and 37th Infantry Brigades were formed into the 14th Indian Division, and the Tigris Corps was re-formed into two Army Corps as under—

*1st Corps*—3rd and 7th Indian Divisions.

*3rd Corps*—13th and 14th Divisions.

*Cavalry Division*—6th and 7th Cavalry Brigades.

Also, the troops on the Euphrates were reorganized as the 15th Division.

The War Office took over complete control and from that time co-operated wholeheartedly in supplying the necessary shipping, railways and war material.

General Maude was, in August, appointed to command the Mesopotamian Forces, while General MacMunn was appointed Inspector-General of Communications.

#### *Distribution of Troops*

In May, the Turks, on the right bank, retired behind the Hai and we advanced to the Dujailah Depression.

Our dispositions up to December then were—

(i) *Area Magasis, Es Sinn, Dujailah*—14th Division.

(ii) *Sheikh Sa'ad, Arab Village, Es Sinn*—3rd Division.

(iii) *Sannayat position*—7th Division.

(iv) *Amara* (for training and to reduce ration requirements forward)—13th Division.

(v) *Arab Village*—Force H. Q. and Cavalry Division.

#### 27. Reorganization of "Q" Services and L. of C.

As soon as the lull in the fighting allowed, General Lake laid the foundations for the improvement of the L. of C. But when General Maude got command, and had the backing of the War Office, he insisted upon an adequate "Q" organization and got it. By November he had a properly organised, and adequate inland Water Transport service. He had railways from Basra to Nasariya, from Qurna to Amara, and from Sheikh Sa'ad to the Sinn area. He had much more and heavier artillery, with plenty of H. E. shell. His

troops had been issued with Lewis guns, Mortars and Mills grenades, none of which had been available before. The land transport was reasonably up to establishment. The troops were at last properly fed, properly clothed, and had reasonable shelter from the weather. And finally, a point of immense importance, he had a proper bridging train which could move across land. Without this latter item he could not have attained the success which he did in the cold weather of 1916-17.

In fact, General Maude, through his own energy and determination, started his offensive on the night of the 13th/14th December 1916, with a properly organized, properly-found, modern army with an adequate "Q" organization behind it, which were things which Generals Aylmer and Gorringe did not have during the Kut Relief Operations. Public opinion at Home and the Mesopotamia Commission had immensely strengthened General Maude's hand in his demands for efficient organization, and he took full advantage of this.

*FIFTH PHASE—BATTLE OF KUT-AL-AMARA, 1917 (VIDE SKETCH MAP No. 4).*

28. *Strategic Situation*

Perhaps the greatest strategic advantage which his efficient transportation services and proper bridging train gave General Maude was that he was no longer tied to the Tigris, as his predecessors were and as the Turks still were. He could easily maintain himself on the Hai, and if necessary, change his L. of C. to the Euphrates, *via* the Hai. He had now, therefore, much greater power of manœuvre than the Turks.

His initiative was, however, considerably cramped by the C.I.G.S., who had imposed a more or less defensive rôle on him, forbidden him to sustain many casualties, and had warned him that the 13th Division might be taken away from Mesopotamia in the near future.

On the other hand, Khalil Pasha, the Turkish Army Commander in Baghdad, played into General Maude's hand by refusing to strengthen the Turkish forces on the Tigris, as he fell into the error of under-rating the fighting qualities of our troops on the Tigris. Also, he was a very conceited young man who considered himself to be a second Napoleon, and so kept a disproportionate preponderance of his

strength in Persia in a grandiose scheme of defeating Baratoff's Russians there, and then capturing our Tigris army from the rear. Consequently General Maude was able to mass a strength of 3 to 1 against the Turks on the Tigris.

Moreover, in his false security, Khalil allowed the five defensive positions, which the sound and cautious Nur-ud-Din had prepared between Kut and Baghdad, to fall into disrepair.

#### 29. *General Maude's First Plan*

In view of the above consideration and limitations, General Maude considered that the best defence was a limited and cautious offensive. He therefore decided to manœuvre the Turks out of the Sannayat—Kut area by stretching their defences along the left bank of the Tigris to breaching point and by increasing his hold on the right bank and threatening to cross the Tigris well behind the Turks.

It was with this limited objective that he opened his offensive on the night of the 13th/14th December 1916.

#### 30. *Advance to the Hai and First Attempt to cross Tigris at Shumran*

The line of the Hai about Atab was captured by dawn on the 14th December, without casualties, by the 13th Division and Cavalry Division, while the 14th Division protected both flanks of the advance. Our force then turned north and advanced up the Hai towards Kut, round which the Turks had been digging hard all summer, as Sketch Map No. 4 shows. Two bridges were built across the Hai about Atab, and the railway was pushed on to there. The 3rd Corps then consolidated its position with one Infantry Brigade of the 13th Division on the eastern bank of the Hai, and the remainder of the 13th and 14th Divisions and the Cavalry Division on the western bank of the Hai, almost as far as the Shumran Bend. Of the 1st Corps, the 7th Division remained at Sannayat and the 3rd Division held the right bank from there to opposite the Turkish position near Mahomed Abdul Hassan. General Maude's Tigris Force was thus spread out on a 30-mile front.

On the 20th December the Cavalry Division, supported by the 35th Infantry Brigade, was sent to bridge and cross the Tigris at the southern end of the Shumran Bend. The whole movement was made in broad daylight, without any attempt at secrecy, so the single

battalion of Turks at Shumran easily prevented the crossing. General Maude was asked whether he wanted the crossing to be forced in face of opposition, but he replied "No," and withdrew the Cavalry Division and the 35th Infantry Brigade.

Lack of secrecy in making his plans was very much the reverse of General Maude's usual method ; so we can have no doubt that his real object in this case was to frighten the Turks into evacuating Sannayat. But the Turks refused to be bluffed.

31. *Capture of Mahomed Abdul Hassan, Hai Bridgehead and Dahra Bend Positions*

After this abortive attempt at Shumran, however, the C.I.G.S. entirely changed General Maude's problem by giving him permission to lose up to 25 per cent. casualties.

General Maude then determined to destroy the Turkish Corps on the Tigris, instead of trying merely to make them retire by threatening their L. of C. He, therefore, determined to drive all the Turks from the right bank and then cross the Tigris behind their left bank positions.

There is no need to describe the very heavy fighting which lasted unceasingly from the 22nd December 1916 to 16th February 1917 before all the Turkish positions on the right bank of the Tigris were captured, as this was all normal trench warfare. Our attacks were done systematically and without hurry, step by step from one limited objective to the next. The Turks fought like tigers all the time, but were gradually and steadily pushed back from trench to trench until the last 2,000 of them surrendered as we were assaulting their last redoubts, on the river bank in the top of the Dahra Bend. Our guns were not of heavy calibre, but we had sufficient by then to give really adequate covering fire for these limited attacks ; and by then we had the Mills bombs and Lewis guns with which to meet the Turks' immediate counter-attacks, which we had not had during the Kut Relief operations. Also, we had sufficient serviceable aircraft then to make accurate trench maps of the enemy's positions ; and Artillery Survey Parties had been formed and so gave us good counter-battery work. So throughout that long, seven weeks' battle we were at last fighting as a properly equipped modern army.

This period of trench to trench attacks contained many useful lessons, but as an infantry company commander throughout that

fighting, two lessons stand out in my mind above all others. These are—

(a) *The value of the immediate counter-attack.*—Almost invariably the Turks carried out a local counter-attack with the utmost bravery and determination within the first 10 or 15 minutes of losing a trench, before we had time to prepare the trench for defence from their side. It was in meeting these that our newly-acquired Lewis guns and Mills grenades proved invaluable. But woe betide those who stopped to “mop up” or reorganize before getting ready for this immediate counter-attack. Once we had had time to dig fire-steps in the captured parados we had drawn the sting from these gallant Turkish counter-attacks.

(b) *The unfairness to the attacking troops of attempting to gain surprise by dispensing with a preliminary bombardment.*—I personally witnessed two occasions when excellent battalions were practically wiped out of existence when this method of surprise was attempted.

On the first occasion my own battalion reported certain enemy machine-guns. The next morning, the 1st February, the 36th and 45th Sikhs made quite a short distance attack with the utmost gallantry but both those two fine battalions literally ceased to exist, except for the small nucleus which had been left out of the fight. Those enemy machine-guns had not been put out of action by a preliminary bombardment before the attack commenced.

On the 2nd February my own brigade carried out exactly the same attack successfully and with very few casualties, because those same enemy machine-guns had been literally blotted out of existence by a short but intense bombardment just before we “went over the top.”

Later on, towards the end of the clearing of the Dahra Bend, I also saw the 41st Dogras and 102nd Grenadiers suffer very heavy casualties indeed, in an attempt to capture a weakly-held trench without any preliminary bombardment.

32. *Crossing of the Tigris at Shumran on 23rd February 1917, and Precipitate Retreat of the Turks from Kut Area*

We completed the capture of the Dahra Bend on the 16th February and General Maude had intended to carry straight on with

his crossing at the Shumran Bend, but that very night it began to rain so heavily that we were again entirely immobilized by mud, and the crossing had to be postponed until the 23rd February.

But the 7th Division had been ordered to attack at Sannayat on the 17th to draw away the attention of the Turks from Shumran. This attack was carried out and was a costly failure on account of mud, exactly as in the case of the third attack on Sannayat on 22nd April.

Meanwhile, General Maude was carrying on all possible preparations for the Shumran crossing with the utmost secrecy, and doing everything he could "to mystify and mislead" the enemy as to his intended crossing place. 800 men of the 14th Division, which was to do the crossing, were given intensive training in rowing pontoons in the Hai (no easy task to learn), while the 27th Punjabis did a very successful night raid across the Tigris at Naqasis which was quite a possible place for a crossing.

At dusk on the 22nd February, the 14th Division moved into position opposite the toe of the Shumran Peninsula, where our pontoons had previously been taken at night and concealed, and at dawn, on the 23rd February, the pontoons were launched and crossings attempted at the three ferries marked on Sketch Map No. 4. The Norfolks at No. 1 Ferry were lucky and got across and rushed the Turkish piquets there before the latter woke up, but the 2nd and 9th Gurkhas at the other two ferries suffered so heavily in their most gallant attempts to get across that those two ferries had to be abandoned. All the remaining pontoons were then concentrated at No. 1 Ferry, where a sufficient bridge-head was eventually established after very bitter fighting all day.

Meanwhile a bridge was being built, under constant shell-fire, also at No. 1 Ferry. It was ready by about 17.00 hours, when the remainder of the 14th Division crossed. General Maude had most of the 13th Division and all the Corps' Artillery in position by dawn on the 23rd February on the right bank of the Tigris, opposite both flanks of the Shumran Peninsula. This covering fire helped very materially to break up the Turkish counter-attacks while the bridge head was being consolidated at No. 1 Ferry.

Moreover, General Maude had materially assisted to mislead the Turks by ordering the 40th Infantry Brigade to make "bridge-building noises" throughout the night of the 22nd/23rd February on the river bank opposite Kut. A. T. carts were driven about

without grease in their axle-boxes, and planks were thrown about and splashed in the water with as much noise as possible. The result was that when dawn came, a large column of Turks was seen marching away from Shumran to the Kut Peninsula, so reducing the opposition to our crossing during the critical first hour or two.

At dawn on the 24th February, the 36th and 37th Infantry Brigades, supported by the 35th, swept up the Shumran Peninsula and had captured the whole of it after some stiff fighting by about 07:30 hours. My own battalion, the 26th Punjabis, captured 2 field-guns and 5 machine-guns in that rapid advance. By that hour I personally saw the whole plain between us and the Suwada Marsh covered by bodies of Turks in full retreat from the direction of Sannayat. It was a glorious opportunity for the Cavalry Division to carry out a mounted attack and complete the destruction of the Turkish Tigris Corps, but the Cavalry Division failed to do anything and the opportunity was lost. They crossed the Shumran Bridge at about 09:00 hours with orders to take up a vigorous pursuit, but they took two hours to go the two miles up the Shumran Peninsula, got mixed up in the counter-attacks being made by the Turkish rear guard on the 14th Division, and instead of going wide round this rearguard, got off their horses and remained where they were.

On 22nd February, the 7th Division had attacked and captured the first three lines of the Sannayat positions, but for some reason their attack at dawn, on the 23rd, was very slow in starting, so they failed to pin the Turks to their ground there. This delay, combined with the amazing apathy of the Cavalry Division, enabled the bulk of the Turks to get clear away in comparatively good order, instead of quite probably being destroyed as an organized force.

### 33. *Lessons of Shumran Crossing*

#### (a) *Secrecy and Misleading the Enemy*

General Maude was always extremely secretive in his plans. In this case he told no one but the R.E. officer concerned exactly where he intended his bridge to be.

Similarly I had the luck to be selected to lead the night march of the 13th Division from Imam-Al-Mansur to Atab on the night of the 13th/14th December. I had been sent out every night for a week previously to carry out various reconnaissances of the Turkish outposts, but it was not until I got back to my own unit on the afternoon of the 13th December that I heard for the first time that

the 13th Division was anywhere in the forward area, much less that I had to lead them that night.

*(b) The Value of Adequate Flanking Fire in an Opposed River Crossing*

The site chosen enabled excellent cross flanking fire right up both flanks of the peninsula on all the Turkish counter-attacks. This was particularly useful on the early mornings of the 23rd and 24th February, before the daily mirage commenced.

*(c) The Value of Determined Non-Stop Advance by Infantry*

On the morning of the 24th February, the 36th and 37th Infantry Brigades penetrated to a depth of 3,000 yards in one continuous, rapid advance, without halting, until they had reached their final objective, having captured several Turkish defences during this advance. We had good, observed flanking artillery covering fire, and the Turkish trenches were not wired; the Turks whom we killed or captured *en route* fought bravely and kept firing at us until we were close enough to rush them with the bayonet, but our casualties were comparatively few until we had reached our final objectives at the head of the Peninsula.

*(d) Cavalry must use their Mobility if they are to Pull their Weight Properly in Battle*

Compare the action of the cavalry on this occasion with the tremendous results they obtained by using their mobility and by mounted attacks in Palestine in 1918, and with the results obtained by General Cassels with this same Cavalry Division in Mesopotamia later on in the campaign.

Once cavalry dismount, they move more slowly than infantrymen, and their led horses are very vulnerable and a constant source of embarrassment to their units.

*FIFTH PHASE—PURSUIT OF TURKS AND CAPTURE OF BAGHDAD (VIDE SKETCH MAP NO. 1)*

34. I cannot afford time to say much about this stage of the operations. General Maude pursued the Turks as far as Aziziya, but had to halt there until the 5th March, partly because he had outrun his supplies, but principally because he had to obtain permission from the C. I. G. S. at Home before continuing his advance to Baghdad. This permission was given in view of the moral effect of the capture

of Baghdad in India, Persia and Afghanistan, but from the point of view of Grand Strategy it seems to have been a mistake, because for the rest of the War, it required a much larger force to defend Baghdad than the Turks had to detach from their main theatre in Palestine to contain us in Mesopotamia.

This delay should have given Khalil time to defend the flanks of his Diyala position by inundations, but he completely lost his head and shilly-shallied. The result was that our advance met no real opposition until we reached the Diyala, where the Turks put up a very stout resistance to our attempts to cross.

At midnight of the 7th and 8th March, the 38th Infantry Brigade attempted to cross the Diyala on the heels of the retreating Turks, but they were unsuccessful. This was a good example of how *NOT* to attempt to cross a river in face of opposition. There was no proper reconnaissance, or previous organization, no covering fire, no feints and no alternative crossings.

But after three more days of very heavy fighting on both banks of the Tigris and on the Diyala, General Maude forced a crossing and threw a bridge across the Diyala near its mouth.

On the night of 10th/11th March the Turks extricated themselves with great skill and Baghdad was captured without further resistance.


### 35. *Conclusion*

In conclusion I should like to say that I have necessarily, in the short space available in these two lectures, had to leave out a great many interesting points which I would have liked to discuss, but I hope that I have brought in sufficient detail to give you a really comprehensive bird's-eye view of these extremely interesting phases of the Mesopotamia Campaign.


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# SKETCH MAP No.1



SKETCH MAP No. 1




# SKETCH MAP No. 2

## BATTLE

OF

## CTESIPHON

SCALE  $\frac{3}{4}$  INCH = 1 MILE





SKETCH MAP No. 4.

TO ILLUSTRATE GENERAL MAUDE'S  
BATTLE OF KUT-AL-AMARA


1917


(TURKISH POSITIONS ONLY SHOWN)

BRITISH FRONT LINE 13<sup>TH</sup> DEC 1916

RIGHT BANK — DUJAILAH DEPRESSION

LEFT BANK - SANNAYAT





## SOME NOTES ON MAHSEER FISHING IN INDIA

By E. A. W.

I have to thank Colonel Gowlland, R.E., and Colonel Taylor and Major Grant, I.M.S., for invaluable assistance in preparing these notes.

Somebody once said, "No one who is a fisherman can be entirely bad."

I feel, therefore, that these fragmentary jottings on mahseer fishing may be of some use to a large body of brother officers who may be held to belong to the above category.

They also may interest another class, those men who are keen salmon or trout fishermen at Home and who, not having tried mahseer fishing seriously, consider it a long way inferior to the sport one can get in the British Isles. I have caught salmon ever since I was a boy, and trout ever since I was a very small boy and honestly consider that the mahseer, pound for pound and minute for minute, is every bit as good. This, of course, where he is fished for in the proper place, which is just where the great rivers emerge from the hills and where you have plenty of rough broken water, rapids full of boulders and strong deep runs over gravel. If you hook a five-pound fish on fine tackle on a dry fly-rod, such as I use, you will get all the sport and all the thrills you want before you land him. Also fish for him as fine as you dare, you will kill more fish and have far better sport.

Another form of appeal lies in the fact that you are independent—you can cut out all the shikaris, beaters, and so on, required for other forms of sport in India. All you want is a coolie to carry your kit; he will soon learn how to land a fish by getting a grip behind the gill plates after you have persuaded it into a shelving beach. All the rest is up to you, when and where to go, the type of water most likely to hold taking fish, the kind of tackle to use and so on. There is a great satisfaction in solving all those problems unaided.

Hitting off the right season has always been to me the major difficulty of fishing in India. Roughly, there are only two seasons in the North of India, the first one in the spring when the weather gets warm enough to get the fish moving and yet not so hot that the snow water has commenced to come down.

Snow water is fatal for big stuff, though one can still catch small fish with a fly-spoon on the edges of the heavy runs, in shallow water.

I should put this period as, roughly, between the 15th February and the 15th April, but one cannot be dogmatic; good fish have been caught at Tangrot and Hardwar at Christmas. If you get a few hours rain at this time, and it is not too cold, the fish often take fairly well.

If I were asked for an optimum date I should say round about the 10th to the 25th March.

The second period is when the rains are over and the water has cleared, and yet has not got too cold. We might put this as from the 15th September to the end of October, depending of course on the monsoon. The time when Government moves from Simla to Delhi generally coincides with good mahseer fishing, and I should say the middle ten days of October are about the best time. I prefer the autumn fishing to the spring, on the whole, as one is free from the fear of snow-water, also if one gets there early enough conditions should improve day by day.

In my experience four essentials are necessary for successful mahseer fishing. They are—

- (a) it must be hot or at least fairly warm, preferably about 80°F. in the shade;
- (b) Clear sky;
- (c) Absence of wind or at least nothing much more than a gentle breeze; and
- (d) Gin clear water.

One can and does catch fish under modifications of all those conditions, but the more we approach an ideal day under those four heads the more likely we are to get a decent bag. Mahseer are intensely moody fish, much more so than salmon and very sensitive to what one might call "atmospherics." Still they seem to come on at some time of the day every day. This involves a lot of hard work, especially if one is using heavy spinning tackle, but is the principle of the old ghillies advice, "Aye keep your flee in the water." I saw General Macmullen fishing one day at Khara from 7 a.m. to 6 p.m. without a touch, and by 7 p.m. he had three fish 40 lbs. on a small rod and fly-spoon.

The habits of the fish vary with the place and the season, but on the whole 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. may be considered the best time.

Very often the period during which the fish take may be half an hour only, then they go right off for some hours. It follows from this that one should kill one's fish reasonably quickly. I hate to see the fish playing the man.

Everyone have their fads about tackle, I think most people fish too heavy. I do my heavy spinning with an old grilse rod cut down to 12' 6", a Silex reel, and a 24 lbs. B. S. American spinning line called the "Lignum Vitae." This is the best spinning line I have ever used and it is cheap—Rs. 20 per 100 yards from Manton, Calcutta. With this I use a fine Punjab wire trace (Hardy's).

For fly-spoon I use my two dry fly-rods, one is 5 oz. and one 8 oz., with a fine gut trace, say, loch trout, and have killed fish up to 14 lbs. on the 8 oz. rod. All the books on mahseer fishing say that spinning a dead bait, *i.e.* a chilwa, is the most deadly method for large fish. I have used the spoon constantly against the chilwa over the same water, and have done on the whole just as well or better than the dead-bait expert. The spoon is easier to use and less messy, and I prefer it. Fish in different rivers seem to prefer different types of spoons, *e.g.* in the Sarda a 2" mother-of-pearl, on the Jumna a 1½" Hardy's kidney spoon, and this year I got all my fish on the Ganges on a very big 3" Mytikyna spoon. Trial and error are indicated here. Of the fly-spoons I prefer a ¾" bar-spoon, a ¾" mother-of-pearl or a plain silver spoon from ½" to 1". I have never done any good with aluminium fly-spoons. As regards flies, the only two rivers where small mahseer take fly well to my personal knowledge, are the Song and the Asan in the Dun. The best flies for these rivers are given later on in this article.

I have never tried a thread-line outfit for mahseer, but think it would be excellent for the smaller fish up to five or six pounds, in fact I know friends of mine who have done very well with it. It is, I consider, useless for heavy fish in a big river.

It is not necessary to spend a small fortune on spoons and traces. A reel of Killin wire, a pair of pliers, swivels, some solder, along with a hank of gut substitute, silk and cobbler's wax, will make all the traces you want. Any *mistry* in the bazar will cut out spoons from brass or copper sheet for a few annas, and electroplating is also generally available. Add to this some triangles and Hardy's "Attachment Links."

I recommend you always to bind your knots and loops when using gut substitute : it is very apt to slip.

## PART II—LOCALITIES.

1. *N. W. F. P.*—The only two places I have done any good are on the Swat River, at Chakdara and Khar. This is, or was, very nice fly-spoon or light spinning water. The Kurram River, above Thal, looks very good and I have favourable accounts of it from officers stationed there.

On both the Swat and Kurram Rivers local politics are apt to interfere with the fishing.

2. *Rawalpindi.*—There are a lot of small rivers quite near Pindi, but they are dreadfully poached—the Rawal, Sohan, Chiblat, Hurroo, etc. They are easy to get at by car and one can use a fly-spoon on all of them. The mulberry on a single hook and fine gut is good in May.

3. *Tangrot.*—One of the most famous fishing places in India, a bit fallen from its high estate, but still very good. The best way to go is to motor up the canal bank from Jhelum, cross the river at the head-works of the Upper Jhelum Canal, and ride about four miles. Tangrot is at the junction of the Poonch and the Jhelum and there is a very fine long run and pool at the junction which is fished from a boat. The rest of the fishing is in the lowest three miles or so of the Poonch—lovely water which can be fished from the bank in places. There are good boats and boatmen who know their job and are very cheap; there is a dâk bungalow and camping sites. The point of Tangrot is that both the rivers are rarely running dirty at the same time and one can generally rely on getting fish. I have been there several times and always got fish; my most successful trip was in June 1915, when, with another officer, we got fifty fish in four days—best 28 lbs.—fishing from 5-30 a.m. to 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. till 8 p.m. Fish have been got at Tangrot every month in the year, although, of course, the spring and autumn are best.

4. *Lower Beas.*—This is an excellent bit of water, it has to some extent eclipsed Tangrot the last few years. Mrs. Gowlland got a 45-lb. fish there this spring.

How to get there—

Rail to Jullundur, change and go to Makerian or Hoshiarpur by a local line.

From Makerian by car over a bad road (20 miles) to Tolwara where there is a District Board bungalow.

From Tolwara there is a track, passable for cars, to Rora where there is a camping ground.

From here you can walk Rora Pool.

By crossing the river and camping at Pant (about 2 miles from Rora) you can fish Pant Pool and another pool above it. The road from Hoshiarpur to Tolwara is bad, but people get along it.

The best time to fish is between the 1st and the 30th April, and the 1st and the 30th October, but with luck you may extend these periods at either end.

Fish up to 70 lbs. were caught in Pant last spring.

5. *Sialkot*.—There is fishing here at Marala below the weir of the Upper Chenab Canal head-works and also above the weir. A very pleasant spot, easily reached by car from Sialkot, with good canal bungalow.

One can also reach from here the Lower Tawi above Jammu. This is in Kashmir territory and His Highness' permission is required. I fished it once in April when the river was as thick as pea soup after rain and appeared hopeless, but the shikari produced a disgusting mess of clotted goat's blood in a chatti. This was fixed on a triangle with some difficulty, and with it I killed two nice fish of 17 and 13 lbs. I should think the fishing farther up would be good, but it has been very little explored.

#### 6. *Rupar*.—

*Situation*.—On the Sutlej at the head-works of the Sirhind Canal.

Reached by road from Kalka. Turning off from the Kalka-Delhi road, about 6 miles from Kalka; a road with very rough surface goes another 20 miles, crossing numerous sandy nullahs which may be temporarily impassable in the rains. The head-works are about a mile from Rupar town.

*Head-works*.—Consist of a long barrage above which the canal takes off, several bungalows and administrative offices.

#### *Fishing*.—

<i>Season</i>	.. Best in the end of April and May.
<i>Conditions</i>	.. Fishing is best in hot, calm, dry weather and is spoiled by sand-storms or rain.
<i>Sizes of fish</i>	.. Although an occasional fish of over 20 lbs. is caught, the average run is from 3 to 10 lbs.

*Best Fishing Places*.—These are marked by crosses on the sketch.

(a) Below the barrage. Fishing from the bank the best place is the vicinity of the groyne, half-way across the barrage beside the fish-

pass. For satisfactory fishing some of the sluices must be partially opened to give a fair current. Fish down the groyne and outside the submerged portion of the fish-pass, and if the water is not too deep wade across to the right bank below and fish the next 50 yards. Fly-spoon (1" to 1½" Hardy's Skene Dhu spoons) are effective. Fish up to 10 lbs. have been had here with fly, fishing in slack water, sink and draw (Patterns, Silver Doctor, Durham Ranger and Dusty Miller; salmon, sizes 3 and 4). Bank fishing from the left bank below the barrage is not very satisfactory. When the chilwa are running the natural bait on a light spinning tackle is very effective.

The Sutlej, for about 250 yards below the barrage, may be fished, trolling from a boat, with a 2" to 2½" gold and silver hog backed spoon.

(b) Above the barrage. When there is a flow in the river, fishing from the groyne running up from the middle of the barrage, especially at the top end, may be good. Trolling may also be tried here.

(c) In the canal. Here the part to fish is the left bank for about 200 yards down from the sluices. Fly-spoon may be used or a heavier spoon fished off the spinning reel. Some good fish are caught here. Some anglers dangle a spoon close up against the sluice gates, but it is weary and uncertain work.

There are believed to be some good spots a mile or two upstream. With a launch it would be worth while starting several miles upstream and fishing successive spots on the way down which are known to the local shikaris. The fishing at Rupar is not very interesting as it is usually in slow water and the number of good places where a fish may be expected is limited.

7. *Okhla (Jumna)*.—Is worth trying when the chilwa are running, say, in March; the locals get a lot of fish, but there seem to be very few mahseer. I don't think fishermen in Delhi have taken Okhla seriously. I am sure there are possibilities here and it is only twenty minutes in a car. Even if one gets no fish it is a delightful place for a picnic.

8. *The Jumna*.—(From the Giri Junction down to Tajuwala)—I have fished this river a lot in the last few years and am very fond of it, and have had some good days, *i.e.*, three fish 85 lbs. on the heavy rod, and seventeen fish 40 lbs. on the fly-spoon. I have also had some very bad ones, but very few absolutely blank. The best time to fish the river is difficult to hit off, but I have done well from the 20th to the 30th March, and again about the 15th to 20th

October. After April 1st in a normal year snow-water is apt to come down, and it may come sooner. The charm of the Jumna is that it is in many places broken up into several separate streams and you can start off in the morning with your heavy spinning outfit and also your light rod with a fly-spoon, and use either, or both, as you please. There are nearly twenty miles of good water available and, except at the Asan Junction near Khara bungalow, it is not over-fished. Both the wading and the walking are hard work, as both the bed of the river and the banks are in most places a mass of heavy shingle or small round and very slippery boulders; there are also long stretches of heavy sand. It is generally possible, by giving previous notice, to arrange for a *surnai*, which consists of a *charpoy* on two inflated nilghai skins with one or two men to work it. This is a great help in getting about. Similarly at Khara I carry a length of grass rope and, towards evening when I may be four miles upstream, the shikari collects eight or ten stranded sleepers, makes a raft and on this we sail home.

I have fished this part of the Jumna from three centres (a) the Asan Junction, (b) Khara, (c) Tajuwala.

The Asan Junction and the water for about two miles below on the left bank is preserved and controlled by the Dehra Dun Fishing Association (annual subscription Rs. 25; visitors' tickets available), the right bank for several miles is preserved after a fashion by H. H. the Maharaja of Sirmoor. The Fishing Association maintain a small shelter, but at the junction, which can only be approached by a forest road (motorable). This road has several locked gates on it, members of the Dehra Dun Fishing Association have keys for these gates, but the road is not open to the general public. You can either live in Dehra Dun and motor out (30 miles), or camp at the junction or two or three miles down, where there is some lovely water, including the famous Paunta Pool. The junction is pretty hard fished by the Dehra Dun people who use a chilwa almost exclusively, but it is a good bit. There is also the Lower Asan at hand, full of small fish up to 5 lbs. and very pretty fishing. Below the junction there are miles of good water till you come to Khara bungalow, which is by river, about 8—10 miles off. Khara is reached by car from Saharanpur railway station, 26 miles up the Chakrata road, then four miles over a forest road; pretty rough going. The bungalow is an Irrigation one (Executive Engineer, Western Jumna Canal, Saharanpur), and has a sitting-room and three

small bed-rooms, and is beautifully situated on a cliff above the river. There are at least 7 miles of very good water at Khara of all types, heavy runs, deep pools, and lots of delightful fly-spoon water. The best fishing is, I think, about four miles upstream in the Fakir's Pool—look out for mugger in the small backwater you have to cross on the right bank going upstream, they got a local man a couple of years ago.

I have always done best with a 1½" Hardy's copper and silver kidney-spoon here; though I have fished the chilwa carefully as well, I have never done much with it. Much of the water is very suitable for thread-line fishing. Colonel and Mrs. Brodrick had a very nice bag this spring with thread-line outfits.

The chowkidar at the bungalow is quite a good shikari, and if not available he can get you one of the men off the sleeper rafts. Khara is on the western edge of a quite good shooting block: plenty of tiger, cheetal and sambhar.

*Tajuwala and Hathnikund.*—These two places are from 4—6 miles downstream from Khara, but on the opposite bank; there is a very good Canal Bungalow at Tajuwala (Western Jumna Canal) and a forest bungalow at Hathni kund. Both these places are reached from the Delhi-Saharanpur road by motoring up the canal bank at Jagadhri, and have excellent fishing at the proper season.

9. *The Ganges near Hardwar.*—There is a lot of good fishing here, but two points have to be remembered. One is that a good deal of the water is sacred and in certain areas fishing is prohibited, in fact a fish caught in a non-sacred area cannot be carried through the town of Hardwar unless it is wrapped up in a sack. The second is that the Asan Junction is preserved by the Dehra Dun Fishing Association, who also maintain a boat and watcher in the famous Raiwala Pool.

There are various bungalows where one may stay: Mayapore Canal Bungalow below Hardwar, Bhimgoda Canal Bungalow at Bhimgoda Weir—a very good bit of water here but the bungalow is hot—Motichur Forest Rest House near Raiwala, and a very good Railway Bungalow at Raiwala. There is also good fishing above Rikhikesh—all the water at Rikhikesh and for a mile or two above and below the town is sacred.

All the difficulties about sacred water can be avoided by fishing from the left bank which is in Chila block of reserved forest, and

there is a good Forest Bungalow at Chila. Most of the water about Hardwar and Rikhikesh is heavy spinning water, and the fish run big in a big river. You want sound tackle and 200 yards of line.

*Fishing in the Doon.*—All the fishing in the Doon is controlled and preserved by the Dehra Dun Fishing Association; annual subscription Rs. 25; visitors' tickets available; apply Honorary Secretary, Dehra Dun Fishing Association, The Club, Dehra Dun.

To those resident in the Doon the fishing is a veritable paradise and, if most opportunities are taken, many will be the red letter days. To the visitor, the fishing may be sometimes disappointing as he or she may not just hit off the right time. If one takes 10 days leave one cannot count on, say, two good days, at least two or three average and the rest doubtful, but one can always catch fish. If the big ones are not stirring good sport can be had with a light rod and light tackle. There is a tendency to use too heavy tackle, and still worse to "barge" into a stream instead of working one's way quietly and slowly to drop your fly over the selected spot. Mahseer are totally different to trout, for one thing there are very many more mahseer in any pool than there would be trout in a similar pool at home. There are literally dozens and dozens of small fry usually lying about in the shallows, and if you splash your way in you send them scurrying in all directions with the result that the bigger fish take fright and go down to the bottom. The only essential difference between this light fishing and that at home is the reel. One must have a reel capable of holding 80—100 yards of line and with a quick wind up.

The great joy of light fishing in the Doon is the fact that the mahseer take a fly readily. One fishes downstream with a single fly and a 2 x cast. One fly is quite sufficient, more so in the days when every second or third cast produces something; these days usually occur in April and May when fish start to move up from the large rivers like the Jumna and Ganges into the smaller rivers, the Song and the Asan, etc.

Some time before the rains break fish start running up smaller streams to spawn, but unlike salmon mahseer do not spawn at once, but lay a batch of eggs at one time several times during the rains. One never catches a mahseer in bad condition.

The reason for this periodic spawning is that Indian rivers and streams vary tremendously. Spawn and fry could never exist in the

large rivers during the rains. The smaller streams, too, vary greatly; what was a mere trickle one day may be a good sized stream a few days later and *vice versa*. So, if all the spawn was laid at once the danger of it being left high and dry or baked in the tropical sun is very obvious. The mahseer is essentially a bottom feeder, and this, no doubt, accounts for its many vagaries, and why some days when conditions are perfect you can hardly move a fish. He feeds but little on the surface, and why he takes a fly except out of curiosity is hard to understand. One can understand why a fly-spoon is a good all-round "taker," because it resembles the small fry which the mahseer feeds on. However, the fact remains that mahseer take fly readily and a variety of such, too, with the following:

Yellow Spider (Loch Erne May hackle fly)

March Brown

Zulu

Alexandra

Jock Scott

Teal and Red

Teal and Green

Grouse and Claret

All about 6—8 size (Loch and Sea Trout size).

As regards fly-spoons  $\frac{1}{2}$  inch to  $\frac{3}{4}$  inch in aluminium, copper and silver, or pearl; the latter two very effective when the water is slightly coloured as they show up well when the water is coloured. If you can see your spoon in 6 inches of water you have a good chance, if you can't see your spoon in 6 inches of water pack up. When fishing in coloured water fish for preference along the edge and fish deep, well down. The best time for fishing in the Doon is April, May and June till the rains break, and again in September and October or as soon as the rivers have cleared, till October.

The time is a break in the rains and when the rivers run clear for a day or so. It's muggy and stuffy, but the fishing can be wonderful. There are places where one can get fish any time of the year, and small though they may be, give excellent sport if you fish light; usual weight 1 to 2 lbs.

#### LOCALITIES IN THE DOON.

There are really two, West—the Jumna and its tributaries. The Asan and Giri (latter not in the Doon) and East—the Ganges with the Song and Suswa.

Of the two undoubtedly the Eastern Doon is the better. Apart from the fishing point of view the Song and Suswa jungles are wonderfully pretty. The Song, from Khansrao to its junction with the Ganges, has some most attractive reaches and pools, particularly the Jakhan pool which always holds good fish.

The Suswa is worth a try, it runs much slower and does not hold such good fish as the Song, nevertheless, one can put in a pleasant evening or morning on it. The Suswa is often clear when the Song is dirty. Both streams have gravelly and pebble courses and easy to fish.

*The Western Doon.*—The Asan, unlike the Song which runs through jungle, runs through arable land and varies from the Song in that the pools are not so deep, but in some cases longer, and being shallower is more easily poached, hence it is not so good as the former; still it holds good fish, and the reach, from about two miles above the junction with the Jumna down to the Jumna, affords good sport. Though mahseer will constitute 90 per cent. of one's catch in the Doon, there are other fish which give good sport. The Indian Trout or Baril, a pretty silver coloured fish running to 2½ lbs., a game fellow and a grand fighter, usually found in slackish water and where the river bed is sandy, rarely takes fly, but goes for your fly-spoon. The murrel or sowli is really an amusing fish to hook, he may feel a dead-weight or bore down to the bottom, then suddenly break water and crash half out of water across to the other bank. His best virtue is his table value as, unlike the mahseer, he is practically boneless and very good eating. He is really a mud fish and invariably to be caught at the edge of a stream where it flows past a low grassy bank, he lives in holes in the bank and has a partiality for frogs. A pearl spoon seems to attract him most, and the extraordinary thing about him is that if you cast your spoon on to the bank itself and then flop it into the river he goes for it, *but* your spoon must spin as soon as it has touched the water, otherwise if, as spoons have a habit of doing in slow running water, it remains flopped and inanimate, there is nothing doing. The spoon for slack water is the bar-spoon, it spins immediately it hits the water and this is the secret of its success. By reason of its build it has to spin and never "flops." The only snag about the bar-spoon is that one cannot get it in any small sizes, on account of its structure; nevertheless it is a very useful addition to one's tackle.

Other frills which occasionally succeed are the "Halycon Spinner," the Feathero minnow and the Dandy Lure, but seldom if ever will they replace the fly and fly-spoon.

*Ramganga at Buxar.*—This is now in the U. P. Game Reserve, but I believe fishing is allowed. A lovely river full of fish—no poaching, no villages—swarming with game. I have only fished it when tiger shooting on off days, but did very well; it is a good river for fly-spoon. The Forest Rest House at Buxar is approached with difficulty from Bijnor railway station.

*Sarda River.*—The Sarda runs between Western Nepal and British India of which it is the boundary, and is a magnificent river very little fished. Fishing is based on Tanakpur, which can be got to by a narrow-gauge line from Pilibhit or by motoring up the Sarda Canal bank. It is impossible in the early autumn because of malaria, and the forest roads being impassable before October 15th. March is very pleasant and free from malaria. There are four bungalows at Tanakpur—Forest, Bhabar, Railway and Dâk Bungalow. Do not fish at Tanakpur itself, but go four miles up the forest road (motorable in dry weather) to where the river comes out of the hills through a magnificent gorge, and fish downstream. Beautiful water. The opposite bank is in Nepalese territory.


Some 15 miles upstream the Ladiya comes in on the right bank, and the junction and the water near it are very good. This was Sir Malcolm Hailey's favourite place, but it is a hard, rough march, the track is only fit for coolies and is impassable for mules.


*Cooch-Bihar.*—Anyone who goes to one of His Highness' tiger shoots should take a rod; the Sankos and the Torsa are full of fish, but I was always too busy with tiger to fish myself.

*Poona.*—There is quite a good lake with a boat on it called "Sheoratra" belonging to Tatas, about 30 miles along the Bombay road and four miles by trolley. Spinning with a light spoon we had ten fish, 50 lbs., there one day at the end of February this year. Permission from Tatas. All the fish are at the head of the lake and it is a five-mile pull.


*Mysore.*—Anyone who goes to Mysore should spend a little time on the Cauvery. The very big fish of 100 lbs. and over have all been got bottom-fishing with atta and coarse tackle. I have tried this but found it very dull.









WESTERN DOON





It is much more amusing to embark in a coracle with a dry fly-rod, 1 x cast, and a supply of grasshoppers, and fish under the trees for Carnatic carp. I had eleven up to 4 lbs. one afternoon this spring.

The man who knows all about this Mysore fishing is my friend de Wet Van Ingen, Taxidermist of Mysore—a very fine sportsman and naturalist.

Finally, tight lines to all of you.

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## AN "ALTER EGO"

BY FOREST CREEK

As one who has just given up command of a battalion, I wish to express my disagreement *in toto* with the conclusions reached in the article entitled "A Pilot for a Passenger," from the point of view of the Indian Army. I cannot speak for British regiments. But I believe that in them the senior Major always does the duties of Second-in-Command, even though the actual appointment does not exist.

In most Indian battalions the middle piece is weak in numbers—that is, in numbers actually present with the battalion. From ten to twenty years service is the period when an officer should be getting that extra-regimental experience—which is so essential for his development—at the Staff College, on Staff appointments, Burma Military Police, Scouts, and all the other jobs which have to be filled. The presence of many whole-time regimental soldiers generally means a weakness in quality, even if it improves the quantity. The result of this is a considerable variation in the age and service of company commanders. A common distribution is that one company should be commanded by a V. C. O., one by a Subaltern, and two—one of which will usually be the Support Company—by Captains or Majors.

If the Second-in-Command is taken away to command a company, it is obvious that his duties must be distributed, as is indeed suggested in the article discussed. Whether this can be done without sacrificing efficiency is very much open to question. Regimental accounts take a lot of time, if done properly. To deal with them efficiently, both experience and continuity are essential. A company commander has not got the time to do them properly in addition to his other duties; particularly if he is Support Company Commander—which is a post that generally falls to a fairly senior officer. The I. O.s' Club and Mess, Havildars' Mess, Battalion Institute and Club (if it exists), Band, Officers' Mess, and such like, will give one officer all the administration he requires to keep him busy throughout the week. He will of course also command the Headquarter Wing, and may have to supervise the Welfare Centre.

But outside administration, a Second-in-Command has a lot of work to do in training.

A Commanding Officer is a busy man. He is responsible for everything in the battalion and, though he may decentralise a great deal, he must still exercise supervision in all departments, and must be continually thinking and meditating on how to improve the quality and decrease the quantity of administration.

The training of officers takes up a great deal of time. I purposely omit the word "Junior" because a Commanding Officer is just as much bound to prepare senior officers for command as he is bound to push subalterns through promotion examinations, and this is a task that makes great demands on his energy as well as on his time. He further has to organise the training of the battalion throughout the year or rather throughout his period of command. For training must be progressive, and in this he needs assistance. Anyway I did. Many points arise for discussion and consideration in which the advice of a senior and experienced officer is invaluable. This help is also much needed in the preparation and conduct of exercises, whether for companies or for the battalion. And here it should be noted that the only way that a Commanding Officer can practise himself in command is by getting his Second-in-Command to set him exercises during battalion training. To my mind it is essential that he should do so.

It must further be remembered that one of a Commanding Officer's main tasks is to co-ordinate training. Company commanders must be given a very free hand, but they must all train the same way. A Commanding Officer is often away on Cantonment and other duties, and in any case cannot be present everywhere. To make this supervision effective, without being obtrusive, an "Alter Ego" is needed.

It seems clear, therefore, that the demands made on a Second-in-Command's time are already fairly considerable, and that if he commands a company he will so often be taken away from it that the continuity of its training will suffer.

A Second-in-Command has further training duties of his own. Tactical cadres for N. C. O.s are essential. For their duration they are a whole-time job during parade hours. The Adjutant cannot do them. He has plenty of cadres of his own to supervise, in which he will be helped by the officer latest from the school concerned—not by

a sort of Admirable Crichton specialist. It may perhaps be urged that such tactical cadres are the responsibility of company commanders. But in the individual training season the shortage of officers generally demands centralization, and in any case the object of these cadres is to inculcate one tactical system throughout the battalion. These are obviously suited for the Second-in-Command.

He also has the school. This cannot be supervised by a company commander unless he neglects his own company, and every year it becomes a greater demand on the time of the officer in charge. He has to take all examinations and see that the correct standard is maintained. He has to organise instruction and prepare suitable men for Belgaum. He has to spend one or two evenings a week teaching English himself unless he is exceptionally lucky in his Educational Jemadar.

I have only dealt with a few jobs. There are many side lines which cannot be gone into, but I cannot help feeling that if the appointment of Second-in-Command was abolished the senior major would have to be struck off to carry out his duties.

There are certain arguments brought forward in the article dealt with, with which I feel compelled to express disagreement.

First of all—it is a fact that the substantive Second-in-Command is often absent. This is to be regretted. He should, I think, be present for at least the last two years of his time, but even if he is away, it is essential to put someone in his place. Nor is it any disadvantage to have a man from another unit. It may even be a great boon.

Fresh ideas are always helpful; criticism from a new angle is always useful; a newcomer may often see failings in old V. C. O.s and N. C. O.s, even in valued regimental customs, to which long acquaintance and false sentiment has made others blind. The idea that a long unbroken period of service with the same unit is essential to efficiency is surely out of date.

Nor do I think that the difference in age and service of Commanding Officers and Seconds-in-Command is very different from old days. Friction should not exist. Perhaps I was lucky, but surely friendship is a more usual quality between old companions. If there is friction, it will certainly be increased if the senior major is kept as a company commander and is replaced as chief assistant by the Adjutant. Neither Adjutants' nor Commanding Officers' wives make really good commanding officers.

I disagree profoundly with the suggestion that the Adjutant should be a senior man. Of late it has been unavoidable in many battalions of the Indian Army, especially in those which have not seconded enough officers. But the situation has now changed. Subalterns and junior captains are becoming quite common, instead of being curios. The training and experience of the Adjutancy are invaluable assets to a Staff Officer. It is an appointment which should be held by as many officers as possible who are going to the Staff College. It is also an excellent training in tact. An Adjutant should, like all other Staff Officers, be the connecting link between the Commanding Officer and his subordinate commanders. He should not be senior to them, should not be in a position to exert any authority on them independent of his position as Staff Officer to the Commanding Officer; though he should exert it freely with subalterns and Indian officers. More senior officers should be used where their experience is most valuable—as commanders and trainers of companies.

I do not personally know any battalions run on Soviet lines as the article suggests. Surely the only matters on which all officers are consulted are certain Mess affairs, and possibly matters of uniform. In all things connected with training, administration and promotion, a Commanding Officer should—in fact must—decide for himself, aided by the counsel of his best friend and most experienced officer—his Second-in-Command.

## OUR MILITARY FAIRY TALE

BY GILBERT

Once upon a time there was a Good Soldier. (This was very long ago.) And he read all his Manuals and even pasted in all the Amendments, which was quite hard work, because if there is no Amendment in any one month you have to delete last month's so as to be able to reinsert it next month, differently worded, of course. (As you know.)

And so when he fell in love, as all Good Soldiers do, on reaching military puberty, that is, thirty years of age for officers but only twenty-six for soldiers, who ripen sooner, he decided to follow the Good Book's advice in everything. So, when he had got the right page and turned over the Amendments so as to get to the meat of it, he found there were several principles which he had to adopt to gain his objective, in this case a very beautiful girl who had just come of age and was very rich and had no parents and was quite dumb and was, therefore, very, very desirable indeed. And our Good Soldier saw that he must follow these principles if he was to compete successfully with all the Bad Soldiers who were after this beautiful girl for her money, but who didn't know their Manuals and always failed in their Promotion Examinations in consequence. (As you will realize.) And he saw the first principle was Concentration, so he knitted his brows and concentrated very hard and said, "I will be good, I will be good," fifty times, just like Queen Victoria on the Throne, only he was in the Company Office sticking in his Amendments, as he was Company Clerk, being such a Good Soldier. Then, having a great deal of time because all the Bad Soldiers were on coal fatigue or peeling potatoes and other military exercises, he looked up the dictionary and said, "I'm doing the wrong sort of concentration; I must go and visit my beautiful honey." He called his objective "honey" because he had been once to the Pictures (this was when he was sowing his wild oats before becoming a Good Soldier) and the only word he had understood the Hero to say was when he addressed a strange but beautiful lady as honey, so he knew this was correct. So being very clever, like all Good Soldiers who read their Manuals, he signed the Pass he had made out with a very good imitation of the Captain's signature and concentrated on the girl (which is termed

having a crush on someone by the Bad Soldiers, who don't know their military vocabulary). And then he knew the next principle was Economy of Force, so he was very gentle with her, but he realized he hadn't got the meaning right, so he changed his attitude, being too modest to change anything else in her presence, and she effected a surprise on him (which should have been his next principle) by slapping him on the face. So when this happened he could only think of the principles of Mobility and Security, and on the way home he remembered a poem he had read when he was sowing his wild oats, and this poem was all about a King watching a spider trying to climb a rope and there was something about Try, Try again. He didn't like to puzzle too much over this story because he knew that natural history was never very nice, but his afternoon's experience made him think (he could still do this in spite of six years' service), so he decided he would put his case before his Company Officer as advised to do by the Colonel when he first joined, who said: "When in any difficulty go and see your Company Officer." So he went into the Company Office next morning with his hat on (only Bad Soldiers take their hats off when entering the room—as you will remember) and saw his Company Officer. "Well, my man, and what can I do for you?" said the Company Officer who had an original way of expressing himself. "Well, it's like this, sir, you see," began the Good Soldier, "I was thinkin' of gettin' married like." "Ho! and what do you want to do that for?" said the Company Officer, "don't you know when you're best off?" At which the serjeant-major, who was filing correspondence with difficulty in the background, gave the appropriate laugh for the occasion and said, "Not 'arf 'e don't. That comes of being Company Clerk. 'E's been workin' aht marriage allowance 'e 'as. It's a change from filling in football coupons anyway." By this time the Company Officer was getting restive, so he gave the serjeant-major an order to fall in a fatigue, and when the last bellows had died away he said to the Good Soldier: "Who is the woman and do you have to marry her?" The Good Soldier said: "She's Miss Emingway, and I have to marry her because she's very rich and then I can buy my discharge and do nothing all day just like an officer." So the Company Officer was very haughty and said, "Well, well, fall out now, I shall have to look into this," and the Good Soldier fell out and like all Good Soldiers thought nothing more about it because it was already 10 a.m. and time for char and wads. But the Company

Officer thought he'd better look into this, so he saw Miss Emingway and, being an officer, he knew his principles very well and so he didn't get his face slapped—at least not on that occasion; but after he had found out that she was really very rich and had her own Austin Seven, he swallowed his principles and married her, and the Good Soldier got seven days soon afterwards for saying the serjeant-major had a beautiful face, which turned him into a Bad Soldier from then on because he thought he'd been unjustly treated. So he had a grievance and lived happily ever after.

## THE BHILS OF THE HILLY TRACTS OF MEWAR

BY "SHIGGADAR"

A Bengali once wrote an essay on the Bhils, which began with the words: "The Bhil is a small black man. When he meets you, he kills you and throws your body into a ditch. By this you may know the Bhil."

The object of this article is to relate something about the habitat and characteristics of one section of this large tribe, which is scattered over Southern Rajputana, Central India and Gujrat, and to show that the Bhil of to-day, although he is still extremely primitive, is by no means just a wild and woolly savage armed with the bow and arrow, but rather a self-respecting person, a good soldier worthy of being classed amongst the best fighting races of India and, in his own sphere, an entirely reliable guardian of law and order.

In the early days of British rule in India, law and order was normally maintained by localised forces stationed at places where trouble was most likely to occur, and the present Malwa and Mewar Bhil Corps are amongst the few survivors of these old local Corps. The pacification of the Bhils was first seriously taken in hand in the year 1825, when the famous James Outram—then a boy of only 22 years of age—raised the Khandesh Bhil Corps; about which Rudyard Kipling wrote that intriguing yarn, "The Tomb of His Ancestors." The raising of this Corps, on the principle of "set a thief to catch a thief," was an experiment which at the time many people deprecated, but which turned out—owing greatly to Outram's amazing energy and force of character—so eminently successful that similar Corps were raised in Malwa and Mewar. It is with the latter area that it is proposed to deal in this article.

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Some fifty miles south-west of Udaipur, the capital of Mewar, there lies a region known as the Hilly Tracts, which is governed by a Hákim of Mewar State (corresponding to a Deputy Collector in British India), and is policed by the Mewar Bhil Corps.

Few Europeans ever visit—or even know of the existence of—the Hilly Tracts, which comprise a tangled mass of small hills varying from two to fifteen hundred feet in height, intersected here and there

by rivers. During the winter and hot weather months these rivers are almost dry, but in the monsoon they become raging torrents, sometimes impassable for days at a time, and many parts of the country become more or less isolated from communication with the outer world. The hills for the most part are covered with thick, low jungle, and such roads as exist—and they are few and far between—are little more than footpaths, a few of them passable in fine weather by bullock-carts or camels.

The inhabitants of the Hilly Tracts are almost entirely Bhils and Grassias, with a few Patels (the farmer class) here and there, and it is only in the bigger villages that Rajputs and Brahmans, both of them very few in number, are to be found. The Bhils are aborigines and the origin of the Grassias, who consider themselves to be slightly higher in the social scale, is obscure, but they are believed by many people to be the descendants of mixed marriages between Rajputs and Bhils. Both Bhils and Grassias are very simple folk and are quite unspoilt by contact with the outer world, for few of them have ever been outside their own country. Their needs are simple, as they build their own houses—either of rammed earth, or, in the more “jungly” parts, of wattle and daub, with roofs of country tiles—and live almost entirely on the *makki* (Indian corn) crop, which they grow on the land adjoining their homesteads, and on the milk of their goats and cows. Whereas in the past they were notorious as thieves and cattle-lifters, nowadays they are law-abiding people and, if treated with justice, give very little trouble. Their chief and almost only vice is drink, which they concoct from the fruit of the *mahwa* tree and of which they consume large quantities, specially during festivals and other great occasions. They are animists, but have adopted many Hindu customs and are full of superstitions and queer beliefs.

Amongst Bhils and Grassias will be found a certain number of “Bhagats,” who take a vow to abstain from drink and the flesh of animals, and who bury their dead instead of cremating them. Every village in the Bhil country has its memorial stones, set up in memory of headmen or other well-known men or women, and these stones are worshipped by the villagers periodically.

There is no purdah amongst Bhils and they have great respect for their women, who are able to wander freely in the jungle without fear of molestation. The women do most of the work in Bhil-land

(in addition to their ordinary household duties) and they help with the crops by sowing, weeding and spreading manure, but are not allowed to handle a plough. Bhil girls are pleasant featured and well built, and their happy disposition is particularly noticeable—they are always laughing. They all dress much alike, in dark red *saris* with a faint black pattern, rather scanty “brassieres,” and red pleated skirts, which, when working, they pull out between the legs and tuck in front, giving the appearance of a *dhoti*. On state occasions they usually wear a more elaborate skirt, often of some flowered blue cotton material. As ornaments they wear a number of brass anklets, sometimes covering the leg from the ankle to the knee, and on their arms highly coloured bangles, made of lacquer, which are manufactured in the local bazars and which they wear both above and below the elbow. Unmarried girls are not allowed to wear bangles above the elbow and married women wear a peculiar shaped brass anklet nearest to the foot, which fits below the ankle bone and is the equivalent of our wedding ring.

Widows are easily recognisable by their dark blue clothes and lack of brass anklets, signs of perpetual mourning, to which they are destined for life, unless they marry again: this they sometimes do if they are still young and attractive when they lose their husbands.

The men are not so picturesque, their dress consisting of the *dhoti* and a short jacket of cotton cloth (the latter they often dispense with in the jungle) and they nearly always go about armed with a bow and arrow, and often with a sword or country-made gun in addition. They have lithe, athletic figures and good, hard-bitten faces and are able, without apparent effort, to cover incredible distances on foot.

The Patels are very similar to the Bhils, but are much better cultivators and live in villages consisting of houses built all in a clump, as opposed to the Bhils and Grassias, who always build their homesteads at a distance from one another, usually on high ground overlooking the piece of land which they cultivate.

Bhils marry young as a rule, the boys between the ages of 18 and 21 and the girls at 15 or 16, and an interesting custom in connection with marriage is the ceremony known as “*Moria*,” which they are bound to perform: it is a form of penance which they both have to undergo in their own villages every day for a fortnight before the final marriage ceremony and which can best be described as “tossing the bride and bridegroom.” The unfortunate bride, or bridegroom,

squats on a small board, about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  feet square, which is held up waist high by a group of men who proceed to dance round in a circle to the accompaniment of music and singing; every now and then the board is jerked up to the level of the men's heads and the bride, or bridegroom, is tossed into the air. This sometimes goes on for hours and must be most trying for the suffering spouse-to-be. Women are allowed to take part in the song and dance in the outer circle, but do not handle the board.

Another curious premarriage ceremony, which is performed in connection with *moria*, is the anointing of the bodies of both bride and bridegroom with an evil-smelling mixture of oil and spices called *pithi*. This they are not allowed to wash off until the day before the wedding, when they both have a good wash at the bridegroom's house.

Bhils are allowed two wives but, like the aborigines of Australia, they are not allowed to marry into their own clan and the wife automatically becomes a member of her husband's clan. Thus interbreeding is prevented and the beneficial results are apparent from the fine specimens of humanity one sees, particularly amongst the women.

All Bhil men have two, three or four brand marks about the size of a shilling, on their forearms. These are self-inflicted when they are boys between the ages of 9 and 12, the belief being that man after death has to pass through fire and that if he brands himself during his lifetime he will come to no harm thereby. They do this branding by placing small wads of cotton on the forearm, setting fire to them and letting them burn down to the skin, a slow and very painful operation for a young boy to undergo voluntarily and one which requires considerable physical courage.

The Hilly Tracts—or Bhumat, as the district is called—is divided up into estates (known as *thikanas*), each ruled by its own Rao. These rulers are the hereditary chieftains of the *thikanas* and, provided they manage their estates properly, are practically independent as far as their internal affairs are concerned, but they are responsible to the Mewar Darbar for the welfare of their subjects and pay an annual tribute to the Maharana of Udaipur, thereby acknowledging his sovereignty.

In the heart of the Hilly Tracts lie the two minute Cantonments of Kherwara and Kotra, which for nearly a hundred years have been occupied by the Mewar Bhil Corps. Each Cantonment consists of a

few bungalows and barracks, a hospital and a school, and a small regimental bazar and village. In Kherwara, which is the Headquarters of the District and of the Mewar Bhil Corps, there is a pretty little Church and a well-cared-for cemetery, the latter—as is the case with most old cemeteries in India—a pathetic testimony of the toll taken in the past by tropical diseases on little English children. Services are held in the Church by the *Padré* of the Bhil Mission, but in Kotra there is no Church and the Mission station, which was formerly located there, has had to be abandoned owing to lack of funds. In Kherwara, the Officers' Mess has long since ceased to exist as such, but the old custom of blowing the Mess calls on the bugle in the evening is still kept up. The Mess garden is still maintained, and in a shady spot by the old Mess well will be found a little graveyard where the memories of a number of favourite dogs and one or two horses have been perpetuated by grave stones, on which such names as "Tiger," "Whisky," "Peps" and "Jim" have been inscribed. Amongst them is an Arab pony which belonged to the late Sir Curzon Wyllie, a former resident of Mewar and Agent to the Governor-General of Rajputana, and a faithful old charger of 20 years' service, which was the property of a former Commandant of the Mewar Bhil Corps. Not far from here, by the side of another well, will be found a watering-trough which was erected recently in memory of the late Lieutenant-Colonel G. M. Ayscough, who died in 1934 while commanding the Corps.

Nowadays Kherwara is connected with Udaipur, 52 miles distant, by a motor road, and the event of the day is the arrival of the postal lorry from Udaipur. This road winds in and out amongst small hills throughout its length, with patches of cultivation here and there and Bhil houses perched on the hill-tops. Every few miles there is a toll-post, usually situated in a village of a few houses, and two old *Dāk* Bungalows at stages on the road form a relic of the days when the journey had to be performed by horse-tonga. At Kherwara the metalled road ends and two *kachcha* tracks, passable by motor in fine weather, branch off; one to Dungarpur State to the south and the other to Idar State to the south-west. The road to Kotra, which is between 50 and 60 miles to the north-west, is motorable for a certain distance in fine weather, but the wise man who respects his car will perform the journey either on horseback or on foot.

The outstanding feature in the Hilly Tracts is the Mewar Bhil Corps, which was formerly a regular unit of the Indian Army and is

now a Military Police Battalion under the Civil Administration of Rajputana. This Corps was raised by Captain W. Hunter in 1841 on the model of Outram's Khandesh Bhil Corps, with the dual object of keeping the Bhils in order and of acting as a civilising influence in what was then an extremely wild and unruly part of the country. That the Corps has fulfilled its dual rôle and thoroughly justified its existence is very evident, both from its past history and from its present state of smartness and efficiency, to say nothing of the state of peace and tranquillity which prevails in the Hilly Tracts at the present time. The Corps remained staunch during the Mutiny of 1857 and did good work in hunting mutineers from other stations who had taken refuge in the hills.

The Bhil is a natural soldier, smart, as hard as nails and very amenable to discipline; there is tremendous competition for enlistment in the Mewar Bhil Corps. It is probably the only Corps in India—and possibly in the world at the present time—where amongst the recruits will be found a squad of youngsters learning their drill without pay and waiting to step into vacancies as they occur. The fault of the Bhil as a soldier is, of course, his objection to leaving his own country, and it was this that prevented this wonderful recruiting ground from being utilised during the Great War; but, had the Bhils of this area become used, like other soldiers of the Indian Army, to serve in out-stations in days gone by, there is little doubt that they would have made a name for themselves for their fighting qualities during the War. As it is, they serve the purpose for which they are required in Mewar admirably, and so long as the Corps exists there is little fear of the intervention of troops from outside ever being required for internal security in the Hilly Tracts. Funnily enough, the Bhils, although they are entirely loyal to their own people and essentially lovers of their homes, have no compunction in operating against their own people when ordered to do so and on such occasions as it has been necessary for them to open fire on their own countrymen they have never showed the slightest hesitation in doing so. In this way they are entirely reliable as a Military Police Force. Accustomed as they are to moving about the hills both by day and night and being able to live on the country, they are very mobile and are always able to arrive at the scene of action, wherever it may be, in the shortest possible time. They are wonderful marchers and evidence of their powers of endurance will be found in

the fact that men going on leave from Kotra to Kherwara will often cover the distance (over 50 miles) in 18 hours or less. The Bhils of the countryside have a very healthy respect for the *topi-wallas*, as they call the men of the Bhil Corps, owing to the pill-box hats which they always wear.

The bi-weekly mail between Kherwara and Kotra is carried by men of the Bhil Corps, and, in spite of the fact that during the rains the grass on the hills grows head high and several rivers in flood have to be crossed, the post hardly ever fails to come in at the scheduled time—at the end of the second day. In cases of necessity letters are sent by special messenger and a curious old custom in Bhil-land is the placing of a feather in the flap of a letter of special importance: it is a point of honour amongst Bhils to deliver such a letter or die in the attempt.

Service in the Corps brings in a lot of money to the Bhils and the gathering of some 400 pensioners at Kherwara every 3 months is a sight worth seeing. They are a motley and hard-bitten crowd, dressed in any sort of kit—some in uniform coats of ancient pattern, others in disreputable rags and a few quite smartly turned out—and they sit around the office cracking about old times. Some of them are very old, having gone on pension after 20 years' service as far back as the years 1894 and 1895, and a few are so ancient that they are bed-ridden and have to be paid at their homes by Indian officers sent out specially for the purpose. Amongst them are a proportion of old stiffies who, no sooner they get their pensions, are off to the grog-shop to celebrate the occasion, and when the officers are returning the pension papers and enquiring of each man how much he has received, it is not unusual to hear the Head Clerk shout out, "Where is so-and-so? he is a drunkard." Then so-and-so's friend quietly goes off and retrieves the bleary-eyed roisterer from the nearest "Pub."

In Bhil-land debts are hereditary, and when pensions are being paid a number of the local *bantias* may be seen lurking around like a crowd of vultures, waiting to extract what they can of past debts, which many of the pensioners can never hope to liquidate during their lifetime.

The Bhils keep numerous festivals during the year, the chief amongst them being the Holi. The celebration of this festival lasts for a fortnight, chiefly by drumming, singing and dancing, and terminates on the last night with an orgy, during which a pot of water,

which has been buried in the ground under a bonfire for 24 hours, is dug up and inspected to see how much water has evaporated. If the pot is full, the Bhils look upon it as a sign of a good monsoon to come, but if it is empty, or partially so, they believe that they are in for a bad year.\* Throughout the days of the Holi festival Bhil girls are at liberty to hold up strangers on the road and demand cocoanuts or money in lieu. They do this by forming a line with their arms interlocked across the road and singing a song, and woe betide the traveller who is unable to pay his due, either in a cocoanut or a few annas. An officer of the Bhil Corps, who went out a year or two ago without money in his pocket during the Holi, was held up by a party of Bhil girls and came back with the shirt torn off his back!

Another curious festival kept by the Bhils is the *Sakrant* (winter solstice), known to Bhils as the *Uterān*, when at early dawn all the men and boys go out into the fields and catch robins, which they do by chasing them from place to place until they become so exhausted that they can fly no more. They then bring them home, feed them on a mixture of *ghi* and *gur* and let them loose one by one. If the robin, when let loose, perches on a green tree, it is considered a good omen; if on a bare tree, a bad one. As, however, at the time of the year this festival takes place the trees are nearly all in leaf, the odds are heavily on the good omen. In the afternoon they amuse themselves by playing the only ball game known in Bhil country. The ball is made of cloth and the game is started by a man throwing it up into the air and hitting it as far as he can with a stick. The players then all rush after it and the one who gets it first has the next hit. When they are tired of playing this game they have a big feed, with plenty of strong drink, and so the day ends.

Such are some of the customs and superstitious beliefs of the Bhils, and there are many of them.

There is very little big game in the Hilly Tracts, though one would expect to find a good deal in the large and sparsely populated areas of dense jungle which exist. The reason is, presumably, lack of game laws and effective game preservation; for though the shooting of big game is nominally prohibited, it is practically impossible to enforce any prohibition in such an out-of-the-way and inaccessible

\* NOTE.—It is a curious coincidence that this year (1936) the water-pot buried at Kherwara came out empty, causing considerable consternation amongst the Bhils; and, sure enough, the monsoon failed, resulting in the total loss of the *makki* crop in that area.

area, where every man is armed with either a bow and arrow or a blunderbuss and where the majority are naturally keen *shikaris*. There is, however, a good deal of small game, principally partridge, hare and sandgrouse, and in some parts good jungle-fowl shooting is to be had. Some Bhils, particularly those from Kotra District, are experts with their bows and arrows, especially at shooting hare and fish. The really keen fisherman has a special arrow with a barbed head which is so loose on the shaft to which it is attached by twine, that when the fish is struck the shaft comes off and floats on the surface, thereby indicating the movements of the wounded fish under water.

There are very few Europeans in the Hilly Tracts ; only three officers of the Mewar Bhil Corps, two of whom are at Kherwara and one at Kotra, and half a dozen Missionaries distributed between 3 different Mission stations very far apart. The latter do a great deal of unobtrusive good work amongst the Bhils and they go about all over the country, often entirely alone but always cheerful, enthusiastic and unafraid. At one Mission station, miles from anywhere, the sole European inhabitant throughout the hot weather is a single Mission lady.

Parts of the Bhil country are really beautiful, particularly to those who love the hills and a jungle life and are not afraid of solitude, and a tour in this area during the winter months, when one can be out for days on end without ever seeing a vehicle—not even a bullock-cart—is a thing never to be forgotten ; it makes one realise that in these days of perpetual rush and excitement there is at least one peaceful spot where the people never change and where one is always welcome.

Such are the Hilly Tracts of Mewar : a most attractive country inhabited by simple, unsophisticated and very pleasant people.

## CHINA AND THE FOREIGNER

## A REVIEW OF THE REASONS FOR ANTI-FOREIGN FEELING.

BY MAJOR A. E. SWANN, R.I.A.S.C.

That the bulk of the Chinese people, who have not come into active contact with foreigners, both dislike and mistrust them is undoubtedly true. The minority, who may have been associated in one way or another with foreigners will probably except those whom they personally know from the general condemnation. But, almost to a man, the Chinese are anti-foreign in that they tend to regard foreigners and their governments as monsters from another world who have descended upon China with the main purpose of making their own fortunes at the expense of the Chinese. The foreigner who goes out of his way to try to understand the Chinese, however, may often receive kindness from them and may sometimes win their friendship. Hundreds of individual foreigners have done so, and have often enjoyed the esteem and respect of their small circle of Chinese acquaintances. Most foreigners, who have any dealings with Chinese, like them, and the majority of Chinese, who rub shoulders with foreigners in the Treaty Ports and other large centres seldom display feelings other than of courteous affability. Yet, for all that, the Chinese are anti-foreign. Their government is anti-foreign, the education in their schools is anti-foreign, and anti-foreign slogans will be found freely plastered over the hoardings of their cities throughout the length and breadth of the country. In the vastness of China, there must be many remote villages and even towns where the people have never even seen the white face of a European, but there will be few who have not seen or heard an anti-foreign slogan, and probably none who have failed to hear the common epithet of contempt applied to foreigners: "Yang Kuei Tzu," the equivalent of which in English is "foreign devil."

The causes which have led up to this unfortunate state of affairs will no doubt be familiar to those who have studied the history of China's foreign relations. But to others, the news that in China, as in so many other places, the white man, and in particular the Briton, is not appreciated at his real intrinsic worth may come rather as a shock. It may not even be believed. But it is true.

The Chinese show scant respect for a foreigner until he has done something to earn it. Far from thinking of him as a superior being, they are much more apt to regard him as an inferior, who may in certain circumstances be admitted as an equal, but never as a superior.

The object of these pages is to demonstrate to those who have not studied Sino-Foreign relations, how natural these feelings of dislike and superiority are, and how utterly impossible it would be for them not to exist. The reader will see that even the scandalous acts of the notorious Boxers in 1900 are capable of very simple explanation, which renders even those blood-curdling incidents readily understandable. The reasons for China's persistent anti-foreignism will become abundantly clear as the story unfolds itself.

It is in no way intended to criticize the actions or policies of the foreign governments in their relations with China, but merely to present the sequence of the main facts and to leave these to speak for themselves. They will show that China has always been the loser in her many essays at foreign diplomacy, that she has been divested of territory, first by one and then by another Power. No doubt she may not herself have been guiltless, and in many cases she may have given provocation which will have seemed to the Power affronted to be ample justification for the severe measures adopted. But China, almost defenceless against the armed strength of foreign invaders, has paid dearly for her several ineffectual attempts at revolt. Beaten into submission she has been forced not only to grant every demand of the aggressor, but to compensate him in addition for the expenses of her castigation. She is thus left with a grievance. And grievances beget hatred.

The superior attitude adopted by so many Chinese towards foreigners is very easily explained when it is remembered that China has enjoyed a moderately high degree of civilization and culture for centuries. When the ancient Britons were little better than savages, the civilization of China was probably not very far below its present level. Educated Chinese, who reverence the past, see little to admire in the parvenu civilizations of the modern world, and are prone to look upon them rather in the way that a hereditary aristocrat must regard the "*nouveaux riches*." That is, after all, a very natural view. The Chinese, with their complacent philosophy, do not hanker for the benefits of modern progress. They prefer to be left in peace. But modern progress has been forced upon them.

by the circumstances of the times, and through the instrumentality of foreigners. Chaos and revolution, definitely traceable to these external influences, have followed in their train, and thus the interference of foreigners is blamed as the root of most of China's ills. The story of these interferences will show that the Chinese are probably right when they contend that, but for the invasion of the West, China's ancient civilization might never have collapsed into the chaos of recent years.

Until the discovery of the sea route to the East, China was more or less isolated and had few relations with the outside world. There was some trade with the Roman Empire, with the Arabs and with India. In the seventh century the Nestorian Christians came from Persia, were hospitably received and allowed to build churches and gain converts: Moslems, too, were permitted to enter and settle freely in the country: there was at this time no hint of any desire to exclude foreigners. In the thirteenth century the Venetian, Marco Polo, with his father and uncle, travelled overland to China, and were not only permitted to remain, but honours were showered upon them and Polo was eventually appointed to a Chinese governorship. Marco Polo, as he recounts in his "*Travels*," was awed by the magnificence, wealth, good order and government of the Chinese cities. The Europe of that day was backward, whilst China was comparatively advanced. We in Europe are sometimes inclined to forget this, and to take the present state of our own civilization as our absolute criterion.

The Portuguese were the first foreigners to come to China by the sea route from the West, two of their vessels arriving in Canton in the year 1517. They appear to have conducted themselves with suitable decorum, for they were allowed to trade and to send an envoy to the court at Peking. The first two ships, however, were followed by a third, the crew of which comported itself very differently and proceeded to loot and plunder. The Chinese attitude of hospitality was immediately reversed and the envoy who had been received at the court at Peking was sent back to Canton in chains. This incident may be cited as an early indication of hostility to foreign trade, but viewed in its proper perspective it would seem more in the nature of an act of reprisal. No hostility had been shown to the first two ships. It developed quite naturally in retaliation for the acts of the third.

As a result it was not until 1557 that the Portuguese succeeded, by bribing the local officials, in opening a trading station on the peninsula of Macao, at the mouth of the Canton river. With this they had to be content, for, with rare exceptions, the only foreigners whom the Chinese would now permit to travel in the country or settle in the interior were missionaries. To these China has been on the whole singularly tolerant, much more so indeed than Christians have often been with each other. Christianity suffered no serious setback until about 1704, in the reign of the Emperor K'ang Hsi, when the Pope issued a bull declaring ancestor worship to be idolatrous. This was considered to be an affront to the Son of Heaven—the Emperor—and, as it threatened the whole basis of Chinese civilization, it resulted in the expulsion of the Dominicans and Franciscans, and later on, in the reign of Yung Cheng, the next Emperor, in the repression of Christianity and the banishment of the Jesuits, with the exception of a favoured few who were retained for the sake of their knowledge of Western science.

The early Portuguese traders were followed by the Dutch, who, similarly excluded from the mainland, opened up a trading station on the island of Formosa in 1624. In 1637 Captain John Weddell of the East India Company forced the passage to Canton in face of the opposition of the Chinese forts, disposed of his cargo, and loaded his craft again with sugar and ginger. By 1685 the East India Company had secured the right to establish a trading station and a factory at Canton, and there was already a growing demand in Europe for the tea, porcelain and silks which came from China. There was as yet, however, little demand in China for European goods, and the merchants were hard put to it to find some commodity to give in exchange for their cargoes. This problem found its solution in the opium smuggled from India into China in contravention of the Chinese law.

The Chinese taste for opium-smoking had its origin in the Phillipine Islands, in the middle of the seventeenth century. The conquest of these islands by Spain led to a large immigration of Chinese, who there learned to smoke tobacco brought from the new world by the Spaniards. The smoking of tobacco mixed with opium and arsenic was locally believed to be a specific against fever, and from this the Chinese soon discovered that opium might be smoked alone with agreeable results. It was thus that the

demoralization of this large section of the human race by the misuse of a useful drug began.

As soon as the potentialities of China as a market for opium were realized by the British merchants, they were not slow to exploit them. Moral objections were no deterrent, if indeed they were considered at all; for by 1770 the East India Company had assumed a monopoly of opium in Bengal, and exported 200 chests of the drug to China during that year. By 1830 the figure had grown to 4,000 chests per annum, and during the next decade increased to more than seven times that quantity!

It was then that the Emperor decided to enforce the opium prohibition laws. The surrender by the merchants of over a million pounds worth of the drug was demanded and obtained, and was followed by a demand for the surrender of certain Europeans for alleged offences. This was refused, and the Chinese thereupon closed the port of Canton to foreign trade, at the same time seizing and destroying the entire stock of opium in the foreign warehouses. The step was a rash one for a country with no means of self-defence, and the insult was too much for the pride of the British of those days. The inevitable happened and Britain declared war; war which ended in the Treaty of Nanking of 1842 and secured for Britain the island of Hong Kong, whilst China was forced to open the five ports of Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo and Shanghai to foreign trade. This war was brought about by the opium traffic, and when it was over it left matters much as they were as regards opium, but might have vindicated its power and China had been compelled against her will by the British to make further concessions to foreigners. The British Government, whilst agreeing that the importation of opium into China was contrary to the law of that country, yet did nothing to restrict its export from India, where the poppy was a valuable source of revenue to the East India Company as well as to some of the Indian princes who had followed the example set them by the Company. When the British Government in India succeeded the Company, a myth which had been current in official circles that opium was necessary to the health of the Chinese seems to have been accepted as a fact; for the traffic went on unchecked.

It cannot be seriously advanced that the Chinese prohibition of the drug was very sincere or that vigorous measures were taken to enforce it. As with "prohibition" in America, the opium embargo

in China seemed to act rather as a spur to the cupidity of venal officials than as a hindrance to the traffic, which continued to flourish and increase whilst peculant mandarins amassed fortunes from their illicit incomes. Nevertheless, whilst it is true that wholesale importation, contrary to the letter of the Chinese law, was freely encouraged by local officials, it cannot be denied that the drug habit itself was originally acquired from foreigners, nor that its exploitation was accomplished by foreign traders, aided and abetted by their governments, who did not hesitate to use force.

Following upon the Treaty of Nanking the next step of British diplomacy in China was to secure, in the next year, the right that any privilege accorded to any other nation would, *ipso facto*, be accorded to England;\* an example which was speedily followed by every other Power with interests in the Far East, so that thenceforward the "most favoured nation clause" was included in all treaties which foreign nations made with China. Thus the United States† and France‡ quickly secured for themselves similar privileges to those obtained by Britain in the Treaty of Nanking, and the other Powers of Europe (and even some of the South American republics) wasted no time in following suit. The French in their treaty insisted upon the liberty of Catholic worship and the restitution of church property confiscated in 1724.§ This was immediately followed by a demand for similar freedom of worship and proselytization by the Protestant Powers; and so the game went on until foreigners had gained for themselves the right to live, trade and preach an alien religion in China, whilst remaining immune from Chinese law. In addition to securing these "extra-territorial rights" for their nationals, the foreign Powers negotiated through their local representatives to obtain "concessions," or leased territory, at each of the ports established by treaty, where foreigners could live and trade under their own municipal arrangements, and subject to no other jurisdiction than that of their own Consul. Naturally the Chinese servants and employees and their families could not be excluded and thus the concessions soon became areas into which Chinese fugitives from law could find sanctuary, and were one of the factors which helped to undermine the authority of government in China.

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\* Treaty of the Bogue, 1843.

† Treaty of Wanghia, 1844.

‡ Treaty of Whampao, 1844.

§ By a rescript in 1846.

It is true that foreigners sought nothing more than the right to trade, but the results of thus forcing the pace upon a proud nation like the Chinese are not always appreciated. Unable to do anything but accede to the threats and demands of the foreign governments, the Chinese mandarins, not unnaturally, began to foment hatred of foreigners. Outrages on Christian converts and isolated foreigners became more and more frequent, and eventually led to further armed intervention; but in the meantime internal discord found expression in the form of the T'aiping rebellion, which broke out in 1850, and which was indirectly the result of foreign influences. The leader of this revolt called himself the T'ien Wang (Prince of Heaven). He was a Christian convert, who announced himself as the Messiah and proclaimed that his mission was to rid the country of the foreign yoke, replacing the Manchu dynasty with a new Chinese dynasty to be known as the T'aiping, whose first Emperor would be the T'ien Wang himself. Fantastic as his claims may sound, he gathered round him an imposing following, and by 1853 he had succeeded in dominating China south of the Yangtse, capturing Nanking with heavy slaughter in March of that year, and thereupon proclaiming himself Emperor in the ancient capital of the Mings. His attempt to advance further against Tientsin and Peking met with disaster, but as the Chinese became embroiled in a further war with the foreign Powers in 1856, the rebellion could not be finally crushed until 1864, and the T'ien Wang retained control of the Yangtse valley until that year.

The war of 1856 between China and the allied forces of France, Russia and Britain was the direct result of the anti-foreignism which had been fomented by the mandarins, and which rendered it impossible for foreigners to move freely in the city of Canton, or indeed anywhere outside the restricted areas of the foreign concessions. The indignation which this state of affairs engendered in the minds of the foreign governments may be readily appreciated, and their decision that the Chinese must be taught a lesson is not difficult to understand. But the attitude of the Chinese, who did not consider themselves the racial or cultural inferiors of the Westerners, is not so generally realized. If one conjures up a picture, however, of an invasion of our own shores in the Middle Ages by Chinese merchants backed by powerful fleets, and the attitude which our own ancestors might have been expected to adopt towards

Chinese settlements forcibly established in our principal ports, the feelings of the Chinese themselves will be more easily understood. They behaved much as our own similarly independent ancestors would have behaved if conditions had been reversed. It is hardly surprising that the atmosphere was explosive; so much so, in fact, that war was inevitable.

A dispute as to whether the crew of the British vessel "Arrow" was subject to British or Chinese law whilst in Chinese territory and waterways provided the spark, and the defences of Canton were seized by the British in October 1856. France shortly afterwards joined in the war, her excuse being the murder of a missionary; and in 1857 Russia, too, joined the allies. In December of that year the British captured and occupied Canton city. The Indian Mutiny somewhat hampered British operations, but by June of 1858 the British and French compelled the Chinese to accept treaties which were signed, for the first time in history, by the Emperor himself instead of by a local representative, at Peking on July 4th. The equality of foreigners with Chinese, toleration of Christianity, the opening of the whole of the Yangtse valley to foreign trade, and the reception of diplomatic missions of foreign Powers at the court of Peking were the main points of these treaties. Whether or not the precaution was necessary cannot be definitely established, but the British and French decided that their envoys should proceed to Peking for the ratification of their treaties by the water route *via* Tientsin and accompanied by contingents of their fleets. No such provision, however, had been accepted by the Chinese or specified in the treaties; consequently when the fleets drew abreast of the Taku forts at the mouth of the Tientsin river they were treated as invaders and met with a serious reverse. It was not until a year later that Lord Elgin and Baron Gros returned with greatly increased forces. Sir Harry Parkes was then despatched by Elgin to conduct preliminary negotiations with Peking for the reception of the mission, but he was captured and held prisoner by the Chinese and some of his party were murdered. As a reprisal for what was then thought to be an act of wanton treachery, the allied forces—in October 1860—advanced on Peking, where they sacked and burned the Summer Palace with all its costly treasures, thus perpetrating an act of vandalism which will live long in Chinese memories. Quite recently Sir Reginald Johnston\* has established from archives

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\* "Twilight in the Forbidden City," by Sir R. F. Johnston (Gollancz).

found in the Imperial Palace at Peking that the capture of Parkes by the Chinese was not in fact an act of treachery, but was due to the mistaken impression that he was the British Commander-in-Chief, and that, deprived of his leadership, the British attack would subside.

A further treaty was now forced upon the Chinese by which the Emperor was forced to legalize the opium trade, and to sanction the recruiting of coolies for labour abroad, whilst Kowloon, opposite Hong Kong on the mainland, was ceded to the British. At the same time an indemnity of eight million taels was exacted, and the Imperial court was obliged to receive the ministers of the Powers. Pending a settlement of the points at issue the allied troops were maintained at Peking, and thus created the impression in Chinese minds that it was intended to retain them there permanently. Profiting by this illusion the Russian minister artfully induced the Chinese to cede to Russia the Amur Province, north of Manchuria \* in exchange for a promise to persuade the British and French commanders to withdraw their forces. There was never any real intention of retaining the foreign troops in Peking once the various demands had been finally settled by treaty, but this was only realized by the Chinese about a year later, when they learned how they had been tricked into giving away territory for nothing. In 1861, England, France and Russia established legations in Peking, the U. S. A. followed suit a year later, and the Imperial court created the Tsung Li Yamen, which was in effect a board to deal exclusively with foreign affairs.

The conclusion of this war with the allied Powers in 1860 found China still in the throes of the T'aiping rebellion, with the T'ien Wang controlling from Nanking the whole of the Yangtse valley and the territory to its south. Without foreign aid it is doubtful whether the Manchu dynasty could have survived, and it appears probable that it would have been overthrown and supplanted by the T'aipings. If this had happened the whole course of Chinese history might have been altered, for a new and virile dynasty, arising phoenix-like from the ashes of the old, might well have succeeded in resisting the influence which led to the revolution in 1911, and China might never have become a republic, and might have been spared the tribulations of the years of anarchy which have followed the overthrow of the Manchu Empire by Sun Yat Sen's reformers. Once the outstanding differences had been satisfactorily settled with the Manchu court,

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\* Subsequently extended to include Vladivostock.

however, the foreign governments were interested in retaining the old dynasty in power. They therefore not only permitted it to import munitions of war for use against the rebels, but also allowed foreign officers to be engaged in the service of the Chinese Government. The first of these was an American sailor, Ward, who, in 1860, began to organize foreign deserters and other volunteers in a militia created at the suggestion of the Chinese viceroy Li Hung Chang. In 1862 Ward was killed and Li Hung Chang then secured the services of Gordon, the British officer who later became known as "Chinese Gordon." Under his leadership Nanking was stormed and the rebellion finally crushed, in 1864. By thus permitting interference in the internal affairs of China, the foreign Powers were able to save the tottering Manchu dynasty for the time being, but have laid themselves open to the charge of altering the course of Chinese history for their own purposes.

It was in 1853, just prior to the events described above, that the foreign control of the China Maritime Customs was born. Rebels had captured the native city of Shanghai and the Imperial officials arranged for the British, American and French Consuls to control the collection of duties on foreign imports into the Shanghai settlement. In 1863, Robert Hart, of the British Consular Service, was appointed by the Chinese Government to control the collection of duties and to organize a service for this purpose as a branch of the Chinese Government. At the outset this service was possibly intended purely for the benefit of China, but as will be seen, it later developed into an instrument of foreign control, with its revenue pledged to provide the vast sums due to foreign Powers as war indemnities.

After the termination of the war with the allied Powers in 1860, China was free from armed foreign aggression until the outbreak of the war with Japan in 1894, but during this period her Empire was shorn of some of its former glory in that large neighbouring kingdoms, which had paid tribute and rendered at least lip-service to the court of Peking, were annexed by foreign Powers. In 1885 the French seized Annam, and in the following year Burma's continued resistance to British penetration led to the complete annexation of that country and its absorption in the Indian Empire. In the meantime Japan had been rapidly reacting to Western influences and by 1894 she felt herself strong enough to challenge China's

claim to control Korea, and to embark upon a war for the acquisition of this territory. By March of 1896 the Chinese fleet had been swept from the sea, Port Arthur had been taken, Korea invaded, and Peking was threatened. Peace was concluded in the Treaty of Shimonoseki, and China was forced to recognize the independence of Korea, to cede to Japan the large island of Formosa and the Pescadores, and in addition to pay an indemnity equivalent to forty million pounds sterling. The treaty actually provided for the cession of Port Arthur and the whole of the Liaotung peninsula of South Manchuria to Japan, but the Western Powers declined to recognize this clause, and under pressure from Russia, France and Germany, Japan agreed to withdraw her claim to this territory and to accept instead an increased indemnity. To raise the necessary funds with which to pay this indemnity China was forced to pledge the revenue of the foreign controlled customs.

The Western Powers now commenced to scramble for railway and mining concessions. Russia was first in the field and secured the right to connect Siberia with the port of Vladivostock by the Chinese Eastern Railway across Manchuria. As a result of the series of humiliations imposed upon China by the foreign Powers, culminating in the crushing terms of the Japanese treaty, feeling against foreigners ran very high and resentment was again vented upon missionaries and other isolated groups of Europeans. In 1897 two German missionaries were murdered in Shantung and the German Government promptly seized upon this incident as a pretext for the occupation of the peninsula of Tsingtao (in Shantung Province) and the exaction of railway and mining concessions in the Province of Shantung. Encouraged by this example the Russians proceeded to occupy Port Arthur, and France arranged to lease Chang Chia Wan. In order to maintain the balance of sea-power in the Gulf of Chihli the British Government deemed it necessary to acquire a lease of Wei Hai Wei. At about the same time various other Powers demanded new or increased concessions, which China, though unwilling to concede, was too weak to resist.

Meanwhile, fostered by the officials, resentment against foreigners was being fanned into hatred. In the north it was particularly acute, and a secret society called the "I Ho T'u'an," the members of which are better known to foreigners as "Boxers," was becoming restive. The aim of this society was to exterminate and drive out

the foreigners from China. In 1900 the movement got completely out of control—if, indeed, there was ever any intention to attempt to control it—and missionaries and their converts were massacred by hundreds in various parts of the country. The Manchu nobles, possibly fearing that the anger of the mob might be turned against the dynasty, itself foreign, persuaded the Empress Dowager to agree to the siege of the Legations, where many foreigners had taken refuge. On the 20th June 1900, she declared war on the foreigners and ordered the Legations to quit Peking within 24 hours; an order which, if they had attempted to carry it out, would have led to their certain annihilation at the hands of the Boxers. The German Envoy who left his Legation to carry his protest in person to the Tsung Li Yamen was, in fact, murdered, and for the next eight weeks the foreign Legations were in a state of siege and fighting for their lives. On the 14th August 1900, they were relieved by a composite force furnished by Japan, Russia, England, the U. S. A., France and Italy, which was subsequently reinforced by 7,000 Germans who arrived in Peking on the 17th October.

The massacre of foreigners and the attack on the Legations were undoubtedly unprecedented acts of violence from which civilized people will recoil in horror. They were, however, the natural outcome of the behaviour of the foreign governments and were more in the nature of a reprisal for wrongs suffered than acts of natural barbarism. To the unarmed and defenceless Chinese the attacks which they had suffered at the hands of foreign navies and soldiery seemed just as one-sided and cowardly as their own acts of revenge upon the unarmed missionaries and the weakly defended Legations. The allied forces, however, from whom more moderation might surely have been expected, appear to have comported themselves with a lack of restraint at least equal to that of the Chinese, and to have wreaked a merciless vengeance upon a helpless countryside. Even the more restrained writers on modern Chinese history fail to find much to be said in extenuation of the excesses committed by the allied troops. Mr. Lionel Curtis in his valuable work "*The Capital Question of China*"\* dismisses the affair in a terse but potent paragraph:

"By ordering a general massacre of foreigners and attacking the foreign Legations, the Manchu dynasty had done everything

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\* Macmillan & Co., 1932.

possible to discredit China in the eyes of the world. This explains, while it cannot excuse, the vengeance taken by the allies on the local inhabitants when Peking and the neighbouring regions lay at their mercy. Of this painful episode it suffices to say that contemporary records show that the Japanese were better restrained than the Europeans."

Not satisfied with reprisals on the spot, the Russian Government apparently considered the moment opportune for a forcible occupation of Manchuria. The following account is from a British commentary: \*

"Their methods were brutal but effective. At Blagovyeshensk 5,000 Chinese—men, women and children—were driven into the river and drowned, the feeble resistance of the Chinese was everywhere easily overcome, the whole of Manchuria was occupied and treated as though it were conquered territory, and at Newchwang the Russian flag was hoisted and a Russian administration established."

Thus once again was the lesson brought home to China that although foreign Powers might act with impunity in Chinese territory, any attempt at armed protest or reprisals would be severely and promptly punished. She was learning the futility of protesting against the aggressive tendencies of more powerful nations.

To drive the lesson home, the allied Powers in the final settlement with China after the Boxer Rising, imposed a colossal indemnity of 450 million taels, which, as it could not possibly be paid at once, was to be realized by instalments with interest at 4 per cent. It is somewhat refreshing to note that although Britain's losses had been greater than those of any other nation, her claims only amounted to 11 per cent. of the total crushing indemnity, whilst Russia headed the list with 29 per cent. To meet the charges the customs service, under Sir Robert Hart, had now to be empowered to collect the native as well as the foreign customs at the various ports, and the service became to an even greater degree the instrument for the collection of debts owed by China to creditor nations. Foreign Powers now had complete control of the Chinese customs and could fix the rates of duty. The amounts collected on foreign imports could thus be kept just high enough to bring in sufficient revenue to meet China's foreign commitments, whilst any attempt on the part of China to increase her revenue by raising high tariffs against foreign goods could be checked. This state of affairs persisted until 1929,

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\* From "Diplomatic Events in Manchuria," by Sir Harold Parlett.

when the Chinese, after years of effort, finally secured the right to regulate their own tariffs.\* Another result of the Boxer settlement was the establishment of a fortified Legation quarter in the midst of the city of Peking, wherein all the Legations were housed, and in which the principal Powers acquired the right to station troops for the defence of their Legations.

An American writer, commenting upon the causes and results of the Boxer outbreak, has voiced his disapproval with candour and force. His conclusions may not be very wide of the mark : †

"There appeared to be left only the formal act of partition when China made her last gesture of revolt. This was the Boxer uprising in 1900 when the Legations in Peking were besieged, missionaries and other foreigners attacked in other parts of the country and many killed. It was an act of fanatic despair and unfortunate in that the innocent were victimized ; but the motives are understandable. At any rate China was penalized for its defiance soon enough. An international expedition marched from Tientsin to Peking, sacked the capital with a degree of cruelty which has since become infamous, and then imposed an indemnity of 330,000,000 dollars—a sum far, far in excess of the actual damage done by the Boxers. For the thousands of Chinese peasants and town workers slaughtered by the foreign troops and the Chinese property looted, no reciprocal compensation was discussed. But a permanent military garrison was established in Peking, almost adjoining the Imperial Palace. It is there yet."

Meanwhile an awakening Japan was jealously watching the Russians who had already forcibly occupied Manchuria and seemed likely to turn their attention next towards Korea. Emboldened by the alliance with England, concluded in 1902, she now felt strong enough to challenge the Russian movement towards the Pacific seaboard and events moved swiftly to the Russo-Japanese war, which broke out in February 1904. During the next fourteen months this war between two alien Powers was fought out on Chinese soil. The Russians were evicted from Manchuria and the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula and Port Arthur was transferred from Russia to Japan. Strong diplomatic representations from the Western Powers prevented a Japanese annexation of the whole of Manchuria, and Japan was forced to content herself for the time being with railway and mining concessions in South Manchuria. Another

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\* Treaties granting tariff autonomy were signed by most of the Powers in 1928, mainly as a result of the stand made by Britain ; but Japan deferred signing until a year later.

† "China : The Collapse of a Civilization," N. Paffer (Routledge).

quarter of a century was to elapse before she felt able, in defiance of world opinion, to reap the full benefits of her victory over the Russians in 1905. In the interim, however, in 1910, she formally annexed Korea, and her action was not questioned by any of the other Powers.

The moral effect in China of the defeat of a European Power by the Japanese was considerable. Not only did it expose once again the weakness of the Chinese form of government and pave the way for the revolution which was to follow six years later, but it encouraged anti-foreign feeling and nerved the Chinese afresh to resist attempts to exploit their weakness. The desire to do as the Japanese had done and purge themselves of foreign interference was born. The reform movement gained increased impetus, a new educational system on Western lines was introduced and effective steps were taken to stop the production of opium in China and its importation from India. The British conscience began to be aroused and an agreement was finally signed which brought the traffic to an end and closed this unsavoury chapter of Anglo-Chinese relations.\*

At the end of 1911 the revolution came and the dynasty was deposed. China lost her traditional form of government and became a republic, at any rate in name. But she was improperly prepared for the change, and the new administration found itself powerless to control the vast continental territories once the traditional fountain-head of authority had been removed. The republican party, which called itself the Kuomintang, or People's Party, had originated in Canton, and encountered difficulties at the outset from the more conservative elements in the northern provinces; it lacked the machinery and funds for the replacement throughout the vast empire of the system of government which it had destroyed. Yet the movement persisted, and in 1913 the republic was recognized by the Powers and loans were floated for the reorganization of China. A year later, however, the Great War effectively diverted the attention of the Western Powers from matters Chinese.

This was Japan's opportunity. Within three weeks of its commencement she blockaded the territory occupied by Germany

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\* Owing to the devastating effect of the abolition of the opium trade upon Indian revenue, the traffic was gradually and progressively decreased, and was not actually brought to an end until 1917. The fact that this sacrifice was agreed to by Britain is striking proof of the change of heart which had taken place, and an earnest of British sincerity. Whilst Britain incurs the full odium of her earlier opium policy, she is less often given the full credit due to her for its abandonment.

in Shantung, landed a force on the northern coast, seized the portions of that province which had been leased to Germany and proceeded to occupy and administer them despite the protests of China. China was a neutral country, but this did not deter Japan, and the other Powers were too much occupied with their own desperate affairs to intervene. Japan followed this up with her notorious "Twenty-one demands," in which she required China to transfer to her all the rights which the Germans had enjoyed in Shantung, to prolong considerably the lease of the Liaotung peninsula and the other concessions in Manchuria, and to grant valuable mining and other rights in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. She further insisted upon sharing the control of the largest iron mines in China, near Hankow, and required that no further territory should be ceded to any Power other than Japan. China was to engage Japanese advisers for political, financial and military affairs, and was to share with Japan the control of the police in "important places." Finally China was not to be permitted to raise foreign loans without Japanese sanction, and the terms of the twenty-one demands were not to be disclosed to any other Power. Their terms leaked out, however, and American intervention caused these humiliating demands to be somewhat modified; but the President of the Chinese Republic was forced to yield to most of them on the 25th May 1915.

In 1917 China decided to enter the war on the side of the allied Powers and, though she sent no troops to any front, the Chinese Labour Corps did valuable work behind the line in France, and made large numbers of other troops available for the actual business of fighting. Her decision to join was no doubt dictated by motives of expediency, as by her declaration of war on Germany and Austria all her unequal treaties with those countries would be automatically cancelled, and she would be in a more advantageous position at the peace conference to combat the claims of Japan to succeed to the privileges of Germany in China. The cancellation of the German and Austrian treaties would breach the whole system of extra-territoriality, opening the way to the annulment of all the unequal treaties with the other Powers. The Boxer indemnity payments due to enemy powers would be cancelled forthwith, and the prospect of their voluntary cancellation by all the Allies after the war would be considerably brightened.

But at the Peace Conference China was once more to suffer disillusionment. Secret treaties were revealed, which showed that the allies, in order to gain Japanese naval support during the war, had agreed to urge the Japanese claim to Shantung. America had not been a party to these treaties, however, and they had not even been revealed to her when she joined the allies in 1917. In consequence, President Wilson warmly supported the Chinese case, and the Japanese delegates agreed to the following modification of their earlier demands: "The policy of Japan is to hand over the Shantung peninsula in full sovereignty to China, retaining only the economic privileges granted to Germany, and the right to establish a settlement under the usual condition at Tsingtao. The owners of the railway will use special police only to ensure security of traffic."\*

The news of the failure to effect the complete eviction of the Japanese from Shantung caused great consternation in China. Help had been given to the allies at a time of crisis, but when China looked to her erstwhile friends for assistance there was no response to her appeal. This, in her view, amounted to betrayal, and it revived feelings of animosity against foreigners (with the exception of Americans) and prompted China to use the only effective weapon she could wield against Japan, in the form of a wholesale boycott of Japanese goods. The effect was so paralysing upon Japanese trade that at the Washington Conference in 1921, Japan agreed to evacuate Shantung within nine months, and to cancel all but four of the twenty-one demands which had been accepted by China under duress in 1915. Following upon the Washington Conference a further treaty was entered into by nine Powers, mainly at the instance of America and Britain, under the terms of which all the signatories, including Japan, agreed "to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China" and "to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government." In another treaty the Powers pledged themselves to appoint a committee to report on means for assisting the Chinese Government to effect such reforms as would warrant the relinquishment by the Powers, progressively or otherwise, of their extra-territorial rights.

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\* "Far Eastern International Relations," Morse and McNair, p. 894.

It will be seen that after the Great War the attitude of the Western Powers towards China has completely changed and there have been no further attempts by any of them to exploit the weakness of that country. The policy has rather been to help China to put her house in order and to stand upon her own feet, though the nations have been somewhat tardy in giving effect to the sentiments expressed in their treaties. The Chinese National Government, with its new capital at Nanking, was recognized by the Powers in 1928, for instance, but despite reiterated requests from China not one of the Powers has yet moved its Legation from the comfortable quarters in Peking to the new capital, nor have any of the leading Powers yet relinquished their extra-territorial rights. Wei Hai Wei and the Hankow concession have been handed back by Britain, Belgium has surrendered her concessions at Tientsin, and some of the smaller Powers have agreed to the cancellation of their extra-territorial rights. Of the great Powers Russia alone has voluntarily renounced them; she did so as a bid for the alliance of China in the Bolshevik adventure.

Whilst the Western Powers have ceased to be aggressive, however, Japan has become more so. Unhampered by the treaties she signed at Washington, she has invaded Manchuria and Jehol, and has commenced inroads into the northern provinces of China. Her military activities in Manchuria and elsewhere have resulted in irreparable loss to China and caused the death of many thousands of her sons. She has bombarded the city of Shanghai and landed a force in defiance of treaty obligations to invade the very country she pledged herself to protect. The League of Nations, in whom China placed her trust, proved incapable of doing anything to check Japan or to enable China effectively to resist her, and the Powers, who had bound themselves at Washington to respect Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, proved capable of nothing more helpful than diplomatic protests and adverse Press comments. Small wonder that the Chinese continue to dislike foreigners. They have had cause enough.

When the record of foreign relations with China is thus impartially reviewed it is not one of which we, in this enlightened and peace-loving century, have any cause to feel proud. Much of what foreigners have done in China may be defended on grounds of provocation and economic necessity, but when the whole chain of

unfortunate events is studied, it presents a sorry sequence of calamities which might have been avoided if more effort had been made to understand the Chinese and appreciate their point of view. They are not a naturally hostile or warlike people and their original reception of foreigners was friendly and tolerant. It was not until excesses were committed by foreigners themselves that they reversed their attitude and became hostile. The opium habit, which has undermined the health of many of the Chinese people, is of foreign origin: it was supplied first by the British, and when the Chinese Government sought to put an end to the trade the infamous "opium war" was the result. Although the traffic has now ceased the drug is still cultivated and freely smoked in China, and provides an ever-present reminder of the unpleasant fact of its foreign origin. Foreign interference at the time of the Taiping rebellion, when the Manchu dynasty was tottering, saved it for a time and prevented the accession of a new dynasty, which many think might have been China's salvation, and which would at all events have forestalled the republic. The crushing indemnities imposed upon China in reparation for the defiance shown in the Boxer outbreak were a staggering blow to a poor and defenceless country. Though the balances of payments were remitted by the various Powers after the Great War and applied for purposes beneficial to China, the feeling of injustice which they engendered will not easily be eradicated, nor will the memory of the atrocities committed by the allied troops when the relief forces had the countryside at their mercy. The secret treaties, which the allies made with Japan, rudely affronted Chinese susceptibilities at a time when there seemed to be an all-round change of heart and a prospect of more cordial Sino-foreign relations. This seeming duplicity might have been forgiven the allies when its results were negated by the treaties made at Washington two years after the Peace Conference; but the failure of those same Powers and the League of Nations to rally to the aid of China, when attacked by Japan in Manchuria and Shanghai, will not soon either be forgotten or forgiven. The failure of the League to act decisively to protect China from aggression has shattered the remnants of faith in Western sincerity and goodwill.

Young Nationalist China is impatient to throw off the foreign yoke. The foreign concessions still existing at the Treaty Ports, the extra-territorial rights still enjoyed by foreigners, the presence

of foreign naval vessels and merchant steamers in China's inland and territorial waters, and of the Legation Guards in Peking, and the delay of the Powers to remove their Legations to Nanking are amongst the main items of the "unequal treaties" which Chinese Nationalism is doing its utmost to abolish.

When the whole record is considered there can hardly be any surprise that the Chinese to-day are almost as anti-foreign as they were in the Boxer days. Japan now receives the major share of the hatred, but there is still bitterness enough for distribution amongst the other Powers.\*

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\* America should perhaps be excepted. She has never occupied a "concession." Under the "most favoured nation" principle she has reaped the benefit of British aggression without incurring the odium. Her astute use of the Boxer funds for the education of large numbers of Chinese in American schools and universities has given a pro-American bias to many of the younger generation. By some Chinese to-day she seems to be looked upon as China's only friend.

## LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

## THE CITY OF LONDON AND REGIMENTAL PRIVILEGES.

DEAR SIR,

I have read with very great interest Mr. C. Grey's article, in the July issue of the journal, on the subject of the privileges of certain regiments in the City of London. I venture to ask that you will grant me the space to comment on two points in this article, in so far as The Buffs are concerned.

The writer states that it was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that the Regiment first exercised its privilege of marching through the City. In the official Digest of Services of the Regiment, however, the first recorded exercise of the privilege is in September 1821. It seems more than likely that it was exercised before this, namely in 1793, when the Regiment was stationed in the Tower of London, but of this, admittedly, there is no record.

With regard to the march in "the middle of the nineteenth century," Mr. Grey presumably refers to the 13th October 1846; he goes on to assume that the then Commanding Officer *chanced* a march, "and having got away with it, established a precedent." His assumption is erroneous, for the Digest of Services of the Regiment contains a copy of a letter from the then Lord Mayor, dated 12th October 1846, acknowledging the claim of Lieut.-Colonel Sir James Dennis, K.C.B., to exercise the ancient privilege of his Regiment, as having sprung from the City of London.

This letter is reproduced on page 495 of the "Historical Records of The Buffs, 1704—1914" (Medici Society, October 1935).

In conclusion, Mr. Grey may find of interest the appendix included in the above mentioned volume, which deals at length with the question of the privilege of The Buffs and other regiments to march through the city, and was compiled as the result of researches among volumes and documents to which he was, in some cases, possibly unable to gain access.

Yours faithfully,  
C. R. B. KNIGHT, CAPTAIN,  
Late, THE BUFFS.

REVIEWS  
THE WAR IN OUTLINE

BY LIDDELL HART

(*Messrs. Faber and Faber, Ltd., London, 1936.* 5 sh.)

The results of the last Great War were perhaps not greater than those of many wars of the past ; its greater importance lies in the fact that it was fought by whole nations and not by professional armies alone. The further the Great War of 1914-18 recedes into the past the greater the number of people who require an introductory book. It must be remembered that to many for whom the Great War was a personal experience, the South African War was mere history ; a longer interval has elapsed since the conclusion of the last war. A concise outline is, therefore, a necessity if the new generation's interest is to be aroused and it is to be educated into studying a calamity which must not be repeated in the future.

A glance at this book gives the impression that Captain Liddell Hart has supplied just what is wanted. A vast subject, which until now it has only been possible to study in bits—a fact which tends to loss of perspective—is condensed into one well proportioned picture. He tells us in the preface that the outline “ is a sequence of salient facts,” and we see the text divided into five parts, each dealing with the salient features of a year. In a book of such modest size selection of the facts to be recorded was of course inevitable and difficult and with Captain Liddell Hart's selection we have no complaint ; the salient facts and their interrelation are clearly put, and the balance of the war as a whole is well shown in a short and well-knit story.

Referring to the preface again we are told that “ it is an attempt to let the facts tell the story . . . without the embroidery of criticism and argument . . . . It does not attempt to weigh men.” This admirable intention is at once stultified by a dissertation at some length on the incompetence of all soldiers in general and of Haig in particular. Further on we find the whole story spoilt by criticism which is unbalanced, vindictive and futile. That it is unbalanced we cannot fail to realise when we see unrelieved condemnation of nearly all the great figures finding room in a book of 250 pages, whose avowed intention is to record facts of what happened in the

four most eventful years in history. It is the habit of vindictive critics to throw mud—and only mud—at those most prominently before the public eye; Haig is the most prominent military figure with the British public, and he consequently bears the brunt; Joffre and Foch are condemned at only slightly less length. The little praise there is goes to junior staff officers whose bright ideas were not taken up. Was Liddell Hart one of these, we wonder? Futility is apparent in foolish comments and bald conjectures as to “what might have happened;” How much more favourably events would have turned out, he says, if, for instance “they (the French) had sent a few army corps to reinforce the defence their small ally was offering” in August 1914. It is again shown when we are invited to note Joffre’s abtuseness: “though a captured map was brought to him that evening, which made it perfectly clear that Kluck was changing direction, it did not change his own intention.” It is to be hoped that no reader, even of meagre military intelligence, will be convinced by a criticism of all the leading figures on the side of the Allies, who did in the end achieve victory, set against praise—as far as Captain Liddell Hart can find any praise for a soldier—of our enemies, who were defeated. The writer takes advantage of the shortness of the book to leave out the “pros” while including the “cons.”

According to the author we should give thanks to Mr. Lloyd George and to T. E. Lawrence, who appear as the only people who showed any ability. We do give them thanks for their share. But we believe that the public will not withhold their gratitude from bone-headed soldiers and sailors who, with all their failings and mistakes, did win the war; nor will they forget that it was nimble-minded politicians and writers who brought on the war, and lost the peace.

J. M. H.

## CITIZENSHIP

THE RESPONSIBILITIES AND PRIVILEGES OF THE INDIAN CITIZEN.

BY BREVET-MAJOR J. WILLATT, M.C., M.A.,

ARMY EDUCATIONAL CORPS.

*(The Oxford University Press, Bombay.)* Re. 1-8-0.

The author has written a book which is primarily intended for the use of the Indian soldier in competing with the Higher Army School Examinations, but its use extends beyond those confines.

The conservative nature of the farmer is a matter which concerns the Governments of Eastern as well as Western countries, and in Part I of the Book the author has dealt with the rights and privileges of an Indian "country citizen" in terms of his family and village life, and has led him to see the advantages of the improvements in agriculture and education which the Government is devising. Also he is shown his responsibilities as a citizen and his duty to initiate such reforms and improvements as are within his capacity.

Part II is a fairly exhaustive exposition of the machinery of Government and the structure of the new Federation which the Government of India Act, 1935, will bring into being. This is of more academic than practical interest, and it is considered that the explanation of the technical terms in this part of the book will tax to the utmost the abilities of the Educational Instructors.

Part III is headed "The Responsibilities of the Government," and deals with some of its main activities in safeguarding the country from foreign aggression, political turmoil and commercial depression, and its efforts towards the improvement of the standard of living of the people of India in general and the agricultural classes in particular.

Citizenship is a subject which looms large in the life of not only the sepoy aspiring to commissioned rank, but it is also a matter concerning which increasing instruction is now given to his more humble brother, so that on his return to his village he may assist materially in improving the conditions of life now existing in the agricultural districts.

Considered from both these points of view "Citizenship" is a valuable addition to the Regimental Military Library, and its author is to be congratulated on the trouble he has taken and the skill he has shown in producing a very useful Army Text-book.

G. A. M.

**Indian Wild Life**

OFFICIAL ORGAN OF THE ALL-INDIA CONFERENCE FOR THE  
PRESERVATION OF WILD LIFE.

July 1936 witnessed the birth of a new publication entitled "Indian Wild Life."

This journal is the official organ of the All-India Conference for the Preservation of Indian Wild Life and hopes also to become the mouthpiece of the various provincial societies which have recently been formed for the same laudable purpose.

A Bird Club is to be formed in connection with this journal to encourage the study of bird life and bird photography, the membership of this club being free.

The Editors propose to publish a very useful feature in serial form which will contain the details of legislation in each province in connection with close seasons and game laws, orders and rules; if sufficient support is forthcoming, it is also proposed to issue these subsequently in the form of an up-to-date hand-book.

It is fitting that this publication should be issued in the U. P., as that Province was the pioneer in the work of wild life protection and already has a Provincial National Park as a sanctuary, an example which, it is hoped, will be followed by others.

The Editor's appeal for support in the form of articles on the fauna of India and on sport generally will, it is hoped, meet with a ready response, as it is on such support that the future attraction and usefulness of this journal will rest.

It is suggested that this is a publication which should be supported by all messes and clubs. The annual subscription is only Rs. 4 and full details can be obtained from H. A. Jafry, Esq., Managing Editor, "Indian Wild Life," Shahganj, Agra.

C. E. E.-C.

# United Service Institution of India

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JANUARY, 1936

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**I.—New Members**

The following new members joined the Institution from 1st September to 30th November, 1935 :—

**ORDINARY MEMBERS**

Brigadier R. Evans, M.C.	Lieut.	A. W. Chamarette.
„ A. A. Evans-Gwynne, D.S.O.	„	A. C. E. Devereux.
Colonel Th. Pirthi Singh.	„	F. H. Fuller.
Lt-Colonel A. S. Mackay, M.C.	„	P. G. Goodeve-Docker.
„ J. B. de W. Molony, O.B.E.	„	E. H. W. Grimshaw.
„ Piara Singh, Bahadur, O.B.I.	„	E. S. Holdaway.
„ Maharaj Shri Nahar Sinhji.	„	H. B. Hudson.
Major N. R. C. Cosby, M.C.	„	J. R. Jennings-Bramly.
„ D. L. Duncan.	„	H. T. A. Lane.
„ J. Darrell Hill.	„	R. G. Langran.
„ Ghulam Moinuddin.	„	P. J. Palmer.
„ T. C. Livingston.	„	Z. A. Qizilbash.
Captain Atma Singh.	„	L. B. H. Reford.
„ W. J. Cardale.	„	T. S. Taylor.
„ J. C. Cotton.	„	M. C. Waddilove.
„ F. H. Dixon.	„	W. C. Walker.
„ R. S. Karki.	„	E. V. Whitehead.
„ J. M. Lyons, M.C.	„	J. G. N. Wilton.
„ J. Murray.	2/Lieut.	Akbar Khan.
„ Puran Sing Thapa.	„	R. E. G. Bartholomew.
„ N. P. Townley.	„	H. O. Holme.
„ E. D. S. Woodruffe.	„	P. N. Narang.
Lieut. Malik Abdul Waheed Khan.	Squadron-Leader	C. J. S. Dearlove,
„ A. Blair.		R.A.F.

**II.—The Journal**

The Institution publishes a Quarterly Journal in the months of January, April, July and October, which is issued postage-free to members in any part of the world. Non-members may obtain the Journal at Rs. 2, annas 8 per copy, or Rs. 10 per annum. Advertisement rates may be obtained on application to the Secretary or to Messrs. L. A. Stronach & Co., Advertising Consultants, Stronach House, Ballard Estate, Bombay.

**III.—Contributions to the Journal**

Articles may vary in length from two thousand to ten thousand words. They should be submitted in duplicate and typewritten on one side of the paper. Manuscript articles cannot be considered. Payment is made on publication at from Rs. 40 to Rs. 100 in accordance with the value and length of the contribution.

With reference to Regulations for the Army in India, paragraph 204, and King's Regulations, paragraph 522, action to obtain the sanction of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to the publication of any article in the Journal of the United Service Institution of India will be taken by the Executive Committee of the Institution.

The Committee reserve to themselves the right to omit any matter which they consider objectionable.

Articles are only accepted on these conditions.

**IV.—Reading Room and Library**

The United Service Institution of India is situated in the Mall, Simla, and is open all the year round—including Sundays—from 9 a.m. until sunset. The Reading Room of the Institution is provided with most of the leading

illustrated papers, newspapers, magazines and journals of military, naval and service interest.

There is a well-stocked library in the Institution from which members can obtain books on loan free in accordance with the following rules :—

(1) The Library is only open to members and honorary members, who are requested to look upon books as not transferable to their friends.

(2) No book shall be taken from the Library without making the necessary entry in the register. Members residing permanently or temporarily in Simla are requested to enter their addresses.

(3) A member shall not be allowed, at one time, more than three books or sets of books.

(4) No particular limit is set as to the number of days for which a member may keep a book, the Council being desirous of making the Library as useful as possible to members ; but if after the expiration of a fortnight from date of issue it is required by any other member, it will be re-called.

(5) Applications for books from members at out-stations are dealt with as early as possible and books are despatched post free per Registered Parcel Post. They must be returned carefully packed per Registered Parcel Post within one month of the date of issue.

(6) If a book is not returned at the end of one month, it must be paid for if so required by the Executive Committee. Lost and defaced books shall be replaced at the cost of the member to whom they were issued. In the case of lost books which are out of print, the value shall be fixed by the Executive Committee and the amount, when received, spent in the purchase of a new book.

(7) The issue of a book under these rules to any member implies the latter's compliance with the rules and the willingness to have them enforced, if necessary, against him.

(8) The catalogue of the Library has been revised and is now available for sale at Rs. 2/8/- per copy plus postage. The Library has been completely overhauled and all books re-classified, hence the new catalogue meets the general demand for an up-to-date production containing all military classics and other works likely to be of use to members of the Institution. Members who have not yet ordered their copies are advised to send a post card to the Librarian of the Institution, Simla.

## V.—Library Books

A list of the books received during the preceding quarter is enclosed in loose leaf form suitable for cutting into strips for pasting in the library catalogue.

The Institution is in possession of a collection of old and rare books presented by members from time to time and, while such books are not available for circulation, they can be seen by members visiting Simla.

The Secretary will be glad to acknowledge the gift of old books, trophies, medals, etc., presented to the Institution.

## VI.—Promotion Examinations

(a) *Military History*—(reference I. A. O. 257 of 1935).

The following table shows the campaigns on which military history papers will be set for Lieutenants for promotion to Captain in sub-head *b* (iii), and for Captains for promotion to Major in sub-head *d* (iii), with a list of books recommended for the study of each :—

1	2	3	4	5
Serial No.	Date of Examination.	Campaign set for first time.	Campaign set for second time.	Campaign set for last time.
1	March 1936.	Mesopotamia, from October 1915 to the occupation of Bagdad, 11th March 1917.	Gallipoli—inception of the campaign to May 1915.	..
2	October 1936.	..	Mesopotamia, from October 1915 to the occupation of Bagdad, 11th March 1917.	Gallipoli—inception of the campaign to May 1915.
3	March 1937.	The Russo-Japanese War, previous to the Battle of Liao-Yang until the 24th August 1904 (excluding the actual siege operations at Port Arthur).	..	Mesopotamia, from October 1915 to the occupation of Bagdad, 11th March 1917.
4	October 1937.	Mesopotamia, from 12th March 1917 to the Armistice.	The Russo-Japanese War, previous to the Battle of Liao-Yang until the 24th August 1904 (excluding the actual siege operations at Port Arthur).	..
5	March 1938.	..	Mesopotamia, from 12th March 1917 to the Armistice.	The Russo-Japanese War, previous to the Battle of Liao-Yang until the 24th August 1904 (excluding the actual siege operations at Port Arthur).
6	October 1938.	..	..	Mesopotamia, from 12th March 1917 to the Armistice.

The following books are recommended for the study of the campaigns:—

Campaign.	Book.
Gallipoli .. ..	.. History of the Great War—Military Operations—Gallipoli, Vol. I.
Mesopotamia— March 1936 to March 1937.	.. History of the Great War—Military Operations—Mesopotamia, Vols. II and III (less Chapters XXXIV <i>et seq.</i> ).
October 1937 to October 1938.	.. History of the Great War—Military Operations—Mesopotamia, Vols. III (Chapters XXXIV <i>et seq.</i> ) and IV.
All ..	.. A brief Outline of the Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914—1918—Major R. Evans, M. C. ( <i>Sifton Praed</i> ).
The Russo-Japanese War	.. Official History of the Russo-Japanese War, Parts I (second edition), and II ( <i>British—Military</i> ).

The campaigns set for Majors, R.A.M.C. and R.A.V.C., up to and including 1935 are published in I.A.O's. 651 of 1933 and 25 of 1934.

(b) *Other Subjects.*

In addition to the manuals and regulations mentioned in K. R. and R.A.I., the following books are recommended:—

“Modern Military Administration, Organization and Transportation” (Harding-Newman).

“Military Organization and Administration,” 1932 (Lindsell).

“A. & Q. or Military Administration in War” (Lindsell).

“A Study of Unit Administration” (Gale and Polden).

“Military Law,” 1932 (Banning).

“The Defence of Duffers’ Drift,” 1929 (Swinton).

“Tactical Schemes with Solutions, Series I and II” (Kirby and Kennedy).

“Elementary Tactics or the Art of War, British School,” Vol. I (Pakenham Walsh).

“Imperial Military Geography” (Cole).

“Elements of Imperial Defence” (Boycott).

“Changing Conditions of Imperial Defence” (Cole).

“A Practical Digest of Military Law” (Townshend-Stephens. Pub. Sifton Praed).

**VII.—Staff College Examination.**—(See Staff College (Quetta) Regulations, 1930, obtainable from the Manager of Publications, Delhi or Calcutta).

(a) *Campaigns.*

The following campaigns have been set for the Staff College Entrance Examination :—

Strategy of—

Napoleon's Campaign of 1796 in Italy.

Waterloo Campaign.

Peninsula Campaign, up to and including the Battle of Salamanca.

The Strategy and Broad Tactical Lessons of—

The American Civil War.

Russo-Japanese War, up to and including the Battle of Liao-Yang.

The Great War in France, Belgium, Mesopotamia, the Dardanelles and Palestine, including a knowledge of the influence on the strategy in these areas of the events in other theatres of the War.

The East Prussian Campaign, 1914.

The Strategy and tactics of—

The Palestine Campaign from 9th November 1917 to the end of the War.

The Action of the British Expeditionary Force in France and Belgium up to and including the first battle of Ypres.

The 3rd Afghan War, 1919.

(b) In addition to his official books every student is recommended to provide himself with a copy of :—

(i) Military Organization and Administration (Lindsell).

Military Law (Banning).

British Strategy (Maurice).

Notes on the Land and Air Forces of British Overseas Dominions, Colonies and Protectorates (Official).

Outline of the Development of the British Army up to 1914 (Hastings-Anderson).

Imperial Military Geography (Cole).

An Atlas.

(ii) The following pamphlets, etc., can be borrowed from the Orderly Room, and should be studied :—

Examination papers for admission to the Staff College.

Training memoranda—War Office.

Training memoranda—A. H. Q. India.

Notes on certain Lessons of the Great War.

Passing it on (Skeen).

(iii) Periodicals, etc., to which students should subscribe.—

“The Times.”

“U. S. I. (India) Journal.”

(iv) Books which can be obtained from libraries.—

(*Note*.—Those marked with an asterisk should be used only as books of reference.)

R. U. S. I. Journal.

Army Quarterly.

Round Table.

Journal of the Institute of International Affairs.

Science of War (Henderson).

Transformation of War (Colin).

The War of Lost Opportunities (Hoffman).

\*The Principles of War (Foch).

\*The Direction of War (Bird).

Soldiers and Statesman (Robertson).

\*Historical illustrations to F. S. R. II (Eady).

\*In the Wake of the Tank (Martel).

\*The re-making of modern armies (Liddell Hart).

\*The British Way in Warfare (Liddell Hart).

\*Napoleon's Campaign in 1796 in Italy (Burton).

\*Waterloo Campaign (Robinson).

\*Outline History of Russo-Japanese War 1904, up to Battle of Liao-Yang (Pakenham Walsh).

The Battle of Liao-Yang (Robinson).

\*The World Crisis (Churchill).

\*A History of the Great War (Cruttwell).

The Palestine Campaign (Wavell).

A Brief Outline of the Campaign in Mesopotamia (Evans).

\*The Dardanelles Campaign (Callwell).

\*German Strategy in the Great War (Neame).

\*Official Histories of the War—France, Egypt, Palestine, Mesopotamia, Gallipoli.

\*Waziristan 1919-20 (Watteville).

\*The Third Afghan War (Official).

A. & Q. (Lindsell).

Changing conditions of Imperial Defence (Cole).

The British Empire (Lucas).

\*The Government of the British Empire (Jenks).

\*The Foundation and Growth of the British Empire (Williamson).

\*A Short History of British Expansion (Williamson).

\*Expansion of the British Empire (Woodward).

(v) Books and articles on Transportation.—

Railways in War. Lieutenant-Colonel E. St. G. Kirke, D.S.O., R.E., Army Quarterly, January 1930.

Strategic moves by Rail 1914. Journal R. U. S. I., February and May 1935.

The lines of communication in the Dardanelles. Lieutenant-General Sir G. Macmunn. Army Quarterly, April 1930.

The lines of communication in Mesopotamia. Lieutenant-General Sir G. Macmunn. Army Quarterly, October 1927.

History of the R.A. S. C., Vol. II (all campaigns).

The supply and transportation problem of future armies. Major B. C. Dening, M.C., R.E., Journal U. S. I. India, April 1932.

The supply of mechanized forces in the field. Journal R. U. S. I., 1929.

The Board of Trade and the Fighting Services. Journal R. U. S. I., 1929.

Railway organization of an Army in War. Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson, D.S.O., R.E., Journal R. U. S. I., 1927.

What is required of a Railway in a theatre of operations. Major-General Taylor, R. E. Journal, September 1932.

F. S. P. B. War Office, 1932. Read Sections 36 to 38. Do not memorize detail. Know where to find it.

F. S. P. B. India.

### VIII.—Schemes, etc.

The following tactical schemes, complete with solutions and maps, and precis of lectures set for the A. H. Q. Staff College Course, 1935, are available for issue to members of the Institution at the nominal price of annas eight per copy, plus postage. The cost of maps is extra and is charged for at Rs. 2/- per map.

STAFF COLLEGE SERIES, 1935.

**Tactical Schemes**

*Continuous Exercises.*

- No. 1. Message Writing.
- „ 2. Divisional Cavalry.
- „ 3. March Orders.
- „ 4. Military Appreciation.
- „ 5. Attack Orders.
- „ 6. Defence Orders.
- „ 7. Withdrawal.
- „ 8. Employment of (A. C.) Squadron R. A. F.

(Note.—The map required for all the above Exercises is Sheet No. 112, 1" to 1 mile.)

*Strategy, Tactics and other papers.*

- (a) Strategy and Tactics, Paper No. 1 (Ref. Map 1" Sheet 123).
  - „ „ „ „ No. 2 (Ref. Map 1" Sheet 93).
  - „ „ „ „ No. 3 (Ref. Map Sheet 44/16 S.E.)
  - „ „ „ „ No. 4 (The maps required for this paper on Frontier Warfare Scheme are not available; they may be obtained on application to O. I/C Map Record and Issue Office, Calcutta).
  - „ „ „ „ No. 5.
- (b) D. M. T.'s Paper No. 1.
  - „ „ „ 2.
  - „ „ „ 3.
  - „ „ „ 4. (Without solution).
  - „ „ „ 5.
  - „ „ „ 6.
  - „ „ „ 7.
  - „ „ „ 8.
  - „ „ „ 9.
  - „ „ „ 10.
- (c) Map Reading Paper. (Ref. Map 1" Sheet 112).
  - Military Law Paper No. I.
  - „ „ „ II.
  - Transportation, Peace and War (Without solution).
  - Organization and Administration excluding Transportation (Peace).
  - Organization and Administration excluding Transportation (War).

**Precis of lectures**

- (i) Staff College Examination.
- (ii) Operation Orders and Instructions.
- (iii) Military Writing.
- (iv) Cavalry.
- (v) Artillery No. 1.
- (va) „ „ 2.
- (vb) „ „ 3.
- (vi) Engineers.
- (vii) Signals No. 1.
- (viiia) „ „ 2.
- (viii) A. F. Vs.—Characteristics and Organization.
- (viiia) A. F. Vs.—Tactical Employment.
- (ix) Army and R. A. F. Co-operation.
- (x) River Crossing.
- (xi) Night Operations.
- (xii) Frontier Warfare.
- (xiii) Strategy and Tactics. Surprise.
- (xiiia) Strategy and Tactics. Morale.
- (xiiib) Strategy and Tactics. Political Objects in War.
- (xiic) Strategy and Tactics. Interior Lines and Communications.
- (xiid) Strategy and Tactics. Fog in War.
- (xiiie) Strategy and Tactics. Gallipoli.
- (xiv) Military Law. Charges and Charge Sheets.
- (xiva) Military Law. Evidence.
- (xivb) Military Law. Court Martial Proceedings.
- (xv) Transportation. Nos. 1 and 2.
- (xvi) “ Q ” and “ O ” Services in Peace including Mobilization.
- (xvii) Organization and Administration other than “ Q ” and “ O ” Services.
- (xviii) Maintenance of Material and Animals.
- (xix) Medical Organization and Evacuation of Casualties.

**IX.—Historical Research**

The U. S. I. is prepared to supply members and units with typewritten copies of old Indian Army List pages, at the rate of Rs. 2 per typewritten page.

The staff of the Institution is always willing to assist units, authors of regimental histories and members by searching the many old military records in the Library on their behalf.

**X.—The MacGregor Memorial Medal**

1. The MacGregor Memorial Medal was founded in 1888 as a memorial to the late Major-General Sir Charles MacGregor. The medals are awarded for the best military reconnaissances or journeys of exploration of the year.

2. The following awards are made annually in the month of June :—

(a) For officers—British or Indian—silver medal.

(b) For soldiers—British or Indian—silver medal with Rs. 100 gratuity.

3. For especially valuable work, a gold medal may be awarded in place of one of the silver medals, or in addition to the silver medals, whenever the administrators of the Fund deem it desirable. Also the Council may award a special additional silver medal, without gratuity, to a soldier, for especially good work.

4. The award of medals is made by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, as Vice-Patron, and the Council of the United Service Institution, who were appointed administrators of the Fund by the MacGregor Memorial Committee.

5. Only officers and soldiers belonging to the Army in India (including those in civil employ) are eligible for the award of the medal.\*

6. The medal may be worn in uniform by Indian soldiers on ceremonial parades, suspended round the neck by the ribbon issued with the medal.†

7. Personal risk to life during the reconnaissance or exploration is not a necessary qualification for the award of the medal ; but, in the event of two journeys being of equal value, the man who has run the greater risk will be considered to have the greater claim to the reward.

8. When the work of the year has either not been of sufficient value or has been received too late for consideration before the Council Meeting, the medal may be awarded for any reconnaissance during previous years considered by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to deserve it.

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\*N.B.—The terms " officer " and " soldier " include those serving in the British and Indian armies and their reserves, also those serving in Auxiliary Forces, such as the Indian Auxiliary and Territorial Forces and Corps under Local Governments, Frontier Militia, Levies and Military Police, also all ranks serving in the Royal Air Force, Indian Air Force, Royal Indian Marine and the Indian States Forces.

†Replacements of the ribbon may be obtained on payment from the Secretary, U.S.I., Simla.

## GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION, 1936

The Council has chosen the following subject for the Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition for 1936 :—


**“Certain conflicting requirements may be observed between the organization of the Army at Home and in India, owing to differences in the tasks of these forces. Keeping in mind the importance of the principle of standardization of training and organization in the Imperial forces, discuss the problems involved.”**

The following are the conditions of the competition :—

- (1) The competition is open to all gazetted officers of the Civil Administration, the Royal Navy, Army, Royal Air Force, Auxiliary Forces and Indian State Forces.
- (2) Essays must be typewritten and submitted in triplicate.
- (3) When reference is made to any work, the title of such work is to be quoted.
- (4) Essays are to be strictly anonymous. Each must have a motto, and, enclosed with the essay, there should be sent a sealed envelope with the motto written on the outside and the name of the competitor inside.
- (5) Essays will not be accepted unless received by the Secretary on or before the 30th June 1936.
- (6) Essays will be submitted for adjudication to three judges, chosen by the Council. The judges may recommend a money award, not exceeding Rs. 150, either in addition to, or in substitution for the medal. The decision of the three judges will be submitted to the Council, who will decide whether the medal is to be awarded and whether the essay is to be published.
- (7) The name of the successful candidate will be announced at a Council Meeting to be held in September or October 1936.

- (8) All essays submitted are to become the property of the United Service Institution of India absolutely, and authors will not be at liberty to make any use whatsoever of their essays without the sanction of the Council.
- (9) Essays should not exceed 15 pages of the size and style of the Journal, exclusive of any appendices, tables or maps.

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# United Service Institution of India

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APRIL, 1936

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**I.—New Members**

The following new members joined the Institution from 1st December 1935 to 28th February 1936—

**ORDINARY MEMBERS**

Colonel S. R. Bhosle, O.B.E.	Major Fakhrul Mulk Nawabzada Saiduzzafar Khan, Bahadur.
„ Girdhari Singh, Sardar Bahadur, Muzaffar-Jung Bahadur, O.B.E.	„ Shankar Rao Powar
Lt.-Colonel M. M. Bashir	„ Sheonath Misra, Bahadur.
„ Bhagwandeem	„ Sohrab S. Antia
„ Dattaji Rao Kakde, Sardar Bahadur.	„ C. F. L. Stevens, M.C.
„ B. A. Deodhar	„ C. H. Townsend
„ Deo Rao Chauhan	„ H. A. White
„ R. H. Farren	Captain A. R. Aslett, M.C.
„ Fateh Singh	„ Bapusaheb Jadhav
„ Kalka Singh	„ J. A. Barraclough, M.C.
„ Kashi Rao Powar	„ Chiman Singh
„ C. G. Phillips, D.S.O., M.C.	„ E. P. Dickson
„ Shahmatullah Khan, Bahadur .	„ S. N. Dube
„ Sheo Narayan	„ J. P. L. Eustace
„ B. G. Shinde	„ A. C. Galloway
„ J. G. Smyth, V.C., M.C.	„ L. A. Harris, M.C.
Major Abdul Aziz Khan	„ J. A. Head
„ N. M. Anderson	„ A. J. L. Hughes
„ J. F. Batten, M.C.	„ E. S. Morley
„ Y. R. Bhosle	„ Pandurang Rao Darekar
„ T. H. Boss, M.C.	„ Ram Singh
„ J. Gahan	„ K. M. Saeed
„ E. W. Goodman, M.C.	„ T. H. L. Stebbing, M.C., M.A.
„ Hamirji Jassaji	„ A. V. Vokins
„ R. M. H. Lewis, M.C.	Lieut. J. K. Bhonsle
„ D. A. L. Mackenzie	„ A. E. B. Brown
„ Manaji Rao Ghadge	„ B. Chatterjee
„ Walaqadar Mumtaz Ali Khan, Bahadur.	„ A. E. Cocksedge
	„ H. G. Croly

Major H. D. H. Y. Nepean, D.S.O.

„ A. R. Nye, M.C.

„ E. G. W. Pearse

„ Ramchandra Rao Shinde

„ Sadanand Rao Rangnekar,  
Bahadur.

Lieut. C. A. M. Cumberlege

„ R. B. S. Eraut

„ Ganga Singh

„ Gurbachan Singh

„ D. St. J. Hoysted

Lieut. R. H. Keenlyside

„ R. J. B. Kelly

„ S. Khalid Jan

„ R. D. Low

„ G. A. MacMunn

„ R. N. Nehra

„ P. H. D. Panton

„ H. A. H. Radcliffe-Smith

„ G. D. Renny

„ R. Richards

„ G. P. V. Sanders

„ S. Shah Husain Rizvi

„ A. Tyrer

„ J. F. Worsley

2/Lieut. Amar Datt.

„ D. Atama Ram

„ K. Bag Singh

„ Bakhtiar Rana

„ Balbir Singh

„ Bhola Nath Dubey

„ G. Dastgir Khan

„ M. G. Dewan

„ J. S. Dhillon

„ Dilbagh Rai Datta

„ Dina Nath

„ Chaudhri Fateh Khan

„ Gurkirpal Singh

„ S. M. Hussain

„ M. G. Jilani

2/Lieut. P. M. W. Doyle

„ F. A. Giles

„ Harbakhsh Singh

„ H. W. Holt

„ A. C. Iyappa

„ J. D. Moffatt

„ Moti Sagar

„ P. Parry-Evans

„ H. D. Parsons-Smith

„ D. L. Powell-Jones

„ G. M. Sayeed

„ Syed Abu Nasar

„ R. Steward

„ J. G. Wilder

„ Abid Ali Akbar Khan

„ Ajit Singh Butalia

„ S. Khushnud Ahmad

„ G. K. Mehta

„ K. S. Moghe

„ Mohamed Mirza

„ Mohammad Said

„ M. Muzaffar Khan

„ A. S. Pathania

„ Prabhu Singh

„ Rahim Ullah

„ M. Sarfaraz Hussain

„ Sawal Khan

„ Shahnawaz Khan

„ Sukhdev Singh

„ Taj Mohammad Khanzada

„ D. N. Thakar

„ P. S. Thapa

M. S. Netto, Esq., B.A.

*Corrigenda.*

In the list of new members published in the January 1936 number of the Journal, for "Lieut. R. G. Langran," read "Lieut. R. G. Langan."

**II.—The Journal**

The Institution publishes a Quarterly Journal in the months of January, April, July and October, which is issued postage-free to members in any part of the world. Non-members may obtain the Journal at Rs. 2, annas 8 per copy, or Rs. 10 per annum. Advertisement rates may be obtained on application to the Secretary.

**III.—Contributions to the Journal**

Articles may vary in length from two thousand to ten thousand words. They should be submitted in duplicate and typewritten on one side of the paper. Manuscript articles cannot be considered. Payment is made on publication at from Rs. 40 to Rs. 100 in accordance with the value and length of the contribution.

With reference to Regulations for the Army in India, paragraph 204, and King's Regulations, paragraph 522, action to obtain the sanction of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to the publication of any article in the Journal of the United Service Institution of India will be taken by the Executive Committee of the Institution.

The Committee reserve to themselves the right to omit any matter which they consider objectionable.

Articles are only accepted on these conditions.

**IV.—Reading Room and Library**

The United Service Institution of India is situated in the Mall, Simla, and is open all the year round—including Sundays—from 9 a.m. until sunset. The Reading Room of the Institution is provided with most of the leading illustrated papers, newspapers, magazines and journals of military, naval and service interest.

There is a well-stocked library in the Institution from which members can obtain books on loan free in accordance with the following rules :—

(1) The Library is only open to members and honorary members, who are requested to look upon books as not transferable to their friends.

(2) No book shall be taken from the Library without making the necessary entry in the register. Members residing permanently or temporarily in Simla are requested to enter their addresses.

(3) A member shall not be allowed, at one time, more than three books or sets of books.

(4) No particular limit is set as to the number of days for which a member may keep a book, the Council being desirous of making the Library as useful as possible to members ; but if after the expiration of a fortnight from date of issue it is required by any other member, it will be re-called.

(5) Applications for books from members at out-stations are dealt with as early as possible and books are despatched post free per Registered Parcel Post. They must be returned carefully packed per Registered Parcel Post within one month of the date of issue.

(6) If a book is not returned at the end of one month, it must be paid for if so required by the Executive Committee. Lost and defaced books shall be replaced at the cost of the member to whom they were issued. In the case of lost books which are out of print, the value shall be fixed by the Executive Committee and the amount, when received, spent in the purchase of a new book.

(7) The issue of a book under these rules to any member implies the latter's compliance with the rules and the willingness to have them enforced, if necessary, against him.

(8) The catalogue of the Library has been revised and is now available for sale at Rs. 2/8/- per copy plus postage. The Library has been completely overhauled and all books re-classified, hence the new catalogue meets the general demand for an up-to-date production containing all military classics and other works likely to be of use to members of the Institution. Members who have not yet ordered their copies are advised to send a post card to the Librarian of the Institution, Simla.

#### V.—Library Books

A list of the books received during the preceding quarter is enclosed in loose leaf form suitable for cutting into strips for pasting in the library catalogue.

The Institution is in possession of a collection of old and rare books presented by members from time to time and, while such books are not available for circulation, they can be seen by members visiting Simla.

The Secretary will be glad to acknowledge the gift of old books, trophies, medals, etc., presented to the Institution.

#### VI.—Promotion Examinations

(a) *Military History*—(reference I. A. O. 257 of 1935).

The following table shows the campaigns on which military history papers will be set for Lieutenants for promotion to Captain in sub-head *b* (iii), and for Captains for promotion to Major in sub-head *d* (iii), with a list of books recommended for the study of each :—

1 Serial No.	2 Date of Examina- tion.	3 Campaign set for first time.	4 Campaign set for second time.	5 Campaign set for last time.
1	October 1936.	..	Mesopotamia, from October 1915 to the occupation of Bagdad, 11th March 1917.	Gallipoli—inception of the campaign to May 1915.
2	March 1937.	The Russo-Japanese War, previous to the Battle of Liao- Yang until the 24th August 1904 (ex- cluding the actual siege operations at Port Arthur).	..	Mesopotamia, from October 1915 to the occupation of Bagdad, 11th March 1917.
3	October 1937.	Mesopotamia, from 12th March 1917 to the Armistice.	The Russo-Japanese War, previous to the Battle of Liao- Yang until the 24th August 1904 (ex- cluding the actual siege operations at Port Arthur).	..
4	March 1938.	..	Mesopotamia, from 12th March 1917 to the Armistice.	The Russo-Japanese War, previous to the Battle of Liao- Yang until the 24th August 1904 (ex- cluding the actual siege operations at Port Arthur).
5	October 1938.	..	..	Mesopotamia, from 12th March 1917 to the Armistice.

The following books are recommended for the study of the campaigns :—

Campaign.	Book.
Gallipoli .. ..	.. History of the Great War—Military Operations—Gallipoli, Vol. I.
Mesopotamia— March 1936 to March 1937.	.. History of the Great War—Military Operations—Mesopotamia, Vols. II and III (less Chapters XXXIV <i>et seq.</i> ).
October 1937 to October 1938.	.. History of the Great War—Military Operations—Mesopotamia, Vols. III (Chapters XXXIV <i>et seq.</i> ) and IV.
All ..	.. A brief Outline of the Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914—1918—Major R. Evans, M. C. ( <i>Sifton Praed</i> ).
The Russo-Japanese War	.. Official History of the Russo-Japanese War, Parts I (second edition), and II ( <i>British—Military</i> ). Official History of the Russo-Japanese War (Naval and Military). Vol. I, Chapters 1—17 (less 4, 7, 9 and 10).

The campaigns set for Majors, R.A.M.C. and R.A.V.C., up to and including 1935 are published in I.A.O's. 651 of 1933 and 25 of 1934.

(b) *Other Subjects.*

In addition to the manuals and regulations mentioned in K. R. and R.A.I., the following books are recommended :—

“ Modern Military Administration, Organization and Transportation ”  
(Harding-Newman).

“ Military Organization and Administration,” 1932 (Lindsell).

“ A. & Q. or Military Administration in War ” (Lindsell).

“ A Study of Unit Administration ” (Gale and Polden).

“ Military Law,” 1932 (Banning).

“ The Defence of Duffers' Drift,” 1929 (Swinton).

“ Tactical Schemes with Solutions, Series I and II ” (Kirby and Kennedy).

“ Elementary Tactics or the Art of War, British School,” Vol. I  
(Pakenham Walsh).

“ Imperial Military Geography ” (Cole).

“ Elements of Imperial Defence ” (Boycott).

“ Changing Conditions of Imperial Defence ” (Cole).

“ A Practical Digest of Military Law ” (Townshend-Stephens. Pub.  
Sifton Praed).

**VII.—Staff College Examination.**—(See Staff College (Quetta) Regulations, 1930, obtainable from the Manager of Publications, Delhi or Calcutta).

*(a) Campaigns.*

The following campaigns have been set for the Staff College Entrance Examination :—

Strategy of—

Napoleon's Campaign of 1796 in Italy.

Waterloo Campaign.

Peninsula Campaign, up to and including the Battle of Salamanca.

The Strategy and Broad Tactical Lessons of—

The American Civil War.

Russo-Japanese War, up to and including the Battle of Liao-Yang.

The Great War in France, Belgium, Mesopotamia, the Dardanelles and Palestine, including a knowledge of the influence on the strategy in these areas of the events in other theatres of the War.

The East Prussian Campaign, 1914.

The Strategy and tactics of—

The Palestine Campaign from 9th November 1917 to the end of the War.

The Action of the British Expeditionary Force in France and Belgium up to and including the first battle of Ypres.

The 3rd Afghan War, 1919.

*(b)* In addition to his official books every student is recommended to provide himself with a copy of :—

*(i)* Military Organization and Administration (Lindsell).

Military Law (Banning).

British Strategy (Maurice).

Notes on the Land and Air Forces of British Overseas Dominions, Colonies and Protectorates (Official).

Outline of the Development of the British Army up to 1914 (Hastings-Anderson).

Imperial Military Geography (Cole).

An Atlas.

*(ii)* The following pamphlets, etc., can be borrowed from the Orderly Room, and should be studied :—

Examination papers for admission to the Staff College.

Training memoranda—War Office.

Training memoranda—A. H. Q. India.

Notes on certain Lessons of the Great War.

Passing it on (Skeen).

(iii) Periodicals, etc., to which students should subscribe.—

“The Times.”

“U. S. I. (India) Journal.”

(iv) Books which can be obtained from libraries.—

(*Note*.—Those marked with an asterisk should be used only as books of reference.)

R. U. S. I. Journal.

Army Quarterly.

Round Table.

Journal of the Institute of International Affairs.

Science of War (Henderson).

Transformation of War (Colin).

The War of Lost Opportunities (Hoffman).

\*The Principles of War (Foch).

\*The Direction of War (Bird).

Soldiers and Statesman (Robertson).

\*Historical illustrations to F. S. R. II (Eady).

\*In the Wake of the Tank (Martel).

\*The re-making of modern armies (Liddell Hart).

\*The British Way in Warfare (Liddell Hart).

\*Napoleon's Campaign in 1796 in Italy (Burton).

\*Waterloo Campaign (Robinson).

\*Outline History of Russo-Japanese War 1904, up to Battle of Liao-Yang (Pakenham Walsh).

The Battle of Liao-Yang (Robinson).

\*The World Crisis (Churchill).

\*A History of the Great War (Cruttwell).

The Palestine Campaign (Wavell).

A Brief Outline of the Campaign in Mesopotamia (Evans).

\*The Dardanelles Campaign (Callwell).

\*German Strategy in the Great War (Neame).

\*Official Histories of the War—France, Egypt, Palestine, Mesopotamia, Gallipoli.

\*Waziristan 1919-20 (Watteville).

\*The Third Afghan War (Official).

A. & Q. (Lindsell).

Changing conditions of Imperial Defence (Cole).

The British Empire (Lucas).

\*The Government of the British Empire (Jenks).

\*The Foundation and Growth of the British Empire (Williamson).

\*A Short History of British Expansion (Williamson).

\*Expansion of the British Empire (Woodward).

(v) Books and articles on Transportation.—

Railways in War. Lieutenant-Colonel E. St. G. Kirke, D.S.O., R.E., Army Quarterly, January 1930.

Strategic moves by Rail 1914. Journal R. U. S. I., February and May 1935.

The lines of communication in the Dardanelles. Lieutenant-General Sir G. Macmunn. Army Quarterly, April 1930.

The lines of communication in Mesopotamia. Lieutenant-General Sir G. Macmunn. Army Quarterly, October 1927.

History of the R.A. S. C., Vol. II (all campaigns).

The supply and transportation problem of future armies. Major B. C. Dening, M.C., R.E., Journal U. S. I. India, April 1932.

The supply of mechanized forces in the field. Journal R. U. S. I., 1929.

The Board of Trade and the Fighting Services. Journal R. U. S. I., 1929.

Railway organization of an Army in War. Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson, D.S.O., R.E., Journal R. U. S. I., 1927.

What is required of a Railway in a theatre of operations. Major-General Taylor, R. E. Journal, September 1932.

F. S. P. B. War Office, 1932. Read Sections 36 to 38. Do not memorize detail. Know where to find it.

F. S. P. B. India.

**VIII.—Schemes, etc.**

The following tactical schemes, complete with solutions and maps, and precis of lectures set for the A. H. Q. Staff College Course, 1935, are available for issue to members of the Institution at the nominal price of annas eight per copy, plus postage. The cost of maps is extra and is charged for at Rs. 2/- per map.

STAFF COLLEGE SERIES, 1935.

**Tactical Schemes**

*Continuous Exercises.*

- No. 1. Message Writing.
- „ 2. Divisional Cavalry.
- „ 3. March Orders.
- „ 4. Military Appreciation.
- „ 5. Attack Orders.
- „ 6. Defence Orders.
- „ 7. Withdrawal.
- „ 8. Employment of (A. C.) Squadron R. A. F.

(Note.—The map required for all the above Exercises is Sheet No. 112, 1" to 1 mile.)

*Strategy, Tactics and other papers.*

- (a) Strategy and Tactics, Paper No. 1 (Ref. Map 1" Sheet 123).
- „ „ „ „ No. 2 (Ref. Map 1" Sheet 93).
- „ „ „ „ No. 3 (Ref. Map Sheet 44/16 S.E.)
- „ „ „ „ No. 4 (The maps required for this paper on Frontier Warfare Scheme are not available; they may be obtained on application to O. I/C Map Record and Issue Office, Calcutta).
- „ „ „ „ No. 5.
- (b) D. M. T.'s Paper No. 1.
- „ „ „ 2.
- „ „ „ 3.
- „ „ „ 4. (Without solution).
- „ „ „ 5.
- „ „ „ 6.
- „ „ „ 7.
- „ „ „ 8.
- „ „ „ 9.
- „ „ „ 10.

- (c) Map Reading Paper. (Ref. Map 1" Sheet 112).

Military Law Paper No. I.

II.

Transportation, Peace and War (Without solution).

Organization and Administration excluding Transportation (Peace).

Organization and Administration excluding Transportation (War).

**Precis of lectures**

- (i) Staff College Examination.
- (ii) Operation Orders and Instructions.
- (iii) Military Writing.
- (iv) Cavalry.
- (v) Artillery No. 1.
- (va) „ „ 2.
- (vb) „ „ 3.
- (vi) Engineers.
- (vii) Signals No. 1.
- (viii) „ „ 2.
- (viii) A. F. Vs.—Characteristics and Organization.
- (viiiia) A. F. Vs.—Tactical Employment.
- (ix) Army and R. A. F. Co-operation.
- (x) River Crossing.
- (xi) Night Operations.
- (xii) Frontier Warfare.
- (xiii) Strategy and Tactics. Surprise.
- (xiiiia) Strategy and Tactics. Morale.
- (xiiib) Strategy and Tactics. Political Objects in War.
- (xiiic) Strategy and Tactics. Interior Lines and Communications.
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8. When the work of the year has either not been of sufficient value or has been received too late for consideration before the Council Meeting, the medal may be awarded for any reconnaissance during previous years considered by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to deserve it.

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\*N.B.—The terms "officer" and "soldier" include those serving in the British and Indian armies and their reserves, also those serving in Auxiliary Forces, such as the Indian Auxiliary and Territorial Forces and Corps under Local Governments, Frontier Militia, Levies and Military Police, also all ranks serving in the Royal Air Force, Indian Air Force, Royal Indian Marine and the Indian States Forces.

†Replacements of the ribbon may be obtained on payment from the Secretary, U.S.I., Simla.

## GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION, 1936

The Council has chosen the following subject for the Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition for 1936 :—


**“Certain conflicting requirements may be observed between the organization of the Army at Home and in India, owing to differences in the tasks of these forces. Keeping in mind the importance of the principle of standardization of training and organization in the Imperial forces, discuss the problems involved.”**

The following are the conditions of the competition :—

- (1) The competition is open to all gazetted officers of the Civil Administration, the Royal Navy, Army, Royal Air Force, Auxiliary Forces and Indian State Forces.
- (2) Essays must be typewritten and submitted in triplicate.
- (3) When reference is made to any work, the title of such work is to be quoted.
- (4) Essays are to be strictly anonymous. Each must have a motto, and, enclosed with the essay, there should be sent a sealed envelope with the motto written on the outside and the name of the competitor inside.
- (5) Essays will not be accepted unless received by the Secretary on or before the 30th June 1936.
- (6) Essays will be submitted for adjudication to three judges, chosen by the Council. The judges may recommend a money award, not exceeding Rs. 150, either in addition to, or in substitution for the medal. The decision of the three judges will be submitted to the Council, who will decide whether the medal is to be awarded and whether the essay is to be published.
- (7) The name of the successful candidate will be announced at a Council Meeting to be held in September or October 1936,

- (8) All essays submitted are to become the property of the United Service Institution of India absolutely, and authors will not be at liberty to make any use whatsoever of their essays without the sanction of the Council.
- (9) Essays should not exceed 15 pages of the size and style of the Journal, exclusive of any appendices, tables or maps.

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Britannia	.. „ 21	Britannia	.. „ 15
Elysia	.. June 25	Tuscania	.. „ 29
Britannia	.. August 1	California	.. Nov. 12
Castalia	.. Sept. 9	Castalia	.. Dec. 19

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# United Service Institution of India

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JULY, 1936

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**I.—New Members**

The following new members joined the Institution from 1st March to 31st May 1936—

**ORDINARY MEMBERS**

Major-General N. C. Bannatyne, C.B., C.I.E.

Brigadier V. H. B. Majendie, D.S.O.

Lieut.-Colonel T. C. Greenwood.

Squadron-Leader A. L. A. Perry-Keene.

Captain Hiranand Dubey.

Captain K. D. Outram.

Lieut. B. M. Archibald.

„ E. H. Baume.

„ K. A. P. Fergusson.

„ P. H. Kyadoe.

„ M. H. Whyte.

Second Lieut. M. H. C. France.

**II.—The Journal**

The Institution publishes a Quarterly Journal in the months of January, April, July and October, which is issued postage-free to members in any part of the world. Non-members may obtain the Journal at Rs. 2, annas 8 per copy, or Rs. 10 per annum. Advertisement rates may be obtained on application to the Secretary.

**III.—Contributions to the Journal**

Articles may vary in length from two thousand to ten thousand words. They should be submitted in duplicate and typewritten on one side of the paper. Manuscript articles cannot be considered. Payment is made on publication at from Rs. 40 to Rs. 100 in accordance with the value and length of the contribution.

With reference to Regulations for the Army in India, paragraph 204, and King's Regulations, paragraph 535, action to obtain the sanction of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to the publication of any article in the Journal of the United Service Institution of India will be taken by the Executive Committee of the Institution.

The Committee reserve to themselves the right to omit any matter which they consider objectionable.

Articles are only accepted on these conditions.

**IV.—Reading Room and Library**

The United Service Institution of India is situated in the Mall, Simla, and is open all the year round—including Sundays—from 9 a.m. until sunset. The Reading Room of the Institution is provided with most of the leading illustrated papers, newspapers, magazines and journals of military, naval and service interest.

There is a well-stocked library in the Institution from which members can obtain books on loan free in accordance with the following rules:—

(1) The Library is only open to members and honorary members, who are requested to look upon books as not transferable to their friends.

(2) No book shall be taken from the Library without making the necessary entry in the register. Members residing permanently or temporarily in Simla are requested to enter their addresses.

(3) A member shall not be allowed, at one time, more than three books or sets of books.

(4) No particular limit is set as to the number of days for which a member may keep a book, the Council being desirous of making the Library as useful as possible to members; but if after the expiration of a fortnight from date of issue it is required by any other member, it will be re-called.

(5) Applications for books from members at out-stations are dealt with as early as possible and books are despatched post free per Registered Parcel Post. They must be returned carefully packed per Registered Parcel Post within one month of the date of issue.

(6) If a book is not returned at the end of one month, it must be paid for if so required by the Executive Committee. Lost and defaced books shall be replaced at the cost of the member to whom they were issued. In the case of lost books which are out of print, the value shall be fixed by the Executive Committee and the amount, when received, spent in the purchase of a new book.

(7) The issue of a book under these rules to any member implies the latter's compliance with the rules and the willingness to have them enforced, if necessary, against him.

(8) The catalogue of the Library has been revised and is now available for sale at Rs. 2/8/- per copy plus postage. The Library has been completely overhauled and all books re-classified, hence the new catalogue meets the general demand for an up-to-date production containing all military classics and other works likely to be of use to members of the Institution. Members who have not yet ordered their copies are advised to send a post card to the Librarian of the Institution, Simla.

#### V.—Library Books

A list of the books received during the preceding quarter is enclosed in loose leaf form suitable for cutting into strips for pasting in the library catalogue.

The Institution is in possession of a collection of old and rare books presented by members from time to time and, while such books are not available for circulation, they can be seen by members visiting Simla.

The Secretary will be glad to acknowledge the gift of old books, trophies, medals, etc., presented to the Institution.

#### VI.—Promotion Examinations

(a) *Military History*—(reference I. A. O. 257 of 1935).

The following table shows the campaigns on which military history papers will be set for Lieutenants for promotion to Captain in sub-head *b* (iii), and for Captains for promotion to Major in sub-head *d* (iii), with a list of books recommended for the study of each:—

1 Serial No.	2 Date of Examina- tion.	3 Campaign set for first time.	4 Campaign set for second time.	5 Campaign set for last time.
1	October 1936.	..	Mesopotamia, from October 1915 to the occupation of Bagdad, 11th March 1917.	Gallipoli—inception of the campaign to May 1915.
2	March 1937.	The Russo-Japanese War, previous to the Battle of Liao- Yang until the 24th August 1904 (ex- cluding the actual siege operations at Port Arthur).	..	Mesopotamia, from October 1915 to the occupation of Bagdad, 11th March 1917.
3	October 1937.	Mesopotamia, from 12th March 1917 to the Armistice.	The Russo-Japanese War, previous to the Battle of Liao- Yang until the 24th August 1904 (ex- cluding the actual siege operations at Port Arthur).	..
4	March 1938.	..	Mesopotamia, from 12th March 1917 to the Armistice.	The Russo-Japanese War, previous to the Battle of Liao- Yang until the 24th August 1904 (ex- cluding the actual siege operations at Port Arthur).
5	October 1938.	..		Mesopotamia, from 12th March 1917 to the Armistice.

The following books are recommended for the study of the campaigns :—

Campaign.	Book.
Gallipoli .. ..	.. History of the Great War—Military Operations—Gallipoli, Vol. I.
Mesopotamia— March 1936 to March 1937.	.. History of the Great War—Military Operations—Mesopotamia, Vols. II and III (less Chapters XXXIV <i>et seq.</i> ).
October 1937 to October 1938.	.. History of the Great War—Military Operations—Mesopotamia, Vols. III (Chapters XXXIV <i>et seq.</i> ) and IV.
All ..	.. A Brief Outline of the Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914—1918—Major R. Evans, M.C. ( <i>Sifton Praed</i> ).
The Russo-Japanese War	.. Official History of the Russo-Japanese War, Parts I (second edition), and II ( <i>British—Military</i> ), or Official History of the Russo-Japanese War (Naval and Military). Vol. I, Chapters 1—17 (less 4, 7, 9 and 10).

The campaigns set for Majors, R.A.M.C. and R.A.V.C., up to and including 1937 are published in I.A.O.'s 72 of 1935 and 49 of 1936.

(b) Other Subjects.

In addition to the manuals and regulations mentioned in K. R. and R.A.I., the following books are recommended :—

“Modern Military Administration, Organization and Transportation” (Harding-Newman).

“Military Organization and Administration,” 1932 (Lindsell).

“A. & Q. or Military Administration in War” (Lindsell).

“A Study of Unit Administration” (Gale and Polden).

“Military Law,” 1932 (Banning).

“The Defence of Duffers’ Drift,” 1929 (Swinton).

“Tactical Schemes with Solutions, Series I and II” (Kirby and Kennedy).

“Elementary Tactics or the Art of War, British School,” Vol. I (Pakenham Walsh).

“Imperial Military Geography” (Cole).

“Elements of Imperial Defence” (Boycott).

“Changing Conditions of Imperial Defence” (Cole).

“A Practical Digest of Military Law” (Townshend-Stephens. Pub. Sifton Praed).

**VII.—Staff College Examination.**—[See Staff College (Quetta) Regulations, 1930, obtainable from the Manager of Publications, Delhi or Calcutta].

*(a) Campaigns.*

The following campaigns have been set for the Staff College Entrance Examination :—

Strategy of—

Napoleon's Campaign of 1796 in Italy.

Waterloo Campaign.

Peninsula Campaign, up to and including the Battle of Salamanca.

The Strategy and Broad Tactical Lessons of—

The American Civil War.

Russo-Japanese War, up to and including the Battle of Liao-Yang.

The Great War in France, Belgium, Mesopotamia, the Dardanelles and Palestine, including a knowledge of the influence on the strategy in these areas of the events in other theatres of the War.

The East Prussian Campaign, 1914.

The Strategy and tactics of—

The Palestine Campaign from 9th November 1917 to the end of the War.

The Action of the British Expeditionary Force in France and Belgium up to and including the first battle of Ypres.

The 3rd Afghan War, 1919.

*(b)* In addition to his official books every student is recommended to provide himself with a copy of—

*(i)* Military Organization and Administration (Lindsell).

Military Law (Banning).

British Strategy (Maurice).

Notes on the Land and Air Forces of British Overseas Dominions, Colonies and Protectorates (Official).

Outline of the Development of the British Army up to 1914 (Hastings & Anderson).

Imperial Military Geography (Cole).

An Atlas.

*(ii)* The following pamphlets, etc., can be borrowed from the Orderly Room, and should be studied :—

Examination papers for admission to the Staff College.

Training Memoranda—War Office.

Training Memoranda—A. H. Q. India.

Notes on certain Lessons of the Great War.

Passing it On (Skeen).

(iii) Periodicals, etc., to which students should subscribe—

“The Times.”

“U. S. I. (India) Journal.”

(iv) Books which can be obtained from libraries—

(*Note.*—Those marked with an asterisk should be used only as books of reference.)

R. U. S. I. Journal.

Army Quarterly.

Round Table.

Journal of the Institute of International Affairs.

Science of War (Henderson).

Transformation of War (Colin).

The War of Lost Opportunities (Hoffman).

\*The Principles of War (Foch).

\*The Direction of War (Bird).

Soldiers and Statesmen (Robertson).

\*Historical Illustrations to F. S. R. II (Eady).

\*In the Wake of the Tank (Martel).

\*The Re-making of Modern Armies (Liddell Hart).

\*The British Way in Warfare (Liddell Hart).

\*Napoleon's Campaign in 1796 in Italy (Burton).

\*Waterloo Campaign (Robinson).

\*Outline History of Russo-Japanese War 1904, up to Battle of Liao-Yang (Pakenham Walsh).

The Campaign of Liao-Yang (Rowan Robinson).

\*The World Crisis (Churchill).

\*A History of the Great War (Cruttwell).

The Palestine Campaign (Wavell).

A Brief Outline of the Campaign in Mesopotamia (Evans).

\*The Dardanelles Campaign (Callwell).

\*German Strategy in the Great War (Neame).

\*Official Histories of the War—France, Egypt, Palestine, Mesopotamia, Gallipoli.

\*Waziristan 1919-20 (Watteville).

\*The Third Afghan War (Official).

A. & Q. (Lindsell).

Changing conditions of Imperial Defence (Cole).

The British Empire (Lucas).

\*The Government of the British Empire (Jenks).

\*The Foundation and Growth of the British Empire (Williamson).

\*A Short History of British Expansion (Williamson).

\*Expansion of the British Empire (Woodward).

(v) Books and Articles on Transportation.—

Railways in War. Lieutenant-Colonel E. St. G. Kirke, D.S.O., R.E., Army Quarterly, January 1930.

Strategic Moves by Rail, 1914. Journal R. U. S. I., February and May 1935.

The Lines of Communication in the Dardanelles. Lieutenant-General Sir G. Macmunn. Army Quarterly, April 1930.

The Lines of Communication in Mesopotamia. Lieutenant-General Sir G. Macmunn. Army Quarterly, October 1927.

History of the R. A. S. C., Vol. II (all campaigns).

The Supply and Transportation Problem of Future Armies. Major B. C. Denning, M.C., R.E., Journal U. S. I. India, April 1932.

The Supply of Mechanized Forces in the Field. Journal R. U. S. I., 1929.

The Board of Trade and the Fighting Services. Journal R. U. S. I., 1929.

Railway Organization of an Army in War. Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson, D.S.O., R.E., Journal R. U. S. I., 1927.

What is required of a Railway in a theatre of Operations. Major-General Taylor, R.E., Journal, September 1932.

F. S. P. B. War Office, 1932. Read Sections 36 to 38. Do not memorize detail. Know where to find it.

F. S. P. B. India.

**VIII.—Schemes, etc.**

The following tactical schemes, complete with solutions and maps, and precis of lectures set for the A. H. Q. Staff College Course, 1935, are available for issue to members of the Institution at the nominal price of annas eight per copy, plus postage. The cost of maps is extra and is charged for at Rs. 2/- per map.

STAFF COLLEGE SERIES, 1935.

**Tactical Schemes**

*Continuous Exercises.*

- No. 1. Message Writing.
- „ 2. Divisional Cavalry.
- „ 3. March Orders.
- „ 4. Military Appreciation.
- „ 5. Attack Orders.
- „ 6. Defence Orders.
- „ 7. Withdrawal.
- „ 8. Employment of (A. C.) Squadron, R. A. F.

(Note.—The map required for all the above Exercises is Sheet No. 112, 1" to 1 mile.)

*Strategy, Tactics and other Papers.*

- (a) Strategy and Tactics, Paper No. 1 (Ref. Map 1" Sheet 123).
- „ „ „ „ No. 2 (Ref. Map 1" Sheet 93).
- „ „ „ „ No. 3 (Ref. Map Sheet 44/16 S.E.)
- „ „ „ „ No. 4 (The maps required for this paper on Frontier Warfare Scheme are not available; they may be obtained on application to O. I/C Map Record and Issue Office, Calcutta).
- „ „ „ „ No. 5.
- (b) D. M. T.'s Paper No. 1.
- „ „ „ „ 2.
- „ „ „ „ 3.
- „ „ „ „ 4 (without solution).
- „ „ „ „ 5.
- „ „ „ „ 6.
- „ „ „ „ 7.
- „ „ „ „ 8.
- „ „ „ „ 9.
- „ „ „ „ 10.
- (c) Map Reading Paper. (Ref. Map 1" Sheet 112.)
- Military Law Paper No. I.
- „ „ „ „ II.
- Transportation, Peace and War (without solution).
- Organization and Administration excluding Transportation (Peace).
- Organization and Administration excluding Transportation (War).

**Precis of lectures**

- (i) Staff College Examination.
- (ii) Operation Orders and Instructions.
- (iii) Military Writing.
- (iv) Cavalry.
- (v) Artillery No. 1.
- (va) „ „ 2.
- (vb) „ „ 3.
- (vi) Engineers.
- (vii) Signals No. 1.
- (viii) „ „ 2.
- (viii) A. F. Vs.—Characteristics and Organization.
- (viii) A. F. Vs.—Tactical Employment.
- (ix) Army and R. A. F. Co-operation.
- (x) River Crossing.
- (xi) Night Operations.
- (xii) Frontier Warfare.
- (xiii) Strategy and Tactics. Surprise.
- (xiii) Strategy and Tactics. Morale.
- (xiii) Strategy and Tactics. Political Objects in War.
- (xiii) Strategy and Tactics. Interior Lines and Communications.
- (xiii) Strategy and Tactics. Fog in War.
- (xiii) Strategy and Tactics. Gallipoli.
- (xiv) Military Law. Charges and Charge Sheets.
- (xiv) Military Law. Evidence.
- (xiv) Military Law. Court Martial Proceedings.
- (xv) Transportation. Nos. 1 and 2.
- (xvi) “ Q ” and “ O ” Services in Peace including Mobilization.
- (xvii) Organization and Administration other than “ Q ” and “ O ” Services.
- (xviii) Maintenance of Material and Animals.
- (xix) Medical Organization and Evacuation of Casualties.

**IX.—Historical Research**

The U. S. I. is prepared to supply members and units with typewritten copies of old Indian Army List pages, at the rate of Rs. 2 per typewritten page.

The staff of the Institution is always willing to assist units, authors of regimental histories and members by searching the many old military records in the Library on their behalf.

**X.—The MacGregor Memorial Medal**

1. The MacGregor Memorial Medal was founded in 1888 as a memorial to the late Major-General Sir Charles MacGregor. The medals are awarded for the best military reconnaissances or journeys of exploration of the year.

2. The following awards are made annually in the month of June :—

(a) For officers—British or Indian—silver medal.

(b) For soldiers—British or Indian—silver medal with Rs. 100 gratuity.

3. For especially valuable work, a gold medal may be awarded in place of one of the silver medals, or in addition to the silver medals, whenever the administrators of the Fund deem it desirable. Also the Council may award a special additional silver medal, without gratuity, to a soldier, for especially good work.

4. The award of medals is made by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, as Vice-Patron, and the Council of the United Service Institution, who were appointed administrators of the Fund by the MacGregor Memorial Committee.

5. Only officers and soldiers belonging to the Army in India (including those in civil employ) are eligible for the award of the medal.\*

6. The medal may be worn in uniform by Indian soldiers on ceremonial parades, suspended round the neck by the ribbon issued with the medal.†

7. Personal risk to life during the reconnaissance or exploration is not a necessary qualification for the award of the medal ; but, in the event of two journeys being of equal value, the man who has run the greater risk will be considered to have the greater claim to the reward.


8. When the work of the year has either not been of sufficient value or has been received too late for consideration before the Council Meeting, the medal may be awarded for any reconnaissance during previous years considered by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to deserve it.

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\*N.B.—The terms " officer " and " soldier " include those serving in the British and Indian armies and their reserves, also those serving in Auxiliary Forces, such as the Indian Auxiliary and Territorial Forces and Corps under Local Governments, Frontier Militia, Levies and Military Police, also all ranks serving in the Royal Air Force, Indian Air Force, Royal Indian Navy and the Indian States Forces.

†Replacements of the ribbon may be obtained on payment from the Secretary, U.S.I., Simla.

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**1937**

Britannia	..	Jan. 5	Elysia	..	July 14
Castalia	..	Feb. 27	Britannia	..	July 31
Britannia	..	Mar. 11	Castalia	..	Sept. 24
<b>Tuscania</b>	..	<b>Mar. 25</b>	Elysia	..	Oct. 16
Elysia	..	Mar. 31	Britannia	..	Oct. 21
<b>California</b>	..	<b>Apl. 8</b>	<b>California</b>	..	<b>Oct. 28</b>
Britannia	..	May 20	<b>Tuscania</b>	..	<b>Nov. 11</b>
Castalia	..	June 12			

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# United Service Institution of India

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OCTOBER, 1936

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**I. New Members**

The following new members joined the Institution from 1st June to 31st August 1936:—

**LIFE MEMBERS.**

2nd./Lieutenant	Altaf Hussain.
"	Burhan-ud-Din.
"	K. S. Katoch.
"	Man Mohan Khanna.
"	Raj Bir Chopra.
"	Sarjit Singh Kalha.
"	N. B. Tandan.
"	Vijai Bahadur Singh Karki.
"	Waheed Haidar.

**ORDINARY MEMBERS.**

	His Excellency Lord Erskine, G.C.I.E.
	His Excellency Sir John Hubback, K.C.S.I.
	E. Conran-Smith, Esq., C.I.E., I.C.S.
	N. G. Pring, Esq.
	M. Slade, Esq., I.C.S.
	Lieut.-General Sir Walter W. Pitt-Taylor, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
"	Sir Ivo L. B. Vesey, K.C.B., K.B.E., C.M.G., D.S.O.
	Major-General H. S. Gaskell, D.S.O.
	Colonel Jaideo Singh, Bahadur.
"	C. G. Lewis, O.B.E.
"	H. E. Roome, M. C.
	Lieut.-Colonel F. C. Chaytor, O.B.E., M.C.
Major	S. W. Anketell-Jones, M. C.
"	T. F. Borwick, D.S.O.
"	R. de B. Devereaux.
"	E. V. Hansford.
"	W. G. H. Wells.
Captain	J. F. R. Forman.
"	H. R. E. C. Fraser.
"	R. M. Hall.
"	R. G. P. Kilkelly.
"	A. G. Mackenzie-Kennedy.
"	R. J. Napier.
"	D. W. G. Ray.
"	G. W. Richards, M.C.
"	W. H. Skrine.
"	V. E. O. Stevenson-Hamilton

Lieutenant	K. L. Atal.
"	Kanwar Bahadur Singh.
"	C. E. P. Chauvel.
"	J. B. Churcher.
"	H. E. M. Cotton.
"	J. S. Douglas.
"	G. K. Gowers.
"	S. G. Humphrys.
"	T. P. Keene.
"	J. A. MacRae.
"	K. F. Marks.
"	J. E. T. Pim.
"	C. R. Price.
"	L. S. Spearman.
"	W. H. C. Travers.
2nd./Lieutenant	Ajit Singh Sodhi.
"	G. R. G. Bickley.
"	Altaf Qadir.
"	Balwant Singh.
"	J. R. deSouza.
"	Dhonkal Singh.
"	Kanwar Gajinder Singh.
"	Raja Ghulam Mohammad Khan.
"	Habibullah Khan Baber.
"	Habibur Rahman Khan.
"	Malik Haq Nawaz.
"	K. N. Kaul.
"	K. O. Law.
"	A. W. Litchfield.
"	J. Masters.
"	D. C. Misra.
"	Prakash Chand.
"	L. Sawhny.
"	Sayed Ghawas.
"	Sultan Ali Shah.
"	R. H. Tobin.

## II.—The Journal

The Institution publishes a Quarterly Journal in the months of January, April, July and October, which is issued postage-free to members in any part of the world. Non-members may obtain the Journal at Rs. 2, annas 8 per copy, or Rs. 10 per annum. Advertisement rates may be obtained on application to the Secretary.

## III.—Contributions to the Journal

Articles may vary in length from two thousand to ten thousand words. They should be submitted in duplicate and typewritten on one side of the paper. Manuscript articles cannot be considered. Payment is made on publication at from Rs. 40 to Rs. 100 in accordance with the value and length of the contribution.

With reference to Regulations for the Army in India, paragraph 204 and King's Regulations, paragraph 535, action to obtain the sanction of

His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to the publication of any article in the Journal of the United Service Institution of India will be taken by the Executive Committee of the Institution.

The Committee reserve to themselves the right to omit any matter which they consider objectionable.

Articles are only accepted on these conditions.

#### IV.—Reading Room and Library

The United Service Institution of India is situated in the Mall, Simla, and is open all the year round—including Sundays—from 9 a.m. until sunset. The Reading Room of the Institution is provided with most of the leading illustrated papers, newspapers, magazines and journals of military, naval and service interest.

There is a well-stocked library in the Institution from which members can obtain books on loan free in accordance with the following rules :—

(1) The Library is only open to members and honorary members, who are requested to look upon books as not transferable to their friends.

(2) No book shall be taken from the Library without making the necessary entry in the register. Members residing permanently or temporarily in Simla are requested to enter their addresses.

(3) A member shall not be allowed, at one time, more than three books or sets of books.

(4) No particular limit is set as to the number of days for which a member may keep a book, the Council being desirous of making the Library as useful as possible to members ; but if after the expiration of a fortnight from date of issue it is required by any other member, it will be re-called.

(5) Applications for books from members at out-stations are dealt with as early as possible and books are despatched post free per Registered Parcel Post. They must be returned carefully packed per Registered Parcel Post within one month of the date of issue.

(6) If a book is not returned at the end of one month, it must be paid for if so required by the Executive Committee. Lost and defaced books shall be replaced at the cost of the member to whom they were issued. In the case of lost books which are out of print, the value shall be fixed by the Executive Committee and the amount, when received, spent in the purchase of a new book.

(7) The issue of a book under these rules to any member implies the latter's compliance with the rules and the willingness to have them enforced, if necessary, against him.

(8) The catalogue of the Library has been revised and is now available for sale at Rs. 2/8/- per copy plus postage. The Library has been completely overhauled and all books re-classified, hence the new catalogue meets the general demand for an up-to-date production containing all military classics and other works likely to be of use to members of the Institution. Members who have not yet ordered their copies are advised to send a post card to the Librarian of the Institution, Simla.

#### V.—Library Books

A list of the books received during the preceding quarter is enclosed in loose leaf form suitable for cutting into strips for pasting in the library catalogue.

The Institution is in possession of a collection of old and rare books presented by members from time to time and, while such books are not available for circulation, they can be seen by members visiting Simla.

The Secretary will be glad to acknowledge the gift of old books, trophies, medals, etc., presented to the Institution.

**VI.—Promotion Examinations**

(a) *Military History*—(reference I. A. O. 257 of 1935).

The following table shows the campaigns on which military history papers will be set for Lieutenants for promotion to Captain in sub-head *b* (iii), and for Captains for promotion to Major in sub-head *d* (iii), with a list of books recommended for the study of each :—

1 Serial No.	2 Date of Examina- tion.	3 Campaign set for first time.	4 Campaign set for second time.	5 Campaign set for last time.
1	October 1936.	..	Mesopotamia, from October 1915 to the occupation of Bagdad, 11th March 1917.	Gallipoli—inception of the campaign to May 1915.
2	March 1937.	The Russo-Japanese War, previous to the Battle of Liao- Yang until the 24th August 1904 (ex- cluding the actual siege operations at Port Arthur).	..	Mesopotamia, from October 1915 to the occupation of Bagdad, 11th March 1917.
3	October 1937.	Mesopotamia, from 12th March 1917 to the Armistice.	The Russo-Japanese War, previous to the Battle of Liao- Yang until the 24th August 1904 (ex- cluding the actual siege operations at Port Arthur).	..
4	March 1938.	..	Mesopotamia, from 12th March 1917 to the Armistice.	The Russo-Japanese War, previous to the Battle of Liao- Yang until the 24th August 1904 (ex- cluding the actual siege operations at Port Arthur).
5	October 1938.	..		Mesopotamia, from 12th March 1917 to the Armistice.

The following books are recommended for the study of the campaigns :—

Campaign.	Book.
Gallipoli .. ..	.. History of the Great War—Military Operations—Gallipoli, Vol. I.
Mesopotamia— March 1936 to March 1937.	.. History of the Great War—Military Operations—Mesopotamia, Vols. II and III (less Chapters XXXIV <i>et seq.</i> )
October 1937 to October 1938.	.. History of the Great War—Military Operations—Mesopotamia, Vols. III (Chapters XXXIV <i>et seq.</i> ) and IV.
All ..	.. A Brief Outline of the Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914—1918—Major R. Evans, M.C. ( <i>Sifton Praed</i> ).
The Russo-Japanese War	.. Official History of the Russo-Japanese War, Parts I (second edition), and II ( <i>British—Military</i> ), or Official History of the Russo-Japanese War (Naval and Military). Vol. I, Chapters 1—17 (less 4, 7, 9 and 10).

The campaigns set for Majors, R.A.M.C. and R.A.V.C., up to and including 1937 are published in I.A.O.'s 72 of 1935 and 49 of 1936.

(b) *Other Subjects.*

In addition to the manuals and regulations mentioned in K. R. and R.A.I., the following books are recommended :—

“ Modern Military Administration, Organization and Transportation ”  
(Harding-Newman).

“ Military Organization and Administration,” (Lindsell).

“ A. & Q. or Military Administration in War ” (Lindsell).

“ A Study of Unit Administration ” (Gale and Polden).

“ Military Law ” (Banning).

“ The Defence of Duffers' Drift,” 1929 (Swinton).

“ Tactical Schemes with Solutions, Series I and II ” (Kirby and Kennedy).

“ Elementary Tactics or the Art of War, British School,” Vol. I  
(Pakenham Walsh).

“ Imperial Military Geography ” (Cole).

“ Elements of Imperial Defence ” (Boycott).

“ Changing Conditions of Imperial Defence ” (Cole).

“ A Practical Digest of Military Law ” (Townshend-Stephens. Pub.  
*Sifton Praed*).

**VII.—Staff College Examination.**—[See Staff College (Quetta, Regulations, 1930, obtainable from the Manager of Publications) Delhi or Calcutta].

(a) *Campaigns.*

The following campaigns have been set for the Staff College Entrance Examination :—

Strategy of—

Napoleon's Campaign of 1796 in Italy.

Waterloo Campaign.

Peninsula Campaign, up to and including the Battle of Salamanca.

The Strategy and Broad Tactical Lessons of—

The American Civil War.

Russo-Japanese War, up to and including the Battle of Liao-Yang.

The Great War in France, Belgium, Mesopotamia, the Dardanelles and Palestine, including a knowledge of the influence on the strategy in these areas of the events in other theatres of the War.

The East Prussian Campaign, 1914.

The Strategy and tactics of—

The Palestine Campaign from 9th November 1917 to the end of the War.

The Action of the British Expeditionary Force in France and Belgium up to and including the first battle of Ypres.

The 3rd Afghan War, 1919.

(b) In addition to his official books every student is recommended to provide himself with a copy of—

(i) Military Organization and Administration (Lindsell).

Military Law (Banning).

British Strategy (Maurice).

Notes on the Land and Air Forces of British Overseas Dominions, Colonies and Protectorates (Official).

Outline of the Development of the British Army up to 1914 (Hastings & Anderson).

Imperial Military Geography (Cole).

An Atlas.

(ii) The following pamphlets, etc., can be borrowed from the Orderly Room, and should be studied :—

Examination papers for admission to the Staff College.

Training Memoranda—War Office.

Training Memoranda—A. H. Q. India.

Notes on certain Lessons of the Great War.

Passing it On (Skeen).

## (iii) Periodicals, etc., to which students should subscribe—

“The Times.”

“U. S. I. (India) Journal.”

## (iv) Books which can be obtained from libraries—

(*Note.*—Those marked with an asterisk should be used only as books of reference.)

R. U. S. I. Journal.

Army Quarterly.

Round Table.

Journal of the Institute of International Affairs.

Science of War (Henderson).

Transformation of War (Colin).

The War of Lost Opportunities (Hoffman).

\*The Principles of War (Foch).

\*The Direction of War (Bird).

Soldiers and Statesmen (Robertson).

\*Historical Illustrations to F. S. R. II (Eady).

\*In the Wake of the Tank (Martel).

\*The Re-making of Modern Armies (Liddell Hart).

\*The British Way in Warfare (Liddell Hart).

\*Napoleon's Campaign in 1796 in Italy (Burton).

\*Waterloo Campaign (Robinson).

\*Outline History of Russo-Japanese War 1904, up to Battle of Liao-Yang (Pakenham Walsh).

The Campaign of Liao-Yang (Rowan Robinson).

\*The World Crisis (Churchill).

\*A History of the Great War (Cruttwell).

The Palestine Campaign (Wavell).

A Brief Outline of the Campaign in Mesopotamia (Evans).

\*The Dardanelles Campaign (Callwell).

\*German Strategy in the Great War (Neame).

\*Official Histories of the War—France, Egypt, Palestine, Mesopotamia, Gallipoli.

\*Waziristan 1919-20 (Watteville).

\*The Third Afghan War (Official).

A. & Q. (Lindsell).

Changing conditions of Imperial Defence (Cole).

The British Empire (Lucas).

\*The Government of the British Empire (Jenks).

\*The Foundation and Growth of the British Empire  
(Williamson).

\*A Short History of British Expansion (Williamson).

\*Expansion of the British Empire (Woodward).

(v) Books and Articles on Transportation—

Railways in War. Lieutenant-Colonel E. St. G. Kirke,  
D.S.O., R.E., Army Quarterly, January 1930.

Strategic Moves by Rail, 1914. Journal R. U. S. I.,  
February and May 1935.

The Lines of Communication in the Dardanelles. Lieutenant-  
General Sir G. Macmunn. Army Quarterly, April 1930.

The Lines of Communication in Mesopotamia. Lieutenant-  
General Sir G. Macmunn. Army Quarterly, October  
1927.

History of the R. A. S. C., Vol. II (all campaigns).

The Supply and Transportation Problem of Future Armies.  
Major B. C. Denning, M.C., R.E., Journal U. S. I. India,  
April 1932.

The Supply of Mechanized Forces in the Field. Journal  
R. U. S. I., 1929.

The Board of Trade and the Fighting Services. Journal  
R. U. S. I., 1929.

Railway Organization of an Army in War. Lieutenant-  
Colonel Anderson, D.S.O., R.E., Journal R. U. S. I., 1927.

What is required of a Railway in a theatre of Operations.  
Major-General Taylor, R.E., Journal, September 1932.

F. S. P. B. War Office, 1932. Read Sections 36 to 38. Do  
not memorize detail. Know where to find it.

F. S. P. B. India.

**VIII.—Schemes, etc.**

The following papers and precis of lectures set for the A. H. Q.  
Staff College Course, 1935, are available for issue to members of  
the Institution at the nominal price of annas four per copy, plus  
postage.

## STAFF COLLEGE SERIES, 1935.

**Tactical Schemes**

D. M. T.'s Paper No. 1.

" " " 2.

" " " 3.

" " " 4 (without solution).

" " " 5.

" " " 6.

" " " 7.

" " " 8.

" " " 9.

" " " 10.

**Precis of Lectures**

1. Staff College Examination.
2. Night Operations.
3. Strategy and Tactics. Political Objects in War.
4. Strategy and Tactics. Fog in War.
5. Strategy and Tactics. Gallipoli.
6. Maintenance of Material and Animals.

**A. H. Q. STAFF COLLEGE COURSE, 1936.**

The stock of complete sets of papers referred to in the notice published with I. A. O.s, dated 18th August 1936, is exhausted, but copies of the papers detailed below may be had at two annas each, postage free.

The following maps are for use with the papers noted against them, and may be had at Rs. 2 each, postage free :

Map 1" to 1 mile Sheet 93 (for paper Nos. 30 to 43)

Map 1" to 1 mile Sheet 94 (for paper Nos. 30 to 39)

Map 1" to 1 mile Sheet 38 N/14 (for paper No. 44)

Item.	Subject.	Serial No.
Notes for officers attending Course	.. ..	1
Lecture .. Military Writing	.. ..	2
Exercise .. Message Writing	.. ..	3
Solution .. " "	.. ..	3-A
Lecture .. Operation Orders and Instructions	.. ..	4
Lecture .. Appreciations	.. ..	5
Lecture .. Contact	.. ..	6
Lecture .. Reconnaissance and Infantry Deployment Drill	.. ..	8
Lecture .. Some Hints on the Attack	.. ..	9
Lecture .. Tactical Aspect of River Crossings	.. ..	10
Lecture .. Defence	.. ..	12
Lecture .. Mechanization and Reorganization of the Army	.. ..	13
Lecture .. Withdrawal and Rearguards	.. ..	15
Lecture .. Divisional Cavalry and Armoured Cars	.. ..	17
Lecture .. Co-operation between the Army and R. A. F.	.. ..	18
Lecture .. Artillery No. 1. Characteristics and Organization	.. ..	20
Lecture .. Artillery No. 2. Attack	.. ..	21
Lecture .. Artillery No. 3. Divisional Artillery, Defence and Withdrawal	.. ..	22
Lecture .. The Mobile Division	.. ..	26
Lecture .. Signals. Characteristics, Organization and Employment	.. ..	27
Lecture .. Frontier Warfare	.. ..	28
Exercise .. March Orders	.. ..	30
Solution .. " "	.. ..	31
Exercise .. Appreciation	.. ..	32
Solution .. " "	.. ..	33
Exercise .. Attack	.. ..	34
Solution .. " "	.. ..	35
Exercise .. Defence	.. ..	36
Solution .. " "	.. ..	37
Exercise .. Withdrawal	.. ..	38
Solution .. " "	.. ..	39
Paper .. Strategy and Tactics No. 1	.. ..	40
Solution .. " " " " No. 1	.. ..	41
Paper .. " " " " No. 2	.. ..	42
Solution .. " " " " No. 2	.. ..	43
Paper .. " " " " No. 3	.. ..	44
Solution .. " " " " No. 3	.. ..	45
Lecture S. & T. No. 1. British Strategy and Higher Direction of War	.. ..	46
Lecture S. & T. No. 2. Concentrations and Detachments	.. ..	47

Item	Subject	Serial No.
Lecture	.. S. & T. No. 3. Surprise and Security ..	48
Lecture	.. S. & T. No. 4. Communications; Interior and Exterior Lines; Offensive and Defensive Strategy; Fortresses ..	49
Lecture	.. S. & T. No. 5. Some Thoughts on Morale and Leadership ..	50
Lecture	.. Transportation. Nos. 1 and 2 ..	58
Paper	.. Transportation ..	60
Solution	.. "A"—Peace and War ..	61
Lecture	.. Medical Organization and the System of Evacuation of Casualties in War ..	62
Lecture	.. "Q" Services in Peace, including Arrangements for Mobilization ..	63
Lecture	.. "Q" War—In Theatre of Operations ..	64
Lecture	.. "O" Peace and War ..	65
Paper	.. Organization and Administration (Peace) ..	66
Solution	.. "No. 1. Military Law—Court Martial Procedure ..	67
Lecture	.. No. 2. " " —Offences and Charges ..	68
Lecture	.. No. 3. " " —Evidence ..	71
Paper	.. No. 1. " " ..	72
Solution	.. No. 2. " " ..	73
Paper	.. No. 1. " " ..	74
Solution	.. No. 2. " " ..	75
Paper	.. Essay No. 1. " " ..	76
Solution	.. " " ..	77
Paper	.. " " ..	78
Solution	.. " " ..	79
Paper	.. " " ..	80
Solution	.. " " ..	81
Paper	.. " " ..	82
Solution	.. " " ..	83
Paper	.. " " ..	84
Solution	.. " " ..	85
Paper	.. " " ..	86
Solution	.. " " ..	87
Paper	.. " " ..	88
Solution	.. " " ..	89
Paper	.. " " ..	90
Solution	.. " " ..	91
Paper	.. " " ..	92
Solution	.. " " ..	93
Paper	.. " " ..	94
Solution	.. " " ..	95

**IX.—Historical Research**

The U. S. I. is prepared to supply members and units with typewritten copies of old Indian Army List pages, at the rate of Rs. 2 per typewritten page.

The staff of the Institution is always willing to assist units, authors of regimental histories and members by searching the many old military records in the Library on their behalf.

**X.—The MacGregor Memorial Medal**

1. The MacGregor Memorial Medal was founded in 1888 as a memorial to the late Major-General Sir Charles MacGregor. The medals are awarded for the best military reconnaissances or journeys of exploration of the year.

2. The following awards are made annually in the month of June :

(a) For officers—British or Indian—silver medal.

(b) For soldiers—British or Indian—silver medal with Rs. 100 gratuity.

3. For especially valuable work, a gold medal may be awarded in place of one of the silver medals, or in addition to the silver medals, whenever the administrators of the Fund deem it desirable. Also the Council may award a special additional silver medal, without gratuity, to a soldier, for especially good work.

4. The award of medals is made by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, as Vice-Patron, and the Council of the United Service Institution, who were appointed administrators of the Fund by the MacGregor Memorial Committee.

5. Only officers and soldiers belonging to the Army in India (including those in civil employ) are eligible for the award of the medal.\*

6. The medal may be worn in uniform by Indian soldiers on ceremonial parades, suspended round the neck by the ribbon issued with the medal.†

7. Personal risk to life during the reconnaissance or exploration is not a necessary qualification for the award of the medal ; but, in the event of two journeys being of equal value, the man who has run the greater risk will be considered to have the greater claim to the reward.

8. When the work of the year has either not been of sufficient value or has been received too late for consideration before the Council Meeting, the medal may be awarded for any reconnaissance during previous years considered by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to deserve it.

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\*N.B.—The terms " officer " and " soldier " include those serving in the British and Indian armies and their reserves, also those serving in Auxiliary Forces, such as the Indian Auxiliary and Territorial Forces and Corps under Local Governments, Frontier Militia, Levies and Military Police, also all ranks serving in the Royal Air Force, Indian Air Force, Royal Indian Navy and the Indian States Forces.

†Replacements of the ribbon may be obtained on payment from the Secretary, U.S.I., Simla.

## MACGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDALISTS

*(With rank of officers and soldiers at the date of the award)*

- 1889 .. BELL, Colonel M. S., v.c., R.E. (specially awarded a gold medal).
- 1890 .. YOUNGHUSBAND, Captain F. E., King's Dragoon Guards.
- 1891 .. SAWYER, Major H. A., 45th Sikhs.  
RAMZAN KHAN, Havildar, 3rd Sikhs.
- 1892 .. VAUGHAN, Captain H. B., 7th Bengal Infantry.  
JAGGAT SINGH, Havildar, 19th Punjab Infantry.
- 1893 .. BOWER, Capt. H., 17th Bengal Cavalry (specially awarded a gold medal).  
FAZAL DAD KHAN, Dafadar, 17th Bengal Cavalry.
- 1894 .. O'SULLIVAN, Major G. H. W., R.E.  
MULL SINGH, Sowar, 6th Bengal Cavalry.
- 1895 .. DAVIES, Captain H. R., Oxfordshire Light Infantry.  
GANGA DYAL SINGH, Havildar, 2nd Rajputs.
- 1896 .. COCKERILL, Lieutenant G. K., 28th Punjab Infantry.  
GHULAM NABI, Sepoy, Q. V. O. Corps of Guides.
- 1897 .. SWAYNE, Captain E. J. F., 10th Rajput Infantry.  
SHAHZAD MIR, Dafadar, 11th Bengal Lancers.
- 1898 .. WALKER, Captain H. B., Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry.  
ADAM KHAN, Havildar, Q. V. O. Corps of Guides.
- 1899 .. DOUGLAS, Captain J. A., 2nd Bengal Lancers.  
MIHR DIN, Naik, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
- 1900 .. WINGATE, Captain A. W. S., 14th Bengal Lancers.  
GURDIT SINGH, Havildar, 45th Sikhs.
- 1901 .. BURTON, Major E. B., 17th Bengal Lancers.  
SUNDAR SINGH, Colour Havildar, 31st Burmah Infantry.
- 1902 .. RAY, Captain M. R. E., 7th Rajput Infantry.  
TILBIR BHANDARI, Havildar, 9th Gurkha Rifles.
- 1903 .. MANIFORD, Lieut.-Colonel C. C., I.M.S.  
GHULAM HUSSAIN, Lance-Dafadar, Q.V.I. Corps of Guides.
- 1904 .. FRASER, Captain L. D., R.G.A.  
MOGHAL BAZ, Dafadar, Q.V.O. Corps of Guides.
- 1905 .. RENNICK, Major F., 40th Pathans (specially awarded a gold medal).  
MADHO RAM, Havildar, 8th Gurkha Rifles.
- 1906 .. SHAHZADA AHMAD MIR, Risaldar, 36th Jacob's Horse.  
GHAFUR SHAH, Lance-Naik, Q.V.O. Corps of Guides.
- 1907 .. NANGLE, Captain M. C., 92nd Punjabis.  
SHEIKH USMAN, Havildar, 103rd Mahratta Light Infantry.
- 1908 .. GIBBON, Captain C. M., Royal Irish Fusiliers.  
MALANG, Havildar, 56th Punjab Rifles.
- 1909 .. MUHAMMAD RAZA, Havildar, 106th Pioneers.
- 1910 .. SYKES, Major P. M., C.M.G., late 2nd Dragoon Guards (specially awarded a gold medal).  
TURNER, Captain F. G., R.E.  
KHAN BAHADUR SHER JUNG, Survey of India.

## MACGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDALISTS—(contd.)

- 1911 .. LEACHMAN, Capt. G. E., The Royal Sussex Regiment.  
GURMUKH SINGH, Jemadar, 93rd Burmah Infantry.
- 1912 .. PRITCHARD, Capt. B. E. A., 83rd Wallajahabad Light  
Infantry (specially awarded a gold medal).  
WILSON, Lieut. A. T., c.m.g., 32nd Sikh Pioneers.  
MOHIBULLA, Lance-Dafadar, Q.V.O. Corps of Guides.
- 1913 .. ABBAY, Capt. B. N., 27th Light Cavalry.  
SIRDAR KHAN, Sowar, 39th (K. G. O.) Central India Horse.  
WARATONG, Havildar, Burmah Military Police (specially  
awarded a silver medal).
- 1914 .. BAILEY, Capt. F. M., I.A. (Political Department).  
MORSHEAD, Capt. H. T., R.E.  
HAIDAR ALI, Naik, 106th Hazara Pioneers.
- 1915 .. WATERFIELD, Capt. F. C., 45th Rattray's Sikhs.  
ALI JUMA, Havildar, 106th Hazara Pioneers.
- 1916 .. ABDUR RAHMAN, Naik, 21st Punjabis.  
ZARGHUN SHAH, Havildar, 58th Rifles, F.F. (specially  
awarded a silver medal).
- 1917 .. MIAN AFRAZ GUL, Sepoy, Khyber Rifles.
- 1918 .. NOEL, Capt. E. W. C. (Political Department).
- 1919 .. KEELING, Lieut.-Colonel E. H., m.c., R.E.  
ALLA SA, Jemadar, N. W. Frontier Corps.
- 1920 .. BLACKER, Capt. L. V. S., Q. V. O. Corps of Guides.  
AWAL NUR, C. Q. M. Havildar, 2nd Bn., Q. V. O. Corps of  
Guides. (Special gratuity of Rs. 200.)
- 1921 .. HOLT, Maj. A. L., Royal Engineers.  
SHER ALI, Sepoy, No. 4952, 106th Hazara Pioneers.
- 1922 .. ABDUL SAMAD SHAH, Capt., o.b.e., 31st D.C.O. Lancers.  
NUR MUHAMMAD, Lance-Naik, 1st Guides Infantry, F. F.
- 1923 .. BRUCE, Capt. J. G., 2/6th Gurkha Rifles.  
SOHBAT, Head-Constable, N. W. F. Police.  
HARI SINGH THAPA, Survey Department (specially award-  
ed a silver medal).
- 1924 .. RAHMAT SHAH, Havildar, I.D.S.M., N. W. F. Corps.  
GHULAM HUSSAIN, Naik, N. W. F. Corps.
- 1925 .. SPEAR, Capt. C. R., 5/13th Frontier Force Rifles.  
JABBAR KHAN, Naik, 5/13th Frontier Force Rifles.
- 1926 .. HARVEY-KELLY, Maj. C. H. G. H., d.s.o., 4/10th Baluch  
Regiment.
- 1927 .. LAKE, Maj. M. C., 4/4th Bombay Grenadiers.
- 1928 .. BOWERMAN, Capt. J. F., 4/10th D. C. O. Baluch Regiment.  
MUHAMMAD KHAN, Havildar, Zhob Levy Corps.
- 1929 .. ABDUL HANAN, Naik, N. W. F. Corps.  
GHULAM ALI, Dafadar, Guides Cavalry (specially awarded  
a silver medal).
- 1930 .. GREEN, Capt. J. H., 3/20th Burmah Rifles.
- 1931 .. O'CONNOR, Capt. R. L., 1/9th Jat Regiment.  
KHIAL BADSHAH, Naik, 1/13th Frontier Force Rifles.

## MACGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDALISTS—(concl'd.)

- 1932 .. BIRNIE, Capt. E. St. J., Sam Browne's Cavalry.  
SHIB SINGH NEGI, No. 4013, Rifleman, 10/18th Royal  
Garhwal Rifles.
- 1933 .. ABDUL GHAFUR, Havildar, K. G. O. Bengal Sappers and  
Miners.
- 1934 .. No award.
- 1935 .. FERGUSSON, Lt. K. A. P., R.A.  
BOSTOCK, Lt. T. M. T., R.E.
- 1936 .. ANGWIN, Capt. J. B. P., R.E.  
MUHAMMAD ISHAQ, No. 8372, Lance-Naik, 2/15th Punjab  
Regiment.

## UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA.

## PRIZE ESSAY GOLD MEDALISTS.

*(With Rank of Officers at the date of the Essay.)*

- 1872 .. ROBERTS, Lt.-Col. F. S., V.C., C.B., R.A.
- 1873 .. COLQUHOUN, Capt. J. S., R.A.
- 1874 .. COLQUHOUN, Capt. J. S., R.A.
- 1879 .. ST. JOHN, Maj. O. B. C., R.E.
- 1880 .. BARROW, Lieut. E. G., 7th Bengal Infantry.
- 1882 .. MASON, Lieut. A. H., R.E.
- 1883 .. COLLEN, Maj. E. H. H., S.C.
- 1884 .. BARROW, Capt. E. G., 7th Bengal Infantry.
- 1887 .. YATE, Lieut. A. C., 27th Baluch Infantry.
- 1888 .. MAUDE, Capt. F. N., R.E.  
YOUNG, Maj. G. F., 24th Punjab Infantry (specially  
awarded a silver medal).
- 1889 .. DUFF, Capt. B., 9th Bengal Infantry.
- 1890 .. MAGUIRE, Capt. C. M., 2nd Cavy., Hyderabad Contingent.
- 1891 .. CARDEW, Lieut. F. G., 10th Bengal Lancers.
- 1893 .. BULLOCK, Maj. G. M., Devonshire Regiment.
- 1894 .. CARTER, Capt. F. C., Northumberland Fusiliers.
- 1895 .. NEVILLE, Lt.-Col. J. P. C., 14th Bengal Lancers.
- 1896 .. BINGLEY, Capt. A. H., 7th Bengal Infantry.
- 1897 .. NAPIER, Capt. G. S. F., Oxfordshire Light Infantry.
- 1898 .. MULLALLY, Maj. H., R.E.  
CLAY, Capt. C. H., 43rd Gurkha Rifles (specially awarded a  
silver medal).
- 1899 .. NEVILLE, Col. J. P. C., S.E.
- 1900 .. THUILLIER, Capt. H. F., R.E.  
LUBBOCK, Capt. G., R.E. (specially awarded a silver  
medal).
- 1901 .. RANKEN, Lt.-Col. G. P. P., 46th Punjab Infantry.
- 1902 .. TURNER, Capt. H. H. F., 2nd Bengal Lancers.
- 1903 .. HAMILTON, Maj. W. G., D.S.O., Norfolk Regiment.  
BOND, Capt. R. F. G., R.E. (specially awarded silver  
medal).

## PRIZE ESSAY GOLD MEDALISTS—(concl'd.)

- 1904 .. MACMUNN, Maj. G. F., D.S.O., R.F.A.  
1905 .. COCKERILL, Maj. G. K., Royal Warwickshire Regiment.  
1907 .. WOOD, Maj. E. J. M., 99th Deccan Infantry.  
1908 .. JEUDWINE, Maj. H. S., R.A.  
1909 .. MOLYNEUX, Maj. E. M. J., D.S.O., 12th Cavalry.  
ELSMIE, Maj. A. M. S., 56th Rifles, F. F. (specially  
awarded a silver medal).  
1911 .. Mr. D. PETRIE, M.A., Punjab Police.  
1912 .. CARTER, Maj. B. C., The King's Regiment.  
1913 .. THOMSON, Maj. A. G., 58th Vaughan's Rifles (F. F.).  
1914 .. BAINBRIDGE, Col. W. F., D.S.O., 31st Sikhs (F. F.).  
NORMAN, Maj. C. L., M.V.O., Q. V. O., Corps of Guides  
(specially awarded a silver medal).  
1916 .. CRUM, Maj. W. E., V.D., Calcutta Light Horse.  
1917 .. BLAKER, Maj. W. F., R.F.A.  
1918 .. GOMPERTZ, Capt. A. B., M.C., R.E.  
1919 .. GOMPERTZ, Capt. M. L. A., 108th Infantry.  
1920 .. KEEN, Lt.-Col. F. S., D.S.O., 2/15th Sikhs.  
1922 .. MARTIN, Maj. H. G., D.S.O., O.B.E., R.F.A.  
1923 .. KEEN, Col. F. S., D.S.O., I.A.  
1926 .. DENNYS, Maj. L. E., M.C., 4/12th Frontier Force Regiment.  
1927 .. HOGG, Maj. D. McA., M.C., R.E.  
1928 .. FRANKS, Maj. K. F., D.S.O., 5th Royal Mahrattas.  
1929 .. DENNYS, Maj. L. E., M.C., 4/12th Frontier Force Regiment.  
1930 .. DURNFORD, Maj. C. M. P., 4/6th Rajputana Rifles.  
1931 .. FORD, Lt.-Col. G. N., 2/5th Mahratta Light Infantry.  
1932 .. THURBURN, Lt. R. G., The Cameronians (Scottish Rifles).  
1933 .. Medal not awarded.  
1934 .. DURNFORD, Maj. C. M. P., 4/6th Rajputana Rifles.  
1935 .. Medal not awarded.  
1936 .. Medal not awarded.
-

## GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION, 1936

Two essays, bearing the following mottoes, were received in the Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition for 1936 :

1. "Onward."
2. "Mark Time or Forward."

The Council of the Institution consider that neither of the essays is of a standard sufficiently high to justify an award.

\* \* \* \* \*

## GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION, 1937

The Council has chosen the following subjects for the Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition for 1937 :

- (i) "It has been stated that the Defence of India and of Burma is, from the strategic aspect, a single problem.

Discuss the truth of this statement, taking as the basis of your argument the threats which exist to the security of both countries in the world conditions of to-day ; "

or, as an alternative subject,


- (ii) "Mr. Baldwin has said that 'The Rhine is our Frontier.' Discuss this."

The following are the conditions of the competition :

- (1) The competition is open to all gazetted officers of the Civil Administration, the Royal Navy, Army, Royal Air Force, Auxiliary Forces and Indian States Forces.
- (2) Essays must be typewritten and submitted in triplicate.
- (3) When reference is made to any work, the title of such work is to be quoted.
- (4) Essays are to be strictly anonymous. Each must have a motto, and, enclosed with the essay, there should be sent a sealed envelope with the motto written on the outside and the name of the competitor inside.
- (5) Essays will not be accepted unless received by the Secretary on or before the 30th June 1937.

- (6) Essays will be submitted for adjudication to three judges, chosen by the Council. The judges may recommend a money award, not exceeding Rs. 150, either in addition to, or in substitution for, the medal. The decision of the three judges will be submitted to the Council, who will decide whether the medal is to be awarded and whether the essay is to be published.
- (7) The name of the successful candidate will be announced at a Council Meeting to be held in September or October 1937.
- (8) All essays submitted are to become the property of the United Service Institution of India absolutely, and authors will not be at liberty to make any use whatsoever of their essays without the sanction of the Council.
- (9) Essays should not exceed 15 pages of the size and style of the Journal, exclusive of any appendices, tables or maps.

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**1937**

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Castalia	..	Feb.	27	Britannia	..	July	31
Britannia	..	Mar.	11	Castalia	..	Sept.	24
<b>Tuscania</b>	..	<b>Mar.</b>	<b>25</b>	Elysia	..	Oct.	16
Elysia	..	Mar.	31	Britannia	..	Oct.	21
<b>California</b>	..	<b>Apl.</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>California</b>	..	<b>Oct.</b>	<b>28</b>
Britannia	..	May	20	<b>Tuscania</b>	..	<b>Nov.</b>	<b>11</b>
Castalia	..	June	12				

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